§ 1. On The Material Integrity Of Confession

1691. Principles. I. MATERIAL integrity in confession is NECESSARY from divine precept, but not from the necessity of the Sacrament.

Thus all. The FIRST is clear: 1. From Trent, sess. 14, can. 7: "If anyone shall say that, in the Sacrament of Penance, for the remission of sins, it is not necessary by divine law to confess all and each mortal sin of which memory is had with due and diligent premeditation, even hidden sins, and those which are against the last two precepts of the Decalogue, and the circumstances which change the species of sin: let him be anathema." 2. From reason; for without such integrity, neither can sacramental judgment rightly be exercised, nor equity be preserved in establishing punishments.²³ The SECOND is proved from these words of the same Council (sess. 14, cap. 5): "The other sins which do not occur to one thinking diligently are understood to be included in the same confession in general." From this declaration it is clear that formal integrity sometimes suffices, and material integrity is not always required (cf. n. 1697).

From these things you will deduce: 1. Since the precept of material integrity is positive, it sometimes admits excusing causes, and to it, as to other positive precepts, that general rule can be applied: "A doubtful law does not oblige." 2. Nevertheless accidentally, or indirectly, material integrity is also required for the value of the Sacrament, as often namely as it can be had physically and morally. The reason is that transgression of the precept, when it becomes voluntary and culpable, also takes away formal integrity, and thus redounds into an essential defect and renders the confession invalid and sacrilegious.

1692. II. In order that confession be materially integral, there MUST BE EXPRESSED the species and number of all mortal sins, the circumstances changing the species, the external act of sin, and the morally evil effect of sin. This is clear from the praised words of Trent and from other arguments to be expounded below.²⁴

We said, 1. species, namely the lowest species, such as is set forth in the Treatise on Sins (n. 324); otherwise mortal sins would not be declared as they are, since not all agree in one genus of malice. Hence the 25th proposition was condemned by Alexander VII: "He who has had intercourse with an unmarried woman satisfies the precept of confession by saying: I committed with an unmarried woman a grave sin against chastity, without explaining intercourse."

But he who cannot reveal the lowest species

is bound to reveal the superior, or generic, species; for example if someone knows that he sinned against chastity, but does not remember the specific sin, he is bound to say that he gravely offended against chastity. Likewise, he who knows that he sinned mortally, but is ignorant even of the generic species of the sin, ought to say that he sinned gravely, but does not remember of what sin he is guilty.

We said, 2. number; for the Council says that individual sins are to be confessed. Therefore, if a certain number can be had, it must be indicated so that it is neither increased nor diminished. - If a certain number cannot be had, the more likely number must be indicated, with this word added: about. If the more likely cannot be had, it suffices to say about how often the sin was committed in a day, in a week, in a month, or even in a year. - But if even this cannot be indicated, at least it must be said whether consent was always given, and whether the temptation or occasion of such sin often occurred.¹ (cf. n. 1705.)

But it must be noted: 1. He who, after a confession made in good faith, discovers that the true number is greater than the approximate one which he denoted with the particle about, is not bound to confess the true number again as often as it was contained in the approximate one. But this is to be judged from the arbitration of the prudent. Behold the NORM which St. Alphonsus hands down:² "About three, understand two or four; about 10, understand 8 or 12; about thirty, 27 or 33; about one hundred, 95 or 105; about one thousand, 950 or 1050." From this general norm you will conclude that the included number increases the more, the greater the number denoted by the particle about has been. 2. He who discovers that the number is less is not bound to retract himself, both because by exaggerating the number in good faith he did not sin, and because thus he harmed no one except himself alone. 3. He who expressed a certain number without the particle about, saying for example, I blasphemed three times, and afterward remembers that he blasphemed four times, is bound to declare this omitted time, because it was not included in the accusation.

We said, 3. circumstances changing the species; for it is of faith that these also must be declared with the number and species of sins, as is clear from Trent (loc. cit.); and the reason is that they constitute a special malice. Understand this if the malice of a diverse species which the circumstance induces is grave; for if it is light, for example the light irreverence of one who in church steals another's book, it is not necessary to express it in confession, as is established concerning venials.

And this same thing must be said of those circumstances which are called general, such as ingratitude toward God, disobedience, sloth, etc.; for from the very fact that they are general and common to any mortal sin, they are already understood of themselves. It is otherwise, however, if they were formally and reflexively intended.³ (cf. n. 180, q. 2, and n. 302.)

We said, 4. the external act of sin; because it perfects the internal act and differs from it morally; hence, without declaration of the external act, for example fornication, the confession of sin would not be integral.⁴ - Besides, without declaration of the external act the confessor could not, for the most part, discharge his office as is fitting concerning absolution to be granted or deferred, admonitions to be given, etc. This is also clear from the universal custom of the faithful, which explains the law in this sense (cf. n. 328).

We said, 5. and the morally evil effect, namely one which followed from a cause advertently placed and not retracted. Thus, for example, he who inflicted a lethal wound from which death followed must say: I committed homicide. Likewise, he who made himself drunk, foreseeing that because of drunkenness he would omit Mass, is bound to confess both the drunkenness and the omission of the Sacrifice. The reason is that such an effect, as being evil and indirectly willed, is a sin in itself according to the truer opinion, and therefore the same reason stands for its accusation as for the accusation of the external act of sin (cf. n. 314). Exception is made if before the effect the perverse will had been retracted; because in this case the effect follows merely materially and is not morally evil; hence it is probable that the penitent is not bound to confess it.⁵ (cf. n. 322, q. 2; n. 760, q. 5; n. 796.)

These things having been explained, it remains that we weigh two questions of great moment: namely, 1. whether notably aggravating circumstances within the same species must be declared; 2. whether doubtful sins must be declared.

1693. Circumstances are called notably aggravating when they increase not lightly the malice of the sinful act within the same species, for example by reason of duration, intensity, degree, manner, time, person, place, etc.

Now, it is certain that aggravating circumstances must sometimes be declared: 1. by reason of censure or reservation, for example if theft is reserved when it reaches such a quantity, if the striking of a cleric was grave or enormous, etc.; - 2. by reason of the number of sins, and thus the circumstance of length of time through which hatred or concupiscence toward a woman endured must be declared; because, from the nature of passion, a longer space becomes a circumstance multiplying sins, as was seen in the Treatise on Sins (n. 328); - 3. by reason of necessary direction, namely when the confessor asks about custom, occasion, or even the obligation of restitution. Thus all (cf. 1689).

But, apart from a reason of this sort, which is accidental, Theologians dispute gravely on both sides whether circumstances NOTABLY AGGRAVATING must be opened necessarily and of themselves. - There are three probable opinions. - The FIRST, which Suarez, Soto, Gonet, Sanchez, Concina, etc., hold, and which the Roman Catechism with the Ritual seems to favor, affirms, saying that the same reason which obliges one to open circumstances changing the species also obliges one to open aggravating circumstances, because both notably change the judgment of the confessor. The SECOND, which Laymann, Sporer, Busenbaum, etc., hold, similarly affirms, but restricts the obligation only to those circumstances which regard the substantial integrity of the sin in the individual, as is the quantity of theft and the degree of conjunction in incest; otherwise, they say, the confessor cannot form for himself a due judgment concerning the substance of the sin. Finally the THIRD opinion, more common and more probable, absolutely denies with St. Thomas, St. Antoninus, St. Bernardine of Siena, Scotus, Navarrus, Lugo, the Salmanticenses, and not a few others. The reason is: 1. because the Council of Trent mentions no other circumstances to be opened except those which change the species of sin; therefore it seems not obscurely to intimate that their manifestation suffices for this, that the Confessor form for himself a right judgment concerning the gravity of crimes and the punishment to be imposed. For here not every equality, but only a certain equality, is required; 2. because otherwise penitents would always fluctuate among anxieties, since they could always doubt about the integrity of their confessions in determining which circumstances are, and which are not, notably aggravating; - 3. especially because no one must be obligated to observing a doubtful law, as we have often said; but the law of confessing notably aggravating circumstances is at least doubtful, since very grave Doctors dispute on both sides; therefore.⁶

Nor is it an obstacle here to say that in the matter of the Sacraments we cannot follow only probable opinions; because this proceeds when the value of the Sacrament is at issue, but otherwise concerning integrity; and as regards value, it is certain that formal integrity suffices.⁷

1694. We note: 1. Ordinarily it is expedient to open the more notable circumstances in confession; for this contributes not only to greater peace and humility of soul, but also to obtaining more abundant grace. Therefore the Christian faithful are usefully exhorted to open such circumstances generally, although they are not obligated to this. - Yet except shameful matter, in which this is very rarely expedient. Indeed the confessor would be a scandal to the penitent and would create danger for himself if, without just cause, he inquired about circumstances of this sort.

2. "Of diminishing circumstances, only those must be explained which either altogether remove malice, or make mortal into venial, as smallness of matter, indeliberation, etc., for example if on Friday, in ignorance, you had eaten meat, or which otherwise notably change the judgment of the confessor, at least as to species."⁸

It is asked: Whether the penitent must declare the number of PERSONS with whom he sinned?

Resp. No, of itself. The reason is that it suffices to declare the number of sins with their various species; but a sin does not change species from the fact that it was perpetrated with several persons. Hence, he who has fornicated with three different women, or three times with the same woman, satisfies by saying that he fornicated three times; nor is he bound to say whether they were prostitutes or others. Yet if he is in a proximate occasion of sin, for example because he sinned several times with the same person, he is bound to open such a circumstance. Thus commonly with Bonacina,⁹ Croix,¹⁰ etc.

Note. Whether the circumstance of sacred time in which a sin was committed must be manifested, see n. 580, end. - Whether the degree in incest must be manifested, see n. 786.

1695. The penitent can doubt: 1. Whether he has confessed a sin certainly committed; 2. Whether he has committed a grave sin certainly to be confessed, namely being uncertain either about the fact itself or about the gravity of the fact. Wherefore the following rules must be established:¹¹

Rule 1. If it is doubted whether a sin certainly committed has been declared in confession, it must be declared. The reason is that the certain obligation of confession possesses in this case, and therefore satisfaction is not made to it by doubtful confession. And all agree in this opinion if a negative doubt is at issue. - But if the doubt is positive, namely so that the confession of the sin is equally probable with its omission, although several deny the obligation of confession, St. Alphonsus nevertheless affirms it, relying on this reason, that satisfaction is not made to a certain obligation except by fulfillment at least morally certain.¹² (cf. n. 96 and 97.) "Nor yet do I reprove," the Blessed Doctor adds,¹³ "what those authors hand down, namely that he who was diligent in confessing his sins, if afterward, after much time has elapsed from when he perpetrated it, he doubts whether he omitted some sin, is not bound to confess, since he can believe, in that case, morally certainly that he has already confessed it. And Concina adds: 'Those who have led a right life for a longer time, although before they had been habituated in vices, if afterwards they doubt that they omitted some sin or circumstance in a general or particular confession, due diligence having preceded, the confessor ought to impose that they no more confess concerning those things, and that they never apply the mind to them.'" If scruples are at issue, see n. 1838.

Rule 2. If it is doubted whether a sin was committed, or whether it reaches mortal sin, and after due inquiry the doubt cannot be overcome: from the more probable opinion, whether the doubt is negative or even positive, from nearly equiprobable conjectures, there is not, I say, an obligation of itself of confessing such a sin. The reason is: 1. because the Council of Trent does not impose, as the adversaries suppose, the confession of sins as they are in conscience, but of sins of which penitents have consciousness, that is, certain knowledge or memory; - 2. because a certain burden is not to be imposed for a doubtful offense, nor, in doubt whether a law exists, is the obligation of the law present, as Benedict XIV wisely says.¹⁴ And this runs even if someone wished to communicate, as we have already said (n. 1548, dic. 2).¹⁵

It was said of itself, for: 1. in the article or danger of death, if someone positively doubts whether he is guilty of grave sin, "he must either elicit contrition, or receive absolution, by confessing at least other certain matter."¹⁶ - 2. In a practical doubt whether something is licit or not, the penitent must seek counsel, lest afterward he act in bad faith and sin gravely (cf. n. 42).

1696. St. Alphonsus admonishes,¹⁷ writing: 1. In practice, ordinarily speaking, it is more advisable to persuade penitents, for greater quiet of their conscience, to confess all doubtful sins, provided they are not scrupulous. 2. Those who are of a timid conscience, and for a long time have never, or only very rarely, sinned mortally, when they doubt whether they consented to a temptation, especially if they remember that, when the temptation rushed in, they resisted; or when they doubt whether they were in perfect wakefulness: these can hold as certain that they did not sin mortally, since it is morally impossible that the will, confirmed in a good purpose,

is changed without such a change becoming clearly known.

3. If sinners who from an evil habit consent to temptations doubt whether they consented, they are presumed to have consented and are bound to confess; because, if they had resisted, they would certainly remember the effort in repelling the temptation. Therefore a mere doubt about consent given or denied scarcely ever subsists (cf. n. 337, q. 3).

It is asked: Whether he who has confessed some mortal sin as DOUBTFUL is bound afterward to repeat it when he recognizes it as CERTAIN?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. If the doubt was about the existence of the fact, he is bound to repeat it, according to the very common and true opinion. And the reason is that the whole substance of the sin was not explained; for it was declared only as doubtful, although it was certainly committed. Hence Dominicus Viva writes:¹ "The negative opinion, which Father Pellizzarius followed, although it has not been condemned, nevertheless was expurgated from that codex (tr. 5, c. 3, n. 56) by the S. Congregation of the INDEX, which does not wish to tolerate it; wherefore in practice one must abstain from it."

2. If the doubt was about the quality of the sin, that is, if the penitent confessed a sin whose gravity either he himself, or the confessor, or both did not know, but afterward, having read or heard Theologians, recognized it to be mortal, he is not bound to repeat it; because no circumstance occurs which was not expressed, nor is it necessary that the confessor determinately know whether the sin which he hears is mortal or not. Thus very commonly.²