The Scope of Material Integrity

We set forth first the principal ecclesiastical documents which pertain here. Moreover, the Council of Trent says this: "For it is established that priests could not have exercised this judgment with the case unknown, nor indeed could they have preserved equity in imposing punishments, if they had declared their sins only in genus and not rather in species and individually. From these things it is gathered that all mortal sins must be recounted by penitents in confession... even if they are most hidden, and committed only against the last two precepts." Besides: "It is further gathered that those circumstances must also be explained in confession which change the species of sin, because without them the sins themselves are neither integrally exposed by penitents nor made known to the judges, and it cannot happen that they can judge rightly concerning the gravity of the crimes and impose on those penitents the punishment which is fitting."¹ Finally: "If anyone shall say that in the sacrament of Penance for the remission of sins it is not necessary by divine right to confess all and individual mortal sins... even hidden ones, and those which are against the last two precepts of the Decalogue, and circumstances which change the species of sin... let him be anathema."² Canon 901 teaches the same: one who after Baptism has perpetrated mortal sins which have not yet been directly remitted through the keys of the Church must confess all of which, after diligent discussion of himself, he has consciousness, and explain in confession the circumstances which change the species of sin.

With these things set forth, we conclude:

¹ Session 14, chapter 5.

² At the cited place; session 14, chapter 5, canon 7.

I. Mortal sins committed after Baptism and not yet directly remitted must be confessed. This follows from the cited documents.

Disputation 1. Whether a sin must be confessed: a) in doubt whether it was committed; b) in doubt whether it was grave.

Response 1. One who opines either that a sin was committed or that the sin which was committed was grave is bound to confess it. For according to the Council of Trent¹ and canon 901 penitents must confess mortal sins "of which, after diligent discussion of themselves, they have consciousness." But one who opines that he sinned has in some way consciousness or knowledge of the sin committed (t. I, n. 215). It is added that each person is bound to observe a law if he opines that the fact founding the law has taken place (t. I, nn. 232 and 233 at the end). But one who opines that he has sinned gravely opines that the fact, that is, sin, founding the law, namely of confessing, has taken place. Finally, one who opines that he has sinned gravely opines that he is liable to the ordinary means for obtaining remission of sin, that is, to the sacrament of Penance. But one who opines in this way seems to be bound to apply that means, with liberty excluded of using only the supplying means, that is, perfect contrition or charity.

Response 2. One who strictly doubts is bound in this way:

1. If he strictly doubts about the commission of sin, he is not bound to confess it. For, as we just noted, the Council of Trent and canon 901 teach that mortal sins of which consciousness is had must be confessed, so that a further obligation should at least practically be excluded. But in strict doubt there is not consciousness or knowledge of a committed sin. The reason seems to be this: one who strictly doubts about a committed sin is only doubtfully liable to the ordinary means for obtaining remission of sin, in the case, to Penance; indeed he is only doubtfully capable of that means in relation to that sin. But such a one, sufficiently probably, is not bound to apply that means, but enjoys liberty of using either the ordinary means or the extraordinary or supplying means, that is, perfect contrition or charity. In the case, if the sin truly took place, it is not remitted independently of the sacrament of Penance.

2. If he strictly doubts about the gravity of the committed sin, these things hold:

a) One who doubts about the gravity of the matter is bound to expose his doubt to the confessor, unless he himself is versed in moral matters.

b) One who doubts about full consent in a grave sin must confess it if he has been accustomed to consent fully, because he is presumed to have consented fully. Otherwise it must be said of the fearful and scrupulous. The former are only to be exhorted to expose doubts of this kind; the latter are to be prohibited from doing so (St. Alphonsus, VI, 473-476; Istruzione e Pratica, chapter 16, n. 30).

Disputation 2. Whether grave sins committed after Baptism doubtfully validly conferred must be confessed.

Response. It seems that this must be affirmed. For first the Holy Office, to the question whether Carolus Wippermann, doubtfully validly baptized, "is to be rebaptized; and insofar as affirmatively, whether confession is to be placed before or after Baptism to be conferred under condition," to that question, I say, responded:² "The Most Holy One, after the votes of the Most Eminent Fathers had been heard, said: Carolus Ferdinandus is to be rebaptized under condition, and, after Baptism has been conferred, let him confess the sins of his past life, and let him be absolved from them under condition." Besides, the same Congregation, to the request of the bishops of England, "whether sacramental confession must be required from neo-converts in England, and whether it must be integral," responded:³ "Affirmatively, and let the decree of June 14, 1715 be given." Moreover, the Holy Office seems to signify that obligation to be universal not only by responding the same thing, but also by referring to the first response. This is confirmed by the fact that the Prefect of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide, in a response to the Archbishop of Quebec,⁴ declared that the decree of the year 1868 contains a universal law, and therefore obliges not only in England but also in other regions. Nor is it an obstacle that that response lacked explicit promulgation; for according to jurisprudence, especially that in force before the Code, it sufficed that such decisions were known.⁵ Besides, the Holy Office, in assigning the norm for reconciling heretics, seems to suppose the affirmative opinion.⁶ Next, one who certainly sinned gravely - which we now suppose to have been done by one doubtfully validly baptized after doubtful Baptism - is bound, if he can, to use at least with moral certainty some ordinary means for obtaining remission of that sin. But by receiving Baptism conditionally he uses only probably the ordinary means for obtaining remission of that sin, because that sin was probably committed after valid Baptism, and therefore probably must be remitted by Penance. Therefore it remains that he receive not only Baptism conditionally, but also conditionally Penance in relation to that sin.

Corollary I. The law explained is divine, as is clear from the intrinsic reason alleged; besides, a priori it is hard to admit that the Church has made a law of confessing sins to the confession of which Christ does not oblige.

Corollary II. What has been said about those doubtfully validly baptized must also be applied to those doubtfully baptized, since the same formal reason subsists.

Corollary III. Sins committed before the first doubtfully valid Baptism are not to be confessed; for if Baptism truly was valid, the aforesaid sins were remitted by the first Baptism; but if it was invalid, they are remitted by the second Baptism. Nor must sins committed and sacramentally declared after the first doubtfully valid Baptism be confessed again; for if the first Baptism was valid, the aforesaid sins were remitted through absolution; but if it was invalid, they will be remitted through the second Baptism.

¹ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 5.

² June 14, 1715 (Collectanea, n. 286).

³ December 17, 1868 (Collectanea, n. 1338).

⁴ July 12, 1869 (Collectanea, n. 1338, in note).

⁵ The Cardinal Secretary of the Holy Office indeed in 1898, in the customary conference of cases of conscience at St. Apollinaris, declared that the response of December 17, 1868 was not general. But the authority of the said Secretary - since he was another than the one who was secretary in 1868, and since he put forth his opinion 30 years after the decree had been issued - is not greater than another private authority. The same must be said of D'Annibale, who was Assessor of the Holy Office after the decree had been issued, and who holds the more benign opinion as probable.

⁶ July 20, 1859 (Collectanea, n. 1178); December 2, 1874 (Collectanea, n. 1426).

II. Sins to be confessed must be declared according to: 1. the lowest moral species, at least known confusedly; 2. number; 3. certain circumstances; 4. the external act; 5. the effect, as will be explained.

1. The lowest moral species, at least known confusedly. This follows from the Council of Trent,¹ which declares that sins must be declared "in species," which words in their obvious sense signify the lowest moral species. The reason is clear from what has been said about the necessity of integrity (n. 317). It is said:

a) Moral species; since it is not necessary to declare the physical species, so that one who has stolen, for example, 100 florins and a cow satisfies by confessing that he committed two grave thefts.

b) Lowest species, so that it does not suffice to confess, for example, the proximate genus of the sin, for instance by declaring: "I committed a sin of lust" or "of lust against nature."

c) At least known confusedly; for a species wholly unknown is not contracted.

Question. What must one confess who knows that he has sinned gravely but does not remember the lowest species?

Response. He is bound to confess the sin according to its generic aspect; for one who cannot integrally satisfy the precept is bound to satisfy it insofar as he can do that, unless the reason of the precept is not found in the defective fulfillment (St. Alphonsus, VI, 480).

2. Number. For the Council of Trent² declares that sins must be confessed "individually." For the rest, this is elicited also from the fact that all mortal sins must be confessed (n. 319; canon 901), which does not take place if the number is not assigned. Moreover:

a) If the true number is established, this must be declared.

b) If the true number is not established, but some number is established, for example, if someone certainly sinned eight times but doubts whether he sinned more often, say twelve times, let him either confess only the certain number or declare a truly approximate number, adding "about" or "more or less," saying, for example, in the case alleged, "about ten times I committed this or that sin." Now by an approximate number a moderate excess is comprehended, but not a notable one. And the greater the number expressed, the greater the excess comprehended. Thus, for example, by saying "three times more or less," up to 4 can be understood; by saying "ten times more or less," up to 12; by saying "thirty times more or less," up to 33; by saying "a hundred times more or less," up to 105 (St. Alphonsus, VI, 466).

c) If not even an approximate number can be assigned, let the habit of sinning be declared, the time through which it persevered, and, as far as possible, the frequency of falls in a day, week, or month (St. Alphonsus, VI, 466). But if not even that can be done at all, or not without great danger of erring, it suffices, after the time of the habit has been declared, to add that he sinned "as often as the occasion was given" or "as often as that desire occurred" (St. Alphonsus, VI, 466). Hence a prostitute commonly satisfies by declaring that she was given over to prostitution for such a time, and that as often as there was occasion she afforded the use of her body both to married and unmarried men. Nevertheless, she should determine more exactly the number of less usual species, if they occurred, for instance sins committed with clerics. Indeed, if she can, she must manifest the number more accurately. One who is accustomed to desire any women he meets satisfies by declaring that habit and the time through which he persists in it; let him add whether often married women, whether sometimes relatives, or sacred persons. One who is accustomed on any occasion to speak about shameful matters likewise satisfies by manifesting the time of a habit of this kind.

Corollary. One who has confessed an approximate number, adding "more or less" or "about," is not bound to supplement if afterward he certainly learns of a moderate excess above the number expressed. The reason is that the sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of a judgment to be exercised in a human way. But, considering the human manner of proceeding, in the case posited the case to be judged seems to have been so declared and judged that, if the penitent proceeded in good faith, the obligation of supplementing seems to be denied (St. Alphonsus, VI, 466). For the same reason the same seems to be said of one who, having confessed more generally and confusedly, afterward remembers the number more distinctly, unless afterward so great a multitude of sins comes to mind that they were not comprehended in the general and confused confession. Finally, it is clear that one who in good faith manifested too great a number is not bound to confess again, since the true number was included in the greater.

Question. Whether one who by one physical act committed several sins numerically, for instance by killing three men by one act, can confess thus: "I killed three men."

Response. It seems this must be affirmed, because he truly confesses the number of sins.

Objection. In the case posited the confessor is led into error as regards the number of acts; which is opposed to integrity.

Response. The confessor is led into error as regards the number of physical acts, let that pass; as regards the number of sins or malices, I deny it; namely, that act, physically one, is morally threefold. But an error induced as regards the number of physical acts is not opposed to integrity.

3. Circumstances of sin. The following must be declared:

a) A circumstance changing the theological species, as it is called, that is, one which makes a venial sin mortal or conversely; at least insofar as this is required lest the confessor take as light what was grave, or as grave what was light. Hence, for example, the circumstance of grave matter in theft must be declared, and the circumstance of half-full consent in an act gravely evil, if the penitent - to which in the case he is not bound - wishes to confess the consent.

b) A circumstance adding a new species of grave sin, or, to use the terminology of the Council of Trent³ and of the Code (canon 901), changing the species of sin, as if someone were to kill a sacred person. Thus the Council of Trent at the cited place and the cited canon of the Code; and it follows from what has been said about the obligation of confessing sins according to the lowest species.

Question. Whether one who by one physical act committed several sins in species, for instance if one bound by a vow of chastity pollutes himself, can confess thus: "I gravely transgressed a vow and perpetrated pollution."

Response. It seems this must be affirmed, provided he truly declares the lowest species, as in the example alleged; for nothing seems lacking to integrity. But if it is objected that the circumstance of the sin must be declared which changes its species or which adds a new species to it, whereas in the case the sin against the vow is not declared as a circumstance of the sin of lust, I respond that by objecting in this way one insists too much, as it seems, on the letter of the law.

c) Circumstances about which the confessor asks, so that he may judge better concerning the disposition and obligations of the penitent, and which especially regard habit, relapse, and proximate occasions. Hence Innocent XI condemned proposition 58: "We are not bound, when the confessor asks, to confess the habit of some sin."⁴

d) Accidentally, the circumstances must be declared on which a censure or reservation of sin depends.

Question. Whether a circumstance which notably aggravates a grave sin in the same species must be declared. I said notably, because no one teaches that a lightly aggravating circumstance must be manifested.

Response. Some affirm simply; others affirm as regards the circumstance "what," or of the object, or which regards the quantity of the thing, as in excessive theft, in incest in a very near degree. Others deny absolutely; with St. Alphonsus (VI, 468) we hold this opinion as sufficiently probable. For: 1. the Council of Trent,⁵ as also canon 901, speaks only of circumstances changing the species, so that a further obligation seems at least practically to be excluded; 2. a further obligation would impose a nearly intolerable burden and would be a source of scruples and difficulties. St. Antoninus,⁶ St. Bonaventure,⁷ St. Thomas, as it seems (4, distinction 16, question 3, article 2, solution 5; opusculum 12 to the reader of Besancon), and all more recent authors also adhere to the more benign opinion.

Corollary. Let the confessor generally not inquire into aggravating circumstances, but let him permit the faithful, for the tranquility of conscience, to manifest them. I said generally; for: 1. as regards sins against chastity, not only should he not inquire into circumstances not to be exposed, but generally he should also advise penitents not to expose anything besides that which must be exposed; 2. as regards sins of injustice, he should for the most part inquire into the gravity of the thing taken or of the damage inflicted, both because the faithful often do not know what matter is grave, and so that he can judge about the obligation of restoring and can teach the faithful about it.

4. External act, whether committed, as fornication, or omitted, as omission of Mass. Moreover, an external act which completes the internal act in the character of sin must be declared; for it comes under the name of sin and in reality is contrary to the law. But of itself an external act which is merely the manifestation of a sin that is properly internal, for example of heresy, need not be declared. Except if it introduces a new species, for example of scandal, or if a censure or reservation of sin depends on it (St. Alphonsus, V, 42).

5. Effect. The discussion concerns grave effects which were foreseen in the cause and either intended or permitted without sufficient reason. Effects of this kind can be, for example, blasphemies uttered in drunkenness, pollution, the death of an enemy following from the giving of poison, etc. Now:

a) The effect must be declared: 1. if the confessor asks about it so that he may judge better concerning the obligation of the penitent; 2. accidentally, if a censure or reservation of sin depends on it. Otherwise:

b) The effect need not be declared if the evil will was sincerely retracted before the event; for when that has been retracted, there is no source from which true morality can accrue to the effect, so that it cannot come under the name of sin (tom. I, n. 10). If the evil will has not been retracted, it is disputed. Moreover, it seems it must be said thus: the effect must be declared which is the complement or consummation of the internal sin, or the external execution, as foreseen blasphemies uttered in drunkenness. The reason is that an effect of this kind, as an act infected by the malice of the will (t. I, n. 60), comes under the name of sin (St. Alphonsus, IV, 149; V, 10). Otherwise it must be said of an effect which cannot be called the consummation or external execution of the internal sin, as the death of an enemy following from the giving of poison.

Question 1. Whether one satisfies integrity who declares a sin not yet confessed as confessed.

Response. It seems this must be wholly denied, because by declaring necessary matter as free, he does not subject it to the judgment of the confessor, but only to repeated absolution, or at least deceives the confessor as regards the obligation of judging the sin; and that deception is grave. Namely, necessary matter must be subjected to the judgment of the confessor and judged by him, because judgment concerning it has not yet taken place; free matter is only subjected again to absolution, although it is licit to subject it to judgment again.

Question 2. Whether one satisfies integrity who, with the confessor aware, for example in a general confession, omits to distinguish between sins confessed and not confessed.

Response. Affirmatively, because it is licit to subject sins already confessed together with those not yet confessed again to the judgment of the confessor, and not only to absolution, as happens if the whole confession is made concerning free matter. In the case, however, the confessor must judge concerning each sin, and therefore also investigate the species and number of old sins, namely lest some sin which has not yet been judged be left unjudged.

Question 3. Whether one satisfies integrity who declares a confessed sin as not yet confessed.

Response. Affirmatively, because it is licit to submit free matter again to the judgment of the confessor. Nevertheless he would commit a lie and a light sacrilege, and so would sin venially (n. 324).

Question 4. Whether one satisfies integrity who falsely declares the time of the committed sin, for instance by declaring a sin recently committed as committed long ago.

Response. Some deny this, because an act recently posited is not an act posited long ago, so that in the case the act posited is not declared. But it seems this must be affirmed, provided he does not proceed for this reason, that he confesses a not-yet-confessed sin as confessed. The reason is that the act is declared primarily as posited, so that it is undeservedly said that the act posited is not declared. I said "provided he does not proceed for this reason, that he confesses a not-yet-confessed sin as confessed"; this he would do if he accused himself of a sin not yet confessed in this way: "Besides, I accuse myself of this or that sin of my past life." Besides, a penitent rightly questioned about the time is bound to open the truth.

Corollary. The penitent has satisfied the precept of integrity only when he has exposed his sins in such a way that he can prudently judge that the confessor sufficiently perceived the things to be exposed. Hence: 1. one who notices that certain grave matters were either not heard by the confessor or were wrongly understood is bound to supplement; 2. a fortiori he is bound to this, indeed he confesses sacrilegiously, who deliberately chooses a somewhat deaf confessor lest the things to be exposed be duly perceived. On the other hand, however, the penitent can presume that the confessor sufficiently perceived the things exposed, until the contrary is established.

¹ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 5.

² Session 14, chapter 5.

³ Session 14, chapter 5.

⁴ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1208.

⁵ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 5.

⁶ Summa Theologica, part 3, title 14, chapter 19, § 7.

⁷ 4, distinction 17, part 3, article, question 3.

III. One who culpably did not satisfy integrity is bound as is explained in n. 332 sq. One who inculpably did not satisfy is bound to supplement, and indeed in the first following confession, because every confession of itself must be materially integral. Nevertheless, it is not required that confession therefore be anticipated, nor that meanwhile he abstain from the Holy Eucharist (n. 179).

Question 1. Whether one who confessed a sin as doubtful, and afterward recognizes it as certain, is bound to repeat it as certain.

Response. Most more recent authors deny this; but with the older authors and St. Alphonsus (VI, 478), it seems this must be affirmed. The reason is that the declaration of the case which is to be judged as doubtfully existing, and likewise the judgment resting on a declaration of this kind, were notably defective; this seems clear of itself, and is confirmed by the fact that that declaration and judgment did not suffice for imposing a fitting penance, that is, a grave one; for in doubt whether someone sinned gravely, a grave penance is not to be imposed.

Objection 1. One who confessed, for example, "I did that about ten times," and afterward certainly knew that he had sinned eleven times, is not bound to confess that eleventh sin again. But there is complete parity with the case just discussed.

Response. I distinguish the minor: the prior case, namely of a moderate doubtful excess, is equal to the case just discussed if the doubtful excess is considered in itself, I concede; if it is considered as part of the whole case to be judged, I deny. For the human manner in which one must proceed also in sacramental judgment brings with it that one who in good faith declared, for example, that he consented to an evil desire about ten times, is immune from the obligation of supplementing, even if afterward he knows that he consented eleven times; but the same cannot with equal right be said of one who consented once and declared it as doubtful. In conformity with this doctrine, the former according to common estimation is said to have confessed morally integrally; not so the latter (St. Alphonsus, at the cited place).

Objection 2. There is no obligation of confessing what has already been directly remitted. But the sin of which we speak has already been directly remitted.

Response. There is no obligation of confessing what has already been directly remitted if it has also been rightly declared, I concede; otherwise I deny. But the sin of which we speak was not rightly declared. Nor, in order to reject the distinction, should you appeal to canon 901, since it is not judged to settle a controversy among theologians about divine law.¹

Objection 3. It suffices to have declared the sin as it was in conscience; which took place in the case posited.

Response. It suffices to have declared the sin as it was in a right conscience, I concede; as it was in a very defective conscience, so that a sufficiently right judgment about the existence of the case could not be formed, I deny. But the latter took place in the case posited.

Objection 4. It suffices to have declared sins according to species, number, and circumstances as explained above; this is posited as having been done.

Response. It suffices to have declared sins according to species, etc., provided the very commission of the sin has been duly declared. But that did not take place.

Question 2. Whether one who omitted a circumstance to be declared is afterward bound to repeat the whole sin.

Response. It suffices to expose the omitted circumstance, if the sin arising from the circumstance can be explained in its lowest species without the whole sin being exposed. Hence one bound by a vow of chastity who confessed fornication but omitted the circumstance of the vow satisfies afterward by confessing that he injured the vow; otherwise the whole sin must be repeated. Thus, for example, a married person who confessed mere fornication does not satisfy afterward by adding that he inflicted a grave injury on his spouse, because by this explanation the malice of the injury contained in adultery is not sufficiently exposed.

Note. One who, after receiving absolution, confesses an omitted grave sin is to be absolved again in this very confession. As regards the penance to be imposed, what was said on p. 229 can be observed.

¹ Code of Canon Law, Preface.

IV. One who doubts whether he has confessed a grave sin, in other words, whether he has fulfilled the precept of integrity, is bound in this way:

1. If he opines that he declared the sin, he is not bound to confess it again (t. I, n. 229). Moreover, one who has diligently received the sacrament can, in doubt, commonly presume or opine that he confessed integrally.

2. If, all things considered, he strictly doubts, he is bound to declare the sin again (St. Alphonsus, VI, 477). This follows from what has been said about doubtful fulfillment of a law (t. I, n. 229). Except, however, the scrupulous, of whom in n. 327.

468. A twofold integrity is distinguished, one material, the other formal.

1. Material integrity consists in the accusation of all mortal sins which occur to the mind ⁴.

⁴ Others say that material integrity is present when in reality all the sins which have been committed are expressed. But if anything falls from memory, they teach that formal integrity is then preserved. Thus, for example, Laymann (De Poenitentia, ch. 8, no. 5), whom the Author also seems to have followed below, no. 470, II, where he attributes the defect of material integrity to forgetfulness.

2. Formal integrity consists in the accusation of all mortal sins which someone, here and now, considering the circumstances, morally can or is bound to confess.

Hence whenever material integrity is present, formal integrity also is present; but not conversely. We shall speak: 1. of the necessity of integrity; 2. of causes excusing from it.

290. A lie, or silence, in matter pertaining to confession, is grave sacrilege whenever it turns upon matter necessary for the integrity of confession, or upon dispositions necessary for absolution. It is certain.

For a lie or silence is injurious to the sacrament and destroys its efficacy: for if a mortal sin which must be declared is denied or kept silent, or it is affirmed that contrition is present when in reality it is not had, no sin is remitted, and so an injury is done both to the sacrament and to the blood of Christ from which the sacraments derive their power; - it is pernicious to the penitent himself, who is deprived of the grace of the sacrament.

It is said: a lie in matter pertaining to confession; for a lie in other matters, for example, by narrating a false history, although it is said in the sacred tribunal and while confessing, does not receive mortal gravity from that circumstance of time and place. It is added: whenever it turns upon necessary matter or dispositions; for to deny some venial sin, or a mortal sin which in no way pertains to the present confession, does not seem to be a grave sin, since of itself it does not impede the effect of the sacrament.

291. Corollaries: (A) He who accuses a recent mortal sin as an old one, not by positively lying, but by leaving the matter in doubt, for example, by making a general confession in which by design he does not distinguish mortal sins committed after the last confession from those which had been committed before, - per se satisfies the substantial integrity of confession, because the circumstance of time in this case does not change the species of the sin; besides, if the confessor does not know sufficiently, from this confused accusation, the state of the penitent, he can question him, and then the penitent is bound to answer sincerely.

I said per se; because per accidens such a way of acting would substantially vitiate the confession, if the species of the sin were not understood; if, for example, the confessor could not discern whether a shameful sin was committed before or after marriage, before or after a vow of chastity.

For the rest, such a way of acting is to be reproved, since it is opposed to perfect sincerity and can prepare a way to sacrilege.

292. (B) On the contrary, according to the common opinion, he sins gravely who confesses a mortal sin not yet accused as an old one already declared before, whether explicitly by saying: "I accuse myself of such a sin which I already declared before"; or equivalently, by using this formula: "then I accuse myself of the sins of my past life, especially of this..." For this manner of speaking is not a mental equivocation, but a true lie, by which the confessor is truly deceived in a grave matter pertaining to confession; for from this he concludes that such a grave sin is not necessary matter.

Some after Ballerini¹ contradict this, because they judge this lie to be slight, since the confessor is not deceived concerning things necessary to be known; yet they grant that he sins gravely who, burdened with one sole mortal sin, would accuse it as remitted before, because then he would deceive the confessor concerning the state of his conscience.² This reason seems to militate against their opinion; for even when other mortal sins are present, the confessor is deceived concerning a matter necessary to be known, namely the existence of one mortal sin in the conscience of the penitent. - Whence there must be no departure from the common opinion.

¹ Ballerini-Gury, note to n. 448; Bucceroni, n. 715; Genicot, n. 288.

² Genicot, n. 288.

293. (C) He who accuses venial sins to his ordinary confessor, but mortal sins to another, (a) certainly sins mortally if he obtains absolution from the venial sins before he has been absolved from the mortal sins, because he sacrilegiously receives the former absolution without due dispositions; (b) but if he is first absolved from the mortal sins and afterward from the venial sins, he per se does not sin, provided that he does this for the sake of shame or lest perhaps he be exposed to the danger of keeping back a grave sin, but not for sinning more freely. - It is said per se, because young men who act thus so that they may embrace the clerical state or a religious order,³ from which otherwise they would be barred, sin gravely per accidens: for then they deceive the confessor in a grave matter pertaining to vocation.

³ Thus Sabetti, p. 743, q. 5.

Whence in practice the confessor should not curiously inquire whether perhaps the penitent has approached another priest, but on the contrary by his whole manner of acting should show that it is in no way displeasing to him that penitents approach another confessor; indeed sometimes he should offer them the occasion of approaching outside confessors; otherwise, not a few are exposed to the danger of making sacrilegious confessions.¹

¹ Cf. Zelle, La Confession, p. 205 sq.; Brahim, De reticentia volunt. peccat., p. 73 sq.

294. (D) Per se he does not sin who disguises his voice lest he be recognized by the confessor, provided that he opens all his mortal sins; for it is not necessary that the penitent be recognized by name. Indeed it is often expedient that the confessor say nothing from which it would appear that the penitent is known to him, since not a few confess more freely to a priest by whom they think they are not known. - It is said per se, because if this is done by design by a habitual sinner or recidivist, in order to deceive the confessor and more easily extort absolution, it is a sin per accidens.

(E) The penitent is bound to respond sincerely to the confessor asking, as often as the latter legitimately asks, for example, about habit, relapse, proximate occasion, in a word, about those things without which a prudent judgment cannot be rendered. But if the question is indiscreet, for example, concerning name, country, place of dwelling, etc., the penitent is not bound to respond, since these things do not pertain to sacramental confession.

1691. Principles. I. MATERIAL integrity in confession is NECESSARY from divine precept, but not from the necessity of the Sacrament.

Thus all. The FIRST is clear: 1. From Trent, sess. 14, can. 7: "If anyone shall say that, in the Sacrament of Penance, for the remission of sins, it is not necessary by divine law to confess all and each mortal sin of which memory is had with due and diligent premeditation, even hidden sins, and those which are against the last two precepts of the Decalogue, and the circumstances which change the species of sin: let him be anathema." 2. From reason; for without such integrity, neither can sacramental judgment rightly be exercised, nor equity be preserved in establishing punishments.²³ The SECOND is proved from these words of the same Council (sess. 14, cap. 5): "The other sins which do not occur to one thinking diligently are understood to be included in the same confession in general." From this declaration it is clear that formal integrity sometimes suffices, and material integrity is not always required (cf. n. 1697).

From these things you will deduce: 1. Since the precept of material integrity is positive, it sometimes admits excusing causes, and to it, as to other positive precepts, that general rule can be applied: "A doubtful law does not oblige." 2. Nevertheless accidentally, or indirectly, material integrity is also required for the value of the Sacrament, as often namely as it can be had physically and morally. The reason is that transgression of the precept, when it becomes voluntary and culpable, also takes away formal integrity, and thus redounds into an essential defect and renders the confession invalid and sacrilegious.

1692. II. In order that confession be materially integral, there MUST BE EXPRESSED the species and number of all mortal sins, the circumstances changing the species, the external act of sin, and the morally evil effect of sin. This is clear from the praised words of Trent and from other arguments to be expounded below.²⁴

We said, 1. species, namely the lowest species, such as is set forth in the Treatise on Sins (n. 324); otherwise mortal sins would not be declared as they are, since not all agree in one genus of malice. Hence the 25th proposition was condemned by Alexander VII: "He who has had intercourse with an unmarried woman satisfies the precept of confession by saying: I committed with an unmarried woman a grave sin against chastity, without explaining intercourse."

But he who cannot reveal the lowest species

is bound to reveal the superior, or generic, species; for example if someone knows that he sinned against chastity, but does not remember the specific sin, he is bound to say that he gravely offended against chastity. Likewise, he who knows that he sinned mortally, but is ignorant even of the generic species of the sin, ought to say that he sinned gravely, but does not remember of what sin he is guilty.

We said, 2. number; for the Council says that individual sins are to be confessed. Therefore, if a certain number can be had, it must be indicated so that it is neither increased nor diminished. - If a certain number cannot be had, the more likely number must be indicated, with this word added: about. If the more likely cannot be had, it suffices to say about how often the sin was committed in a day, in a week, in a month, or even in a year. - But if even this cannot be indicated, at least it must be said whether consent was always given, and whether the temptation or occasion of such sin often occurred.¹ (cf. n. 1705.)

But it must be noted: 1. He who, after a confession made in good faith, discovers that the true number is greater than the approximate one which he denoted with the particle about, is not bound to confess the true number again as often as it was contained in the approximate one. But this is to be judged from the arbitration of the prudent. Behold the NORM which St. Alphonsus hands down:² "About three, understand two or four; about 10, understand 8 or 12; about thirty, 27 or 33; about one hundred, 95 or 105; about one thousand, 950 or 1050." From this general norm you will conclude that the included number increases the more, the greater the number denoted by the particle about has been. 2. He who discovers that the number is less is not bound to retract himself, both because by exaggerating the number in good faith he did not sin, and because thus he harmed no one except himself alone. 3. He who expressed a certain number without the particle about, saying for example, I blasphemed three times, and afterward remembers that he blasphemed four times, is bound to declare this omitted time, because it was not included in the accusation.

We said, 3. circumstances changing the species; for it is of faith that these also must be declared with the number and species of sins, as is clear from Trent (loc. cit.); and the reason is that they constitute a special malice. Understand this if the malice of a diverse species which the circumstance induces is grave; for if it is light, for example the light irreverence of one who in church steals another's book, it is not necessary to express it in confession, as is established concerning venials.

And this same thing must be said of those circumstances which are called general, such as ingratitude toward God, disobedience, sloth, etc.; for from the very fact that they are general and common to any mortal sin, they are already understood of themselves. It is otherwise, however, if they were formally and reflexively intended.³ (cf. n. 180, q. 2, and n. 302.)

We said, 4. the external act of sin; because it perfects the internal act and differs from it morally; hence, without declaration of the external act, for example fornication, the confession of sin would not be integral.⁴ - Besides, without declaration of the external act the confessor could not, for the most part, discharge his office as is fitting concerning absolution to be granted or deferred, admonitions to be given, etc. This is also clear from the universal custom of the faithful, which explains the law in this sense (cf. n. 328).

We said, 5. and the morally evil effect, namely one which followed from a cause advertently placed and not retracted. Thus, for example, he who inflicted a lethal wound from which death followed must say: I committed homicide. Likewise, he who made himself drunk, foreseeing that because of drunkenness he would omit Mass, is bound to confess both the drunkenness and the omission of the Sacrifice. The reason is that such an effect, as being evil and indirectly willed, is a sin in itself according to the truer opinion, and therefore the same reason stands for its accusation as for the accusation of the external act of sin (cf. n. 314). Exception is made if before the effect the perverse will had been retracted; because in this case the effect follows merely materially and is not morally evil; hence it is probable that the penitent is not bound to confess it.⁵ (cf. n. 322, q. 2; n. 760, q. 5; n. 796.)

These things having been explained, it remains that we weigh two questions of great moment: namely, 1. whether notably aggravating circumstances within the same species must be declared; 2. whether doubtful sins must be declared.

1693. Circumstances are called notably aggravating when they increase not lightly the malice of the sinful act within the same species, for example by reason of duration, intensity, degree, manner, time, person, place, etc.

Now, it is certain that aggravating circumstances must sometimes be declared: 1. by reason of censure or reservation, for example if theft is reserved when it reaches such a quantity, if the striking of a cleric was grave or enormous, etc.; - 2. by reason of the number of sins, and thus the circumstance of length of time through which hatred or concupiscence toward a woman endured must be declared; because, from the nature of passion, a longer space becomes a circumstance multiplying sins, as was seen in the Treatise on Sins (n. 328); - 3. by reason of necessary direction, namely when the confessor asks about custom, occasion, or even the obligation of restitution. Thus all (cf. 1689).

But, apart from a reason of this sort, which is accidental, Theologians dispute gravely on both sides whether circumstances NOTABLY AGGRAVATING must be opened necessarily and of themselves. - There are three probable opinions. - The FIRST, which Suarez, Soto, Gonet, Sanchez, Concina, etc., hold, and which the Roman Catechism with the Ritual seems to favor, affirms, saying that the same reason which obliges one to open circumstances changing the species also obliges one to open aggravating circumstances, because both notably change the judgment of the confessor. The SECOND, which Laymann, Sporer, Busenbaum, etc., hold, similarly affirms, but restricts the obligation only to those circumstances which regard the substantial integrity of the sin in the individual, as is the quantity of theft and the degree of conjunction in incest; otherwise, they say, the confessor cannot form for himself a due judgment concerning the substance of the sin. Finally the THIRD opinion, more common and more probable, absolutely denies with St. Thomas, St. Antoninus, St. Bernardine of Siena, Scotus, Navarrus, Lugo, the Salmanticenses, and not a few others. The reason is: 1. because the Council of Trent mentions no other circumstances to be opened except those which change the species of sin; therefore it seems not obscurely to intimate that their manifestation suffices for this, that the Confessor form for himself a right judgment concerning the gravity of crimes and the punishment to be imposed. For here not every equality, but only a certain equality, is required; 2. because otherwise penitents would always fluctuate among anxieties, since they could always doubt about the integrity of their confessions in determining which circumstances are, and which are not, notably aggravating; - 3. especially because no one must be obligated to observing a doubtful law, as we have often said; but the law of confessing notably aggravating circumstances is at least doubtful, since very grave Doctors dispute on both sides; therefore.⁶

Nor is it an obstacle here to say that in the matter of the Sacraments we cannot follow only probable opinions; because this proceeds when the value of the Sacrament is at issue, but otherwise concerning integrity; and as regards value, it is certain that formal integrity suffices.⁷

1694. We note: 1. Ordinarily it is expedient to open the more notable circumstances in confession; for this contributes not only to greater peace and humility of soul, but also to obtaining more abundant grace. Therefore the Christian faithful are usefully exhorted to open such circumstances generally, although they are not obligated to this. - Yet except shameful matter, in which this is very rarely expedient. Indeed the confessor would be a scandal to the penitent and would create danger for himself if, without just cause, he inquired about circumstances of this sort.

2. "Of diminishing circumstances, only those must be explained which either altogether remove malice, or make mortal into venial, as smallness of matter, indeliberation, etc., for example if on Friday, in ignorance, you had eaten meat, or which otherwise notably change the judgment of the confessor, at least as to species."⁸

It is asked: Whether the penitent must declare the number of PERSONS with whom he sinned?

Resp. No, of itself. The reason is that it suffices to declare the number of sins with their various species; but a sin does not change species from the fact that it was perpetrated with several persons. Hence, he who has fornicated with three different women, or three times with the same woman, satisfies by saying that he fornicated three times; nor is he bound to say whether they were prostitutes or others. Yet if he is in a proximate occasion of sin, for example because he sinned several times with the same person, he is bound to open such a circumstance. Thus commonly with Bonacina,⁹ Croix,¹⁰ etc.

Note. Whether the circumstance of sacred time in which a sin was committed must be manifested, see n. 580, end. - Whether the degree in incest must be manifested, see n. 786.

1695. The penitent can doubt: 1. Whether he has confessed a sin certainly committed; 2. Whether he has committed a grave sin certainly to be confessed, namely being uncertain either about the fact itself or about the gravity of the fact. Wherefore the following rules must be established:¹¹

Rule 1. If it is doubted whether a sin certainly committed has been declared in confession, it must be declared. The reason is that the certain obligation of confession possesses in this case, and therefore satisfaction is not made to it by doubtful confession. And all agree in this opinion if a negative doubt is at issue. - But if the doubt is positive, namely so that the confession of the sin is equally probable with its omission, although several deny the obligation of confession, St. Alphonsus nevertheless affirms it, relying on this reason, that satisfaction is not made to a certain obligation except by fulfillment at least morally certain.¹² (cf. n. 96 and 97.) "Nor yet do I reprove," the Blessed Doctor adds,¹³ "what those authors hand down, namely that he who was diligent in confessing his sins, if afterward, after much time has elapsed from when he perpetrated it, he doubts whether he omitted some sin, is not bound to confess, since he can believe, in that case, morally certainly that he has already confessed it. And Concina adds: 'Those who have led a right life for a longer time, although before they had been habituated in vices, if afterwards they doubt that they omitted some sin or circumstance in a general or particular confession, due diligence having preceded, the confessor ought to impose that they no more confess concerning those things, and that they never apply the mind to them.'" If scruples are at issue, see n. 1838.

Rule 2. If it is doubted whether a sin was committed, or whether it reaches mortal sin, and after due inquiry the doubt cannot be overcome: from the more probable opinion, whether the doubt is negative or even positive, from nearly equiprobable conjectures, there is not, I say, an obligation of itself of confessing such a sin. The reason is: 1. because the Council of Trent does not impose, as the adversaries suppose, the confession of sins as they are in conscience, but of sins of which penitents have consciousness, that is, certain knowledge or memory; - 2. because a certain burden is not to be imposed for a doubtful offense, nor, in doubt whether a law exists, is the obligation of the law present, as Benedict XIV wisely says.¹⁴ And this runs even if someone wished to communicate, as we have already said (n. 1548, dic. 2).¹⁵

It was said of itself, for: 1. in the article or danger of death, if someone positively doubts whether he is guilty of grave sin, "he must either elicit contrition, or receive absolution, by confessing at least other certain matter."¹⁶ - 2. In a practical doubt whether something is licit or not, the penitent must seek counsel, lest afterward he act in bad faith and sin gravely (cf. n. 42).

1696. St. Alphonsus admonishes,¹⁷ writing: 1. In practice, ordinarily speaking, it is more advisable to persuade penitents, for greater quiet of their conscience, to confess all doubtful sins, provided they are not scrupulous. 2. Those who are of a timid conscience, and for a long time have never, or only very rarely, sinned mortally, when they doubt whether they consented to a temptation, especially if they remember that, when the temptation rushed in, they resisted; or when they doubt whether they were in perfect wakefulness: these can hold as certain that they did not sin mortally, since it is morally impossible that the will, confirmed in a good purpose,

is changed without such a change becoming clearly known.

3. If sinners who from an evil habit consent to temptations doubt whether they consented, they are presumed to have consented and are bound to confess; because, if they had resisted, they would certainly remember the effort in repelling the temptation. Therefore a mere doubt about consent given or denied scarcely ever subsists (cf. n. 337, q. 3).

It is asked: Whether he who has confessed some mortal sin as DOUBTFUL is bound afterward to repeat it when he recognizes it as CERTAIN?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. If the doubt was about the existence of the fact, he is bound to repeat it, according to the very common and true opinion. And the reason is that the whole substance of the sin was not explained; for it was declared only as doubtful, although it was certainly committed. Hence Dominicus Viva writes:¹ "The negative opinion, which Father Pellizzarius followed, although it has not been condemned, nevertheless was expurgated from that codex (tr. 5, c. 3, n. 56) by the S. Congregation of the INDEX, which does not wish to tolerate it; wherefore in practice one must abstain from it."

2. If the doubt was about the quality of the sin, that is, if the penitent confessed a sin whose gravity either he himself, or the confessor, or both did not know, but afterward, having read or heard Theologians, recognized it to be mortal, he is not bound to repeat it; because no circumstance occurs which was not expressed, nor is it necessary that the confessor determinately know whether the sin which he hears is mortal or not. Thus very commonly.²

1359. - Integrity is distinguished as twofold, one material, the other formal.

1° That integrity is called material to which in reality nothing at all is lacking of those things which, speaking per se, are to be exposed, that is, of those things which of themselves constitute the necessary matter of Confession.

2° But that is formal to which nothing of the things said is lacking through grave fault of the penitent.

Hence whenever material integrity is had, formal integrity is also had; but not vice versa.

We shall speak 1° concerning the necessity of integrity; 2° concerning the causes excusing from it.

St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 6, a. 4.

529. Principle. Confession must be faithful, i.e., true and sincere, in this sense, that it be made without falsity and lying, so that the penitent confesses sins according as they are in conscience, namely certain things as certain, doubtful as doubtful, mortal as mortal, etc., and in the declaration does not fall short, as in denying or lessening sins committed, nor exceed, in exaggerating them or adding fictitious faults. Concerning this, a threefold rule can be stated:

I. To lie in confession concerning a grave thing necessarily to be declared is, from its nature, a grave pernicious lie and grave sacrilege, namely, if it is done concerning matter necessary for the integrity of confession or concerning the dispositions required for absolution, because it is in a grave matter to pervert the sacramental judgment and to deceive the judge, and thus the confession would not be integral and therefore would be void and the absolution invalid; which also would be gravely pernicious to the penitent himself.

Thus of itself he sins gravely who in confession denies a circumstance changing the species of a grave sin, - who denies a mortal sin not yet confessed, or so covers it or says it in a reduced way that it can scarcely be understood by the confessor, - who confesses a certainly mortal sin as doubtful or vice versa, - who from malice accuses himself of a grave sin not committed, - who increases the number of mortal sins unless perhaps this is done from scruple, disturbance of mind, simplicity, or ignorance, for greater security, - who expressly or equivalently confesses a recently committed sin as an old sin already previously declared (otherwise, if by the accusation this is left in doubt), - who falsely denies a habit, relapse, or occasion about which the confessor asks, or studiously avoids this declaration lest it be sought by the confessor.

II. To lie concerning a slight thing or concerning free grave matter is of itself a venial sacrilege, because this does not pervert the judgment in a grave matter, nor make the sentence void, nor render the sacrament invalid, or impede its effect. Thus he sins lightly who falsely accuses himself of a light sin which was not committed, - or denies a venial sin which was committed, - or denies a mortal sin which has already been duly accused.

Yet accidentally it could be mortal a) if the penitent falsely accused himself of a venial sin, bringing no other matter, or b) if he denied things which he is bound to say for rightly forming the judgment of the confessor or for exercising the office of physician, e.g., with respect to habit, custom, occasion, restitution to be enjoined or satisfaction, a remedy against relapse, etc., in one word, if the confessor asked about those things or about free matter as belonging to the present grave matter (cf. condemned prop. 58, by Innocent XI).¹

¹ "We are not held to confess to the confessor asking the habit of some sin."

III. To lie concerning a thing which does not pertain to confession, e.g., concerning name, age, parents, domicile, etc., or by narrating a false story, although it is said in the sacred tribunal while confessing, is not for this reason sacrilege, because it in no way perverts the sacramental judgment.

Hence the sin remains as it was before, mortal or venial; - nevertheless to mix a light lie with confession, for another reason, is a venial irreverence toward the sacrament, namely, to sin at the same time at which remission of sins is sought; but a grave lie is mortal sacrilege because it renders one indisposed for absolution.

530. Practical corollaries. - From the foregoing it is understood:

1. That he does not of himself lie nor sin, at least gravely, who does not declare a recently committed mortal sin negatively as recent, but does not distinguish new mortal sins from old remitted ones and mixes them, yet in such a way that he does not positively affirm but leaves in doubt that they have been previously remitted; e.g., one who in a general confession does not distinguish mortal sins committed since the last confession, even if he does this purposely in order to hide the time at which they were committed. For it is not a lie but an equivocal speech.

Yet accidentally the circumstance of time would have to be declared if it were necessary for removing a proximate occasion, or because of a reserved case, or if otherwise the species of sin would not be understood and thus the confessor could not render a just judgment or impose a congruent penance, e.g., he could not know whether a base sin was committed before or after marriage, before or after a vow of chastity. Hence the confessor can ask about this and then the penitent is bound to answer.

2. On the contrary, that he of himself lies and sins gravely who positively confesses a mortal sin not yet accused, committed after the last confession, as not recent, but as an old one already previously declared, whether by saying explicitly: "I accuse myself of such a sin which I already declared before," or "which I committed last year," or equivalently by using this formula: "then I accuse myself of the sins of my whole life or of my past life, especially of this..." For it is positively to deceive the confessor in a grave matter, namely, in necessary matter of confession, concerning a thing necessary to be known.

Consequently this is grave not only if other recent mortal sins were not declared and therefore the penitent was falsely thought to be in the state of grace, or if otherwise he would escape a fitting penance, or it would be unknown that he is in a proximate occasion, but of itself and generally: both because each mortal sin is a distinct and separate cause to be subjected to the keys (n. 522), and because a lie in such a case is of itself going gravely to pervert the judgment of the confessor, in the same way as adding to committed mortal sins one not committed is a grave sin. And although the circumstance of time is not of itself to be declared, nevertheless it cannot be positively excluded with falsity in an accusation to be made by precept; because the sinner, by positively excluding it, by that very fact denies that he has sinned recently, which is false, and thus accuses a sin which he did not commit before and denies the sin which he now committed.

3. That he does not of himself sin, at least gravely, who feigns that he is making a general confession and nevertheless voluntarily omits some mortal sin previously confessed; indeed, he does not sin at all if there is a just cause of withholding it.

Unless, however, that mortal sin because of some reason had to be necessarily set forth: for then he would sin gravely.

4. That he does not of himself sin who accuses venial sins to one confessor, namely the ordinary one, but mortal sins to another, extraordinary one; not indeed if he obtains absolution from venial sins before he is absolved from mortal sins (for then he sacrilegiously receives the former absolution without the due dispositions), but if first he is absolved from mortal sins, afterward from venial sins,2 provided this is done from an honorable motive, e.g., for the sake of shame, or lest perhaps he be exposed to the danger of withholding a mortal sin; but if he intends the deception of the ordinary confessor, his own glory, or something else inordinate, it is a light sin.

Yet accidentally it is gravely sinful if a grave danger is present from this, because the state of the penitent is unknown to the ordinary confessor, e.g., if the penitent acted in this way in order to sin more freely, or thus remained in a proximate occasion, or if a young person did this so that he could be admitted to religious profession or the clerical state, while otherwise because of a habit of sinning perhaps he would be kept away.

5. That he does not of himself sin gravely who simulates voice or sex or uses other means so that he may not be recognized by the confessor, provided he opens all his mortal sins; for it is not necessary that the penitent be known by name. Indeed, if there is a legitimate cause and a right intention is had, a dissimulation of this sort is not sinful.

Yet accidentally it would be a grave sin if it were done purposely by one habitual in sin or relapsed, for deceiving the confessor and more easily extorting absolution, or if in this way the species of sin were no longer understood, as if a woman simulating the male sex were to confess that an abortion had been procured, which she procured in herself.

1. Indeed according to some he could not only keep this silent from the ordinary confessor, but even say: I have not approached for fifteen days, understanding underneath: to you; but this does not seem to be admitted unless there is a sufficiently grave reason for acting thus.

531. Remarks. - 1. The aforesaid concealments of themselves and generally are not to be approved, but rather reproved, because they harm perfect sincerity.

2. The penitent is bound to answer sincerely a confessor who asks, whenever the latter asks legitimately, e.g., about habit, time, relapse, proximate occasion, in one word about those things without which a prudent judgment cannot be rendered.

3. But if the question is manifestly indiscreet, as easily happens if it concerns name, native land, place of dwelling, whether he has confessed elsewhere, etc., the penitent is not bound to answer, since these things do not regard sacramental confession; indeed, if there is a just cause, he can use restriction in his answers.

364. 6. Faithful, that is, without any lie. Concerning a lie made in confession the following things are to be noted: if someone lies about a grave matter which must necessarily be declared, he commits grave sacrilege. But to lie about some matter which does not necessarily pertain to confession is a sin according to the quality of the matter.

Thus, for example, he sins gravely who in confession denies a circumstance changing the species of a grave sin, and likewise he who speaks a grave calumny concerning his neighbor; but he who denies some venial sin committed or a mortal sin already previously remitted, or lies about indifferent matters, sins venially, at least per se. Nevertheless, every lie made in confession, even one objectively light, introduces an aggravating circumstance, since it is great irreverence toward the sacrament to sin at the same time at which remission of sins is sought.¹⁸⁰ A penitent does not per se sin against fidelity if he confesses mortal sins to an unknown confessor and afterward tells venial sins to his ordinary confessor, provided that he never receives this second absolution before he has been duly absolved from the mortal sins. In practice, however, attention must be given to the motive for which this manner is chosen. If the penitent intends the deception of his ordinary confessor, his own glory, or something else inordinate, he certainly commits a more or less grave sin; but if he acts thus from the shame with which he would be suffused because he knows the confessor familiarly, he does not sin. Therefore the confessor should never inquire curiously concerning a confession made elsewhere, nor show that it displeases him if the penitent has confessed to another priest.

There are still several other ways in which fidelity is more or less injured, for example, if someone accuses a recent sin as an old one, or if the penitent makes a general confession in which he deliberately does not distinguish sins perpetrated since the last confession from those which were committed previously. Indeed, per se the circumstance of time does not gravely violate the fidelity of confession; per accidens, however, when, namely, the confessor's right judgment concerning the present state of the penitent is thereby impeded, it is a grave violation. That such a manner of acting is always blameworthy is evident of itself; but after Lugo certain authors, such as Gury, D'Annibale, Bucceroni, and especially Noldin-Schmitt,¹⁸¹ teach that the penitent neither sins gravely nor gravely injures the fidelity of confession, although he deliberately deceives the confessor by declaring that a sin which he actually committed recently and has not yet confessed was committed a long time ago. Everyone sees that by such a manner of acting the confessor is deceived so gravely that he can no longer judge rightly concerning the present state of the penitent. Therefore the reasons adduced for this opinion seem to be specious rather than solid, and it would be most dangerous if this opinion were reduced to practice. But the fidelity of confession is injured little and not gravely if the penitent disguises his voice or employs other means lest he be recognized by the confessor. When a legitimate cause exists and a right intention is had, however, such disguise is not sinful.

The penitent is also bound to respond faithfully and sincerely to a confessor legitimately questioning him; but he can decline illegitimate questions, for example, concerning his name, country, or place of residence, by refusing an answer or by employing a broad mental restriction.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. Concina, De poenit. l. 1, diss. 4, c. 3, n. 6.

¹⁸¹ De sacr.¹⁷ III, n. 283.

A twofold integrity is distinguished, one material, the other formal. The first is situated in the accusation of all mortal sins which have been committed; but the other, namely formal, consists in the accusation of all mortal sins which someone here and now, with the circumstances considered, morally can or is bound to confess. Hence as often as material integrity is had, formal integrity is also had; but not vice versa.

I say. Although material integrity is not always required, because it is sometimes either physically or morally impossible, and God does not command impossibilities; nevertheless formal integrity is absolutely necessary by divine law. This is clear from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, chap. 5, where these things are had: "The universal Church has always understood that the entire confession of sins was instituted by the Lord, and that it exists as necessary by divine law for all fallen after Baptism; because our Lord Jesus Christ, about to ascend from earth to heaven, left priests, His own vicars, as presidents and judges, to whom all mortal crimes into which the Christian faithful have fallen are to be brought; so that, according to the power of the keys, they may pronounce the sentence of remission or retention of sins. For it is clear that priests could not have exercised this judgment, the case being unknown, ... if they had declared their sins only in general, and not rather in species and one by one. From these things it is gathered that all mortal sins of which penitents have consciousness after diligent examination of themselves must be recounted in confession, even if they are most hidden." And in can. 7 it was defined thus: "If anyone shall say that, in the sacrament of Penance, for the remission of sins it is not necessary by divine law to confess all and individual mortal sins of which memory is had with due and diligent premeditation, even hidden sins and those which are against the last two precepts of the Decalogue, and the circumstances which change the species of sin ... let him be anathema."

He who after baptism has perpetrated mortal sins, which have not yet been directly remitted through the keys of the Church, must confess all of which he has consciousness after diligent examination of himself, and explain in confession the circumstances which change the species of sin (Can. 901).

Question 1. Whether the necessity of integrity requires accusation of sins according to the lowest species? Resp. Affirmatively, altogether, because the lowest species are properly called species, and the Council of Trent speaks properly of their accusation; and consequently it does not suffice to manifest only generic species, namely that you have injured chastity or religion, but it is necessary to add all circumstances inducing a proper species. But this does not import that if someone cannot or is not bound here and now to manifest the lowest species, he is also excused from manifesting the generic species. Therefore if someone, knowing that he has sinned against chastity, cannot or is not bound here and now to say whether it was with a male or female, with an unmarried or married person, nevertheless he is bound to say that he sinned against chastity. The reason is that otherwise formal integrity would not be had.

Question 2. In what way is satisfaction to be made to integrity, when someone cannot arrive at a precise number? Resp. He who cannot remember a certain number is bound to accuse the more probable number, or the number which comes nearer to the truth, adding the particle about; because where certainty is lacking, that which is more likely must be accused. Moreover St. Alphonsus well admonishes that the confessor ought not be too anxious about inquiring into the number of sins in a customary penitent, because it is often impossible to have such a certain number. Rather, let him diligently inquire into the state of conscience, by asking whether he has sinned frequently or rarely; how many times about in a month, in a week, in a day, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 466. - Lehmkuhl, nn. 304 and 305.

Question 3. What number is judged to be comprehended in the particle "about"? Resp. This cannot be determined by an altogether certain rule; nevertheless not just any excess is comprehended, nor a notable defect, but only a moderate one, yet greater or lesser in proportion to the number expressed. Thus, however, it is established by St. Alphonsus: a moderate excess or defect will be, relative to about five sins, to add or subtract one unit on either side; relative to about ten, two; relative to twenty, three or four; relative to forty, four or five; relative to a hundred, five or six ...; and prudently in the first case the penitent will be judged to have sinned four, five, or six times; in the second, however, to have sinned eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve times; and similarly concerning the others you will resolve. Observe, however, that sometimes from the very state of the penitent the number of sins can easily be drawn out. Thus, for example, where a man accuses himself that he lived for three years in concubinage, or a woman that for six months she practiced the gain of the body, there is nothing for which the number of sins committed in that state should be inquired further. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 466.

Question 4. To what is a penitent bound who, after completing a confession in which he used the particle about, finds the exact number of sins? Resp. A distinction must be made: if the sins which he now remembers are certainly more numerous than the number accused together with the particle about, then in the next confession he must add the exceeding number, because that number was in no way manifested; otherwise he is bound to nothing. Likewise he is bound to nothing if he finds that the sins committed were fewer and he exaggerated the number in good faith. I said in good faith; for if he acted in bad faith, he committed, per se, a grave sacrilege. For although a lie uttered in confession itself, and which does not touch the necessary matter of the confession itself, is excused from grave sin because it is neither harmful to the penitent nor gravely injurious to the sacrament, nevertheless one must speak otherwise if the lie is concerned with matter necessarily to be expressed in confession itself. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap. n. 34. - Reuter, n. 313.

Question 5. Whether it hinders the integrity of confession if someone accuses venial sins to the ordinary confessor, but mortal sins to another? Resp. Negatively, provided that he never receives absolution without having manifested all mortal sins to one confessor and being absolved by the same. The reason is that that confession is entire which embraces all mortal sins, since venial sins do not have to be accused necessarily. Therefore in practice those are not to be condemned for integrity not preserved who sometimes confess graver sins to an unknown confessor, but subject lighter sins to their ordinary one, if from shame, with which they would be suffused with a confessor familiarly known, they would commit themselves to danger of confessing sacrilegiously. - I said for integrity not preserved, because certainly they would have to be condemned for another reason, for example, if young men about to embrace the clerical or religious state acted thus, deceiving their own confessor. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 471.

Question 6. Whether it hinders integrity if someone feigns another voice, lest he be recognized by the confessor? Resp. Negatively, per se; for provided he opens all mortal sins, he makes an entire confession. Nor is it necessary that he be known by name by the confessor; for it suffices that the confessor intends to absolve the present sinner: but the intention of the confessor is per se always determined to the present penitent. Cf. Lacroix, de Sacram. in genere, n. 68.

Doubt here can be concerned chiefly 1°. with the act of sin or with the sin committed; 2°. with the gravity of the sin, both on the part of the matter and on the part of consent; 3°. with the confession of a sin certainly committed.

Question 1. Whether mortal sins, not certainly but only probably committed, must necessarily be accused? Resp. Negatively, more probably, if, after a diligent examination has been previously made, the doubt perseveres. The reason is that an obligation cannot be imposed unless it is certainly established concerning it. And indeed from Trent, mortal sins of which consciousness is had must be accused; but consciousness of doubtful sins is not had; for to have consciousness imports certain knowledge of sin, since consciousness is nothing else than certain knowledge and judgment concerning sin committed. Therefore ... - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 473 and 476. - Sporer, n. 389. - Roncaglia, chap. 2, question 7. - Reuter, n. 305.

Question 2. Whether sins certainly committed, but concerning whose gravity only probable reason is had, are to be accused? Resp. Negatively, more probably, per se, namely with the principles of probabilism inspected. The reason is the same as for the preceding question; for since it is not established concerning a grave sin committed, neither can it be established concerning the obligation of confession. But in practice attention must be paid to the two following rules:

Rule I. In doubt whether the matter of sin is grave, rude penitents ordinarily must accuse doubts, 1°. because they almost cannot form conscience by themselves, 2°. because for the most part they do not know how to distinguish venial sins from mortal sins. Except, however, the scrupulous, who are not often accustomed to commit mortal sins. But instructed penitents are not bound to accuse doubtfully grave things, because they can form conscience by themselves; nevertheless they too are ordinarily to be gently exhorted to accuse these things.

Rule II. In doubt concerning full consent or perfect advertence, 1°. if the penitents are of a fearful conscience and are not accustomed to sin gravely, they are in no way bound to confess doubtful sins, because the presumption which is had from things ordinarily happening favors them; indeed often they are to be hindered from this accusation if they seem inclined to scruples; 2°. if penitents keep a middle way between a fearful and lax conscience, they are not indeed to be obliged, but certainly are to be induced to declare doubtful consent, because this is useful for the tranquility of conscience, etc.; 3°. if penitents are of a lax conscience, generally they must declare doubtful sins, because the presumption is opposed to them. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 476.

Question 3. Whether sins certainly committed and certainly also grave, but only probably confessed, must necessarily be accused? Resp. It is greatly controverted: some, among whom is St. Alphonsus, say that sins of this kind must be declared, because the obligation of confession is certain, but its fulfillment doubtful. But several other Doctors deny it, so that Lugo could affirm: "All commonly teach that [someone] is not bound to confess a sin which he probably judges that he has already confessed." But the reason is that a law to which satisfaction has probably already been made, since it is no longer certain and entire, cannot claim entire obedience for itself and bring forth a certain obligation. Thus indeed as to obligation; for in practice the repetition of confession is to be advised for procuring peace of conscience and removing anxieties of soul: unless, however, it happens that in this way anxiety is added to anxiety. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 58 and seq. - Baller. note (c) p. 367; and note (a) p. 368. - St. Alphonsus, n. 477.

Question 4. Whether one who has confessed some sin as doubtful must repeat it if afterward he knows it as certain? Resp. Formerly the Doctors commonly affirmed; but today it is greatly controverted, and the negative opinion appears solidly probable. The reason is deduced from those things which were said above about declaring the number of sins; for just as, after the doubtful number of sins has once been exposed with the particle about, you are no longer bound to declare in confession the certain number which you afterward discovered, provided the excess is not notable; so neither are you bound to repeat in confession a sin which you accused as doubtful, afterward known as certain. For there is no difference between either case, since also in a doubtful number certain sins are declared as doubtful; nor must the species be opened more than the number of sins. Besides, the doubtful sin was directly remitted, since it was remitted by force of absolution, to which, as it was in conscience, it was subjected. Therefore it is not necessary to subject it again to the keys. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 78. - Sporer, n. 397. - Elbel, n. 274. - Reuter, n. 332. - Baller. note (b) p. 368.

The circumstances of sins are distinguished in various ways. For 1°. some change the species, namely those which by reason of themselves add to the act a malice distinct in species from that which the act has by reason of its object; thus the circumstance of a vow or of marriage adds to fornication the malice of sacrilege or adultery; 2°. others are only aggravating, but notably or lightly, according as, notably or lightly, within the same species they increase the malice of the sinful act by reason of duration, intensity, degree, mode, time, person, place, etc.; and finally 3°. others are diminishing, as those which render the malice of sin less, for example, defect of advertence, etc. - Consult what was said above, n. 26.

I say. Just as it is certain that circumstances changing the species are to be accused, if they draw the sin into another species of lethal sin, so it is likewise certain that circumstances lightly aggravating do not have to be accused necessarily, although to expose them is sometimes better. The reason for the first is that then there is properly a new mortal sin; but the reason for the second is that venial sins are not necessary matter of the sacrament of Penance.

Question 1. Whether circumstances NOTABLY aggravating the malice of mortal sins within the same species must necessarily be accused? Resp. Negatively, more commonly and more probably. The reason is that the Council of Trent speaks only of circumstances which change the species of sin, and consequently seems to exclude the obligation of confessing other circumstances. Add that otherwise both penitents and confessors would always fluctuate amid straits, since it is difficult to distinguish which circumstances are notably aggravating; for no rule, at least for the most part, can be assigned by which they are discerned, for example, for duration, intensity, mode, etc. Besides, the reasons on which the affirmative opinion rests are easily dissolved. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 467. - Baller. note (d) p. 372; and notes (a) and (b) p. 373.

Moreover in practice the faithful ordinarily, speaking ordinarily, are wont to declare the more notable circumstances; and this indeed contributes, as to greater peace of conscience, so also to receiving more abundant fruit, both by reason of humility in the confession itself and by reason of the direction which they receive more suitably. - But if the discussion is about circumstances of sins against the sixth precept, not only is inquiry not to be made about them, but it is not even to be permitted that they be exposed, on account of the danger which both the confessor and the penitent could suffer in treating this muddy matter. Indeed Doctors commonly warn that this danger can sometimes require that even inquiry into the species be spared. Cf. Baller. note (c) p. 373.

Question 2. Whether the circumstance of the custom of sin must necessarily be accused? Resp. Negatively, more probably, whether under this name a bad habit is understood, or whether the simple repetition of the same sin is understood: for custom taken as a habit introduced from repeated evil acts, although it is a vice, nevertheless per se is not a sin; but custom taken as repetition of the same sin already declared elsewhere does not make the sin again admitted, and here and now to be confessed, either graver on the part of the object or different in its species. - Except, however, if the confessor asks, as is clear from prop. 58 condemned by Innocent XI, which is read thus: "We are not bound to confess to a questioning confessor the custom of some sin."

Question 3. Whether the circumstance of the degree of incest committed with blood-relatives or relatives by affinity must be declared? Resp. The circumstance of conjunction in the first degree of the direct line, whether by reason of consanguinity or by reason of affinity, must certainly be declared, as is clear per se and as theologians more commonly teach: namely between father and daughter, mother and son, father-in-law and daughter-in-law, mother-in-law and son-in-law, or stepmother and stepson, stepfather and stepdaughter; but it is not necessary to declare the origin of that incest, namely whether it proceeds from affinity or from consanguinity, nor the circumstance of other degrees, even including the first degree in the collateral line. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 469 and 470; and Hom. Ap. tract. 9, nn. 17 and 18.

Question 4. Whether the circumstance of the dignity or office of the person must necessarily be accused, for example, if the sinner is a superior, magistrate, priest, etc., or a physician, confessor, etc., or the circumstance of sacred time?

Resp. Negatively, to all, with the reason of scandal or of an altogether particular obligation or of deceit and force on the part of the physician excluded; likewise, on the part of the confessor, with any relation of the sin to confession excluded. The reason is that all the said circumstances at most aggravate the sin, but do not change its species. - Cf. St. Alphonsus on the third precept of the Decalogue, n. 273; and on the sixth precept of the Decalogue, n. 451. - Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 359, 451, and 520.

Question 5. Whether he satisfies the integrity of confession who accuses a recent sin as committed formerly? Resp. Affirmatively, per se, because the circumstance of time in no way pertains to confession. Hence a penitent satisfies the obligation of confession who mixes new sins with old ones, or who, establishing a general confession, does not distinguish from the others the mortal sins committed since the last confession, although he does this deliberately to cover the time at which he committed the sins. Yet he must explain whether, by reason of the time at which he admitted the sin, he is still subject to reservation or censure, or whether by force of some circumstance, for example, of a vow or of marriage, the sin itself is different. But if the penitent lies concerning the time, for example, if he denies that he sinned today and declares the sin as if committed at another determinate and remote time, the Doctors more commonly think that he does not satisfy his obligation. The reason is that the act which the penitent placed today is not an act placed in the past year. Hence he lies in two ways, namely by concealing a sin committed today, and by accusing a sin as admitted at another time. Yet theologians are not lacking who, probably, as it seems, think this lie to be light, and their opinion pleases us. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 53 and seq. - Tamburini, Method. conf. lib. 2, chap. 1. - Baller. note (a) and (b) p. 376.

Question 6. Whether a penitent must declare the different persons with whom he sinned? Resp. Negatively, per se, because it suffices that the number of sins and their species be declared; but sins do not on that account change species because they were committed with several persons. Hence one who fornicated with three different persons or three times with the same person satisfies by saying that he fornicated three times; nor is he bound spontaneously to say whether the accomplice was one or several, whether they were prostitutes or others. Yet if the confessor asks about this, the penitent is bound to respond, because it is expedient that the confessor know whether perhaps there is present a proximate occasion of sinning, as is likely if the sin was committed several times with the same person. - Cf. Bonac. disp. 5, q. 5, sect. 2, punct. 2, § diff. 3, n. 14. - Tamburini, in Dec. lib. 7, chap. 7. - Lacroix, n. 1040.

Question 7. Whether a priest or religious sinning against chastity must open his condition, or only the circumstance of the vow of chastity? Resp. It is controverted, but probably it must be said that it suffices if each manifests the circumstance of the vow, because the species of obligation does not seem to be changed by the special condition either of priest or of religious. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 149.

Question 8. Whether nearness of persons in sins of hatred must be declared? Resp. Affirmatively, if there is question of nearer kinship, on account of the strict bond of the virtue of piety. Hence grave hatred against parents, children, grandparents, grandchildren, relatives by affinity in the first degree, godparents, godchildren, a spouse, and siblings must be declared; but otherwise if there is question of remote kinship, namely among the other blood-relatives or relatives by affinity. Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 303 and seq.

I say. Mortal sins omitted from inculpable forgetfulness must be accused if they return to the memory of the penitent. The reason is that by divine precept all mortal sins committed after Baptism must be declared in sacramental confession; nor can present forgetfulness excuse from so great an obligation even for the future. This is also clear from prop. 11 condemned by Alexander VII, which has itself thus: "Sins omitted in confession, or forgotten because of imminent danger of life or because of another cause, we are not bound to express in a following confession."

Question 1. Whether sins omitted from forgetfulness or another just cause must be accused as soon as possible? Resp. Negatively, more probably; for an obligation of this kind must be taken morally, especially since these sins have already been destroyed, and consequently there is no danger of soul in delay. Indeed, according to several grave theologians, the penitent probably can defer the confession of these sins until he is bound to confess again by force of another obligation, and consequently he could defer it for several months and even to the time of annual confession. Yet no other confession can be interposed with these omitted. The reason is that it pertains to the integrity of confession to declare in the actual accusation all mortal sins not yet accused, which occur to memory or of which consciousness is had, as the Council of Trent speaks. But, as Suarez says, "those sins are in present consciousness which, committed after Baptism, have not been duly subjected to the keys through another confession." Therefore. Cf. Suarez, disp. 22, sect. 1, n. 1. - Bonac. disp. 5, q. 5, sect. 2, punct. 4, n. 32.

Question 2. Whether a penitent accusing a grave sin omitted in the preceding confession from forgetfulness or another legitimate cause, and already indirectly remitted, must necessarily be absolved again? Resp. Affirmatively, with the most common opinion. The reason is that all mortal sins from the institution of Christ are to be subjected to the keys, that they may be directly remitted. For although they have already been remitted, nevertheless they have not been remitted by force of the sacrament or by force of absolution, but only by force of grace infused through the sacrament and concomitantly with other sins. And although, absolutely speaking, the confessor could omit absolution with penitents who are accustomed to return to the same confessor, since these would be directly absolved in another confession; nevertheless it is better to impart absolution to all when it can easily be done, for the consolation of the penitent and tranquility of soul, as well as on account of the fruit to be received from the sacrament. Add the danger that the penitent may not be able to approach the same confessor again. - Cf. Sporer, n. 627.