Question — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Question First. On Piety, Observance, and Obedience
278. On piety. 1. Piety is defined as a moral virtue by which due worship is paid to parents and country.
a. Piety is taken in a threefold sense: alpha. for religion or divine worship, in which sense it is said in sacred Scripture: "piety is profitable to all things";1 beta. for mercy or for the affection of kindness, in which sense God is called pious and merciful;2 gamma. for the special virtue by which we worship parents and country as the principle of our origin.
b. God, who is the supreme principle of life and governance, through creatures as through secondary principles communicates life to others and governs them. Therefore, just as to God as the supreme principle of life and governance worship is owed, which is exercised through the virtue of religion, so to parents and country worship is owed, which is exercised through the virtue of piety.3
c. The virtue of piety is exercised not only by children toward parents, but also by spouse toward spouse and by parents toward children; wherefore the offices which are owed by parents to children and which are owed by spouse to spouse are called offices of piety.
- The material object of piety is constituted by those acts by which parents are worshiped, namely love, reverence, and obedience; the formal object is the natural honesty which is perceived in this worship. For natural reason understands that, on account of the special relation of superiority by which parents as principle of life and education are referred to children, honor and worship are owed to them.
Piety toward parents differs from charity toward neighbor, because piety worships parents precisely insofar as they are authors of life and education; and piety toward country differs from legal justice, because the motive of the latter is the good of the community, of which someone is a part, to be procured chiefly through the observance of laws; but the motive of the former is the good which country confers for our origin and education, both bodily and spiritual. Hence it is that piety toward country must be shown even by him who has left his native soil; but only he is held to exercise legal justice who actually is a part of the community, even if he was neither born nor educated in it.
Note. Sins against piety. a. Sins committed against parents put on the specific malice of wounded piety if the evil which is inflicted upon them immediately injures their person or personal good, such as life, safety, honor, reputation; therefore sins of hatred, wounding, detraction, etc., are against piety, but by no means sins of theft. Something similar must be said about sins which are committed by parents against children.
b. Sins committed against brothers or sisters, even if they injure their personal goods, do not put on the grave malice of wounded piety unless a most grave evil is inflicted upon them, as of a very grave wound, killing, notable defamation. For conjunction with brothers is not as great as with parents; therefore the evil which, inflicted on parents, suffices to constitute another species of sin does not suffice when inflicted on brothers, but a greater evil is required. - Sins committed against blood-relatives in more remote degrees do not induce a special malice against piety.4
1 1 Tim. 4:8.
2 Ecclus. 2:13.
3 Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 101, a. 1.
4 Cf. Lugo, De poenit., disp. 16, n. 299, 307.
279. On observance. 1. Observance (Hochachtung) is defined as a moral virtue by which due worship is shown to superiors and to persons constituted in dignity.
That which this virtue chiefly regards in persons constituted in dignity is governance. Nevertheless by this virtue we worship not only superiors, but all who are endowed with some excellence: the former, indeed, because they actually govern us; the latter, because on account of their excellence they are fit to govern us.1
According as this dignity of the person is diverse, diverse observance is distinguished: a. civil, if the dignity is human, as in kings, masters, teachers; b. religious, if the dignity is conjoined with religion, as in the pope, bishops, priests. Religious observance is either natural or supernatural, according as the religion is natural or supernatural; to the latter is also referred the worship which we pay to the saints and call dulia.
Its material object is the honor and worship to be shown to superiors and other persons constituted in dignity; the formal object is the honesty which is perceived in this worship: for reason understands that honor and submission are owed to those who after God are our superiors and govern us toward the due end.
Observance is distinguished from piety by motive: for piety is owed to parents because they are authors of our life; observance is owed to superiors because they govern us. Insofar as parents govern their children still constituted under paternal power, observance is owed to them by children; but this virtue in children is not distinguished from piety, since piety "in a higher and more eminent mode also contains that which is the honesty of observance."2
1 Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 102, a. 1.
2 Lehmkuhl, I, n. 778.
280. On obedience. 1. Obedience is defined as a moral virtue by which we comply with the will of a superior.
a. Its material object is that which the superior wills, whether by the will of precept or by the will of counsel or good pleasure; the formal object is the natural honesty which is in this, that a man conforms himself to the will of the superior, whether he commands or not, provided he has the power of commanding, since the will of the superior is a certain rule of the subject.
b. Whether obedience properly so called requires a true precept of the superior, or whether a manifestation of the will short of precept suffices for it, is disputed. Lessius indeed holds (n. 27) that obedience requires a true precept; but Lehmkuhl holds (n. 779) that he performs an act of true obedience who executes the will of a superior even not commanding, because he subjects himself to the will of him who has the right and power of commanding.
To satisfy the precept of obedience it is not necessary that the enjoined work be done from the motive of obedience, but it is enough that the prescribed work be posited from an honest end; but if it is done because it has been commanded, it will be an act of the special virtue of obedience.
A special sin of disobedience is committed only when someone does not obey from contempt of the precept or of the one commanding, or when someone does not obey because it has been commanded.
a. In all sins, indeed, some material or general disobedience is found, but not the formal or special sin of disobedience unless contempt accedes. The omission of a prescribed work is a sin against that virtue to which the prescribed work itself pertains, if the superior has legislative power and has used it by commanding; otherwise it is a sin against that virtue, such as religion, piety, etc., from which obedience is owed.
b. Since the formal sin of disobedience involves contempt of the law or lawgiver, or of authority itself, it is clear that the sin of disobedience is always a grave sin.