The vow of poverty and sins against it

Poverty in general is the want of temporal goods that have a money value. It is not a virtue of itself, but rather a physical defect, for a suitable provision of temporal goods is very useful and necessary for men to lead a decent life. Poor human nature, however, is inclined to attach itself too much to wealth, and for the sake of wealth to forget why man was created by God and placed in this world. Jesus Christ taught that detachment from worldly possessions was a necessary condition for being his disciple: “‘ Every one of you that doth not renounce all that he possesseth, cannot be my disciple.”¹ And for such as were not content to follow him in the ordinary way of the observance of the Commandments, but aimed at perfection, he proposed not only detachment from wealth or spiritual poverty, but actual poverty, the actual renunciation of wealth for his sake in order to imitate him more closely: “ If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me.² Hence voluntary poverty in imitation of Jesus Christ is the foundation of the religious state. Voluntary poverty, however, does not constitute the essence of religious perfection; all Christian perfection consists in charity, to which poverty is but a means. Hence there is not an absolute and uniform standard of religious poverty, but it varies with the different ends which religious orders propose to themselves. Indeed, religious poverty is personal; it is the voluntary renunciation of personal and individual wealth, so that the love of wealth may not be an obstacle to the perfect following of Christ. Its essence consists in the renunciation of personal and independent ownership and use of property, for this it is which constitutes a snare for men’s affections and a hindrance to perfection, So that religious poverty does not of itself prevent property being owned in common by religious, and if the end for which an order was founded requires it, there is nothing to prevent it having large possessions in common, provided that the individual religious practises poverty and is imbued with its spirit.

The effects of the vow of poverty depend to a great extent on the rules and constitutions of the various religious orders and on the positive law of the Church. The chief distinction is that between solemn and simple vows of poverty, due to positive ecclesiastical law. The legal effects of a solemn vow of poverty are to render the religious incapable of individual and personal ownership of any property that has money value. So that after taking a solemn vow of poverty the religious cannot own any property in his own personal right. As a member of a religious community he may be a joint owner of vast possessiens, but individually he is incapable of having anything as his own.

Ownership may be absolute or qualified. Absolute ownership is the moral right to dispose of property and of all its uses for one’s own advantage. Qualified ownership is the right to dispose of the property or of its uses for one’s own advantage. Divines call the qualified ownership of the thing itself direct ownership, and the qualified ownership of its uses they call indirect ownership. A religious, even though solemnly professed, retains his personal rights to life, good name, and honour; he can still dispose of his personal actions, such as the celebration of Mass, and such personal rights as that of presenting to a benefice; he may own a relic and dispose of it by gift, for it has no money value. As a solemnly professed religious is incapable of owning property in his own right, so he cannot acquire it for himself; whatever he gains by his labour, or whatever comes to him by gift or inheritance, becomes the property of the community to which he belongs; “ whatever a monk acquires he acquires not for himself, but for his monastery,” as the old adage had it. By the special constitutions of their respective orders, Capuchins, Observantines, and professed Jesuits cannot take property, even in the name and for the benefit of the community to which they belong, if it come to them by any hereditary title or by operation of law. They may, however, take gifts and legacies, and these become the property of their communities (Can. 582).

The simple vow of poverty does not deprive the religious of the direct, but of the indirect, ownership of property; so that he cannot lawfully use or dispose of anything that has a money value without the leave of his superior. Notwithstanding, then, the simple vow of poverty, religious retain the direct ownership of all the property that they had before profession, and of all that comes to them afterwards by any legal title or gift.

Several Canons of the new Code affect the matter of religious poverty. By Canon 568, if during the novitiate a novice in any way whatever renounces his benefices or his property or encumbers them, such a renunciation or encumbrance is not only illicit but also null and void.

Canon 569 prescribes: Sec. i. Before the profession of simple vows, whether temporary or perpetual, the novice must cede, for the whole period during which he will be bound by simple vows, the administration of his property to whomsoever he wishes, and dispose freely of its use.and usufruct, unless the constitutions determine otherwise.

Sec. ii. If the novice, because he possessed no property, omitted to make this cession, and if subsequently property come into his possession, or if, after making the provision, he becomes under whatever title the possessor of other property, he must make provision, according to the regulations of Sec. i, for the newly acquired property, even if he has already made simple profession.

Sec. iii. In every religious congregation the novice, before making profession of temporary vows, shall freely make a will of all the property he actually possesses or may subsequently possess, While safeguarding this latter canon, Canon 580 prescribes that all those who have made profession of simple vows, whether perpetual or temporary, unless the constitutions declare otherwise, retain the ownership of their property and the capacity to acquire other property. But whatever the religious acquires by his own industry or in respect of his institute, belongs to the institute.

As regards the cession or disposition of property treated of in Canon 569, sec. 2, the professed religious can modify the arrangement, not, however, of his own free choice unless the constitutions allow it, but with the permission of the Superior General, or, in the case of nuns, of the local Ordinary, as well as with that of the Regular Superior if the monastery be subject to regulars; the modification, however, must not be made, at least for any considerable part of the property, in favour of the institute; in the case of withdrawal from the institute this cession and disposition ceases to have effect.

Except within sixty days preceding the solemn profession, the professed of simple vows cannot validly renounce his property, but within this time, he must, saving special indults from the Holy See, renounce in favour of whomsoever he wishes all the property which he actually possesses on condition of his profession subsequently taking place. 47 The profession having been made, the necessary measures must be immediately taken to insure that the renunciation be effective also according to the civil law (Can. 581).

‘After profession of solemn vows, likewise without prejudice to special indults of the Apostolic See, all the property which comes in whatever manner to a regular— (1) In an order capable of ownership, goes to the order, to the province, or to the house, according to the constitutions: (2) In an order incapable of ownership, such as the Capuchins, it becomes the property of the Holy See (Can. 582).

Those who have made profession of simple vows in any religious congregation: (1) May not abdicate gratuitously the dominion over their property per actum inter vivos. This phrase is technical, and signifies any way of disposing of property except by will. So that after profession of simple vows the professed cannot lawfully make a gift of his property to anyone.

(2) May not alter the will made according to the terms of Canon 569, sec. 3, without the permission of the Holy See, or if the case be urgent and time does not admit of recourse to the Holy See, without the permission of the higher superior, or, if recourse cannot be had to him either, without the permission of the local superior (Can. 583).

Within the limits indicated above, a religious, with the leave of his superior, may lawfully use and dispose of property. In order to justify such use and to excuse it from sin against the vow, the presumed leave of the superior is sufficient, which consists in a reasonably founded judgement that the act contemplated is not against the superior’s wish. Much more will the actual, virtual, or tacit leave of the superior excuse an act of ownership on the part of a religious and prevent it from being a violation of the vow.

¹ Luke xiv 33.

² Matt. xix 21.

Sins against poverty are grievous if the matter be considerable. The measure as to what matter is considerable is the same here as in theft, for just as the sin of theft consists in taking away the property of another against his reasonable wish, so a sin against religious poverty consists in the use, disposal, or acceptance of property contrary to one’s promise to God and the wish of religious superiors. The absolute sum which is necessary and sufficient for a mortal sin against the vow in all cases will be one pound sterling, and less will be sufficient if the community whose property is used or disposed of without leave is poor. Divines, however, allow that a moderately rich monastery may be considered in this matter as equivalent to an absolutely rich individual proprietor.

"So that the decrees of the Council of Trent concerning the vow of poverty to be guarded may be observed more faithfully, it is commanded that no one from among the Friars, even if he is a Superior, can possess as his own, or even in the name of the convent, immovable or movable goods, or money, revenues, alms, acquired either from sermons, or from lectures, or for Masses, whether to be celebrated in his own Church or anywhere whatever, or by another just labor and cause of theirs, and under whatever name acquired, even if they are subsidies of relatives, or pious largesses, legacies, or donations; but let all these things at once be handed over to the Superior and incorporated into the convent, and be mingled with the other goods, revenues, moneys, and proceeds of it, so that from this common food and clothing can be supplied to all. But of those things which had been conceded for necessity, let no one possess anything as his own, nor use it as his own. No dispensation of any Superiors whatever, no license as regards immovable or movable goods, can excuse the brothers from being liable to the fault and penalty imposed by the same decrees of the Council and to be incurred by the very fact, even if Superiors assert that they can grant dispensations or licenses of this kind, to whom We will that faith by no means be given in this matter." Const. of Clement VIII for the reform of Regulars, 20 March 1601, nn. 3, 5, 7.

"Those professed of simple vows in Orders in which solemn vows are emitted will be able to retain the radical dominion, as they say, of their goods; but the administration of them, and the spending and use of revenues, is altogether interdicted to them. Therefore before the profession of simple vows they must cede for the time during which they remain in the same profession of simple vows, the administration, usufruct, and use, to whomever they please, and even to their own Order, if they have so judged according to their own choice." S. C. over the State of Regulars, 12 June 1858.

"Concerning the vow of poverty the following disposition was established by the Apostolic See as regards some more recent institutes of this kind: 'The professed will be able to retain the radical dominion, as they say, of their goods; but the administration of them, and the spending and use of revenues, is altogether interdicted to them as long as they remain in the institute. Therefore before profession they must cede, even privately, the administration and use to whomever they please, and even to their own institute, if they have so judged according to their own choice. But this cession will no longer have force in the case of departure from the institute; indeed, there can be added the condition that it is revocable whenever, even if they have remained in the institute; but the professed during vows will be able by no means to use this right of revoking in conscience, unless the good pleasure of the Apostolic See accedes. This must also be said concerning goods which after profession have come to them by hereditary title. Nevertheless, they will be able to dispose concerning dominion, either by testament or, with the license however of the General Moderatrix, through acts among the living; nor is it forbidden to them to perform those acts of property, with the license of the same General Moderatrix, which are prescribed by laws.'" Bizzarri, Collectanea, pp. 793, 806, ed. 1885.

“In order that the decrees of the Council of Trent concerning the faithful observance of the vow of poverty may be observed more faithfully, it is commanded that no one of the friars, even if he is a Superior, can possess as his own, or even in the name of the convent, immovable or movable goods, or money, revenues, alms—whether from sermons, lectures, or for Masses to be celebrated either in their own Church or anywhere whatsoever—or things acquired by their own just labor and cause and under any name whatsoever, even if they were subsidies from blood relatives, pious benefactions, legacies, or donations; rather, let all these things be immediately delivered to the Superior and incorporated into the convent, and let them be mingled with its other goods, revenues, money, and proceeds, so that common food and clothing can thereby be supplied to all. But of those things which had been granted for necessity, let no one possess anything as his own or use it as his own. No dispensation, no permission of any Superiors whatsoever, as regards immovable or movable goods, can excuse the friars from being subject to the fault and penalty imposed by the same decrees of the Council and to be incurred by the very fact, even if the Superiors assert that they can grant dispensations or permissions of this kind; We will that no credence whatever be given to them in this matter.” Constitution of Clement VIII for the reform of Regulars, 20 March 1601, nos. 3, 5, 7.

“The Bishop of Zamora in Spain sets forth that N. N., a Nun of the Premonstratensian Order in the convent of the city of N. in this diocese, has from the Spanish civil Constitutions the right to enter upon an inheritance which has fallen to her from the death of her brother, a priest recently deceased. Hence it is asked:

“1. Whether the aforesaid Nun, given the solemn religious profession which she emitted long ago, can lawfully in conscience undertake proceedings, either personally or through a procurator, so that she may enter upon the inheritance in her own name before the secular judge, yet for the good of the whole Community, as is fitting; or whether she rather needs a lawful dispensation from the vow of poverty in order to undertake the aforesaid juridical proceedings for acquiring the inheritance?

“2. Given that she needs a dispensation, can this be granted to her by the Superior of the convent or by the Bishop to whom the convent is subject; or, by reason of the solemn vow, must it necessarily be obtained from the Apostolic See? Finally, given the necessity of having recourse to the Apostolic See for the aforesaid dispensation, the Bishop petitioner humbly requests:

“3. That the faculty be granted to the aforesaid Nun to institute and complete juridical proceedings through a procurator for entering upon the inheritance for herself and in her own name, which shall redound to the good of the whole Community.

“4. That a sufficient faculty be granted to the same Bishop petitioner so that he may dispense from the vows of poverty in similar cases, so that he may be able to provide for the urgency which regularly occurs in them.

“Response. To the first and second: Provision will be made in the Third. To the third: Affirmative for the faculty requested; yet in such a way that the inheritance be acquired for the Monastery. To the fourth: Affirmative for the faculty requested for three years, only for urgent cases, namely, those in which time does not permit recourse to the Holy See.” Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, 15 January 1897.

“Those professed in simple vows (in Orders in which solemn vows are emitted) can retain, as they say, the radical dominion of their goods, but the administration of them and the disbursement and use of the revenues are wholly forbidden to them. Therefore, before the profession of simple vows, they must cede, for the time during which they shall remain in the same profession of simple vows, the administration, usufruct, and use to whomever they please, and even to their own Order, if they shall judge this according to their pleasure.” Sacred Congregation on the State of Regulars, 12 June 1858.

The same provision was extended to nuns of solemn vows who, before those vows, must now emit simple vows for three years. Cf. no. 277, Decree Perpensis. With respect to the more recent Institutes of simple vows: “115. Before the first emission of vows, they (Sisters and male Religious) must dispose of the use and usufruct of their revenues or fruits in whatever manner they please.… They must also cede the administration of their goods to a person or persons favorable to them.…—116. The cession of administration and the disposition of use and usufruct shall no longer have force in the case of departure from the Institute.…—117. The revocation and even alteration of these acts of Cession and Disposition cannot lawfully be made while the vows endure without the permission of the Moderatrix General.…—119. Those professed are prohibited from abdicating radical dominion before the profession of perpetual vows by acts inter vivos;—121. and without the permission of the Apostolic See.—120. It is fitting that all freely dispose of their goods by testament before vows.—122. Professed Sisters, both to make and to change a testament, need the permission of the Apostolic See.…—124. Concerning goods which come to the Sisters after vows have been emitted…they must or respectively can dispose according to the norms hitherto established.…—125. Sisters can in no manner dispose of a dowry offered to the Institute.—126. Whatever the Sisters shall have acquired after the emission of vows by their own industry or in consideration of the Institute, they cannot ascribe or reserve to themselves; rather, all those things must be assigned to the goods of the community, for the common utility of the Institute or house.” Norms of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, 28 June 1901.

1. Theodore, a religious, with a general permission of his superiors for spending money, applies to his own use money given to him for this purpose by friends; he spends some things upon objects not indeed necessary, yet useful or proper; other things, on the contrary, upon matters wholly superfluous and useless, and even sometimes unlawful. Hence it is asked:

Whether Theodore sins against the vow of poverty in these expenses?

Response. 1. An abundant use of things, provided it is had by permission of the superiors, is not of itself opposed to poverty. The reason is, first, because a poor man does not cease to be poor because at times he is somewhat more abundantly supplied by the charity and liberality of others; for he does not use those more abundant things by his own right, nor does he cease habitually to suffer want of all things. The reason is, secondly, because religious poverty is not to be understood so strictly, according to the manner of certain very timid persons, that it contains only the use of things strictly necessary, with permission of the superior; otherwise there would be no end of scruples and anxieties. See Suarez, De Religione, tome 3, book 8, chapter 5, nos. 32, 33, and chapter 15, nos. 3, 4. Therefore Theodore is not to be disturbed with regard to things simply abundant beyond strict necessities, as far as concerns the vow of poverty. Nevertheless a fault can perhaps be present by reason of scandal, or danger of relaxing regular discipline; indeed, there can also be so notable and excessive an abundance as to bring an indecency upon the state of poverty contrary to the vow itself. St. Alphonsus, book 4, no. 30.

2. Expenses in things wholly useless and unlawful are plainly illicit. But whether the permission of the prelate for such uses is invalid in itself is a question of no small moment. The first and more common opinion affirms that it is; because the prelate is not the owner, but only the administrator, of the goods of the monastery, and therefore he cannot validly permit useless or unlawful expenses, since he has not this power either from religion or from the canons. The second opinion denies this; for otherwise these purchases would be invalid, and no law declares that they are invalid. St. Alphonsus adheres to the first opinion, but says that he does not dare to reject the second. And certainly the reason for the first opinion is not entirely demonstrative, at least when the question is not about goods of the monastery, but about things received from outsiders in order to be spent. See Suarez, De Religione, tome 3, book 8, chapter 5, no. 33; Lugo, Responsa Moralia, book 4, doubt 6, no. 8; Liguori, book 4, no. 28.

3. As concerns Theodore, he did not receive a faculty to spend money on useless and unlawful things, but only a general permission to spend money. St. Alphonsus asks: if a prelate grants to a religious a general permission to spend some sum at his pleasure, and the religious spends it on base and vain uses, whether the religious sins against poverty, and whether both he and the receiver are bound to restitution? The holy Doctor reports two opinions. The first affirms it, on account of the reason given above. The second denies it, because the fact that the superior is not the owner does not stand in the way. For, at least, the monastery is the owner in such a way that it can dispose of its goods for all uses; and in the case it is presumed to consent, lest the reputation of the subject, of the superior, and of the monastery itself be endangered. Lugo, after reporting this opinion, says:

In truth, although the superior is a simple administrator, still no law is known by which his power is restricted to licit uses alone. For it must not be judged that the superior, when he gives a license, limits it only to licit uses; but, giving a general license, he removes the impediment which arose from the defect of license. In the same way, if the Pope dispenses with relatives so that they may marry, he does not merely grant that they may lawfully have the conjugal act, but he also removes the malice of incest; so that even if afterward they were to sin with one another outside the use of marriage, there would not be the malice of incest. Likewise, if the Pope dispenses with someone for eating meats, even if that man eats meats harmful to his health, he will sin against temperance, but not against the precept of fasting, which has been taken away by the dispensation.

Nevertheless St. Alphonsus says again that he embraces the first opinion, but does not dare to reject the second. Therefore we abstain from charging Theodore, in the proposed case, with a grave sin against the vow of poverty. See Lugo, Responses, as above; La Croix, book 4, no. 115.

2. Francis, a religious, hesitates whether he can ask the superior for permission to spend, in favor of a Marian Congregation of workers, whose Director he has been appointed by the superiors, various alms received for this purpose from devout persons, and the proceeds of various pious books which he has published. These expenditures would be necessary for promoting the Congregation. But it seems to him that he would thereby possess a peculium contrary to poverty.

Response. There is no reason why he should hesitate. This is, in fact, done even by holy religious, as we read concerning St. Francis de Hieronymo. Nor should Francis fear that he possesses a peculium, if he asks and obtains permission from the superior, and if he acts always dependently on him; much more, if he deposits the money with the superior for the destined pious use, and, as often as there is need, asks money from him.

For a peculium is properly that which individual religious have in order to provide for their necessities and useful needs. If they use this according to the need of the state of poverty, with the permission of the superior, and therefore by precarious use, that is, by a use revocable at the superior’s will, it is not against the vow of poverty. See I.M. 288. But in the proposed case the money is not destined for the proper uses of Francis, but for a pious work plainly conformable to his Institute, as is evident from the fact that the superiors have appointed Francis director of that same Congregation. Therefore, since it is used in a pious work exercised by the Institute according to Constitutions approved by the Apostolic See, it is wholly outside the notion of a peculium.

3. Ferdinand, a religious, obtained from the superior permission to dispose of a sum of money. The following day that superior was removed from office, and another was appointed in his place. It is asked:

Whether Ferdinand is obliged to ask permission again?

Response. No. The permission given by the superior also regards the future time, when he will have been removed from the office of superior. For the power or grace once granted is complete and perfect. La Croix adds:

Although a superior can licitly accept something for himself while he is superior, and can retain it after he has ceased to be superior, nevertheless he cannot spend it without the permission of the present superior; because he could delegate or entrust to others, not to himself, the power of spending for the following time, since there must be a distinction between the one delegating and the one delegated.

La Croix, book 4, no. 115.

4. Theodosius, a religious, while his parents were still living, before solemn profession renounced every present and future hereditary right in favor of his nephew Antonius. After the profession, his parents died intestate. The brothers of Theodosius, succeeding their parents, ask whether in conscience they are bound to give a part of the inheritance to Theodosius, or whether they can retain it for themselves. For Theodosius claims the inheritance, invoking the modern laws which favor him, and he thinks of disposing of it in favor of another nephew, Augustinus. Antonius also claims the inheritance by virtue of the renunciation made in his favor. But the steward of the convent says that it is owed to the convent, which succeeds in place of the religious by the principle: “Whatever a monk acquires, he acquires not for himself, but for the monastery.”

Response. 1. Theodosius invokes the modern laws in vain. For by solemn profession he was made canonically incapable of possessing anything. Nor can he recover this habilitas in a particular case by dispensation of a regular prelate, or even of a bishop. Therefore he cannot dispose of the paternal inheritance in favor of Augustinus, even with the permission of the superior or of the Ordinary; nor in any other way, even in favor of pious causes.

2. Antonius cannot claim the inheritance by reason of the renunciation made in his favor. For that renunciation has no force, since no one can give what is not, and will not be, his own. At the time when the renunciation was made, the inheritance did not belong to Theodosius, since his parents were still living; nor did it belong to him afterward, since a professed religious is incapable of being an heir. Therefore this inheritance was not included in the general renunciation of present and future goods and rights. It was not a present right, and neither was it a future one, since by reason of his incapacity it could not pertain to the professed man. Besides, either civil or canon law prohibits any disposition of an unopened inheritance in favor of a determinate third person, and makes it invalid.

3. The steward has no right, if by the Constitutions of the Order the convent is not capable of hereditary succession in place of the professed religious, as happens in the Society of Jesus, which does not succeed its professed members, nor are the professed capable of hereditary succession. In that case, the brothers of Theodosius claim the inheritance by right. But if the convent is capable of hereditary succession in place of the professed religious, the inheritance belongs to the convent, and the brothers of Theodosius have no right to it.

4. Cardinal Lugo, Responsa Moralia, doubt 5, no. 9, thinks otherwise. He concedes that it is impossible to renounce, by transferring to another and to the prejudice of another, namely the convent, a right which one does not yet have, nor ever will have, if the inheritance is not owed, for example, from a collateral relative. But he says that it is otherwise concerning the renunciation of the legitime; because, although the son does not actually possess it while the father is living, nevertheless he has a right to it, and it is owed to him. Therefore he says that he would not deny that the son could, before profession, renounce it in favor of another, to whom he now gives it. But this does not persuade us. For the son has no strict right to the legitime until the father dies, from the goods then left. Therefore, if the father dissipates the goods during life, although he sins, nevertheless he does not sin against commutative justice, nor is he bound to restitution. Furthermore, such a disposition of an unopened inheritance is prohibited and made invalid by positive law, even in the legitime. See I.M. 1034. Indeed Lugo himself, in the immediately preceding doubt 4, no. 7, says that if a novice or scholastic of the Society after the vows of the biennium renounces the inheritance of a living father in favor of a relative, then if the parent dies and the one renouncing has already been professed, the inheritance does not pertain to the one in whose favor he renounced, unless it is otherwise left to him by intestacy or testament; rather, it is deferred to those who would have to succeed according to the testament or intestacy, because from the renunciation they could acquire no right to the inheritance deferred at that time.

5. John, a professed religious of the Society, before profession renounced, in favor of a certain college of the Society, all his present and future goods and rights. Afterward, when he was already professed, his brother left him a legacy; and a doubt arises whether this legacy is valid notwithstanding the profession, and whether it is acquired by the college in whose favor John had renounced, or by another college in which, at the time of his brother’s death, John was permanently living.

Response. The universal clause of renunciation of all present and future goods and rights is usually added by notarial style, in order to signify the universality of the renunciation; nor is it without every effect. For if, between the renunciation and solemn profession, some goods and rights come to the religious, they are included under that clause. It is otherwise harmless, because it is conditional: if I shall have goods and rights in the future. But that condition cannot be verified after profession, since the professed man is incapable of having any good or right.

There is no doubt about the validity of the legacy. For the professed of the Society cannot be heirs, whether by testament or by intestacy; but they can be legatees. See Sanchez and Lugo. Thus, whether John had renounced or had not renounced, he remained capable of the legacy, although he could not be instituted heir.

But the legacy does not belong to the college in whose favor he had renounced before profession, but to that in which he was living when the legacy devolved. For, if there had been no renunciation, it is certain that the legacy would belong to the house or college in which he was living, according to the principle: whatever a monk acquires, he acquires for the monastery. And when it is said that the Society is not capable of succeeding its professed members, this is to be understood in this sense: that the goods of the professed do not pass by profession itself, by force of law, to the Society, but to the testamentary or intestate heirs. It is not to be understood as meaning that after profession the Society can acquire nothing through the professed. Therefore, if a devout person gives an alms to a professed religious, that alms is acquired wholly by the Society, or by the house and college in which he lives. Although the professed man cannot be heir, and if an inheritance devolved upon him the Society could not acquire it, nevertheless the same professed man is capable of a legacy, which he acquires not for himself, but for the Society, that is, for the house and college in which he is. Therefore, just as an alms given to a professed religious would not be acquired by the college in whose favor he made the renunciation before profession, so neither is the legacy acquired by it. For he cannot transfer to another what he does not have and to which he has no right. But he does not have, at the time when he renounces, things given to him afterward by donation or by legacy after profession, nor does he then have a right to them; nor does he have such a right after profession, since he is incapable of dominion and of right. The whole right, therefore, then belongs to the house and college in which he is. Therefore only this house and college acquires the thing given or left to him. Lugo, Responsa Moralia, book 4, doubt 5.

6. Pius, a testator, ordered that from his goods there be erected, in a parish church and at a fixed altar, a perpetual chaplaincy with the burden of daily Mass, the revenue assigned being 6,000 lire. Sempronius, a regular dispersed after the violent suppression of religious orders, in order to provide for his own support and that of another religious living with him in the same private house, asked for and obtained this chaplaincy from the bishop, although the parish priest was displeased.

Response. Sempronius acted by right. For first, a chaplaincy with a simple burden of Mass has the nature of a simple pious legacy, and, according to the Doctors, religious are not incapable of such chaplaincies. Indeed the Sacred Congregation of the Council, in Meliten., decreed that with the authority of the superiors religious can obtain such chaplaincies not only in their own churches, but also in secular churches, 23 November 1694, 11 June 1695, and 1 December 1691. Moreover, in the Letters of the Sacred Penitentiary by which the faculties already granted to dispersed regulars are enlarged, paragraph 16 grants to solemnly professed regulars that they can legitimately obtain and retain in administration chaplaincies, or even one ecclesiastical benefice, whether residential or with cure of souls, with the consent and at the will of the Ordinary, with the superiors also agreeing; yet they are obliged to leave it immediately when they are recalled by their superiors to the cloisters. Finally, the resolution is made certain from the affirmative response of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, 21 August 1869, in Acta Sanctae Sedis, volume 5, page 82 and following.

7. Brother Francis of the Passion, a lay brother of the Congregation of Discalced Clerics of the Most Holy Cross and Passion of Our Lord Jesus Christ, before he emitted profession, renounced the usufruct of his goods conjointly to his parents, retaining for himself the right of ownership, as the Constitutions of the Society permit, chapter 13. His father having died, his mother survived with twin unmarried daughters, who were in want of all things. There were also two brothers who had withdrawn from the maternal home, and were placed in such a condition that they could support and nourish themselves and their family. Now these brothers were asking that the part of the usufruct which previously the father enjoyed should be granted to them; the mother, on the contrary, claimed it for herself.

Question 1. To whom does the aforesaid usufruct devolve: to the mother, to the sons, to the daughters, to all, or finally to Francis himself?

Question 2. To whom does the whole usufruct devolve when the mother also has died?

R. To the first question: the usufruct devolves to the mother by right of accretion. To the second question: the usufruct devolves to the owner himself, for the purpose of disposing of it according to the Constitutions. Thus S. C. EE. et RR., 15 September 1837, in Bizzarri, Collect., p. 75, ed. 1885.

8. “Titius by testament established a certain and perpetual revenue for a chaplaincy in the Church of a professed house of the Society of Jesus; and he enjoins the chaplain, to be appointed for the time by the superiors of the Society, that, retaining for himself a determined sum, namely one suitable as an alms for the daily Mass to be celebrated, he should give what remains each year as an alms to the Church of the same professed house.

Question. Whether this is an obstacle to the poverty of the professed house, or of its Church?

R. It is not an obstacle, provided that there is in the hands of the Society no disposal of those revenues, and no civil right is acquired by the same Society for petitioning in court for annual alms of this kind.

All these things are had expressly in the Constitutions of the Society, part 6, chapter 2 and 1, § 6, where it is said thus: ‘No one of the Society ought, nor can he, induce anyone to leave perpetual alms to houses or churches of the same Society; and if any should leave them of their own accord, let no civil right be acquired for petitioning for them in court. But when charity on account of God has moved them to this, then let them bestow them.’ Again, that there can be no disposal of those revenues in the hands of the Society is had in the same chapter, § 2: ‘No revenues can be held as applied to anyone, not even to the sacristy or the Fabric; nor in any other manner, so that there is in the hands of the Society any disposal of them.’ And in the Declarations of the same chapter, letter B, these things are had: ‘If one of the founders of houses or churches should wish to leave certain revenues for the use of the Fabric, provided that neither the disposition of them pertains to the Society, nor there is anything from which an action concerning them belongs to it, although it would be its care that the one to whom such a duty has been committed should do his office, and so in similar matters, this would not be alien to the poverty of the Society.’ From these things the truth of this proposition is manifestly gathered: it is not against the poverty which the Constitutions of the Society require in professed houses and Churches, if these use revenues spontaneously established by benefactors, provided that the disposition of them is not in the hands of the Society, nor a right to petition for them in court.

“It is said, that the disposition ought not to be in the hands of the Society, so that care may be taken lest even colleges have revenues which they perpetually expend, whether from an obligation imposed by benefactors, or from a disposition left free to themselves, for the support of professed houses and their churches. For this is held to be against the poverty of the Society in canon 12 from decree 61 of the Seventh General Congregation. With this caution having been applied, the Society is now understood to have done whatever it can on its part for guarding the purity of its poverty against revenues spontaneously left for its benefit. It has rendered itself incapable of any right whatever in the revenues themselves; it has furthermore willed no right whatever for petitioning and exacting them. What remained for it to perform? Was it that it should not petition in any way whatever? or that it should not accept, when they were given each year? But these two things do not stand in the way of poverty. But you will say: they would be owed each year; therefore they would be like a true revenue. But the response is manifest: for they would not be owed from any right residing in the Society, but from the right of him who disposed of his goods. Thus, one who receives money from another, in order to distribute it to the poor, owes it to the poor, not from a right existing in the poor, but in the owner, especially since the poor either are incapable of right, or are unwilling to have that right. Rome, 26 June 1723. Christopher Rassler, Edward De Vitry, Antonius De Gaizenrode, John De Ulloa, John James Ghezrius.” A copy of this Resolution is preserved in the Archive of the Father Procurator General of the Society of Jesus.

9. Boniface, a regular superior, whenever his subjects ask from him permission to give some alms to the poor, or to spend something on pious causes and on pious works proper to the Order, never exceeds the quantity of a few solidi. For he says that since religious are poor, they cannot, whether in giving alms or in doing pious works, exceed the quantity proper to the poor.

Question. What is to be said to the Case?

R. Boniface’s reason, considered in itself, is true if there is question of money and other things, in great quantity, to be expended for uses wholly superfluous, vain, and unlawful. Expenses of this kind in superfluous matters, in notable quantity, are opposed to the state of religious poverty. Hence it is that, although they are made with the superior’s permission, this indeed not improbably prevents the religious from being a proprietor, since he usurps nothing without the consent of the superior; but it does not prevent there being an illicit use opposed to the vow of poverty. I say in notable quantity; otherwise the aforesaid expenditures, although unlawful from another source, are not specially opposed to poverty. Cf. Lugo, De Iustitia et Iure, d. 3, 127 ff., n. 134 ff.

But what things are called notably superfluous in this matter cannot be handed down by one general rule. For it depends on prudent judgment, with attention to the circumstances of persons, place, custom, and similar things. Hence, in an observant religion, it would be a grave sin against poverty to have, for example, gold or silver furnishings, silk garments, silk coverlets or ornaments of the bed, forty or thirty linen shirts for one’s private use, etc. For these and similar things are not fitting, but gravely unbecoming to the state of poverty which an observant religion professes. Therefore a subject having these things, even with the superior’s license, sins against the vow of poverty, not indeed because of defect of license, but because that vow is not only about not using any thing without the prelate’s license, but also about preserving the state of a poor man, and not making expenditures which do not befit the poor. Lugo, loc. cit., n. 131, 183.

With these things premised, it is clear first that, although Boniface’s reason is true considered generally, nevertheless it is applied erroneously by restricting the legitimate faculty of the superior and the legitimate use of the subject to a few solidi. Besides, it is also applied erroneously to the giving of alms and to the performing of other pious works. For these are not expenses and expenditures which are unbecoming to religious poverty. And as regards alms for the poor and needy, there is indeed no precept for religious, as there is for beneficiaries, that the superfluous be expended upon the poor and pious causes; but this is so because it is exceedingly clear that religious, who profess poverty, expend the superfluous in alms and other pious causes, which in fact is done by religious even very poor and most observant of poverty. Hence it is that they often feed even many poor daily, and build churches and Altars of great price, and establish public works of piety and mercy.

153. • I. A Religious bound by a solemn vow of poverty, namely a Religious solemnly professed in an Order approved by the Holy See, is altogether incapable in particular or personally of any dominion over a temporal thing estimable by price ¹, even with the permission of the Superior. This is established from the Council of Trent, sess. 25, ch. 2. - But the Community can acquire and possess goods, either by itself or through subjects, unless its constitutions stand in the way. Hence the well-known axiom of Canon Law: "Whatever a Monk acquires, he acquires not for himself, but for the Monastery."

¹ ** Nevertheless the Apostolic See, as is established by several examples, has dispensed that Religious even solemnly professed could validly and licitly have and retain dominion of temporal goods. And, to pass over St. Francis Borgia, who, from a dispensation obtained from Paul III, emitted the solemn vows of the Society of Jesus in such a way that nevertheless only within a four-year period after profession did he abdicate the Duchy of Gandia and the remaining temporal goods from himself (cf. the Life of St. Francis Borgia written in Spanish by Alvaro Cienfuegos, bk. 3, ch. 8, § 2, and ch. 10, § 1), we have Responses of the Sacred Penitentiary, both that given for French nuns on 28 Nov. 1818, by which the faculty is imparted that, notwithstanding the solemn vow of poverty, "... they can retain the goods and revenues which they have acquired up to now" (see Carriere, De Iust. et Iur., p. 4, sect. 1, ch. 4, n. 214), and that given on 20 Nov. 1820 for the nuns of Belgium, to whom, although solemnly professed, by the express authority of the Holy See the faculty is attributed of acquiring, possessing, and administering goods, which they may use for honorable ends, etc. (see Bouix, Tract. De Regularibus, part 3, ch. 3).

But from these things it sufficiently appears that the incapacity of a solemnly professed religious for having and exercising dominion over temporal things must be traced back not to natural or divine law, but only to ecclesiastical law. Hence St. Ignatius de Loyola added to part 6, ch. 2, of the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus a Declaration in which the faculty, even after solemn profession, of acquiring and retaining dominion, which could be obtained from the Apostolic See, is expressly mentioned. "If someone," he says, "moved by his devotion and with holy intention to the greater glory of God, before his profession were to obtain from the Apostolic See the faculty that either he himself, or the house in which he emitted profession, could have the right of succeeding to an inheritance, ... he would not be judged contrary to this Constitution or its intention."

Nor indeed ought the reason of this doctrine to seem hidden. For this must be confessed, as daily practice in the Church teaches, that dominion of temporal things is indeed compatible with a simple vow of poverty. But what is added to the simple vow, namely the solemnity of the same vow, was introduced by ecclesiastical law, as the Apostolic Constitutions openly declare. Now if solemnity is superadded to a vow by ecclesiastical law alone, is it not manifest that the force of the same solemnity, and the measure of its effects, is defined by that power from which solemnity itself proceeds, and therefore depends on the judgment of the Supreme Legislator in the Church? Therefore from the very nature of the thing it is that a solemnly professed religious exists incapable or capable of dominion according to the judgment of the supreme authority, to whose wisdom it belongs to dispose all things according to the circumstances of times, places, and persons. Cf. Marc. Struggl (Th. Moral., tr. 6, q. 5, n. 33), who concludes: Thus Sanchez, in Decal., bk. 5, ch. 2, n. 9, Card. De Lugo, De Iust., disp. 3, n. 75, and others COMMONLY.

Therefore a professed Religious is altogether unfit to exercise any act of proprietorship concerning any thing, whether of the monastery, or of parents, or of outsiders; and therefore without the Superior's permission, either general or special, he can dispose of no thing, either licitly or validly, by acceptance, donation, sale, loan for use, loan for consumption, use, exchange, improvement, etc.

159. • QUESTION 9º. What matter is to be judged grave in violation of the vow of poverty?

Resp. 1º In sins which are at the same time against Religion and justice, speaking generally, that matter must be held as grave which constitutes mortal sin in theft. - St. Ligorius, n. 24. - Lugo. - Sanchez, and others commonly.

Yet some Theologians say that that matter only is grave which is judged grave in the thefts of sons of a family, namely matter about twice greater than in thefts against outsiders. - Thus Elbel, n. 646. - But this does not seem to be admitted. The reason is that sons are in hope of the goods of the father of the family, but Religious are not. Moreover Superiors are more unwilling as to thefts of subjects than parents are about thefts of sons. Besides, graver detriments follow as to the soul in the former than in the latter ⁸. - St. Ligorius, ibid. For the rest, in order that judgment may be made about the gravity of matter in thefts of this sort, it must be noted that monasteries of middling wealth are commonly equated with rather wealthy private owners. Hence the same measure as for those generally constitutes grave matter. But if they are very wealthy, a greater quantity is required. A greater quantity is also required if a Religious usurps things of the Monastery for his own use, or gives them to others of the same Community, than if he were to disburse the same things to outsiders, because thus they remain at home. Greater also in minute thefts, which besides, with a notable interval interposed, do not coalesce into grave matter. Greater again in edible things, as we said concerning servants, tom. 1, n. 608.

⁸ ** Nevertheless the reason can have force on the contrary, that the Superior, as to the substance of the thing taken secretly, is less unwilling as to members of the household than as to outsiders. But although the condition of a Religious and of a son is different, nevertheless in this there is something similar, that the goods of the monastery are possessed for the good of the subjects, not indeed for the convenience of the Superior. Finally, as to the detriments which seem to be feared, these depend chiefly on the use of the things taken secretly; for a son can consume things taken away in gaming and whoring, and a Religious can disburse them to the poor, and vice versa.

161. Resolutions. - 1º A Religious sins against the vow of poverty if without the consent of the Superior he accepts, retains, consumes, exchanges, gives to another, or lends for use anything at home or outside, even from those things which pertain to food or clothing. Likewise if without permission of the Superior he accepts money or other things as loan for consumption or for use from outsiders.

2º He sins against the vow of poverty also who spends things obtained for some use on another use, or culpably loses or destroys them.

3º He sins against the vow who eats or drinks apud outsiders without the faculty of the Prelate; because while he accepts something without permission, he posits an act of proprietorship. Nevertheless generally he does not seem by this to sin mortally ¹⁰. - Lacroix, n. 105. - Suarez. - Sanchez, etc.

¹⁰ ** Indeed permission can be presumed without difficulty; and otherwise the Superior could perhaps be judged unwilling not so much by reason of the thing accepted by the subject as from another cause.

4º If a Religious accepts from outsiders a thing to be handed over to the Superior, he can very easily suppose presumed permission. But if he cannot suppose it, he seems to sin against poverty; nevertheless generally that sin will not exceed venial sin. - Lacroix, n. 118, etc.

5º He sins against the vow of poverty who keeps a thing accepted with permission for use beyond the limits of time fixed by the Superior; who applies it to another use with detriment of the same; who keeps a thing with the soul of an owner, namely with the intention of subtracting it from the free disposition of the Superior, for example, if he hides it lest it be seen; and indeed this one cannot be excused from this, that he had obtained permission previously.

6º He sins against the vow of poverty who without faculty of the Superior buys something even for the Community, because he acts as proprietor. Sometimes, however, he can presume permission, namely when he knows that this will be pleasing to the Superior and easy recourse to him is not open, for example, on a journey. But permission of this sort can more easily be presumed in matters of lesser moment.

7º A Religious making a journey cannot turn aside to other places outside the straight way to see curious things, unless perhaps the distance is brief and no expenses or very modest expenses must be made; but in a particular case, if a grave cause underlies, the permission of the Superior can deservedly be presumed. Otherwise he will sin both against poverty and also against obedience.

8º A Religious can accept no deposit properly so called without permission. The reason is 1º because according to the opinion of several he would make an act of proprietorship; 2º because a deposit is a contract; but a Religious without the faculty of the Superior can enter no contract concerning temporal things ¹¹.

¹¹ ** Concerning this matter Pellizzarius says (Manual. Regul., tr. 4, ch. 2, n. 232): "You will ask: Are religious prohibited by the vow of poverty from receiving money of outsiders in deposit without the permission of the Prelate? Resp., they are not prohibited if they receive it with the intention of returning it as often as the owner wishes; although this can be against obedience and religious decency if it is done secretly. Thus Diana from Suarez, Sanchez, and Faustus." And Laymann (bk. 4, tr. 5, ch. 7, n. 4): "To accept things in deposit, so that the depositor retains every right of dominion and possession and administration, is not repugnant to the vow of poverty; although in such a mode, for example, monies have been deposited apud a Religious so that he can use them after permission of the Superior has been sought and obtained; nevertheless such things are against the perfection of poverty, and for the most part against the prescription of the Rule." Lugo has the same things (De Iust., disp. 33, n. 6), who moreover (disp. 3, n. 219) warns that the Convent is not held to repair the damage when some thing deposited by an outsider apud a Religious was lost by his fault or taken away by thieves. Indeed not even if he accepted that deposit with permission of the Prelate, because the offense of a subject does not harm the Convent.

162. • 9º All gifts which are made to Religious solemnly professed are by that very fact acquired for the Monastery, not excepting legacies and inheritances, from the most known principle of Canon Law: "Whatever a Monk acquires, he acquires not for himself, but for the Monastery." This principle has force also as to other Religious within the limits of the vow of poverty, which does not take away from them the faculty of acquiring and possessing. Hence these are able to accept and acquire legacies and inheritances, although they cannot dispose of them without permission. As to the remaining donations, they come to the Monastery unless they are made specially in view of a private person and not insofar as Religious ¹². But then the Religious cannot accept without at least presumed permission, or under the condition of obtaining permission.

¹² ** The Author says this concerning Religious not solemnly professed. For donations, even if they are made as to private persons, if they are made to solemnly professed persons, come to the monastery.

10º Manual works, whatever they are, which are made by Religious, pertain to the Community. Therefore private persons, although artisans, cannot dispose of them, nor can they receive any emolument from them ¹³. The same must be said about honoraria which are attributed to Regulars for Masses or other spiritual ministries.

¹³ ** Yet sometimes Superiors are accustomed to indulge that the subject receive emolument from the wage of his labors and industry, and apply monies to his own uses. In this surely one must beware lest the devil, as not infrequent experience teaches, draw the unwary monk back from Religion to the world by these, as it were, nets or little cords.

11º Religious sin against the vow of poverty who do not apply equal care lest things conceded for their own use become worse. Say the same about those who, because of negligence, allow things committed to them by office to perish or suffer detriment.

The explanation of the vow of poverty is the most difficult of the three vows. Wherefore, for the sake of clarity, a general idea of that vow seems to have to be placed before the other explanations.

— I. General Idea of the Vow of Poverty. By the vow of poverty, the religious promises to God that renunciation of exterior goods or riches which is prescribed by the constitutions of the religion as the matter of the vow.

In the present discipline of the Church, by force of the vow of poverty, from common law:

1. Every professed is prohibited from the independent use, for his own advantage, of any thing estimable by price; that is, he can use no thing estimable by price as his own, whether that thing is his own property, or belongs to the community, or to another person.

2. Every professed acquires for his religion the temporal fruits of his own industry, so that if he alienates the same without permission, he is also held to restitution on account of violated commutative justice. And this industry, if we take the norm of the responses of the Sacred Congregation of Religious, March 16, 1922, concerning moneys which come to religious on the occasion of military service, is to be taken very broadly, concerning every emolument of one's own action, even one foreign to the religious state, and concerning every donation which seems in some way remuneratory of such action, as is a donation made in reward of military virtue.

3. Those solemnly professed are incapable of ownership and, after such profession, acquire all things for the religion, if this is capable; otherwise, for the Holy See (c. 582).

It is also common that those simply professed of themselves preserve their patrimony and are capable of new acquisition.

All remaining things vary, whether you consider ownership of goods or dispositions concerning goods.

For what goods can those simply professed acquire? Quite often, besides goods which connaturally accede to the patrimony, also any legacies and gifts made in view of their own person. Yet this rule is not universal: the faculty of scholastics of the Society of Jesus is less broad.

As to dispositions concerning revenues, the professed sometimes disposes by his own free judgment; sometimes the disposition must be approved by Superiors; sometimes it is defined by the Constitutions themselves.

But concerning goods, c. 583 establishes this: To those professed of simple vows in religious Congregations it is not lawful: "1. By an act between the living to abdicate the ownership of their goods by gratuitous title." The making of a testament is prescribed to novices of religious Congregations, c. 569, §3. As to the mode of disposing of goods, sometimes, but not always, permission of the Superior is to be sought.

As to sanctions, a disposition illicitly made can be opposed either to the vow or to ecclesiastical law alone or to the Constitutions. More easily are acts contrary to the vow by which something is illicitly acquired or kept than acts by which someone illicitly renounces goods. And because in religious Orders simple profession succeeded solemn profession, which by the vow of poverty excluded all independent acts concerning any goods whatsoever, those simply professed in religious Orders seem, as often as they act illicitly, at the same time to violate the vow, while so absolute a rule cannot commonly be applied to religious Congregations.

The Constitutions must be consulted; the way in which the vow of poverty is commonly understood in the Institute must be considered.

4. But all, with due permission, can perform acts civilly necessary, for example for possessing or acquiring common goods.

— II. The remote matter of the vow of poverty is an external temporal thing estimable by price; therefore not honor, reputation, the very industry of the religious, or the application of Mass, but indeed the fruits of industry, stipends received for the application of Mass. Manuscripts, insofar as they are retained with the person, fall outside this matter, as too much joined with the person; but if the writer wishes to separate them from his person, now donation or alienation without permission is prohibited by the vow itself. Cf. Sacred Congregation of Religious, July 13, 1913.

A work made by art, a painted picture, are matter of the vow. But a religious artist does not violate the vow who from the beginning promises or cedes to someone the work by which he will make a statue or picture, especially if the other has furnished the material.

— III. With the goods which continue to belong to the professed now set aside, the following acts violate the vow, unless they are made honest by due permission: acquisition, in such a way nevertheless that permission can easily be presumed for accepting what yields to the utility of the religion; donation and renunciation of a right already acquired, in such a way that by refusing an alms or donation not yet accepted, though it must be said otherwise of a legacy, charity alone can be injured; exchange, in such a way nevertheless that if it concerns fungible things of the same kind, such as various coins of themselves are, this scarcely seems repugnant to the vow, and, from presumed permission, is done altogether honestly; so that exchange of things wholly similar lacks grave fault, and lesser fault is present in exchanges of similar things among brothers of the same house; consumption, in such a way that if you receive and consume food or drink among outsiders themselves, probably, according to Cardinal De Lugo (De iust. et iure, d. 3, n. 53), you do nothing except a use of fact by which the vow is not injured; otherwise if you carry things home and consume them there; loan and commodatum, in such a way that, if restitution is certain and the concession has been made for a brief time, there will not have been grave violation, and less grave if you give to a brother than to an outsider; use for other ends than those which have been taxatively indicated by the prelate expressly or tacitly, as if you do not expend the whole travel allowance given for a journey and, returned home, keep it for various uses; great negligence or quasi-dissipation in using clothing, etc., or consuming things of which, as for example paper and oil, disposition is permitted to the reasonable judgment of the religious; retention of a thing beyond the time for which it is conceded, as if you retain books of common use longer, but it will not be grave if another who needs them can easily recognize the holder; concealment of a thing, even one obtained with permission, done for this reason, lest the Superior be able to take the thing away. If the thing is concealed or locked up for another end, for example lest others see it importunately, or lest a Superior of lesser grade petition revocation of the faculty, the vow will not be violated, unless the permission is judged to have been given on this condition, that nothing be closed to the immediate Superior.

— They do not violate the vow, although they can be illicit from elsewhere: administration of another's thing, made in his name; destruction of a thing, probably, if you do it merely with the mind of doing harm, taking no utility from it; acceptance of money for a pious use, whether determined, which all concede, or even, as is probable, to be defined by the religious himself, provided that he cannot use the thing also for profane uses by his own judgment; administration of a benefice, since it accedes to a spiritual thing; possession of goods in common.

What concerning a deposit properly so called, not concerning a certain simple custody of a thing furnished? A deposit seems to others repugnant to the vow, since the depositary takes on an obligation to which he cannot fully satisfy except as owner; which others deny, since it contains no act of ownership over the thing deposited.

— The permission by which the vice of proprietorship is warded off must proceed from the proper competent Superior of the religious. Wherefore, unless the constitutions subject guests to the Superior of the house in which they are staying, he will not be able to give permission except to those religious who have domicile or quasi-domicile in the house over which he presides.

Permission would be invalid if it were extorted by force or fraud. But of itself it can be general, special, express, tacit, reasonably presumed. Presumption is plainly legitimate in circumstances where the prelate is prudently judged to oppose neither the thing or substance of the fact, nor the mode by which you act, that is, permission not having first been petitioned. For then the act is made dependently upon the will of the prelate. On the contrary, permission which would be denied cannot be presumed. If the prelate, having been asked, would have conceded permission, but is opposed to the fact that you did it with himself not consulted, then either he is judged so disposed that absolutely he would not will the thing to be used by you without permission, or, the negligence being known, he would be opposed merely to the omission of permission. In the latter case, he is unwilling only as to the mode, nor is the vow injured; in the former case, he is said to be unwilling by reason of the mode as to the substance, and the vow has been violated. Displeasure which seems likely to be grave or light can be held as a sign of one or the other repugnance.

After the fact, it is of itself fitting to admonish the Superior concerning presumed permission, and not rarely the rule enjoins it. Yet to omit this is not opposed to poverty, unless the matter, not plainly past, has some successive course, as if you keep with yourself a thing accepted from a presumed faculty.

Of itself, unless otherwise established, the permission which a prelate now performing an office previously gave continues to be valid; but he cannot give permissions to himself, as to an inferior, for the later time: for he was never subject to himself.

The dissent of a greater prelate, or a simple prohibition made by the same, of itself takes nothing away from the power of a lesser prelate, who therefore can validly concede what the greater Superior has denied. Yet the latter can weaken the former's faculty in advance or after the act.

From a reasonable interpretation, express permission of receiving several medals, rosaries, and little images in number is tacit permission of distributing them; but permission made to someone of giving or receiving, when from the declaration of the Superior or from usage it is judged to regard all, consequently gives to others the faculty of receiving or giving. Yet one must act in good faith, lest one person seem to have been constituted through whom all mutual gifts, with the Superior unaware, pass. And unless the prelate has contradicted it, from tacit or presumed permission, religious can, when the prelate cannot be approached, give modest alms in grave necessity of the poor or when this seems to pertain to edification. The same must be said concerning slight donations which are, as it were, owed from gratitude, if the religious has certain goods conceded to himself for use. St. Alphonsus, l. 4, n. 21. And when, as in certain religions it has been accustomed to be done for clothing, a certain amount of moneys or things is so given for the support of the religious that neither the monastery must supply anything nor he himself render an account, or if he is staying outside the cloister, the faculty is judged conceded of giving to whomever he pleases that which by living more sparingly he has obtained as remaining over.

— IV. Grave Matter. 1. The question concerning grave injury of poverty is reputed difficult and is accustomed to be treated incompletely. For although today most religious are no longer solemnly professed, nevertheless present moral treatises are accustomed to examine only those cases which formerly were almost universal, namely of religious who can have nothing proper. Yet it is manifest that donation of a thing which a religious truly possesses cannot be assimilated to donation of a thing not possessed. Donation of the former, unless there were a positive prohibition, would not even be contrary to the vow of poverty. For by donating or abdicating, someone becomes poorer.

2. When there is question of the vice of proprietorship properly so called, or of acts which are prohibited by the vow to be done concerning things not proper to oneself, the more common opinion proposes this rule: the same quantity which would constitute grave theft is to be indicated as a grave injury of religion in one professing poverty. That rule rests upon a certain likeness between theft and sin against the vow of poverty: in each an undue appropriation is committed.

But this rule must be explained more; for there is absolutely and relatively grave matter of theft. Most take matter relatively grave, with account had of the riches or poverty of the monastery itself. Yet there is not question of estimating damage, which pertains to injustice, but of weighing neglect of due dependence upon Superiors, which seems to be the same whether the thing wrongly usurped belongs to a poor or to a rich one. Wherefore Palmieri, t. IV, whom Genicot follows, II, 98, thinks that an absolutely grave quantity must be taken. That opinion will be safe in a religion whose approved authors have defended it: the intention of those vowing can be judged accommodated to this, who can, not indeed turn light matter into grave, but attenuate the obligation which of itself would correspond to the matter.

But elsewhere we would not put it forward; for it seems to us alien from the true. For does not another relative consideration succeed in place of the relative consideration of damage or detriment brought? Both, justice and poverty, regard property, but in a different way: the former, that you may preserve another's property inviolate; the latter, that you may repel it from yourself. Therefore, just as under the former respect the question concerning grave matter is posed thus: what is notable spoliation of another, so under the other respect, which is our present one, this question must be solved: what is notable acquisition of a religious as such? But that this varies according to the manner of living of the one acquiring is manifest. And who will deny that a religious who, as a Capuchin Friar Minor, professes strict poverty sins gravely by a lesser quantity than a regular canon of a wealthy monastery? Wherefore we judge that the condition in which the religious who has sinned stands from his profession is to be attended to. Is it, as in most present religions, the condition of an honest priest? Matter grave in comparison with an honest priest will of itself have to be taken.

3. But a much greater quantity is required when a religious, without due permission, disposes of goods whose ownership he lawfully keeps. For then not so much the thing as the very distribution or administration is usurped. Wherefore: a. if he disposes for himself, we judge that he sins gravely when from this he draws a tenor of life which gravely derogates from the profession of poverty; b. but if he attributes to another, the quantity absolutely grave in the account of theft could perhaps be taken four or five times. And if the use was a work of piety, or something similar, the Superior will scarcely of himself be gravely unwilling.

4. Several things which are accustomed to make the prelate, whose permission removes the vice of poverty, less unwilling attenuate the gravity of the sacrilege, so that there is need of a greater quantity for lethal sin. Hence, if there is question of edibles and drink, especially for the present use of the religious, unless the thing was extraordinary and precious, grave fault will be absent; the fault is also of itself lighter if from common things you illicitly take for yourself or give to brothers of the same house than if you give to outsiders; if you intend a useful use than if a vain one.

And it is clear that when use alone is usurped, the value of the use is to be considered.

On the contrary, because the prelate is judged more unwilling, several wish that one sins more gravely against the vow if at the same time he has injured justice than if he has injured religion alone.

5. Small sacrileges, although often repeated, do not seem to coalesce. Yet he sins gravely from the beginning who deliberately accepts small things with the mind of progressing to grave matter; and he who, from several things preserved, has with himself a grave value which he cannot retain without grave guilt.

— A religious injures justice, whether toward the religion or toward outsiders, who damages, steals, retains for himself, or gives to others what by right belongs to the community or to others, all these things being understood as is explained in the treatise On Justice. But when the detriment belongs to his own religion, although the very severity of discipline and the lesser faculty of disposing in a prelate, who is not owner but administrator, does not allow that the religious be judged a son under family power, nevertheless, because the goods of the religion yield to the utility of the religious, their case seems able to be estimated more benignly than that of outsiders, so that you can increase somewhat, for example by half, the quantity required for grave sin.

The cases are:

a. of injury without sacrilege: as if a religious, merely from the mind of doing harm, brings damage upon another's thing, or as confessor unjustly dispenses someone from restitution;

b. of sacrilege without injury: as if the religious otherwise applies or hands over to another what he could consume unproductively for a certain end; if he takes for himself what the prelate would not have denied him; if what he has spared of money, for example on a journey, he expends otherwise in the same moral time; if from outsiders he accepts something consumable by use and offered exclusively to himself;

c. of sacrilege concurring with injury: as if he does not hand over to the religion the fruits of his own industry, for example Mass stipends received.

And grave injury can be light sacrilege, and conversely: as if a religious snatches a modest quantity from a poor person, or, conversely, takes for himself a great amount of money from a person lightly unwilling.

— Because permissions and obligations of religious are judged to have been made or undertaken for no temporal profit of the Institute but for the sake of religion, sloth or laziness of a religious does not seem to be condemned as injustice. A religious will make restitution to the community by avoiding expenses which he could lawfully make from common goods, by handing over to the community what he could have applied to other uses. Yet for that reason he must not deprive himself of things which are referred to his own honest support.

— On Common Life and on Peculium. A threefold account of common life can be distinguished. The first is had when, other things being equal, religious are clothed, fed, and treated in a morally equal way. Other things being equal, insofar as Superiors at the same time with paternal charity provide for the peculiar necessities of a weaker body, and, with attention to the end of the Institute, procure what special studies or ministries can require.

Another account is observed if religious obtain necessary things for themselves from the community, formally or equivalently. Formally, as when things are bought with common money; equivalently, as when things bought with another's money are handed over to the free disposition of the Superior, and are conceded for use to the religious for whom they were destined by the buyer only dependently upon the will of the Superior and precariously.

Finally the third account demands that things be administered commonly, and that there be no portion of common things which the religious, beyond what present necessity morally requires, is permitted to possess, administer, or hold for his own uses.

The first account of common life procures uniformity; the other, common possession; the third, common administration.

To the second and third account of common life peculium is opposed. But peculium is distinguished into that of perfect right, which the Superior now cannot take away, and that of imperfect right, which can be circumscribed or taken away by the Superior. Peculium of perfect right is opposed to the vow of poverty, just as it is commonly understood in present law; peculium of imperfect right is not of itself repugnant to the vow, but if there is question of lasting peculium and one received, as it were, by customs, it is alien from the mind of the Church. She urges everywhere the prudent restoration of common life. But a custom which is opposed to the Code cannot be tolerated unless centenary or immemorial, insofar as Ordinaries have judged this opportune.

2. Now the Code, c. 594, §1, prescribes that "in any religion common life be observed by all, even in those things which pertain to food, clothing, and furniture." Besides, in §2 it is enjoined that whatever religious, even Superiors, acquire by their own industry or by reason of religion, and whatever goods come to an Order by reason of the solemn profession of members, be mixed with common goods, and that any money and all securities be deposited in the common chest.

With this prescription of the second paragraph saved, the common life of which in §1 seems able to be understood as it is imposed by the constitutions. This is confirmed by c. 2389. For canon 2389 commands Superiors gravely to admonish, and, if amendment has not followed, to punish religious who in a notable matter violate the law of common life as prescribed by the constitutions.

— There does not exist a special virtue of poverty, since riches and the possession of them are of themselves indifferent. But excessive affection toward temporal goods, just as in another person, so also in a religious, is to be charged as a sin which, according to the varying case, will be opposed to varying virtue.

— Matter of the Vow. By the vow of chastity, which coheres intimately with the profession of sanctity, a religious is prohibited, from the motive of religion: a. from all lust, internal and external; b. from marriage during profession.

For the common understanding of the matter has it thus: that the material object of the vow is the same as that of the virtue. Yet it can happen that, with the virtue intact, only the vow of chastity is violated, and conversely. One who is bound by a simple vow contracts marriage illicitly but, with peculiar exception saved, validly. If he uses the same, he will indeed injure the vow but not the virtue of chastity. And he who, himself free of lust, induces someone to sin with another person, will have sinned against the virtue, but not against the vow.

Some charge the violation of a solemn vow as a stricter sacrilege; but that the species varies on account of solemnity is not demonstrated.

Marriages honorable of themselves, with a pact of continence and therefore with a vow of chastity, can be composed together. But in the vow of chastity of religious, a vow of celibacy is judged to be contained, as is proved by the canonical penalties themselves to be alleged immediately below.

— Juridical Effects. "Religious who have professed solemn vows attempt marriage invalidly" (c. 1073).

Besides, "a marriage not consummated between baptized persons, or between a baptized party and a non-baptized party, is dissolved... by the law itself through solemn religious profession" (c. 1119).

With a special disposition set aside, as in the Society of Jesus, a simple vow of chastity does not dirime marriage. And by no simple profession is a marriage merely ratified dissolved. But by simple profession nuptials are prohibited; and every vow of chastity of religious, since it is public, is reserved to the Holy See. Concerning the effect of dismissal or departure with indult, cf. below, nn. 154, 157.

— Penal Sanction. Those solemnly professed who presume to contract marriage even civilly only, just like persons who presume to contract nuptials with them in the same way, are punished with an excommunication latae sententiae simply reserved to the Holy See. If there is question of those professed of perpetual simple vows, the excommunication latae sententiae is reserved to the Ordinary (c. 2388).

On account of the word "presume," every ignorance, with affected ignorance alone excluded, excuses from the censure. But the Ordinary to whom the excommunication is reserved, since the Code defines nothing further, seems to be the one to whom the penitent is actually subject.

— Account of the Vow. The vow of obedience of religious is a promise made to God of the obedience which is owed in religious life.

1. Whom one must obey. By force of the vow of obedience, the religious must obey: a. that hierarchical prelate who commands him as a religious by power of jurisdiction. This is, as to Orders and Congregations of pontifical law, the Supreme Pontiff (c. 499, §1) and the regular Prelate, at least exempt; as to diocesan religions, also the bishop or quasi-bishop; b. those who are placed over the internal governance of the religion or house: therefore the religious Superior properly so called, and also, if usage bears this, others to whom the Superior has communicated his power, as to a Prior, sub-Prelate, or Minister, sub-Rector. But usage rather has it that, at least when the Superior of the house is present, he alone is to be obeyed from the vow. Yet in other matters the authority of the Superior himself, and thus the vow, could be violated.

2. The remote matter of the vow is contained in all those things which either are explicitly presented by the rule or constitutions, or belong to it reductively, insofar as they are at least very suitable for the observance of the rule: thus mutual services, suitable punishment of delicts. For religious vow obedience according to their religious manner of life. St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 104, art. 5 ad 3.

Although the matter is disputed, internal acts do not seem able to be directly prescribed, since obedience owed to man cannot exceed the mutual conversation of men, which is circumscribed by external things.

In doubts concerning power, the presumption stands for the Superior, at least when the matter belongs to the genus in which it is established that the Superior can command; in doubts concerning the honesty of the matter, if the Superior prescribes what is probably honorable, he seems to have to be obeyed, though Lessius is contrary, c. 41, n. 76. In negative doubts, let the subject simply commit himself to the governance of Superiors.

— The proximate matter of the vow of obedience comprehends precepts strictly such, which are imposed on religious as such by force of dominative power or even of jurisdiction.⁽¹⁾ Precepts strictly such, that is, by which the Superior intends to oblige conscience; on religious as such, that is, precepts which are referred to their proper state, not to the common condition of citizens or the faithful, such as precepts concerning the observing of sacred times; by force of dominative power or even of jurisdiction, so that he also will have violated the vow who has transgressed a rule obliging under sin. Yet one must see how the vow is commonly understood in the religion of the one vowing. But violation of the special law of religious or of laws which have been made for religious does not seem contrary to the vow unless it brings forth properly so-called precepts.

In many religions today, the Superior is not judged properly to command, not even under light sin, through the very words: "I strictly prescribe"; "I enjoin under precept"; but it is necessary that he command in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, or in virtue of holy obedience, or by at least some other manner clearly express his will of obliging conscience.

Therefore he sins against the vow:

1. Who impedes the precepts themselves while he tries to withdraw himself from the dominion of Superiors in perpetuity or for a time: through apostasy, flight, or by illicitly procuring his own expulsion.

2. Who virtually violates the precepts when, even on the occasion of a simple command, he absolutely declares: "I do not wish to obey, I will not do it," understanding that of every matter or of some grave matter. If he limits it to a small matter, which seems to him useless or ridiculous, the violation will not have been grave.

3. Who violates a precept obliging under sin.

Violation of the vow of obedience is sacrilege; and besides, a sin, generally light, against observance toward the Superior to whose dominative power the religious is subject. If the Superior, which he is not presumed to do, has used his power of jurisdiction in commanding, the sin will also be opposed to that virtue to which the matter prescribed pertains.

⁽¹⁾ There are those (Suarez, Rel., tr. 7, l. 10, c. 2, n. 5; Sanchez, Dec., 4. 11, 25) who think that it remains entire for the Superior, when he prescribes by force of jurisdiction, either to urge or to omit the obligation of the vow. Rather, from our very definition of religious obedience, we would take away the opposite opinion from Lugo. Cf. Lugo, Paenit., 10, 172.

— An Opportune Manner of Prescribing. It pertains to the gentle governance of Superiors that they rarely induce the guilt of sin by their precepts. But a religious who does not obey the more broadly preceptive will of the prelate, although he is not a transgressor of his vow, nevertheless will offend observance toward the Superior, charity toward the community, and humility; and habitual disobedience of this kind does not seem to be excused from grave guilt, whether on account of the sadness by which it affects the Superior and Brothers, or on account of the common detriment which it effects, or on account of the danger of expulsion which it thus prepares. It is not rarely said to transgress the virtue of obedience, or obedience commonly so called. Yet the special virtue of obedience does not intervene here.

Question 7. Does a Religious sin not only against the vow of poverty, but also against justice, who unduly expends or consumes things of the monastery?

Resp. If he expends or consumes without any, not even tacit or presumed, permission of the superior, he is guilty of violated justice, because he commits true theft by converting another's thing to his own use against the reasonable will of the owner. But if he expends or consumes, the superior permitting or conniving, but for illicit or notably superfluous uses, he certainly sins against the vow; but whether he sins against justice is controverted. St. Alphonsus with others affirms it, because such permission is invalid and void; for the superior is not the owner, but a simple administrator of the goods of the monastery. De Lugo, Elbel, and many others deny it, because, although the Prelate is only administrator of the goods, it is not established by any law, at least universal law, that the owner himself, namely the community or religious Order, wished to invalidate permission of this sort, although it altogether disapproves it. Either opinion seems probable. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 30.

Question 8. What matter is to be judged grave in violation of the vow of poverty?

Resp. 1st. In sins which are at once against religion and justice, generally speaking, that is to be held as grave matter which constitutes mortal sin in theft; and although a few theologians say that that matter alone is grave matter which is judged grave in thefts of sons of a family, namely matter about twice greater than in thefts against outsiders, nevertheless this in no way seems to be admitted. The reason is that sons are in hope of the goods of the father of the family, but Religious are not. Moreover Superiors are more, and indeed reasonably, unwilling as regards thefts of subjects than parents are concerning thefts of sons. Besides, graver detriments follow as regards the soul in the former than in the latter. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 24. - Lugo, de just. et jure, disp. 3, n. 172. - Sanchez, Decal., lib. 7, cap. 20, n. 3.

But in order that judgment be made concerning the gravity of matter in thefts of Religious, it is to be noted that monasteries moderately wealthy are commonly equated with private masters sufficiently wealthy. Hence the same measure as for them generally constitutes grave matter. But if they are very wealthy, a greater quantity is required. A greater quantity is also to be required if a Religious usurps things of the monastery for his own use or gives them to others of the same community, than if he expended them upon outsiders, because in this way they remain at home. Greater also in petty thefts, which moreover, with a notable interval interposed, do not coalesce into grave matter. Greater again in foodstuffs, as we said concerning servants.

Resp. 2nd. In sins against religion alone, or committed against the vow alone, the difficulty increases and there is greater disagreement of theologians. Nevertheless more commonly they generally require the same matter for mortal sin as in the preceding case, where justice is violated, because an act of ownership seems to be of the same gravity. Nevertheless not improbably some grave Doctors require a greater quantity for grave sin. Cf. Elbel, n. 646. Salmant., tract. 15, cap. 6, n. 12.

But they commonly agree that a much greater value is required for sinning gravely when gifts are received from outsiders to be expended upon others, because then the act of ownership is much less than if these were retained for one's own use. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 24.

You Will Resolve. 1st. A Religious sins against the vow of poverty if without any consent of the superior he accepts, retains, consumes, exchanges, or gives to another, at home or outside, anything, even from those things which pertain to food or clothing. Likewise if without the permission of the superior he accepts money or other things on loan or for use from outsiders. But as regards things received or handed over on loan or for use without the permission of the Prelate, generally speaking, he will not sin gravely against the vow of poverty if he gives things for his use to outsiders on loan or for use, provided he is certain about recovering them and does not therefore bring grave damage upon the community, which on this account, for example, lacks the use of a thing gravely necessary here and now. Much less gravely will he sin if he lends or gives for use to other Religious of the same monastery things granted to himself for use. The reason is that, although he makes some act of ownership in these things, nevertheless this is not here estimable at so great a price that it reaches grave matter, according to the common interpretation of theologians. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 27.

2nd. He sins against the vow of poverty who retains a thing accepted with permission for use beyond the limits of time fixed beforehand by the superior; who employs it for another use with detriment to it; who keeps a thing with the intention of withdrawing it from the free disposition of the superior, for example, if he hides it so that it may not be seen; and indeed this one cannot be excused from the fact that he had previously obtained permission. But, generally speaking, grave fault is not present if a thing is taken secretly from the community, for example, a book for one's own use even for a long time, but not perpetually, unless it is so hidden that it cannot be found by Superiors; because then the Prelate is not judged unwilling as regards the substance, but only as regards the manner. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 24.

3rd. He sins against the vow of poverty who, without the faculty of the superior, buys something even for the community, because he acts as an owner. Sometimes, however, he can presume permission, namely when he knows that it will be pleasing to the superior and easy recourse to him is not open, for example, on a journey. But permission of this sort can more easily be presumed in matters of lesser moment, and much more easily still if there is question of a thing to be accepted from outsiders and handed over to the superior. - Cf. Lacroix, lib. 4, nn. 118 and seq.

4th. A Religious cannot accept any deposit properly so called without permission. The reason is both because according to the opinion of many he would make an act of ownership, and because a deposit is a contract; but a Religious without the faculty of the superior cannot enter into any contract concerning temporal things. - Many, however, think that this is not against the vow, although it is against the perfection of poverty and for the most part against the rule. - Cf. Suarez, de Relig., tract. 7, lib. 8, cap. 11, n. 45.

5th. If a former superior gave you permission to have some thing, it still has force, even if he has departed from office. - Cf. Lacroix, n. 115.

6th. If you have permission to give something to Paul, and you give it to Peter, you do not sin, unless the superior gave permission for Paul because of a peculiar reason and would have denied it if you had asked this for Peter. - Cf. Lacroix, n. 119.

7th. If Titius the Religious has permission to give something to anyone whatsoever, Caius of the same community by this very fact has the faculty of accepting, because to give and to accept are correlatives, and therefore permission for one is judged also to be for the other.

8th. Concerning manuscripts, certain recent replies are to be kept before the eyes:

"Religious belonging to Institutes of simple vows are held by the same laws as Regulars of solemn vows as regards the Imprimatur, or good-pleasure, to be requested from their Superiors, whenever they desire to publish some manuscript of their own." And as often as "publication of some manuscript has been interdicted" by their Superiors, they cannot "hand the same manuscript to some printer who publishes it with the Imprimatur of the local Ordinary, the author's name being suppressed." - S. Cong. de Relig., 11 June, 1911.

It was asked of the same Congregation: "Whether Religious, both of solemn vows and of simple vows, who during vows have written out some manuscript, have dominion of the same in such a way that they can give it or alienate it by any title whatsoever?" and the answer was: Negative, 13 July, 1913. These replies are connected with one another. Cf. the preface to the last one in the context itself. The most recent reply simply excludes the case of a Religious who, permission to print a manuscript having been denied, gives it to a friend, and this friend, having been made owner of it, sees to the printing. Therefore from that reply a Religious cannot give to another, or alienate by any title whatsoever, a manuscript written out by himself during vows. Indeed the Sacred Congregation is not speaking of a manuscript work by a Religious who has been assigned to writing by mandate of the superior, nor of a work of no value. For as regards the first, no one affirms that he can alienate it, just as no one denies it of the second. A manuscript written out seems altogether to be taken as signifying either some complete work composed by industry with labor, or something similar, which by law can be the object of a contract. Moreover the reply is expressed entirely cautiously: "written out during vows"; nothing is said concerning others, concerning which certainly he is obliged now as before, neither more nor less, at least when this reply is considered; it is said, "Whether . . . they so have dominion of the same that they may give it, etc." To which the Congregation responded: "Negative." Therefore the decree is not opposed to the doctrine contained in Question 3. - Cf. De Religiosis, Periodica, v. 7, p. 165. - Nouvelle Rev. Theol., v. 45, p. 709. - Ferreres, n. 156.

Note. - Let these things be said concerning religious poverty in general; but in particular attention must be given to the constitutions of individual Orders or to the custom tolerated by Superiors; for in many monasteries it is generally permitted to Religious to ask, accept, or procure for themselves many things necessary for food, clothing, books, and other things of this kind.

I. The vow of poverty is the first foundation of the regular life. The matter of that vow is the abdication of temporal things, manifested by Christ the Lord, Matthew 19: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor. The other two counsels — of cultivating virginity, and of abnegating one's own will and subjecting oneself to a man's authority — the divine Master expressed in few words. But the very method by which the Apostles and the first Christians committed to execution the evangelical counsel of poverty the Evangelist Luke describes clearly and distinctly, Acts 2: And all they that believed were together, and had all things common. Their possessions and goods they sold, and divided them to all, according as every one had need. More fully does the holy Evangelist express this form of poverty in chapter 4: And the multitude of believers had but one heart and one soul: neither did any one say that aught of the things which he possessed was his own; but all things were common unto them. … For neither was there any one needy among them. For as many as were owners of lands or houses sold them, and brought the price of the things they sold, and laid it down before the feet of the apostles. And distribution was made to every one, according as he had need.

I. Riches and evangelical poverty are no less opposed than chastity and luxury. Wherefore Christ said: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor. To sell and to retain — do they not mutually fight in hostile fashion? Do not these two — to sell all things, as all the Fathers interpret, which the Gospel itself has clearly and perspicuously published, and to retain some things — constitute a monstrous chimera? And yet this chimera is familiar. Before young men make profession, they reserve to themselves life-rents, richer or smaller, as the domestic patrimony permits.

II. They reply that they reserve these revenues not for themselves but for the Religion. For the Religion has the absolute dominion of these revenues, but the Religious the pure and mere use, by the licence and faculty of Superiors. But dominion, and not the mere use of fact, fights with the vow of poverty. Rightly and prettily. What fills and saturates our appetitions — dominion or use? Dominion absolutely is sterile, and is uniquely sought on account of use. If you separate dominion from use, it becomes futile and vain. I would most easily concede to you a most perfect dominion, provided the Religion always had the use of the moneys. What would that dominion in such a case profit you? If a husband had the dominion and another the use of his wife, would he keep chastity? The husband with his dominion would be continent and chaste; the other with his sole use would fulfil venery.

III. They insist that the Superior can at his nod revoke this use. Excellently. But he never revokes it, as experience establishes. If Superiors could revoke at their nod the use of a private purse, why do they not revoke it? Why do they not bring in community at nightfall? Why do they not obey the decrees of so many Councils and Supreme Pontiffs? I have already exhibited a perspicuous answer.

I. QUESTION I. Are games of dice and of chance lawful to Regulars? ANSWER. That Religious can indulge in games which consist in jesting speech and sportive deeds, which exercise the body, and which are directed to gladdening the spirit and restoring strength, all with St. Thomas, II-II, q. 168, art. 2, concede.

II. On the contrary all theologians and all the Rules approved by the Apostolic See most severely forbid games of dice to Religious bound by the vow of poverty. By the name of dice all games of chance are understood. What of this, that these games are forbidden to Christians themselves; nay all the heathen Philosophers execrated games of this kind, as I have made plain in Vol. VII of the Christian Theology? The Constitutions of the Order of Preachers condemn to the penalty of prison Brethren who shall have been found playing at dice, no otherwise than those guilty of the flesh and of theft. A game of chance is the fruit of avarice alone and of a desire of growing rich. What is more adverse to evangelical poverty than this desire of increasing riches?

III. QUESTION II. Whether it repugn the vow of poverty that Regulars have silver instruments, as spoons, a knife, a fork, a box for tobacco, watches, and things of that kind? ANSWER. All these things are opposed to the solemn vow of poverty, and overturn the state of monastic discipline. For poverty and the preciousness of gold and silver directly fight. These things are discovered by their own nature. All the monastic Rules forbid the use of gold and silver in instruments of this kind. The Constitutions of the Order of Preachers, distinction 1, chapter 10, prescribe these things: Let no Brother or Sister of our Order, of whatsoever grade (N.B.) or condition he be, use spoons and instruments of gold or silver, or even of precious stones, whether at table, or in girdles, or in cloaks, or in knives or their sheaths, or in any other utensils of things whatsoever. But if any transgressors of these things be found, let them be utterly deprived of those instruments, and let them be applied to the community, and let the transgressors moreover be GRAVELY punished. A grave punishment supposes a grave fault. Nor should you object that constitutions of this kind do not oblige to fault. Constitutions do not oblige to fault which do not expose the vow of poverty. But that vow binds to fault, and indeed a grave one. Do you dare therefore to condemn a use so common? Not I, but regular discipline; not I, but the vows which have marked your lips for God, detest all the aforesaid. But Religious learned and upright use these instruments. What thence? They sin the more gravely, because by their own doctrine and probity they inflict a graver scandal upon the rest of the little ones.

BASSEUS, v. Furtum, 2. num. 6., says that a religious who takes things of the monastery that are not necessary, or without leave, is a thief to the same extent as laymen stealing their own goods.

Religious indeed do not undergo the lot of servants, but of sons, as D. Bonaventure teaches in Apolog. pauperum, respon. 3. cap. 1., and it is clear ex C. litteris, de sepultur. in 6. et Leg. qui in potestate, ff. de testamen. et Authent. Ingressi. Cod. de Sacrosanctis Ecclesiis, Nauar. cap. Non dicatis 12. quaest. 1. num. 61., Sanchez l. 7. de Relig. cap. 21. num. 31., Rebell. p. 1. lib. 3. quaest. 15. s. 8. 3. num. 22. Hence the jurists do wrong when they count them among their own, wishing that whatever they acquire should accrue to the monastery, in the manner of servants.

From these texts the Doctors deduce, as is indicated quaest. 4. in fine, that thefts of religious are to be considered in the manner of thefts of sons of the family, not of the very rich, but of the middling, and consequently that five silver pieces, or thereabouts, are grave matter; although Caspensis, cited there, requires something more, and Fagundez l. 7. cap. 5. num. 15. two hundred denarii, that is, ten crowns.

ONE of the conditions excusing religious from theft and from proprietary guilt is that it be of edible things for one's own use; if this is licit for servants, as I showed quaest. 5., much more is it licit for sons to consume some edibles.

But for giving away, they held that one ought not exceed the value of three giulii: so thought Bartholom. a S. Fausto Thesauro, l. 8. quaest. 218. and Paulinus Berti on the Bull of Clement VIII on the giving of gifts. See also Fabrum in 4. disput. 45. cap. 5. num. 122. and Diana p. 1. Tract. de paupertate Religiosa, resol. 14.

IN MY judgment the opinion of Suarez seems discerning, T. 3. de relig. l. 8. cap. 11. num. 41., where he thus asserts:

Of the goods of the monastery, consumable in use, namely those pertaining to food and drink, if something is taken by religious for their own actual, so to speak, and transitory use, it does not regularly seem to be mortal sin, unless the damage to the Religion would be excessive, and in something extraordinary and more precious; outside a case of this kind, the things are considered of lighter condition. And although the prelates dislike this, they are not yet so unwilling that they regard it as grave matter in respect of poverty, but only in respect of decorum and religious perfection.

IT IS ADDED that religious are treated as sons as regards the use of such things; but between parent and son a similar act is not considered grave; it would be otherwise, however, if such things were taken in great quantity, and retained secretly, and little by little consumed, for that could be grave sin, although great prudence is necessary to discern it in the particular case. So Suarez, with whom Diana is pleased, p. 1. Tract. 6. de paupertate, resol. 30. See also Sanchez T. 2. l. 7. cap. 19. num. 53., Tanner 2. 2. disp. 7. quaest. 1. dub. 4. num. 106., where he says: Not even all the severity of Prelates can render such takings, as regards the substance of the thing taken, unjust. See again Diana ibi, resol. 35.

LEDESMA in addit. ad Summam, Tom. 2. cap. 4. and Cenedo tract. de paupertate Religiosa, dub. 20. num. 10. place eight or nine reales as matter deadly for religious; but they require a greater quantity in edibles.

RODRIQUEZ, however, Summa Tom. 4. cap. 118. num. 27. et 29., prescribes the sum of two gold coins for religious; the same Sotus taught, de Iust. l. 4. quaest. 3. ad 3., as did Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 66. art. 6. conclus. 3.; but Diana is not pleased with it, resol. 36.

BASSEUS, with Miranda, in Manuali prael. t. 1. quaest. 28. art. 17., thinks that a notable quantity in the thefts of religious is to be determined in the particular case, according to the difference of times, places, persons, Religions, and other circumstances, at the judgment of a good man. But Mendoza quaest. 8. posit. de paupertate, concl. 9. num. 12. teaches that two silver pieces are not a notable quantity. Ioan. de la Cruz de statu relig. l. 1. c. 3. dub. 5. and Sanchez Summa Tom. 1. l. 7. cap. 20. num. 3. et 6. think it to be four silver pieces. Diana subscribes. Bartholomaeus a S. Fausto l. 8. quaest. 193. num. 2. says that in the richest monasteries three silver pieces, in monasteries moderately endowed two silver pieces, but in poor ones one suffices for mortal proprietary guilt.

But our SANCTES, most poor, set one giulio, in cap. 6. Regulae; he did not remember that these thefts are committed against the most wealthy Pontiff. I confess, however, that they are committed from the pantry of the poor.

This is indeed a most poor opinion; for no one so religious is oppressed by it, nor does he himself rightly cite Navarrus. But this Doctor, in this as in many other decisions of the Rule, is severer than is altogether just.

Diana ADDS, resol. 41., ex Ioan. Cruz de statu relig. lib. 1. comp. 3. dub. 3. concl. 3., that a religious may take a meal or other edibles, from Lopez in Instruct. p. 1. cap. 6., who says: A religious may receive from laypersons some gifts of electuaries, or of heartening confections, two little vessels, or a pair of partridges, or hens, or something similar; but because in edibles of great value leave is not so easily presumed to be granted by the Superior, therefore one must proceed cautiously in such a case.

These things seem to me to be in the mind of D. Bonaventure, in 4. dist. 15. p. 2. art. 2. quaest. 1., and in this way is to be understood canon. 12. quaest. 1., where it is said: It is certain that a monk ought to have, or give, or receive nothing without the leave of his superior, unless perhaps he who is in need is in extreme necessity; then he ought not obey the Abbot, for he would plainly act against God. There he also teaches that there is no proprietary guilt unless it is expressly against the will of the Prelate. And he adds, cap. 2. speculi animae, these words: Fourthly, concerning the theft of religious in the retention of their own property, it must be noted what Augustine says, serm. 1. ad Fratres in Eremo, about religious: If anyone conceal a thing entrusted to him, he shall be condemned by judgment of theft; but I understand this concealing, and having as one's own, when it is so concealed that, even if the Prelate should command in virtue of holy obedience that it be revealed, it would still be concealed. Nor do I otherwise understand it as mortal, unless when it is retained against the preceptive will of the Prelate. This must also be noted of religious, and stewards, and sons of the family, and wives, that they can commit theft if they notably damage the owners of goods in dispensing, against the will and intention of the owners; but when, out of an eye to piety, and even in procuring the common good, without evil intention, they give or dispense some things, it is not to be judged mortal. The same, from D. Augustine, he reports in speculo disciplinae ad Novitios, p. 1. cap. 4.

Where you have, first, that religious are numbered together with sons and wives in this matter. Secondly, that not only is presumed leave not necessary to avoid theft and religious proprietary guilt, but that retention against the will of the Prelate is required, even if it were preceptive, for him to be a proprietor.

This is indeed a tacit leave, while the prelates do not forbid, and it suffices, because tacit and express leave have the same force, Leg. cum quod, ff. de rebus creditis, et cap. 2. de rescriptis, and so teach Sanchez l. 7. de Relig. cap. 9. num. 7. and Fagundez lib. 7. cap. 5. num. 12., who add that the use and received custom introduced in religion, of giving and receiving without leave for licit uses, excuses religious. The same must be said with respect to retention.

WHEREFORE the principal sign of proprietary guilt, which is to retain something without legitimate leave, as Navar. teaches, C. non dicatis, 12. quaest. 1., Suarez de Relig. T. 3. l. 8. cap. 12. num. 2., as is had in C. Monachi, de statu Monachorum, is removed, if he receives and retains with this intention, that if the Prelate should command, he would not wish to retain it.

For the S. Doctor considered that the grave penalties there enjoined are not to be imposed for any omission whatever of leave. For there it is ordered that they be removed from the altar unless they repent, and that in death they be deprived of suffrages and of Ecclesiastical burial if they die in that state, and in life be deprived for two years of active and passive voice, and formerly they were expelled from the monastery, as is had in cap. cum ad Monasterium. It is true that this penalty was corrected by cap. Finale de regularibus, as Sanchez notes, l. 7. de Relig. cap. 20. num. 77., and Abbas on the aforesaid C. Cum ad Monasterium, num. 13., and Fagundez cap. 5. num. 13.

Sanchez notes very well, however, that the penalties of proprietary guilt are not incurred by those who give or receive without leave, but only by those who possess their own property; of these the C. Monachi speaks.

It must also be noted, in order to incur these penalties of proprietary guilt, that any private property whatever, or proprietary guilt, does not suffice, but it is required that a monk be found to have a great private store. But how great that store ought to be is not found treated among the Doctors, as Fagundez says, num. 4.; it is only found in Ioannes Andreas, C. cum ad Monasterium, de statu Monach. numer. 4., Hostiensis numero 7., Anchar. num. 10., and others, that a proprietary monk is to be buried outside the Church with some part of money and of his own store found, in these words: Let thy money be with thee unto perdition. And they add that this part ought to be thirty silver pieces, because Christ the Lord was sold at that price, that is, three ducats. From this you have that the quantity ought to be much greater for one to be a proprietor; and thus Fagundez thinks it could be thirty ducats.

Secondly, a religious is EXCUSED from proprietary guilt by the presumed will of the superior for that occasion, and a certain epieikeia is said to apply. For this, however, it is necessary that the matter be pressing, and that the Superior be absent, so that he cannot be approached. So teaches D. Bonavent. p. 1. Speculi disciplinae ad Novitios, cap. 4. in fine, D. Thom. 2. 2. quaestione 32. articul. 8. ad 1., Lessius Tom. 1. lib. 2. cap. 41. de statu religion. dub. 9., Lopes p. 1. cap. 156., Rodriquez Tomo 2. summae, cap. 31., whom Fagundez cites and follows, in septimum Praeceptum, l. 7. cap. 5. num. 20. Hence Suarez says, Tomo 3. de Relig. lib. 9. cap. 9. num. 28.: If a necessity of relieving a parent, gravely suffering and in need, should befall a Friar Minor of St. Francis, by accepting money offered by someone, and then he has no opportunity of going to his superior, and there is no hope of having another similar occasion, he may accept that money by epieikeia; he affirms the same moreover if the superior should unjustly deny him leave.

But they ASK: whether one who has applied epieikeia in this manner is bound afterwards to report to the superior. It is answered with D. Bonav.: if the thing still exists, and the superior can revoke or amend it, he is bound to report to the superior, that he may not be a proprietor. The same thought Sanchez de Relig. lib. 7. cap. 19. num. 8. and Fagundez num 22.

But if he would probably not believe that the superior would revoke or amend it, he is not bound to approach him, even if the thing still exists. So Sanchez and Fagundez loc. cit., Nauar. in commentario, 2. num. 20. de regular. mendic. quaest. 8. quodlib. concl. 8., Graffius p. 1. l. 3. cap. 5. num. 54.

Further, to receive or to give with this intention, that afterwards we may wish to ask leave, the S. Doctor judges not altogether safe, loco adducto.

We have seen the SANCTITY of this Vow, and its antiquity, disp. 2. quaest. 3.

Religious POVERTY is a voluntary renunciation of temporal goods, as to dominion at least, and ownership independent of the will of superiors. So Suarez tract. 3. de Rel. lib. 8. cap. 7. and Valencia disp. 10. quaest. 4. puncto 9.

One must perceive well, however, what you promise by this vow, so that from it you may know in what way it can be violated.

A LORD, or proprietor, first has the free faculty of using a thing at his own discretion without injury to another, which would be against commutative justice, and by this faculty someone is constituted a lord, as it were in first act, as is clear from the definition of dominion given, Tract. de Iust. disp. 27. quaest. 1.

SECOND he uses the thing independently of the will of another, whereby he is lord of the thing, as it were in second act. Now Religious renounce both by the vow of Poverty: For they promise that they will neither have nor receive that free faculty over any thing, nor even use anything independently of the will of a superior. So Valencia loco cit. and Sylvester V. Religio 6. num. 2.

Hence it will easily be judged in which cases Poverty is violated, of which I shall treat. For a religious is forbidden to have direct or useful dominion, or possession in money, or a thing worth money, whether movable or immovable, or independent use. Rodriquez tract. 3. qq. quaest. 19. art. 3. et 4. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 41. num. 78. Sanchez lib. 7. moral. cap. 18. num. 25. Miranda tract. 1. quaest. 18. art. 1. Faust. in thesauro lib. 8. quaest. 12. Basseus V. Pauper. num. 1. adding meanwhile that a religious retains dominion, or the right of honor, of fame, the right of electing, presenting, and consenting; likewise to hold a regular benefice, and spiritual jurisdiction, and to be able to act in his own name for acquiring, retaining, recovering such rights.

INNUMERABLE cases are to be defined here, and so this question must be treated more broadly.

NOTE first, from what was said in question 1 from the obligation induced by the vow, by what means it is violated. The vow of Poverty therefore strips one of all dominion, and of use independent of the free will of the Superior. Wherefore anyone whatsoever usurping some dominion, or use independent of the will of the Superior, will be guilty of rashly violating Poverty.

NOTE secondly, that the will of the superior grants the disposition of some thing in two ways: first expressly, second tacitly, or interpretatively, as D. Bonaventure teaches in the Apology of the Poor, cap. 3. of the fourth response. The will is express, when the Superior expressly grants the faculty by word, in writing, or by signs. The tacit interpretative, or presumed will, is that by which the superior, knowing and able to object, freely permits something; and for that reason we can act, interpreting the will of the Superior, which we morally presume not to resist, and which, if he knew this were being done, he would not refuse, nor would he demand that an express faculty be sought. And this has been introduced chiefly from the custom of doing these things without a sought faculty, as D. Bonav. notes in the opuscula cited, and Bassaeus V. Paupertas, num. 3. It is gathered also from the circumstances of the superior: whether he be discreet, whether gentle, whether friendly. From the circumstances also of the subject: whether he be upright and serious. From the things themselves: whether they be studious, whether useful to the Religion, etc.

But OBSERVE, as Faustus notes in the treasury, lib. 8. question 162, and Bassaeus loc. cit., and Rodrig. part. 3. on the Vow of Poverty, that the Religion in which these things occur must be keenly observed; for what in this one will be venial, or free from fault, in another will be mortal. The customs also must be observed: whether they were introduced and kept by the God-fearing, or rather are corruptions and abuses creeping from the looser morals of the age into the Religion, which the Prelates tolerate for the sake of peace, lest seditions be stirred up. Truly these faculties do not have the character of a privilege in the manner of one, so that they be given and diffused to all by communication; for although all vow Poverty, some vow a stricter one than others, as I showed in question 1, and where the pledge is equal, the observance is not equal.

THEREFORE against the vow of Poverty a Religious sins if he accepts, keeps, consumes, exchanges, or gives away any thing whatsoever, whether of the Religion, or from outside, without the tacit or express consent of the superior: Azor. tom. 1. lib. 12. cap. 12. Valent. d. 10. question 4. point 3. Sanchez lib. 7. moral. cap. 19. Less. lib. 2. cap. 1. num. 78. Bassaeus num. 2. Arag. with D. Thom. 2. 2. question 32. art. 8. Diana on Poverty resol. 31. part. 1. Laym. lib. 4. tract. 5. cap. 7. Sanchez lib. 7. moral. cap. 18.

It is PROVED from the first noting, because he promised the opposite.

THEN among consumable things are also foods, to the grave loss of the Religion; which if they are taken from outside, it is against Poverty; but if from the Monastery, it will also be theft. Yet these are not to be weighed with so delicate a scale, that if anyone, even with a companion, frequently consumes them by eating, it be mortal (except if grave loss were inflicted). Thus Suarez Tom. 3. on Religion lib. 8. cap. 11. num. 41. Tannerus adds 2. 2. d. 7. question 3. d. 4. num. 106. Nor can any severity of the Prelates render such acceptances, with respect to the substance of the thing accepted, iniquitous. Caramuel subscribes d. 60. num. 888.

RESTRICT however, if the Religion were poor, as Barthol. a Sancto Fausto says of himself in the treasury lib. 8. question 110. Sayrus lib. 9. cap. 16. num. 20. Bassaeus num. 3.

But WHAT quantity is required for it to be mortal, Diana does not determine first part. on Poverty resol. 30, nor Faustus, nor Sayrus, nor even Bassaeus.

Caius, born in Belgium, entered a religious order of solemn vows in the English province with the intention of devoting himself to the foreign missions. When his studies were completed, he made solemn profession, and after a year received news of his father’s death in Belgium and of the legitimate portion of his father’s goods falling to him according to Belgian laws. But since regulars in Belgium, notwithstanding even a solemn vow of poverty, remain capable of ownership by a pontifical dispensation, Caius doubted whether he himself could enter upon the inheritance or not. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a vow?

2. What are the effects of the vow of poverty, and which of these are from the nature of the vow and which from ecclesiastical law?

3. How is the solemnity of the vow of poverty compatible with the capacity to have ownership?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. This question is answered in “Manual of Moral Theology,” vol. i, p. 246.

2. What are the effects of the vow of poverty and of these which follow from the nature of the vow, and which follow from positive ecclesiastical law?

By the vow of poverty the Religious makes a voluntary renunciation of temporal goods that have pecuniary value.

It belongs to the essence of such a vow that the Religious should not retain any independent use of such temporal goods, and the unlawfulness of such use independently of the will of the Superior is therefore a necessary effect of the vow of poverty. Ownership of property is not necessarily repugnant to religious poverty, provided that there be no independent use of it. But by ecclesiastical law the solemn vow of poverty makes the Religious incapable of possessing property as his own individually; he becomes civilly dead; individually he can neither own, acquire, or dispose of property that has pecuniary value. As a member of a corporation he remains capable of corporate ownership.

3. How is a solemn vow of poverty compatible with capacity for ownership ?

As has just been said, the incapacity for ownership is not a necessary effect of the vow of poverty by itself; it is a creature of positive ecclesiastical law. The whole distinction between solemn and simple vows, and therefore their different effects, are derived from positive law (C. un. de voto et voti redemp. in 6to). Hence if the Pope so wills it, for good reason a Religious may be under a solemn vow of poverty, and yet by special provision he may be capable of owning property, provided that he has not the independent use of it.

4. The case. Caius was born in Belgium, but entered the English province of a Religious order with solemn vows. After his profession he heard that his father was dead and that the legitimate part of his father's property had devolved on him according to Belgian law. Even solemnly professed regulars in Belgium are capable of succeeding personally to such property by dispensation, as Leo XIII declared, July 31, 1878.¹ Caius doubted whether he could accept his legitim or not. The words of the Pope’s decree are: “All and each of the regulars of Belgium of both sexes, even those who have pronounced solemn vows, validly and lawfully exercised and exercise all the aforesaid acts (to acquire, retain, and administer goods, and to dispose of them).” However, Caius belongs to the English province of his order, and he can not be called a “regular of Belgium.” “Moreover, the regulars of Belgium appear to be all those who are admitted into a community of Belgium,” says Fr. Vermeersch.² Therefore the legitim of Caius lapses just as if he were dead.

1 Lehmkuhl, vol. i, no. 524.

2 De Relig. Instit., vol. i, n. 243.

Caius, a religious, was visiting Titius, his old friend, whom he found dying. As Caius was about to leave, Titius called him back and said that in his will he had left him one thousand pounds sterling. Caius had already sought his dismissal from the Order, which he expected would take place within a few weeks; hence he asked Titius to arrange for the legacy to be paid to a certain bank, to be delivered to him whenever he should ask for it. After receiving his dismissal, Caius sought and received the legacy; anxious, however, as to whether this was lawful and valid or not, he consulted a confessor about the question. Hence it is asked:

1. What is the vow of poverty, and what are its effects?

2. How is the gravity of sins against poverty measured?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is the religious vow of poverty and what are its effects?

The essence of religious poverty consists in the voluntary renunciation of personal and independent ownership and use of property for love of Jesus Christ. The effects of the solemn vow differ from those of the simple vow. The effects of the solemn vow are to render the Religious incapable of individual and personal ownership of any property that has money value. The simple vow does not deprive the Religious of the direct, but of the indirect ownership of property; so that he can not lawfully use or dispose of anything that has a money value without the leave of his superior.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 649 f.

2. How is the gravity of sins against poverty measured?

By the same rule that measures the gravity of sins against justice, for as the malice of theft consists in taking what belongs to another against his reasonable wish, so the malice of sins against religious poverty consists in disposing of property without leave of the Superior against one’s promise made to God and against that Superior’s wish.²

3. The case. If Caius was under solemn vows at the time when the legacy was paid in to the bank at his request he has no right to keep the money except with the leave of the Order to which he belonged. For in that case the legacy belongs to his Order: Quidquid monachus acquirit non sibi sed monasterio acquirit. If, however, he was only under simple vows he was capable of receiving the legacy validly, as his personal property, and he may keep the money as his. Whether in accepting the legacy he sinned or not against his vow of poverty depends on whether he had at least the reasonably presumed leave of his superior or not.

‘Ibid., p. 651.