Article — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
Article I. On Piety
569. Distinctions and definition.
Piety is taken in a threefold sense:
a) for religion or divine worship, insofar as worship is offered to God as Father. But if this is done by the prompting of the Holy Spirit, there is the gift of piety, which is numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. The Angelic Doctor aptly observes:952 "To offer worship to God as Creator, which religion does, is more excellent than to offer homage to a carnal father, which piety, as a virtue, does; but to offer worship to God as Father is still more excellent than to offer worship to God as Creator and Lord. Hence religion is more excellent than the virtue of piety, but piety, insofar as it is a gift, is more excellent than religion." In this sense can be taken that saying of St. Paul: "Piety is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come."953
b) for benignity or mercy, in which sense God Himself and the saints are called pious, for example: "For God is pious and merciful."954 And in the Antiphon St. Dominic is invoked: "Pious Father Dominic, ... stand before the supreme Judge for thy company of the poor." St. Augustine says:955 "In common usage the name of piety is also frequently employed in works of mercy, ... from which custom it has come about that God Himself is also called pious."
c) for a special moral virtue by which we honor parents and fatherland as the principle of our existence. In this last sense piety is a potential part of justice and can be defined: "a moral virtue by which dutiful service and diligent homage are rendered to blood relatives and to those well disposed toward their fatherland."956 Or also: "Piety is a certain manifestation of the charity which someone has toward parents and fatherland."957 Here there will be discussion of this piety alone.958 For its fuller explanation the following matters are to be noted:
952 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 121, a. 1 ad 2.
953 1 Tim. 4:8.
954 Ecclus. 2:13.
955 De civ. Dei l. 10, c. 1; cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 101, a. 1 ad 2.
956 Thus Cicero, De invent. Rhet. l. 2, c. 53.
957 S. theol., l.c., a. 3 ad 1.
958 Elternliebe, Kindesliebe, Verwandtenliebe, Vaterlandsliebe [love of parents, love of children, love of relatives, love of fatherland], or in one word: Pietätspflichten [duties of piety].
570. The object of piety.
a) The material object of piety is constituted by two acts, which in the definition given are called dutiful service and homage, or, as St. Thomas says, service and reverence.959
b) The formal object or motive attains the material object under the aspect of a debt, because parents and fatherland are the secondary principle of our origin. For to God, as our supreme and first principle, the worship of religion is due; but to parents and fatherland, as our secondary principle, the homage of piety is due. This debt, especially in relation to parents, cannot be rendered according to equality, at least ordinarily, because children ordinarily cannot repay all the benefits which they have received from parents. In extraordinary cases, however, children can render this debt even according to equality, indeed above equality; for example, if a son rescues his father from a most dreadful death, or converts him from heresy to the true faith, etc. Because piety ordinarily cannot render strict equality as justice does, although it renders a debt, it is therefore a potential part of justice, as was said above, n. 73. It is very expedient that all the benefits received from parents be vividly placed before children and that it be inculcated in them that they cannot repay according to equality all the benefits received.
c) The persons to whom the object is directed are parents, fatherland, and all blood relatives. It must be noted, however, that the acts of piety, namely, service and reverence, are directed principally to parents as the proximate principle of our origin, and only secondarily to others. Hence St. Thomas says:960 "In the homage of parents is included the homage of all blood relatives, because blood relatives are so called from the fact that they have proceeded from the same parents."
Therefore the foundation of piety is the most intimate union existing among those who are joined by blood or fatherland. Parents also, exercising piety toward their children, must perform the same acts of service and reverence: service, insofar as they provide them a good education, establishment in a state of life, suitable support, and a sufficient inheritance; reverence, insofar as they treat them not as servants but as legitimate children, dwelling with them and living amicably.961
959 S. theol., l.c., a. 2.
960 Ib., a. 1.
961 Cf. Cajetan, Comm. in 2, 2, q. 101, a. 1.
571. The following corollaries are deduced from what has been said:
1. Piety is a special virtue distinct from every other virtue, and notably from charity toward one's neighbor and legal justice; for it has a special object which it attains from a special motive. Piety toward parents and blood relatives differs from love of one's neighbor because piety is founded upon the intimate union of the proximate common stock, but love of one's neighbor upon the union of the human race. Piety toward the fatherland (or true patriotism) differs from legal justice because "piety extends to the fatherland insofar as it is a certain principle of our being; but legal justice regards the good of the fatherland insofar as it is the common good."962 But since the fatherland which begot us always remains a certain principle of our origin, a man, even one who lives as an exile from his fatherland, must preserve piety toward his fatherland; whereas one who is no longer a subject of the fatherland is not bound to preserve legal justice toward it.
2. If piety is a special virtue, sins against it are also special sins to be declared distinctly from others in confession. Hence unjustly striking one's father is a sin of a species diverse from striking an unrelated man. It must be noted, however, that, according to the more probable opinion, a grave violation of piety is present only when parents or children are gravely injured in their person or in a personal good, for example, in life, bodily integrity, honor, reputation, etc. On the contrary, if the injury concerns property alone, and notably occurs through theft, it is not a violation of piety; indeed, such a sin, other things being equal, is lighter than if it were committed against strangers. The reason is that, according to the Angelic Doctor,963 justice strictly so called does not exist between parents and children, since they constitute a certain community of goods; but justice requires that it be toward another. Hence also the thefts of children under paternal power are not so easily mortal sins, nor does the obligation of restitution arise so quickly, as was said above, n. 83. A violation of piety among blood relatives of a more remote degree, for example, through hatred, striking, etc., is indeed a circumstance aggravating the substance of the sin, but it does not introduce a new moral species. Hence a penitent who hates a cousin need not necessarily declare the circumstance of blood relationship in confession.964
3. Piety toward the fatherland is violated by excess by those who practice excessive nationalism in words and deeds, with injury to other nations; by defect, however, by those men who boast that they are cosmopolitans and whose adage is that old saying of the pagans: "Where it is well, there is one's fatherland."
962 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 101, a. 3 ad 3.
963 Ib., q. 57, a. 4, and q. 58, a. 7. St. Thomas, following the footsteps of Aristotle, calls this justice domestic justice.
964 Cf. Lugo, De poenitentia diss. 16, n. 308.