Point II. On the Scope of Material Integrity

We set forth first the principal ecclesiastical documents which pertain here. Moreover, the Council of Trent says this: "For it is established that priests could not have exercised this judgment with the case unknown, nor indeed could they have preserved equity in imposing punishments, if they had declared their sins only in genus and not rather in species and individually. From these things it is gathered that all mortal sins must be recounted by penitents in confession... even if they are most hidden, and committed only against the last two precepts." Besides: "It is further gathered that those circumstances must also be explained in confession which change the species of sin, because without them the sins themselves are neither integrally exposed by penitents nor made known to the judges, and it cannot happen that they can judge rightly concerning the gravity of the crimes and impose on those penitents the punishment which is fitting."¹ Finally: "If anyone shall say that in the sacrament of Penance for the remission of sins it is not necessary by divine right to confess all and individual mortal sins... even hidden ones, and those which are against the last two precepts of the Decalogue, and circumstances which change the species of sin... let him be anathema."² Canon 901 teaches the same: one who after Baptism has perpetrated mortal sins which have not yet been directly remitted through the keys of the Church must confess all of which, after diligent discussion of himself, he has consciousness, and explain in confession the circumstances which change the species of sin.

With these things set forth, we conclude:

¹ Session 14, chapter 5.

² At the cited place; session 14, chapter 5, canon 7.

I. Mortal sins committed after Baptism and not yet directly remitted must be confessed. This follows from the cited documents.

Disputation 1. Whether a sin must be confessed: a) in doubt whether it was committed; b) in doubt whether it was grave.

Response 1. One who opines either that a sin was committed or that the sin which was committed was grave is bound to confess it. For according to the Council of Trent¹ and canon 901 penitents must confess mortal sins "of which, after diligent discussion of themselves, they have consciousness." But one who opines that he sinned has in some way consciousness or knowledge of the sin committed (t. I, n. 215). It is added that each person is bound to observe a law if he opines that the fact founding the law has taken place (t. I, nn. 232 and 233 at the end). But one who opines that he has sinned gravely opines that the fact, that is, sin, founding the law, namely of confessing, has taken place. Finally, one who opines that he has sinned gravely opines that he is liable to the ordinary means for obtaining remission of sin, that is, to the sacrament of Penance. But one who opines in this way seems to be bound to apply that means, with liberty excluded of using only the supplying means, that is, perfect contrition or charity.

Response 2. One who strictly doubts is bound in this way:

1. If he strictly doubts about the commission of sin, he is not bound to confess it. For, as we just noted, the Council of Trent and canon 901 teach that mortal sins of which consciousness is had must be confessed, so that a further obligation should at least practically be excluded. But in strict doubt there is not consciousness or knowledge of a committed sin. The reason seems to be this: one who strictly doubts about a committed sin is only doubtfully liable to the ordinary means for obtaining remission of sin, in the case, to Penance; indeed he is only doubtfully capable of that means in relation to that sin. But such a one, sufficiently probably, is not bound to apply that means, but enjoys liberty of using either the ordinary means or the extraordinary or supplying means, that is, perfect contrition or charity. In the case, if the sin truly took place, it is not remitted independently of the sacrament of Penance.

2. If he strictly doubts about the gravity of the committed sin, these things hold:

a) One who doubts about the gravity of the matter is bound to expose his doubt to the confessor, unless he himself is versed in moral matters.

b) One who doubts about full consent in a grave sin must confess it if he has been accustomed to consent fully, because he is presumed to have consented fully. Otherwise it must be said of the fearful and scrupulous. The former are only to be exhorted to expose doubts of this kind; the latter are to be prohibited from doing so (St. Alphonsus, VI, 473-476; Istruzione e Pratica, chapter 16, n. 30).

Disputation 2. Whether grave sins committed after Baptism doubtfully validly conferred must be confessed.

Response. It seems that this must be affirmed. For first the Holy Office, to the question whether Carolus Wippermann, doubtfully validly baptized, "is to be rebaptized; and insofar as affirmatively, whether confession is to be placed before or after Baptism to be conferred under condition," to that question, I say, responded:² "The Most Holy One, after the votes of the Most Eminent Fathers had been heard, said: Carolus Ferdinandus is to be rebaptized under condition, and, after Baptism has been conferred, let him confess the sins of his past life, and let him be absolved from them under condition." Besides, the same Congregation, to the request of the bishops of England, "whether sacramental confession must be required from neo-converts in England, and whether it must be integral," responded:³ "Affirmatively, and let the decree of June 14, 1715 be given." Moreover, the Holy Office seems to signify that obligation to be universal not only by responding the same thing, but also by referring to the first response. This is confirmed by the fact that the Prefect of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide, in a response to the Archbishop of Quebec,⁴ declared that the decree of the year 1868 contains a universal law, and therefore obliges not only in England but also in other regions. Nor is it an obstacle that that response lacked explicit promulgation; for according to jurisprudence, especially that in force before the Code, it sufficed that such decisions were known.⁵ Besides, the Holy Office, in assigning the norm for reconciling heretics, seems to suppose the affirmative opinion.⁶ Next, one who certainly sinned gravely - which we now suppose to have been done by one doubtfully validly baptized after doubtful Baptism - is bound, if he can, to use at least with moral certainty some ordinary means for obtaining remission of that sin. But by receiving Baptism conditionally he uses only probably the ordinary means for obtaining remission of that sin, because that sin was probably committed after valid Baptism, and therefore probably must be remitted by Penance. Therefore it remains that he receive not only Baptism conditionally, but also conditionally Penance in relation to that sin.

Corollary I. The law explained is divine, as is clear from the intrinsic reason alleged; besides, a priori it is hard to admit that the Church has made a law of confessing sins to the confession of which Christ does not oblige.

Corollary II. What has been said about those doubtfully validly baptized must also be applied to those doubtfully baptized, since the same formal reason subsists.

Corollary III. Sins committed before the first doubtfully valid Baptism are not to be confessed; for if Baptism truly was valid, the aforesaid sins were remitted by the first Baptism; but if it was invalid, they are remitted by the second Baptism. Nor must sins committed and sacramentally declared after the first doubtfully valid Baptism be confessed again; for if the first Baptism was valid, the aforesaid sins were remitted through absolution; but if it was invalid, they will be remitted through the second Baptism.

¹ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 5.

² June 14, 1715 (Collectanea, n. 286).

³ December 17, 1868 (Collectanea, n. 1338).

⁴ July 12, 1869 (Collectanea, n. 1338, in note).

⁵ The Cardinal Secretary of the Holy Office indeed in 1898, in the customary conference of cases of conscience at St. Apollinaris, declared that the response of December 17, 1868 was not general. But the authority of the said Secretary - since he was another than the one who was secretary in 1868, and since he put forth his opinion 30 years after the decree had been issued - is not greater than another private authority. The same must be said of D'Annibale, who was Assessor of the Holy Office after the decree had been issued, and who holds the more benign opinion as probable.

⁶ July 20, 1859 (Collectanea, n. 1178); December 2, 1874 (Collectanea, n. 1426).

II. Sins to be confessed must be declared according to: 1. the lowest moral species, at least known confusedly; 2. number; 3. certain circumstances; 4. the external act; 5. the effect, as will be explained.

1. The lowest moral species, at least known confusedly. This follows from the Council of Trent,¹ which declares that sins must be declared "in species," which words in their obvious sense signify the lowest moral species. The reason is clear from what has been said about the necessity of integrity (n. 317). It is said:

a) Moral species; since it is not necessary to declare the physical species, so that one who has stolen, for example, 100 florins and a cow satisfies by confessing that he committed two grave thefts.

b) Lowest species, so that it does not suffice to confess, for example, the proximate genus of the sin, for instance by declaring: "I committed a sin of lust" or "of lust against nature."

c) At least known confusedly; for a species wholly unknown is not contracted.

Question. What must one confess who knows that he has sinned gravely but does not remember the lowest species?

Response. He is bound to confess the sin according to its generic aspect; for one who cannot integrally satisfy the precept is bound to satisfy it insofar as he can do that, unless the reason of the precept is not found in the defective fulfillment (St. Alphonsus, VI, 480).

2. Number. For the Council of Trent² declares that sins must be confessed "individually." For the rest, this is elicited also from the fact that all mortal sins must be confessed (n. 319; canon 901), which does not take place if the number is not assigned. Moreover:

a) If the true number is established, this must be declared.

b) If the true number is not established, but some number is established, for example, if someone certainly sinned eight times but doubts whether he sinned more often, say twelve times, let him either confess only the certain number or declare a truly approximate number, adding "about" or "more or less," saying, for example, in the case alleged, "about ten times I committed this or that sin." Now by an approximate number a moderate excess is comprehended, but not a notable one. And the greater the number expressed, the greater the excess comprehended. Thus, for example, by saying "three times more or less," up to 4 can be understood; by saying "ten times more or less," up to 12; by saying "thirty times more or less," up to 33; by saying "a hundred times more or less," up to 105 (St. Alphonsus, VI, 466).

c) If not even an approximate number can be assigned, let the habit of sinning be declared, the time through which it persevered, and, as far as possible, the frequency of falls in a day, week, or month (St. Alphonsus, VI, 466). But if not even that can be done at all, or not without great danger of erring, it suffices, after the time of the habit has been declared, to add that he sinned "as often as the occasion was given" or "as often as that desire occurred" (St. Alphonsus, VI, 466). Hence a prostitute commonly satisfies by declaring that she was given over to prostitution for such a time, and that as often as there was occasion she afforded the use of her body both to married and unmarried men. Nevertheless, she should determine more exactly the number of less usual species, if they occurred, for instance sins committed with clerics. Indeed, if she can, she must manifest the number more accurately. One who is accustomed to desire any women he meets satisfies by declaring that habit and the time through which he persists in it; let him add whether often married women, whether sometimes relatives, or sacred persons. One who is accustomed on any occasion to speak about shameful matters likewise satisfies by manifesting the time of a habit of this kind.

Corollary. One who has confessed an approximate number, adding "more or less" or "about," is not bound to supplement if afterward he certainly learns of a moderate excess above the number expressed. The reason is that the sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of a judgment to be exercised in a human way. But, considering the human manner of proceeding, in the case posited the case to be judged seems to have been so declared and judged that, if the penitent proceeded in good faith, the obligation of supplementing seems to be denied (St. Alphonsus, VI, 466). For the same reason the same seems to be said of one who, having confessed more generally and confusedly, afterward remembers the number more distinctly, unless afterward so great a multitude of sins comes to mind that they were not comprehended in the general and confused confession. Finally, it is clear that one who in good faith manifested too great a number is not bound to confess again, since the true number was included in the greater.

Question. Whether one who by one physical act committed several sins numerically, for instance by killing three men by one act, can confess thus: "I killed three men."

Response. It seems this must be affirmed, because he truly confesses the number of sins.

Objection. In the case posited the confessor is led into error as regards the number of acts; which is opposed to integrity.

Response. The confessor is led into error as regards the number of physical acts, let that pass; as regards the number of sins or malices, I deny it; namely, that act, physically one, is morally threefold. But an error induced as regards the number of physical acts is not opposed to integrity.

3. Circumstances of sin. The following must be declared:

a) A circumstance changing the theological species, as it is called, that is, one which makes a venial sin mortal or conversely; at least insofar as this is required lest the confessor take as light what was grave, or as grave what was light. Hence, for example, the circumstance of grave matter in theft must be declared, and the circumstance of half-full consent in an act gravely evil, if the penitent - to which in the case he is not bound - wishes to confess the consent.

b) A circumstance adding a new species of grave sin, or, to use the terminology of the Council of Trent³ and of the Code (canon 901), changing the species of sin, as if someone were to kill a sacred person. Thus the Council of Trent at the cited place and the cited canon of the Code; and it follows from what has been said about the obligation of confessing sins according to the lowest species.

Question. Whether one who by one physical act committed several sins in species, for instance if one bound by a vow of chastity pollutes himself, can confess thus: "I gravely transgressed a vow and perpetrated pollution."

Response. It seems this must be affirmed, provided he truly declares the lowest species, as in the example alleged; for nothing seems lacking to integrity. But if it is objected that the circumstance of the sin must be declared which changes its species or which adds a new species to it, whereas in the case the sin against the vow is not declared as a circumstance of the sin of lust, I respond that by objecting in this way one insists too much, as it seems, on the letter of the law.

c) Circumstances about which the confessor asks, so that he may judge better concerning the disposition and obligations of the penitent, and which especially regard habit, relapse, and proximate occasions. Hence Innocent XI condemned proposition 58: "We are not bound, when the confessor asks, to confess the habit of some sin."⁴

d) Accidentally, the circumstances must be declared on which a censure or reservation of sin depends.

Question. Whether a circumstance which notably aggravates a grave sin in the same species must be declared. I said notably, because no one teaches that a lightly aggravating circumstance must be manifested.

Response. Some affirm simply; others affirm as regards the circumstance "what," or of the object, or which regards the quantity of the thing, as in excessive theft, in incest in a very near degree. Others deny absolutely; with St. Alphonsus (VI, 468) we hold this opinion as sufficiently probable. For: 1. the Council of Trent,⁵ as also canon 901, speaks only of circumstances changing the species, so that a further obligation seems at least practically to be excluded; 2. a further obligation would impose a nearly intolerable burden and would be a source of scruples and difficulties. St. Antoninus,⁶ St. Bonaventure,⁷ St. Thomas, as it seems (4, distinction 16, question 3, article 2, solution 5; opusculum 12 to the reader of Besancon), and all more recent authors also adhere to the more benign opinion.

Corollary. Let the confessor generally not inquire into aggravating circumstances, but let him permit the faithful, for the tranquility of conscience, to manifest them. I said generally; for: 1. as regards sins against chastity, not only should he not inquire into circumstances not to be exposed, but generally he should also advise penitents not to expose anything besides that which must be exposed; 2. as regards sins of injustice, he should for the most part inquire into the gravity of the thing taken or of the damage inflicted, both because the faithful often do not know what matter is grave, and so that he can judge about the obligation of restoring and can teach the faithful about it.

4. External act, whether committed, as fornication, or omitted, as omission of Mass. Moreover, an external act which completes the internal act in the character of sin must be declared; for it comes under the name of sin and in reality is contrary to the law. But of itself an external act which is merely the manifestation of a sin that is properly internal, for example of heresy, need not be declared. Except if it introduces a new species, for example of scandal, or if a censure or reservation of sin depends on it (St. Alphonsus, V, 42).

5. Effect. The discussion concerns grave effects which were foreseen in the cause and either intended or permitted without sufficient reason. Effects of this kind can be, for example, blasphemies uttered in drunkenness, pollution, the death of an enemy following from the giving of poison, etc. Now:

a) The effect must be declared: 1. if the confessor asks about it so that he may judge better concerning the obligation of the penitent; 2. accidentally, if a censure or reservation of sin depends on it. Otherwise:

b) The effect need not be declared if the evil will was sincerely retracted before the event; for when that has been retracted, there is no source from which true morality can accrue to the effect, so that it cannot come under the name of sin (tom. I, n. 10). If the evil will has not been retracted, it is disputed. Moreover, it seems it must be said thus: the effect must be declared which is the complement or consummation of the internal sin, or the external execution, as foreseen blasphemies uttered in drunkenness. The reason is that an effect of this kind, as an act infected by the malice of the will (t. I, n. 60), comes under the name of sin (St. Alphonsus, IV, 149; V, 10). Otherwise it must be said of an effect which cannot be called the consummation or external execution of the internal sin, as the death of an enemy following from the giving of poison.

Question 1. Whether one satisfies integrity who declares a sin not yet confessed as confessed.

Response. It seems this must be wholly denied, because by declaring necessary matter as free, he does not subject it to the judgment of the confessor, but only to repeated absolution, or at least deceives the confessor as regards the obligation of judging the sin; and that deception is grave. Namely, necessary matter must be subjected to the judgment of the confessor and judged by him, because judgment concerning it has not yet taken place; free matter is only subjected again to absolution, although it is licit to subject it to judgment again.

Question 2. Whether one satisfies integrity who, with the confessor aware, for example in a general confession, omits to distinguish between sins confessed and not confessed.

Response. Affirmatively, because it is licit to subject sins already confessed together with those not yet confessed again to the judgment of the confessor, and not only to absolution, as happens if the whole confession is made concerning free matter. In the case, however, the confessor must judge concerning each sin, and therefore also investigate the species and number of old sins, namely lest some sin which has not yet been judged be left unjudged.

Question 3. Whether one satisfies integrity who declares a confessed sin as not yet confessed.

Response. Affirmatively, because it is licit to submit free matter again to the judgment of the confessor. Nevertheless he would commit a lie and a light sacrilege, and so would sin venially (n. 324).

Question 4. Whether one satisfies integrity who falsely declares the time of the committed sin, for instance by declaring a sin recently committed as committed long ago.

Response. Some deny this, because an act recently posited is not an act posited long ago, so that in the case the act posited is not declared. But it seems this must be affirmed, provided he does not proceed for this reason, that he confesses a not-yet-confessed sin as confessed. The reason is that the act is declared primarily as posited, so that it is undeservedly said that the act posited is not declared. I said "provided he does not proceed for this reason, that he confesses a not-yet-confessed sin as confessed"; this he would do if he accused himself of a sin not yet confessed in this way: "Besides, I accuse myself of this or that sin of my past life." Besides, a penitent rightly questioned about the time is bound to open the truth.

Corollary. The penitent has satisfied the precept of integrity only when he has exposed his sins in such a way that he can prudently judge that the confessor sufficiently perceived the things to be exposed. Hence: 1. one who notices that certain grave matters were either not heard by the confessor or were wrongly understood is bound to supplement; 2. a fortiori he is bound to this, indeed he confesses sacrilegiously, who deliberately chooses a somewhat deaf confessor lest the things to be exposed be duly perceived. On the other hand, however, the penitent can presume that the confessor sufficiently perceived the things exposed, until the contrary is established.

¹ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 5.

² Session 14, chapter 5.

³ Session 14, chapter 5.

⁴ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1208.

⁵ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 5.

⁶ Summa Theologica, part 3, title 14, chapter 19, § 7.

⁷ 4, distinction 17, part 3, article, question 3.

III. One who culpably did not satisfy integrity is bound as is explained in n. 332 sq. One who inculpably did not satisfy is bound to supplement, and indeed in the first following confession, because every confession of itself must be materially integral. Nevertheless, it is not required that confession therefore be anticipated, nor that meanwhile he abstain from the Holy Eucharist (n. 179).

Question 1. Whether one who confessed a sin as doubtful, and afterward recognizes it as certain, is bound to repeat it as certain.

Response. Most more recent authors deny this; but with the older authors and St. Alphonsus (VI, 478), it seems this must be affirmed. The reason is that the declaration of the case which is to be judged as doubtfully existing, and likewise the judgment resting on a declaration of this kind, were notably defective; this seems clear of itself, and is confirmed by the fact that that declaration and judgment did not suffice for imposing a fitting penance, that is, a grave one; for in doubt whether someone sinned gravely, a grave penance is not to be imposed.

Objection 1. One who confessed, for example, "I did that about ten times," and afterward certainly knew that he had sinned eleven times, is not bound to confess that eleventh sin again. But there is complete parity with the case just discussed.

Response. I distinguish the minor: the prior case, namely of a moderate doubtful excess, is equal to the case just discussed if the doubtful excess is considered in itself, I concede; if it is considered as part of the whole case to be judged, I deny. For the human manner in which one must proceed also in sacramental judgment brings with it that one who in good faith declared, for example, that he consented to an evil desire about ten times, is immune from the obligation of supplementing, even if afterward he knows that he consented eleven times; but the same cannot with equal right be said of one who consented once and declared it as doubtful. In conformity with this doctrine, the former according to common estimation is said to have confessed morally integrally; not so the latter (St. Alphonsus, at the cited place).

Objection 2. There is no obligation of confessing what has already been directly remitted. But the sin of which we speak has already been directly remitted.

Response. There is no obligation of confessing what has already been directly remitted if it has also been rightly declared, I concede; otherwise I deny. But the sin of which we speak was not rightly declared. Nor, in order to reject the distinction, should you appeal to canon 901, since it is not judged to settle a controversy among theologians about divine law.¹

Objection 3. It suffices to have declared the sin as it was in conscience; which took place in the case posited.

Response. It suffices to have declared the sin as it was in a right conscience, I concede; as it was in a very defective conscience, so that a sufficiently right judgment about the existence of the case could not be formed, I deny. But the latter took place in the case posited.

Objection 4. It suffices to have declared sins according to species, number, and circumstances as explained above; this is posited as having been done.

Response. It suffices to have declared sins according to species, etc., provided the very commission of the sin has been duly declared. But that did not take place.

Question 2. Whether one who omitted a circumstance to be declared is afterward bound to repeat the whole sin.

Response. It suffices to expose the omitted circumstance, if the sin arising from the circumstance can be explained in its lowest species without the whole sin being exposed. Hence one bound by a vow of chastity who confessed fornication but omitted the circumstance of the vow satisfies afterward by confessing that he injured the vow; otherwise the whole sin must be repeated. Thus, for example, a married person who confessed mere fornication does not satisfy afterward by adding that he inflicted a grave injury on his spouse, because by this explanation the malice of the injury contained in adultery is not sufficiently exposed.

Note. One who, after receiving absolution, confesses an omitted grave sin is to be absolved again in this very confession. As regards the penance to be imposed, what was said on p. 229 can be observed.

¹ Code of Canon Law, Preface.

IV. One who doubts whether he has confessed a grave sin, in other words, whether he has fulfilled the precept of integrity, is bound in this way:

1. If he opines that he declared the sin, he is not bound to confess it again (t. I, n. 229). Moreover, one who has diligently received the sacrament can, in doubt, commonly presume or opine that he confessed integrally.

2. If, all things considered, he strictly doubts, he is bound to declare the sin again (St. Alphonsus, VI, 477). This follows from what has been said about doubtful fulfillment of a law (t. I, n. 229). Except, however, the scrupulous, of whom in n. 327.