§ I. On the Necessity of the Integrity of Confession

I say. Although material integrity is not always required, because it is sometimes either physically or morally impossible, and God does not command impossibilities; nevertheless formal integrity is absolutely necessary by divine law. This is clear from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, chap. 5, where these things are had: "The universal Church has always understood that the entire confession of sins was instituted by the Lord, and that it exists as necessary by divine law for all fallen after Baptism; because our Lord Jesus Christ, about to ascend from earth to heaven, left priests, His own vicars, as presidents and judges, to whom all mortal crimes into which the Christian faithful have fallen are to be brought; so that, according to the power of the keys, they may pronounce the sentence of remission or retention of sins. For it is clear that priests could not have exercised this judgment, the case being unknown, ... if they had declared their sins only in general, and not rather in species and one by one. From these things it is gathered that all mortal sins of which penitents have consciousness after diligent examination of themselves must be recounted in confession, even if they are most hidden." And in can. 7 it was defined thus: "If anyone shall say that, in the sacrament of Penance, for the remission of sins it is not necessary by divine law to confess all and individual mortal sins of which memory is had with due and diligent premeditation, even hidden sins and those which are against the last two precepts of the Decalogue, and the circumstances which change the species of sin ... let him be anathema."

He who after baptism has perpetrated mortal sins, which have not yet been directly remitted through the keys of the Church, must confess all of which he has consciousness after diligent examination of himself, and explain in confession the circumstances which change the species of sin (Can. 901).

Question 1. Whether the necessity of integrity requires accusation of sins according to the lowest species? Resp. Affirmatively, altogether, because the lowest species are properly called species, and the Council of Trent speaks properly of their accusation; and consequently it does not suffice to manifest only generic species, namely that you have injured chastity or religion, but it is necessary to add all circumstances inducing a proper species. But this does not import that if someone cannot or is not bound here and now to manifest the lowest species, he is also excused from manifesting the generic species. Therefore if someone, knowing that he has sinned against chastity, cannot or is not bound here and now to say whether it was with a male or female, with an unmarried or married person, nevertheless he is bound to say that he sinned against chastity. The reason is that otherwise formal integrity would not be had.

Question 2. In what way is satisfaction to be made to integrity, when someone cannot arrive at a precise number? Resp. He who cannot remember a certain number is bound to accuse the more probable number, or the number which comes nearer to the truth, adding the particle about; because where certainty is lacking, that which is more likely must be accused. Moreover St. Alphonsus well admonishes that the confessor ought not be too anxious about inquiring into the number of sins in a customary penitent, because it is often impossible to have such a certain number. Rather, let him diligently inquire into the state of conscience, by asking whether he has sinned frequently or rarely; how many times about in a month, in a week, in a day, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 466. - Lehmkuhl, nn. 304 and 305.

Question 3. What number is judged to be comprehended in the particle "about"? Resp. This cannot be determined by an altogether certain rule; nevertheless not just any excess is comprehended, nor a notable defect, but only a moderate one, yet greater or lesser in proportion to the number expressed. Thus, however, it is established by St. Alphonsus: a moderate excess or defect will be, relative to about five sins, to add or subtract one unit on either side; relative to about ten, two; relative to twenty, three or four; relative to forty, four or five; relative to a hundred, five or six ...; and prudently in the first case the penitent will be judged to have sinned four, five, or six times; in the second, however, to have sinned eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve times; and similarly concerning the others you will resolve. Observe, however, that sometimes from the very state of the penitent the number of sins can easily be drawn out. Thus, for example, where a man accuses himself that he lived for three years in concubinage, or a woman that for six months she practiced the gain of the body, there is nothing for which the number of sins committed in that state should be inquired further. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 466.

Question 4. To what is a penitent bound who, after completing a confession in which he used the particle about, finds the exact number of sins? Resp. A distinction must be made: if the sins which he now remembers are certainly more numerous than the number accused together with the particle about, then in the next confession he must add the exceeding number, because that number was in no way manifested; otherwise he is bound to nothing. Likewise he is bound to nothing if he finds that the sins committed were fewer and he exaggerated the number in good faith. I said in good faith; for if he acted in bad faith, he committed, per se, a grave sacrilege. For although a lie uttered in confession itself, and which does not touch the necessary matter of the confession itself, is excused from grave sin because it is neither harmful to the penitent nor gravely injurious to the sacrament, nevertheless one must speak otherwise if the lie is concerned with matter necessarily to be expressed in confession itself. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap. n. 34. - Reuter, n. 313.

Question 5. Whether it hinders the integrity of confession if someone accuses venial sins to the ordinary confessor, but mortal sins to another? Resp. Negatively, provided that he never receives absolution without having manifested all mortal sins to one confessor and being absolved by the same. The reason is that that confession is entire which embraces all mortal sins, since venial sins do not have to be accused necessarily. Therefore in practice those are not to be condemned for integrity not preserved who sometimes confess graver sins to an unknown confessor, but subject lighter sins to their ordinary one, if from shame, with which they would be suffused with a confessor familiarly known, they would commit themselves to danger of confessing sacrilegiously. - I said for integrity not preserved, because certainly they would have to be condemned for another reason, for example, if young men about to embrace the clerical or religious state acted thus, deceiving their own confessor. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 471.

Question 6. Whether it hinders integrity if someone feigns another voice, lest he be recognized by the confessor? Resp. Negatively, per se; for provided he opens all mortal sins, he makes an entire confession. Nor is it necessary that he be known by name by the confessor; for it suffices that the confessor intends to absolve the present sinner: but the intention of the confessor is per se always determined to the present penitent. Cf. Lacroix, de Sacram. in genere, n. 68.

Doubt here can be concerned chiefly 1°. with the act of sin or with the sin committed; 2°. with the gravity of the sin, both on the part of the matter and on the part of consent; 3°. with the confession of a sin certainly committed.

Question 1. Whether mortal sins, not certainly but only probably committed, must necessarily be accused? Resp. Negatively, more probably, if, after a diligent examination has been previously made, the doubt perseveres. The reason is that an obligation cannot be imposed unless it is certainly established concerning it. And indeed from Trent, mortal sins of which consciousness is had must be accused; but consciousness of doubtful sins is not had; for to have consciousness imports certain knowledge of sin, since consciousness is nothing else than certain knowledge and judgment concerning sin committed. Therefore ... - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 473 and 476. - Sporer, n. 389. - Roncaglia, chap. 2, question 7. - Reuter, n. 305.

Question 2. Whether sins certainly committed, but concerning whose gravity only probable reason is had, are to be accused? Resp. Negatively, more probably, per se, namely with the principles of probabilism inspected. The reason is the same as for the preceding question; for since it is not established concerning a grave sin committed, neither can it be established concerning the obligation of confession. But in practice attention must be paid to the two following rules:

Rule I. In doubt whether the matter of sin is grave, rude penitents ordinarily must accuse doubts, 1°. because they almost cannot form conscience by themselves, 2°. because for the most part they do not know how to distinguish venial sins from mortal sins. Except, however, the scrupulous, who are not often accustomed to commit mortal sins. But instructed penitents are not bound to accuse doubtfully grave things, because they can form conscience by themselves; nevertheless they too are ordinarily to be gently exhorted to accuse these things.

Rule II. In doubt concerning full consent or perfect advertence, 1°. if the penitents are of a fearful conscience and are not accustomed to sin gravely, they are in no way bound to confess doubtful sins, because the presumption which is had from things ordinarily happening favors them; indeed often they are to be hindered from this accusation if they seem inclined to scruples; 2°. if penitents keep a middle way between a fearful and lax conscience, they are not indeed to be obliged, but certainly are to be induced to declare doubtful consent, because this is useful for the tranquility of conscience, etc.; 3°. if penitents are of a lax conscience, generally they must declare doubtful sins, because the presumption is opposed to them. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 476.

Question 3. Whether sins certainly committed and certainly also grave, but only probably confessed, must necessarily be accused? Resp. It is greatly controverted: some, among whom is St. Alphonsus, say that sins of this kind must be declared, because the obligation of confession is certain, but its fulfillment doubtful. But several other Doctors deny it, so that Lugo could affirm: "All commonly teach that [someone] is not bound to confess a sin which he probably judges that he has already confessed." But the reason is that a law to which satisfaction has probably already been made, since it is no longer certain and entire, cannot claim entire obedience for itself and bring forth a certain obligation. Thus indeed as to obligation; for in practice the repetition of confession is to be advised for procuring peace of conscience and removing anxieties of soul: unless, however, it happens that in this way anxiety is added to anxiety. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 58 and seq. - Baller. note (c) p. 367; and note (a) p. 368. - St. Alphonsus, n. 477.

Question 4. Whether one who has confessed some sin as doubtful must repeat it if afterward he knows it as certain? Resp. Formerly the Doctors commonly affirmed; but today it is greatly controverted, and the negative opinion appears solidly probable. The reason is deduced from those things which were said above about declaring the number of sins; for just as, after the doubtful number of sins has once been exposed with the particle about, you are no longer bound to declare in confession the certain number which you afterward discovered, provided the excess is not notable; so neither are you bound to repeat in confession a sin which you accused as doubtful, afterward known as certain. For there is no difference between either case, since also in a doubtful number certain sins are declared as doubtful; nor must the species be opened more than the number of sins. Besides, the doubtful sin was directly remitted, since it was remitted by force of absolution, to which, as it was in conscience, it was subjected. Therefore it is not necessary to subject it again to the keys. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 78. - Sporer, n. 397. - Elbel, n. 274. - Reuter, n. 332. - Baller. note (b) p. 368.

The circumstances of sins are distinguished in various ways. For 1°. some change the species, namely those which by reason of themselves add to the act a malice distinct in species from that which the act has by reason of its object; thus the circumstance of a vow or of marriage adds to fornication the malice of sacrilege or adultery; 2°. others are only aggravating, but notably or lightly, according as, notably or lightly, within the same species they increase the malice of the sinful act by reason of duration, intensity, degree, mode, time, person, place, etc.; and finally 3°. others are diminishing, as those which render the malice of sin less, for example, defect of advertence, etc. - Consult what was said above, n. 26.

I say. Just as it is certain that circumstances changing the species are to be accused, if they draw the sin into another species of lethal sin, so it is likewise certain that circumstances lightly aggravating do not have to be accused necessarily, although to expose them is sometimes better. The reason for the first is that then there is properly a new mortal sin; but the reason for the second is that venial sins are not necessary matter of the sacrament of Penance.

Question 1. Whether circumstances NOTABLY aggravating the malice of mortal sins within the same species must necessarily be accused? Resp. Negatively, more commonly and more probably. The reason is that the Council of Trent speaks only of circumstances which change the species of sin, and consequently seems to exclude the obligation of confessing other circumstances. Add that otherwise both penitents and confessors would always fluctuate amid straits, since it is difficult to distinguish which circumstances are notably aggravating; for no rule, at least for the most part, can be assigned by which they are discerned, for example, for duration, intensity, mode, etc. Besides, the reasons on which the affirmative opinion rests are easily dissolved. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 467. - Baller. note (d) p. 372; and notes (a) and (b) p. 373.

Moreover in practice the faithful ordinarily, speaking ordinarily, are wont to declare the more notable circumstances; and this indeed contributes, as to greater peace of conscience, so also to receiving more abundant fruit, both by reason of humility in the confession itself and by reason of the direction which they receive more suitably. - But if the discussion is about circumstances of sins against the sixth precept, not only is inquiry not to be made about them, but it is not even to be permitted that they be exposed, on account of the danger which both the confessor and the penitent could suffer in treating this muddy matter. Indeed Doctors commonly warn that this danger can sometimes require that even inquiry into the species be spared. Cf. Baller. note (c) p. 373.

Question 2. Whether the circumstance of the custom of sin must necessarily be accused? Resp. Negatively, more probably, whether under this name a bad habit is understood, or whether the simple repetition of the same sin is understood: for custom taken as a habit introduced from repeated evil acts, although it is a vice, nevertheless per se is not a sin; but custom taken as repetition of the same sin already declared elsewhere does not make the sin again admitted, and here and now to be confessed, either graver on the part of the object or different in its species. - Except, however, if the confessor asks, as is clear from prop. 58 condemned by Innocent XI, which is read thus: "We are not bound to confess to a questioning confessor the custom of some sin."

Question 3. Whether the circumstance of the degree of incest committed with blood-relatives or relatives by affinity must be declared? Resp. The circumstance of conjunction in the first degree of the direct line, whether by reason of consanguinity or by reason of affinity, must certainly be declared, as is clear per se and as theologians more commonly teach: namely between father and daughter, mother and son, father-in-law and daughter-in-law, mother-in-law and son-in-law, or stepmother and stepson, stepfather and stepdaughter; but it is not necessary to declare the origin of that incest, namely whether it proceeds from affinity or from consanguinity, nor the circumstance of other degrees, even including the first degree in the collateral line. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 469 and 470; and Hom. Ap. tract. 9, nn. 17 and 18.

Question 4. Whether the circumstance of the dignity or office of the person must necessarily be accused, for example, if the sinner is a superior, magistrate, priest, etc., or a physician, confessor, etc., or the circumstance of sacred time?

Resp. Negatively, to all, with the reason of scandal or of an altogether particular obligation or of deceit and force on the part of the physician excluded; likewise, on the part of the confessor, with any relation of the sin to confession excluded. The reason is that all the said circumstances at most aggravate the sin, but do not change its species. - Cf. St. Alphonsus on the third precept of the Decalogue, n. 273; and on the sixth precept of the Decalogue, n. 451. - Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 359, 451, and 520.

Question 5. Whether he satisfies the integrity of confession who accuses a recent sin as committed formerly? Resp. Affirmatively, per se, because the circumstance of time in no way pertains to confession. Hence a penitent satisfies the obligation of confession who mixes new sins with old ones, or who, establishing a general confession, does not distinguish from the others the mortal sins committed since the last confession, although he does this deliberately to cover the time at which he committed the sins. Yet he must explain whether, by reason of the time at which he admitted the sin, he is still subject to reservation or censure, or whether by force of some circumstance, for example, of a vow or of marriage, the sin itself is different. But if the penitent lies concerning the time, for example, if he denies that he sinned today and declares the sin as if committed at another determinate and remote time, the Doctors more commonly think that he does not satisfy his obligation. The reason is that the act which the penitent placed today is not an act placed in the past year. Hence he lies in two ways, namely by concealing a sin committed today, and by accusing a sin as admitted at another time. Yet theologians are not lacking who, probably, as it seems, think this lie to be light, and their opinion pleases us. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 53 and seq. - Tamburini, Method. conf. lib. 2, chap. 1. - Baller. note (a) and (b) p. 376.

Question 6. Whether a penitent must declare the different persons with whom he sinned? Resp. Negatively, per se, because it suffices that the number of sins and their species be declared; but sins do not on that account change species because they were committed with several persons. Hence one who fornicated with three different persons or three times with the same person satisfies by saying that he fornicated three times; nor is he bound spontaneously to say whether the accomplice was one or several, whether they were prostitutes or others. Yet if the confessor asks about this, the penitent is bound to respond, because it is expedient that the confessor know whether perhaps there is present a proximate occasion of sinning, as is likely if the sin was committed several times with the same person. - Cf. Bonac. disp. 5, q. 5, sect. 2, punct. 2, § diff. 3, n. 14. - Tamburini, in Dec. lib. 7, chap. 7. - Lacroix, n. 1040.

Question 7. Whether a priest or religious sinning against chastity must open his condition, or only the circumstance of the vow of chastity? Resp. It is controverted, but probably it must be said that it suffices if each manifests the circumstance of the vow, because the species of obligation does not seem to be changed by the special condition either of priest or of religious. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 149.

Question 8. Whether nearness of persons in sins of hatred must be declared? Resp. Affirmatively, if there is question of nearer kinship, on account of the strict bond of the virtue of piety. Hence grave hatred against parents, children, grandparents, grandchildren, relatives by affinity in the first degree, godparents, godchildren, a spouse, and siblings must be declared; but otherwise if there is question of remote kinship, namely among the other blood-relatives or relatives by affinity. Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 303 and seq.

I say. Mortal sins omitted from inculpable forgetfulness must be accused if they return to the memory of the penitent. The reason is that by divine precept all mortal sins committed after Baptism must be declared in sacramental confession; nor can present forgetfulness excuse from so great an obligation even for the future. This is also clear from prop. 11 condemned by Alexander VII, which has itself thus: "Sins omitted in confession, or forgotten because of imminent danger of life or because of another cause, we are not bound to express in a following confession."

Question 1. Whether sins omitted from forgetfulness or another just cause must be accused as soon as possible? Resp. Negatively, more probably; for an obligation of this kind must be taken morally, especially since these sins have already been destroyed, and consequently there is no danger of soul in delay. Indeed, according to several grave theologians, the penitent probably can defer the confession of these sins until he is bound to confess again by force of another obligation, and consequently he could defer it for several months and even to the time of annual confession. Yet no other confession can be interposed with these omitted. The reason is that it pertains to the integrity of confession to declare in the actual accusation all mortal sins not yet accused, which occur to memory or of which consciousness is had, as the Council of Trent speaks. But, as Suarez says, "those sins are in present consciousness which, committed after Baptism, have not been duly subjected to the keys through another confession." Therefore. Cf. Suarez, disp. 22, sect. 1, n. 1. - Bonac. disp. 5, q. 5, sect. 2, punct. 4, n. 32.

Question 2. Whether a penitent accusing a grave sin omitted in the preceding confession from forgetfulness or another legitimate cause, and already indirectly remitted, must necessarily be absolved again? Resp. Affirmatively, with the most common opinion. The reason is that all mortal sins from the institution of Christ are to be subjected to the keys, that they may be directly remitted. For although they have already been remitted, nevertheless they have not been remitted by force of the sacrament or by force of absolution, but only by force of grace infused through the sacrament and concomitantly with other sins. And although, absolutely speaking, the confessor could omit absolution with penitents who are accustomed to return to the same confessor, since these would be directly absolved in another confession; nevertheless it is better to impart absolution to all when it can easily be done, for the consolation of the penitent and tranquility of soul, as well as on account of the fruit to be received from the sacrament. Add the danger that the penitent may not be able to approach the same confessor again. - Cf. Sporer, n. 627.