The Virtue of Piety

278. On piety. 1. Piety is defined as a moral virtue by which due worship is paid to parents and country.

a. Piety is taken in a threefold sense: alpha. for religion or divine worship, in which sense it is said in sacred Scripture: "piety is profitable to all things";¹ beta. for mercy or for the affection of kindness, in which sense God is called pious and merciful;² gamma. for the special virtue by which we worship parents and country as the principle of our origin.

b. God, who is the supreme principle of life and governance, through creatures as through secondary principles communicates life to others and governs them. Therefore, just as to God as the supreme principle of life and governance worship is owed, which is exercised through the virtue of religion, so to parents and country worship is owed, which is exercised through the virtue of piety.³

c. The virtue of piety is exercised not only by children toward parents, but also by spouse toward spouse and by parents toward children; wherefore the offices which are owed by parents to children and which are owed by spouse to spouse are called offices of piety.

2. The material object of piety is constituted by those acts by which parents are worshiped, namely love, reverence, and obedience; the formal object is the natural honesty which is perceived in this worship. For natural reason understands that, on account of the special relation of superiority by which parents as principle of life and education are referred to children, honor and worship are owed to them.

Piety toward parents differs from charity toward neighbor, because piety worships parents precisely insofar as they are authors of life and education; and piety toward country differs from legal justice, because the motive of the latter is the good of the community, of which someone is a part, to be procured chiefly through the observance of laws; but the motive of the former is the good which country confers for our origin and education, both bodily and spiritual. Hence it is that piety toward country must be shown even by him who has left his native soil; but only he is held to exercise legal justice who actually is a part of the community, even if he was neither born nor educated in it.

Note. Sins against piety. a. Sins committed against parents put on the specific malice of wounded piety if the evil which is inflicted upon them immediately injures their person or personal good, such as life, safety, honor, reputation; therefore sins of hatred, wounding, detraction, etc., are against piety, but by no means sins of theft. Something similar must be said about sins which are committed by parents against children.

b. Sins committed against brothers or sisters, even if they injure their personal goods, do not put on the grave malice of wounded piety unless a most grave evil is inflicted upon them, as of a very grave wound, killing, notable defamation. For conjunction with brothers is not as great as with parents; therefore the evil which, inflicted on parents, suffices to constitute another species of sin does not suffice when inflicted on brothers, but a greater evil is required. - Sins committed against blood-relatives in more remote degrees do not induce a special malice against piety.⁴

¹ 1 Tim. 4:8.

² Ecclus. 2:13.

³ Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 101, a. 1.

⁴ Cf. Lugo, De poenit., disp. 16, n. 299, 307.

279. On observance. 1. Observance (Hochachtung) is defined as a moral virtue by which due worship is shown to superiors and to persons constituted in dignity.

That which this virtue chiefly regards in persons constituted in dignity is governance. Nevertheless by this virtue we worship not only superiors, but all who are endowed with some excellence: the former, indeed, because they actually govern us; the latter, because on account of their excellence they are fit to govern us.¹

2. According as this dignity of the person is diverse, diverse observance is distinguished: a. civil, if the dignity is human, as in kings, masters, teachers; b. religious, if the dignity is conjoined with religion, as in the pope, bishops, priests. Religious observance is either natural or supernatural, according as the religion is natural or supernatural; to the latter is also referred the worship which we pay to the saints and call dulia.

3. Its material object is the honor and worship to be shown to superiors and other persons constituted in dignity; the formal object is the honesty which is perceived in this worship: for reason understands that honor and submission are owed to those who after God are our superiors and govern us toward the due end.

Observance is distinguished from piety by motive: for piety is owed to parents because they are authors of our life; observance is owed to superiors because they govern us. Insofar as parents govern their children still constituted under paternal power, observance is owed to them by children; but this virtue in children is not distinguished from piety, since piety "in a higher and more eminent mode also contains that which is the honesty of observance."²

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 102, a. 1.

² Lehmkuhl, I, n. 778.

280. On obedience. 1. Obedience is defined as a moral virtue by which we comply with the will of a superior.

a. Its material object is that which the superior wills, whether by the will of precept or by the will of counsel or good pleasure; the formal object is the natural honesty which is in this, that a man conforms himself to the will of the superior, whether he commands or not, provided he has the power of commanding, since the will of the superior is a certain rule of the subject.

b. Whether obedience properly so called requires a true precept of the superior, or whether a manifestation of the will short of precept suffices for it, is disputed. Lessius indeed holds (n. 27) that obedience requires a true precept; but Lehmkuhl holds (n. 779) that he performs an act of true obedience who executes the will of a superior even not commanding, because he subjects himself to the will of him who has the right and power of commanding.

2. To satisfy the precept of obedience it is not necessary that the enjoined work be done from the motive of obedience, but it is enough that the prescribed work be posited from an honest end; but if it is done because it has been commanded, it will be an act of the special virtue of obedience.

3. A special sin of disobedience is committed only when someone does not obey from contempt of the precept or of the one commanding, or when someone does not obey because it has been commanded.

a. In all sins, indeed, some material or general disobedience is found, but not the formal or special sin of disobedience unless contempt accedes. The omission of a prescribed work is a sin against that virtue to which the prescribed work itself pertains, if the superior has legislative power and has used it by commanding; otherwise it is a sin against that virtue, such as religion, piety, etc., from which obedience is owed.

b. Since the formal sin of disobedience involves contempt of the law or lawgiver, or of authority itself, it is clear that the sin of disobedience is always a grave sin.

I. Notion of Piety. The name piety in Sacred Scripture sometimes denotes religion itself;¹ likewise the affection of mercy.² But in the sense of some special virtue it is defined: a moral virtue inclining man to show due duty and honor to parents and country, insofar as they are principles of our being and governance. It is said:

1. To show due duty and honor. By these words is indicated the material object of this virtue.

2. To parents and country. By these words is indicated the terminus to whom of this virtue; and by the name of parents are primarily indicated father and mother, as properly and immediately the authors of our life; secondarily also our blood relatives, who in part are remotely the authors of our life, and all who share the blood of the authors of life and thus represent them to us. By the name of country are also understood fellow citizens and all friends of the country, on account of the intimate connection (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 101, a. 1).

3. Insofar as they are principles of our being and governance. Thus is indicated the proper reason or cause why due duty and honor must be shown.

¹ 1 Tim. 4:7.

² Ecclus. 2:13.

II. Object of Piety. 1. The material object is all acts by which we show due duty and honor to them. These are acts of love, reverence, obedience, and assistance, whether with respect to body or with respect to soul.

2. The remote formal object is the reason of debt on account of the received benefit of origin and governance. Therefore St. Thomas says: "Man is made debtor in different ways to others, according to their different excellence and the different benefits received from them. But in both respects God holds the highest place, who is both most excellent and is for us the first principle of being and governance; secondarily, however, the principles of our being and governance are parents and country, from whom and in which we were born and nourished. And therefore, after God, man is debtor above all to parents and country. Hence, just as it pertains to religion to show worship to God, so in a secondary degree it pertains to piety to show honor to parents and country" (II-II, q. 101, a. 1). The proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in rendering this debt.

III. Opposed Vices. One sins against piety either by omission of prescribed acts or by commission of contrary acts; these are contained under the common, though ambiguous, name of impiety. Acts of commission are hatred, irreverence, and disobedience.

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 101-122.)

Having treated of religion, the chief potential part of justice, we shall new consider the remaining subsidiary virtues of the present group, namely, piety, reverence, truthfulness, gratitude, vindication, friendship, liberality, equity (see 2141-2143).

The Virtue of Piety.—In general, piety is the virtue that inclines one to show due recognition of indebtedness to those from whom one has received life and existence. There are three senses of the word:

(a) in its strictest meaning, it refers to the dutifulness owed to the immediate or secondary causes of our being, namely, parents and country;

(b) in a derived meaning, it is applied to the religious duties owed to God, who is our Heavenly Father and the First Author of our being. Hence, those who are faithful to the worship of God are called pious and the divine services are known as works of piety;

(c) in its widest meaning, piety is applied to works of mercy, since they are most pleasing to God as a tribute of filial devotion. The merciful man has pity (piety), because his kindness to the unfortunate honors God more than victims or sacrifices. Hence, since God is merciful, He Himself is sometimes called pious: “The Lord is compassionate (pius) and merciful” (Ecclus., ii. 13).

Definition of Piety.—Piety in the strictest sense is defined as “a moral virtue that inclines one to pay to father and fatherland the duty of respect and assistance that is owed them as the authors and sustainers of our being.”

(a) It is a moral virtue, one pertaining to justice, and hence it differs from the special duty of charity owed to parents and country (see 1158, 1171 sqq.). Charity loves parents and country out of love for God whose creatures they are; piety honors them in recognition of the benefits received from them and the authority vested in them.

(b) Piety is shown to father and fatherland; that is, just as religion gives worship to God in acknowledgment of His excellence and our dependence upon Him, so does piety show due respect to those who hold the place of God in our respect on earth. Filial piety is owed to the mother as well as to the father, and in a less degree to other relatives, inasmuch as they share or continue the blood of one’s parents and may be regarded as representing them (e.g., brothers and sisters, husband or wife). Patriotism belongs to one’s native land or the country, nation, state, city, etc., of which one is a citizen; and it should include, not only fellow-citizens, but also the friends and allies of one’s country. He who is the adopted citizen of a country should love the place of his birth, but loyalty and obedience are owed to the nation to which he has transferred his allegiance.

(c) Piety offers respect and assistance. The first duty is owed to parents on account of their position of progenitors and superiors; the second is owed to their condition when they are infirm or destitute or otherwise in need. It is more probable that filial piety is violated only when the personal goods (e.g., life, health, body, fame, honor) of parents are injured, and that injury to their real goods pertains to fraud, theft or damage, rather than to impiety. Moreover, on account of the community of goods that exists between parents and children, real injuries between them are not rigorously acts of injustice and require more than the ordinary grave matter for serious sin (see 1902).

(d) Piety is owed to parents and country as the authors and sustainers of our being. Thus, it differs from legal justice, which is the duty owed the State or community, precisely as it is the whole of which one is a part. It differs likewise from commutative justice, which is obligatory in agreements with parents or other superiors, for the duty is then owed them as partners to a free contract. On account of this nobility of the formal object, filial piety and patriotism are very like to religion and rank next after it in the catalogue of virtues.

The Reverence Required by Piety.—(a) Parents should be honored internally by the esteem in which their parental dignity and merits (not their personal failings) are held; externally, by the marks of respect customarily shown to parents.

(b) Relatives should receive a lower degree of respect commensurate with the nearness and quality of the kinship. Thus, parents should treat their children with the consideration owed to members of the family, and not as servants or strangers, brothers and sisters and relatives of remoter degree should give one another that courtesy and regard which respect for common parents or ancestors calls for. Lineal relatives are nearer than collaterals, and elder relatives (such as grandparents, uncles and aunts) are more entitled to respect than younger relatives (such as grandchildren, nephews and nieces).

(e) Country should be honored, not merely by the admiration one feels for its greatness in the past or present, but also and primarily by the tender feeling of veneration one has for the land that has given one birth, nurture and education. Even though a country be poor and humble, it should be patriotically revered (Ps. cxxxvi). External manifestations of piety towards country are the honors given its flag and symbols, marks of appreciation of its citizenship (Acts, xxi. 39), and efforts to promote its true glory at home and abroad.

The Assistance Required by Piety.—(a) Parents should be helped in their needs, spiritual or temporal. If they are sick, they should be visited; if they are poor, they should be assisted; if they are in need of the Sacraments or prayers or suffrages, these spiritual means should be provided. But a son is not bound to pay the debts of his deceased father who left him nothing, since the debt was a personal one.

(b) Relatives should also be assisted in their needs, especially if the necessity is urgent and the relationship close (as in the case of brothers and sisters). But this duty is not as strict as that owed to parents, and, if the relationship is distant, there is no special obligation of piety.

(c) Country is helped by the aid given to fellow-countrymen who are in moral, mental or corporal need. The noblest patriots are those who devote their lives, labors or substance to the promotion of religion, education and contentment among their people, to the correction of real evils that threaten decay or disaster to the national life, and to the preservation of those special ideals and institutions that constitute what is characteristic and best in the nation.

Sins against Piety.—(a) By Excess.—Exaggerated respect for relatives or country is a sin, since it is not according to order or reason. Thus, while children should not dishonor their parents under the pretext of religion (Matt., xv. 3-9), neither should they be more devoted to their parents than to God (Luke, xiv. 26; Matt., viii. 22), nor neglect God’s call when their parents do not need them (Matt., iv. 22). Thus also, patriotism should not degenerate into patriolatry, in which country is enshrined as a god, all-perfect and all-powerful, nor into jingoism or chauvinism, with their boastfulness or contempt for other nations and their disregard for international justice or charity.

(b) By Defect.—Disrespect for parents is felt when they are despised on account of their poverty, ignorance, or feebleness; it is shown by word (e.g., when they are addressed in bitter, reproachful, or contemptuous speech; or when they are ill spoken of to others), by signs (e.g., when mocking gestures or mimicry are used to ridicule them), by deeds (e.g., when they are threatened or struck), and by omissions (e.g., when their children are too proud to recognize them or to give them tokens of honor). Disrespect for one’s country is felt when one is imbued with anti-nationalistic doctrines (e.g., the principles of Internationalism which hold that loyalty is due to a class, namely, the workers of the world or a capitalistic group, and that country should be sacrificed to selfish interests; the principle of Humanitarianism, which holds that patriotism is incompatible with love of the race; the principle of Egoism which holds that the individual has no obligations to society); it is practised when one speaks contemptuously about country, disregards its good name or prestige, subordinates its rightful pre-eminence to a class, section, party, personal ambition, or greed, etc.

Malice of Sins against Piety.—(a) The moral malice is distinct from that of other sins, since injustice committed against the debt owed to the human principle of existence has a special character of wrong, as being opposed to a special kind of right. Parricide and matricide have always been looked on as having a peculiar enormity among sins of homicide; and similarly, disrespect to father and mother are greater evils than disrespect to persons who have no like claim to honor. Hence, he who has struck his father must mention the circumstance of relationship in confession, since it is a circumstance that changes the species of the sin. But he who has struck his fourth cousin need not confess the relationship, for distant kinship, though an aggravating circumstance, does not give the injury the character of impiety.

(b) The theological malice of the sin is grave from the sin’s nature, since piety ranks next to religion and is the object of a special commandment and promise from God. But the sin may be venial on account of lightness of the offense (e.g., when young children answer back or speak saucily to their parents, but without contempt) or on account of the lesser importance of the person offended (e.g., when a brother slaps his brother, the sin is not as serious as when a child strikes his parent). Children who have been seriously disrespectful to their parents are obliged to beg pardon; but to impose the obligation regularly in confession is deemed unwise, since insistence may only lead the penitent to new sins, and moreover the forgiveness of parents may generally be presumed when there is amendment.

6. The object to whom of piety is 1. parents, because after God they are the chief authors of our origin and of our education; 2. country, because country also is in some way the principle of our origin and education; 3. other blood-relations, not because they are the principle of our origin, but because in them, by communion of blood, parents are in some way represented; 4. the well-wishers of the country, because in them we behold the favor and assistance of the country. Therefore, just as on account of parents piety pays worship to blood-relations, so on account of country it pays worship to the well-wishers and allies of the country. "It must be said that man becomes debtor to others in diverse ways according to their diverse excellence and the diverse benefits received from them. But in each respect God obtains the highest place, who both is most excellent and is for us the first principle of being and governing. But secondarily the principles of our being and governance are parents and country, from whom and in which we were born and nourished. And therefore after God man is most debtor to parents and country. Hence just as it pertains to religion to offer worship to God, so in the secondary degree it pertains to piety to offer worship to parents and country. But in the worship of parents there is included the worship of all blood-relations; because blood-relations also are so called from the fact that they proceeded from the same parents... But in the worship of country there is understood the worship of all fellow citizens and all friends of the country. And therefore to these piety principally extends itself... The communications of blood-relations and fellow citizens are referred more to the principles of our being than other communications, and therefore the name of piety extends more to these." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 1.

10. The objective formal reason of piety is the special honesty which is in that worship; arising proximately from the reason of debt of that worship, remotely from the reason of the principle of our origin, which is in our parents. For piety offers worship and service to parents because this is due to them; but this is due to them because they are the principle of our origin. Therefore piety is wholly distinguished from charity toward neighbor. For charity indeed wills good and does good to parents, but on account of God, namely insofar as they are ordered to God. But piety wills good to them and does good to them according as they are the principle of being for us. "Just as religion is a certain protestation of faith, hope, and charity, by which man is primordially ordered to God; so also piety is a certain protestation of the charity which someone has toward parents and country." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 3, ad 1. Likewise piety is wholly distinguished from legal justice, which indeed "regards the good of the country, but according as it is the common good" to be obtained through observance of the laws: "Piety extends itself to the country according as it is a certain principle of being for us." St. Thomas, l. c., ad 3.

Whether simulation is licit? "Formal simulation, namely when someone intends through an external deed to signify something other than he has in mind, is never licit, because it is a true lie of deed; but material simulation, that is, when someone does something, not intending the deception of another, but some end of his own, is licit with a just cause, always and when from the circumstances others can conjecture that it is done for another end; as was said about restriction not purely mental. Thus Christ the Lord, Luke 24, at Emmaus feigned that he would go farther, not intending that the Disciples believe this, but wishing to signify that he truly would have gone farther unless he were invited by them." L. 171. - St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 111, a. 1. Dissimulation is had when, by not speaking, not acting, something is covered and someone is deceived from it. Of itself it is licit, for there is no obligation of always manifesting the truth.

If one of the spouses is publicly unworthy, can the other enter into marriage with that one, and consequently minister the sacrament to him or her? - Resp. In the negative, if the person is unworthy because he or she is an excommunicate to be avoided, as is clear. - In the affirmative, if the person is unworthy because excommunicated, but tolerated; for the Council of Constance granted indistinctly that the faithful can communicate with tolerated excommunicates. In the affirmative, if the person is unworthy because of some sin, and the other spouse could not recede from the marriage without grave inconvenience. Thus more probably and more commonly. The reason is that the aforesaid administration is by them as ministers not consecrated for this. L. 55; H. A. tr. 14, n. 6. Hence one who contracts with an unworthy person is excused from mortal sin; for he does not sin insofar as he ministers to the unworthy person, because charity alone forbids this, and grave inconvenience excuses, which is scarcely absent, or not even scarcely; nor insofar as he asks from an unworthy person, because that person is a minister not consecrated for this. - Lugo d. 8, n. 226, 230; L. l. 2, n. 60.

569. Distinctions and definition.

Piety is taken in a threefold sense:

a) for religion or divine worship, insofar as worship is offered to God as Father. But if this is done by the prompting of the Holy Spirit, there is the gift of piety, which is numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. The Angelic Doctor aptly observes:⁹⁵² "To offer worship to God as Creator, which religion does, is more excellent than to offer homage to a carnal father, which piety, as a virtue, does; but to offer worship to God as Father is still more excellent than to offer worship to God as Creator and Lord. Hence religion is more excellent than the virtue of piety, but piety, insofar as it is a gift, is more excellent than religion." In this sense can be taken that saying of St. Paul: "Piety is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come."⁹⁵³

b) for benignity or mercy, in which sense God Himself and the saints are called pious, for example: "For God is pious and merciful."⁹⁵⁴ And in the Antiphon St. Dominic is invoked: "Pious Father Dominic, ... stand before the supreme Judge for thy company of the poor." St. Augustine says:⁹⁵⁵ "In common usage the name of piety is also frequently employed in works of mercy, ... from which custom it has come about that God Himself is also called pious."

c) for a special moral virtue by which we honor parents and fatherland as the principle of our existence. In this last sense piety is a potential part of justice and can be defined: "a moral virtue by which dutiful service and diligent homage are rendered to blood relatives and to those well disposed toward their fatherland."⁹⁵⁶ Or also: "Piety is a certain manifestation of the charity which someone has toward parents and fatherland."⁹⁵⁷ Here there will be discussion of this piety alone.⁹⁵⁸ For its fuller explanation the following matters are to be noted:

⁹⁵² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 121, a. 1 ad 2.

⁹⁵³ 1 Tim. 4:8.

⁹⁵⁴ Ecclus. 2:13.

⁹⁵⁵ De civ. Dei l. 10, c. 1; cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 101, a. 1 ad 2.

⁹⁵⁶ Thus Cicero, De invent. Rhet. l. 2, c. 53.

⁹⁵⁷ S. theol., l.c., a. 3 ad 1.

⁹⁵⁸ Elternliebe, Kindesliebe, Verwandtenliebe, Vaterlandsliebe [love of parents, love of children, love of relatives, love of fatherland], or in one word: Pietätspflichten [duties of piety].

570. The object of piety.

a) The material object of piety is constituted by two acts, which in the definition given are called dutiful service and homage, or, as St. Thomas says, service and reverence.⁹⁵⁹

b) The formal object or motive attains the material object under the aspect of a debt, because parents and fatherland are the secondary principle of our origin. For to God, as our supreme and first principle, the worship of religion is due; but to parents and fatherland, as our secondary principle, the homage of piety is due. This debt, especially in relation to parents, cannot be rendered according to equality, at least ordinarily, because children ordinarily cannot repay all the benefits which they have received from parents. In extraordinary cases, however, children can render this debt even according to equality, indeed above equality; for example, if a son rescues his father from a most dreadful death, or converts him from heresy to the true faith, etc. Because piety ordinarily cannot render strict equality as justice does, although it renders a debt, it is therefore a potential part of justice, as was said above, n. 73. It is very expedient that all the benefits received from parents be vividly placed before children and that it be inculcated in them that they cannot repay according to equality all the benefits received.

c) The persons to whom the object is directed are parents, fatherland, and all blood relatives. It must be noted, however, that the acts of piety, namely, service and reverence, are directed principally to parents as the proximate principle of our origin, and only secondarily to others. Hence St. Thomas says:⁹⁶⁰ "In the homage of parents is included the homage of all blood relatives, because blood relatives are so called from the fact that they have proceeded from the same parents."

Therefore the foundation of piety is the most intimate union existing among those who are joined by blood or fatherland. Parents also, exercising piety toward their children, must perform the same acts of service and reverence: service, insofar as they provide them a good education, establishment in a state of life, suitable support, and a sufficient inheritance; reverence, insofar as they treat them not as servants but as legitimate children, dwelling with them and living amicably.⁹⁶¹

⁹⁵⁹ S. theol., l.c., a. 2.

⁹⁶⁰ Ib., a. 1.

⁹⁶¹ Cf. Cajetan, Comm. in 2, 2, q. 101, a. 1.

571. The following corollaries are deduced from what has been said:

1. Piety is a special virtue distinct from every other virtue, and notably from charity toward one's neighbor and legal justice; for it has a special object which it attains from a special motive. Piety toward parents and blood relatives differs from love of one's neighbor because piety is founded upon the intimate union of the proximate common stock, but love of one's neighbor upon the union of the human race. Piety toward the fatherland (or true patriotism) differs from legal justice because "piety extends to the fatherland insofar as it is a certain principle of our being; but legal justice regards the good of the fatherland insofar as it is the common good."⁹⁶² But since the fatherland which begot us always remains a certain principle of our origin, a man, even one who lives as an exile from his fatherland, must preserve piety toward his fatherland; whereas one who is no longer a subject of the fatherland is not bound to preserve legal justice toward it.

2. If piety is a special virtue, sins against it are also special sins to be declared distinctly from others in confession. Hence unjustly striking one's father is a sin of a species diverse from striking an unrelated man. It must be noted, however, that, according to the more probable opinion, a grave violation of piety is present only when parents or children are gravely injured in their person or in a personal good, for example, in life, bodily integrity, honor, reputation, etc. On the contrary, if the injury concerns property alone, and notably occurs through theft, it is not a violation of piety; indeed, such a sin, other things being equal, is lighter than if it were committed against strangers. The reason is that, according to the Angelic Doctor,⁹⁶³ justice strictly so called does not exist between parents and children, since they constitute a certain community of goods; but justice requires that it be toward another. Hence also the thefts of children under paternal power are not so easily mortal sins, nor does the obligation of restitution arise so quickly, as was said above, n. 83. A violation of piety among blood relatives of a more remote degree, for example, through hatred, striking, etc., is indeed a circumstance aggravating the substance of the sin, but it does not introduce a new moral species. Hence a penitent who hates a cousin need not necessarily declare the circumstance of blood relationship in confession.⁹⁶⁴

3. Piety toward the fatherland is violated by excess by those who practice excessive nationalism in words and deeds, with injury to other nations; by defect, however, by those men who boast that they are cosmopolitans and whose adage is that old saying of the pagans: "Where it is well, there is one's fatherland."

⁹⁶² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 101, a. 3 ad 3.

⁹⁶³ Ib., q. 57, a. 4, and q. 58, a. 7. St. Thomas, following the footsteps of Aristotle, calls this justice domestic justice.

⁹⁶⁴ Cf. Lugo, De poenitentia diss. 16, n. 308.

S. Th. II-II, q. 101, a. 1 and 3.

816. Piety (filial piety; filial love and homage) is the virtue by which service and worship are given to parents and country. It is a virtue because it renders a debt. It is a special virtue because it has a special object: for just as we owe worship to God because He is for us the first principle of being and governing, so also to parents and country because they are the secondary principle of our being, education, and governance. But where there is a special account of debt, there is a special part of justice and a virtue. It is one virtue because it has one object: the secondary principle of our being, which belongs to parents and country, to whom piety first and principally extends;¹ it indeed honors blood-relatives, but insofar as the blood of the parents exists in them and therefore they represent them; also fellow-citizens and all friends of the country, because in them we behold the favor and helps of the country and therefore they represent it to us; it honors a spouse and children, insofar as they preserve the blood-relationship received from the parents; indeed even ourselves, insofar as we venerate in ourselves the image and blood of our parents, but piety reaches all these only secondarily.

¹ Although piety is owed more principally to parents than to country, because from the fact that we are born from parents, the country pertains to us (q. 122, a. 5, ad 2); nevertheless in the latter there is per se a title to piety, which demands our dependence, and not only on account of the sole relation to parents.

817. Object of piety. - The material object which it intends to exhibit is worship and service toward parents and country, namely, acts by which we render due honor to them and attest their excellence and our subjection.

The primary material object which principally, per se, and by reason of itself it intends to exhibit by service is the due equality between the honor exhibited and the right of parents to it, by which equality the honor is proportioned to the right which parents have to it.

The formal object by which, or proximate motive on account of which we exhibit worship to them, is the special honesty of the said equality.

818. Corollaries. - 1. The debt which piety attends to is a strict or legal debt, because parents have a true right that honor be exhibited to them. And nevertheless piety is not a species of justice properly so called: 1) because justice is toward another and is founded upon the personal distinction of one from another, while piety is founded upon the special conjunction of father and children: father and son as such are in some way one; 2) because piety does not render the whole debt, a) parents are for us the principle of being and have conferred on us the very faculty of honoring them, which we are not able to render back to them; b) besides, by ordinary services and in the same order of things, namely, of generation, education, and providence, we cannot render the debt to equality. But virtue regards that which is per se, and therefore piety falls short of strict justice and is only a potential part of it.

2. Legal justice is distinguished from piety. For piety regards the country according as it is the principle of our being; legal justice, according as it is the common good. Whence the preeminence above all human virtues which St. Thomas attributes to legal justice is not to be attributed to piety toward country.

3. God in a more excellent mode than parents is the principle of our being: for He is the primary and total principle, and is the cause of every created paternity, because no one can be a parent except through the force received from Him. Whence the virtue of piety does not order us to Him as Creator, but the virtue of religion, which is not formal but eminent piety. Besides, because God through grace has adopted us as sons, toward Him there is also formal piety: for from the virtue of piety there must be distinguished the gift of the Holy Spirit by which we venerate God as Father and other men as His sons (I Tim. IV, 8; q. 121, a. 1, ad 2).

4. Cajetan notes on a. 1: "The name of piety seems to have been extended to works of mercy (and to God) (on account of the likeness of the works). Namely, because works of mercy are similar to the works which from piety we exhibit to those joined by blood and to citizens and friends of the country, therefore works of mercy seem to have been called works of piety, and those who are occupied with them called pious. And hence it seems to have become usage that God is called pious, that divine piety does these and those things; since God most greatly exercises works of mercy. But, so far as the proposed matter is concerned, the offices of piety differ from the offices of mercy in this, that piety gives what it gives under the account of debt, while mercy does so under the account of gratuitous relief."

VIRTUES which are joined by some kindred bond often lend one another their names; hence Piety is often taken for mercy, or that compassion by which we are moved toward others, and conversely; hence also that affection by which certain Brute animals nourish their young with such solicitude passes into a semblance of piety, as some call it. It will not be beside the point, therefore, to inquire what Piety truly is, in how many ways it is taken, and what kind of virtue it is.

THE Saintly Doctor notes, in book 3 here, and dist. 9, article 2, question 1, ad 3, from D. Augustine, book 10, de civitate, cap. 1, and in other places, that Piety is taken in many ways.

FIRST, indeed, it signifies the worship of God, and the very virtue of Religion, by which God is worshiped, which the Greeks call EUSEBIA. On this account, wishing to commend someone for his Religion, we call him pious.

SECOND, it signifies the virtue of mercy, as Hugh also writes, de claustro, and D. Bonaventure, de dono Pietatis, and D. Gregory, book 1, moral. cap. 2. S. Augustine gives the reason for this, at the place cited, because the works of mercy are commanded by God in a special manner, whence it has come about by custom that God himself is called pious.

THIRD, it signifies the special gift of the Holy Spirit, as you have in Isaiah 11.

MOREOVER, in another way it is taken here for the Virtue by which due worship is rendered to one's country, parents, kindred, and fellow citizens. The Saintly Doctor defines it thus, part 3 of the Summa contra Gentiles, sect. 42, and Opusc. declaratorio terminorum Theol., and in the Compend. Theol. verit., book 5, cap. 37, from Cicero, book 2, de Inventute: Piety is that by which dutiful service and diligent worship are rendered to those joined by blood and to a benevolent country.

The REASON is the one Tanner gives, disp. 6, question 1, dub. 1, from D. Bonaventure, book 3, dist. 35: because natural law dictates affection toward one's principle, in a special way, and therefore by a special virtue. Just as we are moved toward God in a special way, as our principle, by the virtue of Religion. For parents and country are those from whom we have arisen and been nourished, secondary principles for us after God.

IN the worship of parents, indeed, is included the honor due to ascendants and the other kindred, since they belong to our parents either as principles, or as effects, or as joined to them, as S. Bonaventure teaches, in the places cited, from Aristotle, book 8, Eth. cap. 12. Likewise, in the worship of one's country is included the worship of all fellow citizens and of all the friends of the country.

THIS virtue is an eminent potential part of Justice, as the Saintly Doctor teaches, sect. 1 of D. Thom., art. 3, and others, since it is directed to a special object, namely, to parents and country, as principle begetting and governing. For although to love all belongs to Charity; yet affection toward parents under this aspect is the special Virtue of Piety. So also, although legal justice is directed to the country as the common good; yet insofar as it is the principle of our being and lasting, it belongs to the special virtue of Piety.

The duty of this virtue is of itself indeed to render to parents, and therefore to country, and so to fellow citizens, honor and reverence; but per accidens, and in a case of necessity, also the duty of aid and sustenance. So D. Thomas, art. 102, ad 1, D. Bonaventure, sermon 5, on the ten commandments, and commonly in Fagundez on the fourth commandment. He proves both from the fourth precept of the Decalogue, Honor thy Father and thy Mother, which Christ explains, Matthew 15, reproaching the Pharisees for hindering sons from sustaining their parents. And Cicero taught this above, in the definition of Piety, where he says the object of Piety is the duty which is referred to the service of aid, and the worship, which is directed to reverence; for as D. Augustine says above, we are said to worship those men whom we frequent with honorific remembrance or presence.

The reason of D. Bonaventure, in the cited sermon, is that if we are bound by Charity to come to the aid of others in necessity; much more are we bound in a special way to aid parents, and others joined to us by blood, and our benevolent country.

Parents indeed are bound to lay up treasure for their children, not children for their parents, as the Apostle says, 2 Corinth. 12, because children ought to succeed their parents; yet in sustaining parents out of necessity, the obligation of children toward parents is greater.

But the Saintly Doctor brings forward a most excellent reason, in the cited sermon, from Ecclesiasticus 13, where it is said: He that feareth God shall honor his father and mother, and shall serve them as a master them that begat him, since indeed children are parts precisely of their parents, the whole is more owed to them than to each part the whole. The Saintly Doctor gravely proves this from Ephesians 6, where he says that it pertains to justice: Children, obey your parents: for this is just. Where, with the Apostle, he observes that he is called to the first commandment in promise, because to him is promised a long dwelling on the earth, whereas with the other precepts no promise of any good is added. Longevity, moreover, does not sound merely length of days (for many good sons die), but value, as the Saintly Doctor says, at the place cited, as it is said in Ecclesiasticus 3, as below.

The Saintly Doctor shows the same also from that passage of Ecclesiasticus 3: Son, support the old age of thy father, and grieve him not in his life: He that honoreth his father shall enjoy his children, and in the day of his prayer he shall be heard. He that honoreth his father shall live a long life: and he that obeyeth his father shall be a comfort to his mother. He that feareth the Lord, honoreth his parents, and shall serve them as masters them that begat him. In work, and word, and all patience honor thy father, that a blessing may come upon thee from God, and his blessing may remain in the latter end. See the Saintly Doctor, at the place cited, expounding these things most excellently.

He adds, however, that if the service of parents draws us away from the worship owed to God, then the worship of parents is no longer to be insisted upon against the worship of God, as Christ also taught, Luke 14, and there the Saintly Doctor comments most excellently: If anyone comes to me, and hateth not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple; and the same is found in Matthew 10. Whence in praise of James and John it is said, Matthew 4, that they, leaving their nets and their father, followed Christ; and in praise of the Levites, Deuteronomy 33: Who said to his father, and to his mother: I know you not; and to his brethren: I see you not: and their children they knew not. These kept thy word, and observed thy covenant, as the Saintly Doctor observes, on chapter 9 of Luke, toward the end, on these words: Suffer the dead to bury their dead.

The Saintly Doctor also brings forward that saying of D. Jerome, epistle 1, to Heliodorus: Go forth, trampling underfoot thy father, go forth, trampling underfoot thy mother, and fly to the standard of the Cross: The highest kind of piety is to have been cruel in this matter. The reason of the Saintly Doctor is that we are more bound to worship God than our parents, and we must obey God rather than men, Acts 5.

Yet that he infers the same — that we must often omit some spiritual goods for the sake of aiding parents, and that we are not bound to enter religion, because this is a good of counsel; but to aid parents in necessity is a precept, as the Saintly Doctor teaches, on chapter 1 of the Rule, and S. Thomas here, art. 4.

Here certain questions occur, which I shall resolve. I shall set forth, however, that the name of son in Greek Φίλος indicates Philo, that is, friend.

For since children are held to exhibit three things to their parents: Love with reverence, Obedience, and Beneficence, or, as D. Bonaventure says, in the cited sermon, a threefold honor is owed to parents, of Reverence, Obedience, and Beneficence; from this threefold head they contract special obligations.

As to the first, they are bound to love their parents in a singular way, not only inwardly, but also outwardly, so that hatred toward parents, or contempt, is a graver sin than toward others; for they offend not only against charity, but also against piety. Therefore this circumstance is to be explained in confession, just as one who killed his father would be bound to explain that circumstance. So D. Bonaventure, serm. cit., Bass., V. Filius 2, Toletus, book 5 of the summa, c. 1, Navarre, in manuali lat. c. 24, Azor, tract. 2, lib. 2, cap. 2, question 2, Sylvester, V. filius, question 22, Tabiena, there, question 26, Fagundez, lib. 4, c. 2. They are also bound to behave reverently toward them.

As to the second, they are bound to obey their parents in their governance.

As to the third, they are bound to come to their aid in necessities; but many doubts can occur in these matters.