A Cardinal Virtue

Justice

St. Thomas treats it at II-II, qq. 57-122. See also every passage on the topic page.

How the Authors Compare

Vindicative justice divides them most. Prümmer sets out three opinions and concludes “let each one abound in his own sense” (II, n. 71). Noldin says it can “in no way” be “numbered as a fourth species among the subjective parts of justice” (n. 272). Merkelbach ascribes a fourth species to “Some among more recent authors, after Schmalzgrueber” and reduces it to the three (II, n. 256). Wouters reduces it to legal justice, “unless, which seems not altogether improbable, it must be held as a special virtue and a potential part of justice” (n. 382). St. Thomas assigns public vengeance to commutative justice and private vengeance to the annexed virtue (II-II, q. 80). McHugh-Callan has it “elicited by commutative justice” (n. 1707); Marc says it “primarily pertains to legal justice”, yet often to commutative justice too (n. 400); Sabetti counts it among four justices, but adds that “many do not hold vindicative justice as a peculiar species of justice distinct from the others” (n. 346). Concina divides it: in the judge or prince vindicative justice “is an act of true commutative justice; but in the persons injured it is not true justice, but a potential part of the same”, with St. Thomas (IX, diss. I, ch. III, n. V, IX, diss. I, ch. III, n. VI).
Social justice is named differently. Merkelbach holds it “nothing other than legal justice” and says of those who also call distributive justice social, “but not rightly” (II, n. 256). Noldin reports both uses, “either legal justice” or “at the same time legal and distributive justice” (n. 272). Prümmer and Wouters give it as another name for legal justice (II, n. 71, n. 382).
Merkelbach rejects the opinion that “only commutative justice” is justice strictly so called (II, n. 256). Wouters reports both sides of the question, noting that some deny a true division because “the reason of justice is found perfectly in commutative justice alone” (n. 382). Marc calls distributive justice “imperfect justice, because it is not founded upon strict right, but upon a debt of fittingness”, and says legal justice “falls short of the notion of perfect justice” (n. 400). Sabetti: the other justices share in commutative justice, “which alone is such strictly”, and those who break the laws “are called rebels or wicked, but not unjust” (n. 346). McHugh-Callan: “Particular justice partakes more of the nature of justice” (n. 1703). Noldin calls the right of distributive justice less strict, “although both are true right, properly so called and perfect” (n. 270). Concina: that legal justice “is not justice in the whole rigour of the term the Salmanticenses and others contend; but the opposite opinion is to me the more probable”, though “the right of distributive justice is imperfect, founded not in the thing or to the thing” but in fitness (IX, diss. I, ch. III, n. III, IX, diss. I, ch. III, n. VII). Billuart: particular justice is divided into commutative and distributive “as into essentially distinct species”, the distributive rendering what is owed “not simply, but secundum quid” (On the division of justice, n. 2, On the division of justice, n. 4).
They count the annexed virtues differently. Merkelbach gives “eight” principal ones, adding penance to religion and mercy to liberality (II, n. 258). Wouters counts “nine” with penance as its own (n. 384). Prümmer gives three and six, with penance “closely related to vindication” (II, n. 73). Noldin alone lists obedience among them apart from observance (n. 273).
St. Thomas calls doing good and declining from evil “quasi-integral parts” (II-II, q. 79, a. 1). Merkelbach adds that they are “proper to justice itself” because in the other virtues to do good is the same as to avoid evil (II, n. 250). Prümmer notes that “Some modern authors enumerate as integral parts of justice constitutive justice” and “restitutive justice, which repairs injured justice”, against St. Thomas's two (II, n. 72).
Whether legal justice is a special virtue. St. Thomas: it “is a special virtue in respect of its essence”, though “virtually general” (II-II, q. 58, a. 6). Prümmer reports “those who think that this general justice is not a special virtue” and answers that it is held “better and more rightly” to be one (II, n. 71); so Merkelbach, Wouters and Marc; Noldin: it is called general “not because it has no special object” (n. 272); McHugh-Callan: “Essentially, it is a distinct virtue” (n. 1702). Bontempi names Buridan, who “thinks that Legal Justice is any virtue whatever” as it serves the common good (Whether justice is a special virtu, n. 13), and holds against him that it “is not a general virtue” (Whether justice is a special virtu, n. 15). Vermeersch calls it “a general virtue, lacking special matter and commanding in the matter of all virtues” (n. 349), and gives the good acts citizens do freely for the common good to piety and the other virtues: “This escapes not a few writers today” (n. 347).
By which justice the ruler makes good laws. St. Thomas puts legal justice “in the sovereign principally and by way of a mastercraft” (II-II, q. 58, a. 6); Merkelbach: in the prince “principally and, as it were, architectonically” (II, n. 260); Noldin: the prince exercises it “by prescribing those things which are necessary for procuring the common good” (n. 272); Prümmer: by its command “the prince establishes good laws” (II, n. 71). Vermeersch: “to establish good laws, to administer well the republic or the Church is for rulers an office of commutative justice” (n. 347); legal justice only disposes princes “to fulfilling their own office of commutative justice” (n. 349).
What right is, and which sense comes first. St. Thomas: “jus” first meant “the just thing itself” (II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 1); Merkelbach: “Properly, and indeed in its primary signification, that which is just” (II, n. 149). Noldin puts the power first: “Right, in its proper and primary sense, signifies the inviolable moral power” (n. 266). What it essentially is: Merkelbach, “a moral preference” by which one is preferred to all others in the use of a thing (II, n. 151), as Lugo taught; Bontempi reports Lugo, that right “is nothing else than a certain moral prelation” (Whether right is the object of jus, n. 15), and rejects it: “all of these relapse into the same circle”, for the preference is an effect of right (Whether right is the object of jus, n. 16); with Tanner he thinks it “can scarcely be explicated by any common concept” (Whether right is the object of jus, n. 17). Vermeersch makes formal right “the inviolable autonomy of the person”, and calls the usual description by an inviolable faculty “more common but less accurate” (n. 346). Billuart sets the just thing first and the faculty second, yet “right taken in this second way is the foundation of right taken in the first way”, since “right and debt are correlatives” (What is right, and of how many kinds, n. 1, What is right, and of how many kinds, n. 2).
Whether justice or mercy is the greater. St. Thomas sets legal justice “foremost among all the moral virtues” and particular justice above the rest (II-II, q. 58, a. 12), yet calls mercy, of the virtues toward our neighbor, “the greatest” (II-II, q. 30, a. 4). McHugh-Callan argues “The superiority of justice to fortitude, temperance, and the annexed virtues, such as mercy” (n. 1715), while granting that “some authorities hold” religion and mercy “more important than justice” (n. 1717). Bontempi: “particular Justice is not simply more perfect than all the other virtues which are toward another; for Mercy seems more perfect”, and piety, and much more religion (Whether justice is the most excell, n. 3). Merkelbach ranks religion and penance above justice (II, n. 148).
How the two particular justices measure. St. Thomas gives distributive justice “geometrical proportion” and commutative justice “the arithmetical mean” (II-II, q. 61, a. 2). Bontempi reports that Vasquez and Turrianus deny commutative justice any geometric equality, lest the species be confused, while Suarez, Lugo and Poncius allow it when a bankrupt must pay many creditors in proportion (Whether distributive justice diffe, n. 10); Amicus “for that reason denies that they are specifically distinguished” (Whether distributive justice diffe, n. 12). He reports too that Lugo makes distributive justice compare several persons in every act (Whether distributive justice diffe, n. 14), which Suarez, Poncius and Mastrius deny, since a bishop can confer a benefice without comparing anyone (Whether distributive justice diffe, n. 15); Bontempi sides with Lugo: “this reason is frivolous”, for Trent requires the worthier to be chosen (Whether distributive justice diffe, n. 16).
Whose act judgment is. St. Thomas: judgment “belongs properly to justice”, as an act of justice in that it inclines one to judge aright, and of prudence in that prudence pronounces it (II-II, q. 60, a. 1). McHugh-Callan: “the proper act of the virtue of justice” (n. 1727); Merkelbach places it under distributive justice, judgment “which primarily and formally is an act of distributive justice” (II, n. 132). Bontempi: the judgment one forms privately about a neighbor's probity “pertains to Prudence, not to Justice” (Whether judgment is an act of just, n. 10); McHugh-Callan calls rash judgment “a sin against justice, because it infringes the strict right of the neighbor” (n. 1739). Billuart: judgment “is an act of justice, because it belongs to justice to define and determine what is just” (Whether judgment is lawful, n. 1).
Whether a harm of another order must be made good in money. St. Thomas: when what was taken cannot be restored in equivalent, “compensation should be made as far as possible”, in money or in honor for a limb (II-II, q. 62, a. 2, ad 1). Prümmer reports St. Alphonsus calling the denial “more probable and more common”, with Báñez, Lessius and Lugo, and answers that its reason “does not seem convincing” (II, n. 204). Merkelbach: “speaking speculatively, the opinion of St. Thomas seems more probable”, though in practice the other may be used (II, n. 297). Marc follows St. Alphonsus but grants that St. Thomas's opinion “is also probable” (n. 928). Noldin denies it, reading St. Thomas's words “of counsel, not of precept” (n. 433); Vermeersch: “This reason seems to be preferred” (n. 587); Sabetti: “neither can compensation be made” (n. 413). All grant that money is owed once a judge has imposed it. Concina: “The other opinion, which is the more probable, affirms it”, since a life or limb, though it cannot be given back, “can nevertheless in some manner be compensated with goods of fortune” (IX, diss. II, ch. V, n. II).
Returning a stolen thing to the thief to recover the price. Prümmer sets out both sides: Cajetan, Soto, Concina and Billuart bind the buyer in good faith to the owner even at the loss of his price; St. Antoninus, Báñez, Lugo and Lessius let him return it to the thief, and “St. Alphonsus favors this opinion” (II, n. 214). Merkelbach gives both, the second as probable: “it can probably be returned to the thief” (II, n. 301); Marc: “very probably, and perhaps more probably” (n. 939); Sabetti: “more probably the buyer can send the thing back to the thief” (n. 418); Vermeersch: “Many permit him to do this” (n. 651); McHugh-Callan: “it is held by some” (n. 1774). Marc, with St. Alphonsus, allows it even to one who bought knowingly, as “absolutely probable and perhaps more probable” (n. 942). In their own words: Concina, “The opinion true to me is that the buyer in the case proposed is bound to restore the thing to the lord, as St. Thomas teaches” (IX, diss. II, ch. I, n. XXV); Billuart, “It is more probable that he who buys a stolen thing in good faith, when he knows it is stolen, is held to render it immediately to the true owner, and not to the thief, even though he would not recover his price from the thief” (Whether one who in good faith bought…, n. 2).
Whether a debtor from injury is freed when money handed to his confessor perishes. Prümmer reports Tanquerey, Lessius and Lehmkuhl holding him “immune from a new restitution”, grants that the opinion is probable, “but in practice one should nearly always proceed in another manner” (II, n. 239). Merkelbach: “not according to the rigor of principles”, yet “perhaps not improbably” (II, n. 331). Noldin sets Lugo against it, notes that St. Alphonsus “does not judge probable, but does not dare to condemn” it, and finds it “truly probable” (n. 511); McHugh-Callan: “It is held as probable” (n. 1792). Marc holds the debtor from delict not freed, quoting St. Alphonsus's “neither do I dare” (n. 1013); Wouters: St. Alphonsus “deservedly prefers the contrary opinion” (n. 1015).
Whether a debtor who cannot pay may enter religion. St. Thomas: after surrendering his property “he may lawfully enter religion, nor is he bound to remain in the world in order to earn the means of paying the debt” (II-II, q. 189, a. 6, ad 3). Bontempi reports Gerson and many Parisian doctors denying it (Whether entrance into religion exc, n. 4), very many affirming it with St. Thomas (Whether entrance into religion exc, n. 5), and a middle opinion, of Sanchez, Navarre and Lessius among others, that he must wait if he hopes to pay within a year or two (Whether entrance into religion exc, n. 6); he holds with St. Thomas, on his own reasoning (Whether entrance into religion exc, n. 17). Vermeersch: one who hopes to pay shortly, “say after one or two years”, must defer it (n. 681); Sabetti allows it “more probably in itself, if he must wait through a notable time” (n. 463). Prümmer forbids it while the creditor is known and may discover the debtor, for the Church's law and the scandals that civil law can raise, and allows it when the creditor is unknown (II, n. 243).
Whether inward attention belongs to the essence of prayer. St. Thomas: attention “is absolutely necessary” for prayer's third fruit, the refreshment of the mind, while for merit and impetration the first intention suffices (II-II, q. 83, a. 13). Prümmer: “theologians dispute sharply whether external attention suffices” for the Office; Cajetan, Soto, Concina, Billuart and St. Alphonsus deny it, Durandus, Lugo, Noldin “and many modern authors” affirm it (II, n. 355); for himself, “the essence of private prayer cannot subsist with external attention alone” and voluntary distraction (II, n. 357). Noldin: “Internal attention is not required for the essence of prayer”, so long as it was present at the beginning (n. 139); Vermeersch: distraction “does not take away the substance of prayer, at least of vocal prayer” (n. 189); McHugh-Callan reports both opinions: “According to the opinion of many modern authors, external attention suffices” (n. 2174). Merkelbach: prayer lasts “as long as the first intention of praying and attending is not revoked” (II, n. 672). Wouters quotes St. Alphonsus against the virtual attention of the distracted: “I have never been able to understand how attention can virtually remain in one who is distracted” (n. 583). Bontempi, with St. Bonaventure, requires attention for satisfying the Office (Whether attention is necessary in, n. 3). Concina, whom Prümmer counts among the deniers: “there is a precept of reciting the Canonical Hours with internal attention”, by natural and divine law, a purpose of attending not revoked “by a contrary act, or by a voluntary distraction, or by an external action which by its own nature carries the mind elsewhere”; and the Salmanticenses' rule that voluntary distraction leaves virtual attention standing “is false to me” (III, diss. VI, ch. VIII, n. V, III, diss. VI, ch. VIII, n. III).
Whether the souls in purgatory pray for us, and may be invoked. St. Thomas: they “are not in a condition to pray” but rather to be prayed for (II-II, q. 83, a. 11, ad 3). Prümmer: they “can more probably pray both for themselves and for those living on this earth”, though “The older theologians seem more commonly to deny” it (II, n. 334); one may invoke them privately, but it “does not seem to be something to be preached publicly from the pulpit” (II, n. 344). Noldin: “It is very probable” both that they intercede for us and that we may invoke them, Bellarmine and Suarez departing from St. Thomas (n. 141); Bontempi: “it is probable that the souls of Purgatory pray for us” (Who ought to pray, n. 9); McHugh-Callan: it is lawful “privately to invoke” them (n. 2159). Merkelbach leaves both questions “disputed” (II, n. 665); Wouters: “There is no obligation of invoking souls detained in purgatory” (n. 585).
Whether prayer for another is infallibly heard. St. Thomas: “we are not always heard when we pray for others”, and he names praying “for ourselves” among the four conditions (II-II, q. 83, a. 15, ad 2). Prümmer follows him: “it sometimes happens that prayer made for another does not impetrate” because of an obstacle in the other (II, n. 352). Noldin reports “others with Suarez” who “teach that of itself even prayer made for others has infallible efficacy”, the promise being general (n. 145). Merkelbach: whether prayer for another “who is well disposed is infallible is disputed” (II, n. 679); so Wouters (n. 586).
How often the precept of prayer binds of itself. Prümmer: some say “every week”, others with St. Alphonsus every month or two, others every year, and “All these opinions cannot be strictly proved”; it binds “several times in life” (II, n. 347). Merkelbach: some say “at least once in a year”, others monthly or weekly, “others more probably: at least several times in a year” (II, n. 677). Noldin: St. Alphonsus says every month, and “there are those who say that to have prayed once a year is sufficient” (n. 147); Marc: “more often in the year, indeed frequently” (n. 549). Concina: once a year, the Salmanticenses' opinion, “I reject as evidently false”; when they call the monthly rule harsh, “even in this censure they are shamefully deceived”; “That the precept of praying presses on every Lord's day is certain to me”, though the precept “admits the exception of parvity of matter”, and confessors should not straightway condemn the lukewarm of grave fault (III, diss. V, ch. II, n. VIII, III, diss. V, ch. II, n. X, III, diss. V, ch. II, n. XII).
Whether fear makes a vow void. Grave fear unjustly struck to extort a vow voids it; Prümmer: “Thus from positive ecclesiastical law” (II, n. 397); Noldin: “but also by the law of nature” (n. 214); Wouters: “It is disputed whether such fear also by natural law impedes the validity of a vow” (n. 642). Of light fear so struck, Prümmer: “Light fear does not invalidate vows”, against Busembaum, Navarre, Schindler and Noldin (II, n. 397); Noldin: “There are those who probably extend this same thing even to light fear” (n. 214); Merkelbach: “indeed probably” it voids a vow “extorted by slight fear unjustly inflicted”, if it was the sole cause (II, n. 713). Concina: a vow from grave fear unjustly struck is valid by natural law, “the common opinion of the Theologians”, for “fear diminishes, but does not take away, the voluntary”; by the Church's law only the solemn vow of profession is void, the opinion holding other such vows valid seeming “more probable”; and “Light fear does not invalidate a vow” (III, diss. IX, ch. IV, n. XV, III, diss. IX, ch. IV, n. XIV).
Whether a husband may annul all his wife's vows. St. Thomas: no vow stands “of a wife, without the consent of her husband” (II-II, q. 88, a. 8, ad 3). Marc, with St. Thomas and many others: “a husband can directly irritate the vows of his wife emitted during the time of marriage”, even those that touch none of his rights (n. 638); Merkelbach: “The husband, probably, can annul the vows of his wife, because he is the head of the woman” (II, n. 735). Prümmer: it “is greatly disputed”; the negative “seems to be truer and more common”, the wife's subjection reaching only to the duties of marriage, so that he may annul only vows that hinder his rights (II, n. 418); Noldin: “very controversial”, and the denial “seems to be preferred” (n. 231). McHugh-Callan reports both (n. 2228). Concina is with Prümmer: the husband may annul only vows touching “marriage, the governance of the family, the administration of goods, and the education of children”; the contrary, held by “grave and numerous Theologians”, is false of vows on her paraphernal goods, and he cannot annul her vows of hearing Mass or of not asking the debt (III, diss. IX, ch. V, n. XVI).
Whether a promissory oath binds gravely in a small matter. Prümmer: “greatly disputed”; Cajetan, Lessius, Valentia and Concina hold every breach of a valid oath grave perjury, and the “far more common and more probable opinion” admits small matter (II, n. 450). Merkelbach: it “probably admits lightness of matter, just as a vow does” (II, n. 755); Noldin and Marc: it binds gravely or lightly as the thing promised is grave or light (n. 250; n. 614); Wouters: “it is disputed whether the obligation is grave or light” (n. 689); Vermeersch: “practically, in no light matter will the obligation of a sworn promise have to be urged under grave sin” (n. 204). All hold an assertory oath to a falsehood grave in any matter. Concina in his own words: the failure is always mortal against the oath, though light against the promise, for “the oath takes its species from truth”, and to invoke God “as witness of falsity, even in the lightest matter, is a most grave injury against God”; the contrary of Soto, Suarez, Sanchez, Tamburini, Azor, the Salmanticenses and others is “False” (Theol. V, diss. II, ch. I, n. X, Theol. V, diss. II, ch. I, n. XV).
Whether breaking a vow is sacrilege. Prümmer: Cajetan holds that breaking any true vow is sacrilege, the thing vowed being made sacred; the common opinion denies it; others confine it to the vow of chastity, or to the public vow of chastity; “This controversy is a dispute about a name” (II, n. 403). Merkelbach: “of itself it is not sacrilege, because it is not the violation of a sacred thing” (II, n. 722); McHugh-Callan: sacrilege “is committed only by sins against certain vows”, such as a public vow of chastity, not a vow to fast (n. 2209); Vermeersch: breaking a simple vow “differs specifically from sacrilege”, and is graver (n. 221).
Whether obedience needs a true precept. St. Thomas: its object is “a command tacit or express, because the superior's will, however it become known, is a tacit precept” (II-II, q. 104, a. 2). Prümmer: “Theologians dispute whether formal obedience demands a true command of the superior” or whether a known wish suffices, and calls the controversy of little importance (II, n. 575). Noldin: “Lessius indeed holds (n. 27) that obedience requires a true precept”, while Lehmkuhl counts it true obedience to do a superior's will unbidden (n. 280). Marc, with Lessius: disobedience is a special sin “only when a true precept issued by a Superior is transgressed” (n. 690).
Equity: two virtues under one name, and where each belongs. St. Thomas makes epikeia “a subjective part of justice”, above legal justice, “a higher rule of human actions” (II-II, q. 120, a. 2). Prümmer: “Epikeia can be taken in a twofold sense”, the benign reading of a law, joined to legal justice, and a natural equity that remits strict right, “midway between justice and charity” (II, n. 617). Merkelbach separates them: epikeia “pertains to legal justice, of which it is a subjective part or species” (II, n. 891); equity in the use of one's right is “a virtue annexed to particular justice or a potential part” (II, n. 892). McHugh-Callan likewise gives legal equity “the rank of a subjective part” (n. 2430). Vermeersch treats equity as the annexed virtue and bids the reader distinguish epikeia from it (n. 685). Marc counts equity among the annexed virtues, “although this is rather referred to legal justice” (n. 403).
With what worship the cross and images of Christ are honored. Prümmer: “The other part of this thesis is disputed”; Bellarmine was the first to deny that any image is to be adored with latria, while St. Thomas and the older theologians, with the Second Council of Nicaea and Trent, give the cross and images of Christ a relative latria (II, n. 386). Merkelbach: they receive relative worship, as “the name and images of God, the cross of Christ, the instruments of the Passion, and relics are worshiped” (II, n. 653). Marc gives holy persons a twofold reverence, a relative latria and an absolute dulia (n. 536). Concina gives the cross latria with St. Thomas, “since the Cross of Christ is his image. Now the image of Christ is adored with the same worship as Christ himself”, the true Cross besides “on account of physical contact, and that precious blood with which it was sprinkled” (III, diss. VII, ch. I, n. VI).
Neglecting to pray in a grave temptation: a second sin, against religion? Concina: “Lessius, Villalobos, Prado, the Salmanticenses, and others deny it. Graver Theologians, with St. Thomas, affirm it. This opinion is more probable to me, and true”, since the precept of praying “presses by accident at the time of a most grave temptation”, so that one who consents without imploring help “commits two sins: one against chastity, the other against the virtue of Religion” (III, diss. V, ch. II, n. XIII).

What It Is

With Ulpian, put in due form: “justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 135
Ulpian's definition, held by all: “the constant and perpetual will of granting to each his own right”	Prümmer II, n. 70In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 135; Marc n. 398; Sabetti-Barrett n. 346; Bontempi What justice is, n. 5
Its words: “Hence the definition of justice mentions first the "will," in order to show that the act of justice must be voluntary; and mention is made afterwards of its "constancy" and "perpetuity" in order to indicate the firmness of the act.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 1In nearly the same words: Sabetti-Barrett n. 346
As the later authors put it: “Justice is the moral virtue which inclines man to render to each one his own right, or what is owed to him, according to equality.”	Noldin n. 268In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 135; Sabetti-Barrett n. 346; Vermeersch n. 340; Wouters n. 377
McHugh-Callan: “In a strict sense, it signifies the special moral virtue that consists in a firm purpose of the will to give to everyone his due or right”	McHugh-Callan n. 1689
Tully's, in Bontempi: “Justice is a habit of mind, which, preserving the common utility, assigns to each his own dignity.”	Bontempi What justice is, n. 2In nearly the same words: Bontempi What justice is, n. 3
St. Augustine's: “What shall I say justice is, but the virtue by which each is given his own?”	Bontempi What justice is, n. 4
The word also names all virtue: “In the broadest sense, for the complex of all virtues, or for total and integral moral rectitude”	Prümmer II, n. 70In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 134; Wouters n. 377; McHugh-Callan n. 1689; Noldin n. 268
and justification: “In a broad sense, for justification or the state of sanctifying grace”	Prümmer II, n. 70In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 134; Bontempi Whether right is the object of jus, n. 3
St. Bernard's, in that wider sense: “render to the superior, render to the inferior, render to the equal, to each what is his own”	Bontempi On Justice, n. 2
“to superiors obedience; to juniors Doctrine; to friends joy; to enemies patience”	Bontempi On Justice, n. 2

Its Place Among the Virtues

Justice and Charity
Legal justice, first of the moral virtues: “If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the common good transcends the individual good of one person.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 12In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 148; McHugh-Callan n. 1715; Bontempi Whether justice is the most excell, n. 2
Particular justice excels the rest too: “The first reason may be taken from the subject, because justice is in the more excellent part of the soul, viz. the rational appetite or will”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 12In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 148; McHugh-Callan n. 1715
“whereas justice is praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being well disposed towards another”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 12
St. Ambrose: “Great is the splendor of justice”	McHugh-Callan n. 1715
Above fortitude: “Although fortitude is about the most difficult things, it is not about the best, for it is only useful in warfare, whereas justice is useful both in war and in peace”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 12, ad 3In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1716
And liberality: “Again liberality which gives of a man's own is based on justice, whereby one renders to each man what is his.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 12, ad 1In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1716
Not the greatest: “Nevertheless it is not the greatest of virtues: for the theological virtues excel because they pertain to divine good”	Merkelbach II, n. 148In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1715
Religion is greater: “indeed, among the virtues annexed to justice, religion (likewise penance) is more excellent, because it approaches more nearly to God”	Merkelbach II, n. 148In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1717
“Whence although justice is more perfect than religion in the character of justice, because it renders the debt more perfectly, it is less perfect in the character of virtue.”	Merkelbach II, n. 148
A cardinal virtue: “Justice is a cardinal virtue, because it is concerned with that which is principal and more difficult in its proper matter”	Merkelbach II, n. 147
“Whence justice, because it perfectly pays to another a perfect debt, is the foundation of the other virtues”	Merkelbach II, n. 147
The Decalogue: “the precepts of the Decalogue, according to St. Thomas, II-II, q. 122, a. 1, all regard justice”	Merkelbach II, n. 133In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2434
Against charity: “If I exercise a work of charity, I give to my neighbor what is mine; but if I exercise a work of justice, I give to my neighbor what is his own.”	Prümmer II, n. 70In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1699; Merkelbach II, n. 137
“And so a man can indeed injure charity toward himself, but not justice (properly so called).”	Prümmer II, n. 70In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 137
“Certainly in itself and by reason of object charity far surpasses justice, but the obligation of justice is customarily stricter than the obligation of charity, which admits a certain latitude.”	Prümmer II, n. 70In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 145
Charity perfects it: “justice can be considered as a certain beginning of friendship, which queen charity leads to the summit of unity with God and neighbor”	Vermeersch n. 688

Right, Its Object

What Right Is
Right, the object: “For this reason justice has its own special proper object over and above the other virtues, and this object is called the just, which is the same as "right." Hence it is evident that right is the object of justice.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 57, a. 1In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether right is the object of jus, n. 1
Its first sense, the just thing: “the word "jus" [right] was first of all used to denote the just thing itself, but afterwards it was transferred to designate the art whereby it is known what is just”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 149
Noldin puts the power first: “Right, in its proper and primary sense, signifies the inviolable moral power of a person to have, do, or exact something”	Noldin n. 266
Taken actively, a faculty: “A moral faculty or power of doing, having, demanding, omitting something, etc.”	Prümmer II, n. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 150; McHugh-Callan n. 1691; Marc n. 720
Law, the rule of right: “so too there pre-exists in the mind an expression of the particular just work which the reason determines, and which is a kind of rule of prudence”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 149
“and so law is not the same as right, but an expression of right”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 2
Merkelbach, what is essential to it: “in right, considered both subjectively and objectively, there is essentially imported a moral preference by which someone is preferred, all others being excluded, in the use of some thing on account of the peculiar connection which the thing has with him”	Merkelbach II, n. 151
Bontempi, against Lugo's moral prelation: “I indeed, weighing this new invention, find that all of these relapse into the same circle”	Bontempi Whether right is the object of jus, n. 16
Vermeersch: “Formal or subjective right is the inviolable autonomy of a person, or of a being existing for itself, in pursuing the proper end on account of which it exists”	Vermeersch n. 341
“Hence, by the more common but less accurate description of right, subjective right is called the morally inviolable faculty of a person of having, acting, exacting.”	Vermeersch n. 346
Its Foundation
Its foundation, the person: “this is the dignity and inviolability of the person himself”	Merkelbach II, n. 152In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 266
and ultimately God: “but the primary foundation or ultimate source of right is God Himself”	Merkelbach II, n. 153In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 1; Sabetti-Barrett n. 349
“Right (Recht) and debt (Pflicht) are correlatives.”	Prümmer II, n. 1In nearly the same words: Marc n. 720
Not from the State: “Therefore true right arises from natural law alone, or from that positive law which is conformable to natural or divine law”	Prümmer II, n. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 154
Condemned in the Syllabus: “The status of the republic, as being the origin and source of all rights, is endowed with a certain right circumscribed by no limits.”	Prümmer II, n. 1
“If, however, a thing is, of itself, contrary to natural right, the human will cannot make it just”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2
Not in animals: “animals are indeed an object, but not a subject of right”	Prümmer II, n. 1
Its Kinds
Natural and positive: “first by its very nature, as when a man gives so much that he may receive equal value in return, and this is called "natural right."”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 57, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 156
The right of nations: “"whatever natural reason decrees among all men, is observed by all equally, and is called the right of nations."”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 57, a. 3In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 2
Strict and not strict: “Strict right is that which is so closely connected with man that it cannot be taken away from him without manifest injury.”	Prümmer II, n. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 157; McHugh-Callan n. 1692; Marc n. 720
“The common poor man has a non-strict right to alms”	Prümmer II, n. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 157
In a thing, and to a thing: “Ius in re, or real right, is that by which someone enjoys some thing already legitimately existing, at least in some way, in his disposition.”	Prümmer II, n. 2In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 267; Sabetti-Barrett n. 348
“Ius ad rem is therefore the way to ius in re.”	Prümmer II, n. 2In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 267
Not an adequate division, says Vermeersch: “Therefore it is seen that the division of right into right in a thing and right to a thing, even if you attend to merely patrimonial rights, is by no means adequate, although it is very useful.”	Vermeersch n. 345

Its Object, Subject and Mean

Three Conditions
Toward another: “It is proper to justice, as compared with the other virtues, to direct man in his relations with others: because it denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 57, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 134
Toward another, of a strict debt, to equality: “Three conditions are required for justice strictly so called”	Merkelbach II, n. 136In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 268; Wouters n. 379; Marc n. 398; Vermeersch n. 344
Without strict debt: “by defect of the second condition, fidelity, gratitude, and liberality fall short of the character of strict justice, in which there is only a moral debt, though one obliging under sin”	Merkelbach II, n. 136In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 266
Without equality: “by defect of the third condition, religion, piety, and observance do not pertain to strict justice, because we cannot render an equal thing to God, to parents, and to superiors.”	Merkelbach II, n. 136In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 377
Toward God: “Since justice implies equality, and since we cannot offer God an equal return, it follows that we cannot make Him a perfectly just repayment.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 3
Not toward oneself: “Hence, justice properly speaking demands a distinction of supposits, and consequently is only in one man towards another.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 137
Father and son: “Hence a father is not compared to his son as to another simply, and so between them there is not the just simply, but a kind of just, called "paternal."”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 57, a. 4In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 268
“Hence in so far as each of them is a man, there is justice towards them in a way”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 57, a. 4, ad 2In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 268; Merkelbach II, n. 157
Husband and wife: “Husband and wife are less perfectly one than parent and child and than master and servant”	McHugh-Callan n. 1700In nearly the same words: Marc n. 398
Its Matter and Its Subject
External acts and things: “Consequently, since justice is directed to others, it is not about the entire matter of moral virtue, but only about external actions and things”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 8In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 140; McHugh-Callan n. 1710; Prümmer II, n. 70
“Hence justice is not about the passions, as are temperance and fortitude, which are in the irascible and concupiscible parts.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 9In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 140; McHugh-Callan n. 1710
Its formal object: “The formal object by which, or the immediate and proximate motive on account of which we render the debt and establish equality, is the special honesty of the said equality”	Merkelbach II, n. 139In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 268; Marc n. 398; McHugh-Callan n. 1699
In the will: “Therefore justice cannot be in the irascible or concupiscible as its subject, but only in the will”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 4In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 144; McHugh-Callan n. 1698; Bontempi In what subject justice consists, n. 3
“for we are not said to be just through knowing something aright”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 4In nearly the same words: Bontempi In what subject justice consists, n. 1
Against Buridan: “while Buridanus alone places not only Fortitude and Temperance, but also Justice, in the sensitive appetite”	Bontempi In what subject justice consists, n. 5
Its Mean
The mean of the thing: “wherefore the mean of justice consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the external person”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 10In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 141; Bontempi Whether right is the object of jus, n. 25; Prümmer II, n. 70
“This real mean is also the rational mean, wherefore justice satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 10, ad 1
“If the real value of a horse is $100—it makes no difference whether the seller be a prince or a peasant, whether the buyer be rich or poor—the just payment will be $100.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1711In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 141
Just, however done: “And so a thing is said to be just, as having the rectitude of justice, when it is the term of an act of justice, without taking into account the way in which it is done by the agent”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 57, a. 1
Yet only materially: “and likewise he who pays his debts faithfully, merely in order to avoid the penalties of the law, exercises justice materially but not formally”	McHugh-Callan n. 1713

Its Act, and Judgment

Judgment
Its act: “Therefore the proper act of justice is nothing else than to render to each one his own.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 11In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 143
By giving and by not taking: “not only positively by procuring that which is owed, but also negatively (through omission, by which the right of another is left intact), by abstaining from every violation of right”	Merkelbach II, n. 135In nearly the same words: Bontempi What justice is, n. 7; Marc n. 721
“A judge renders to each one what belongs to him, by way of command and direction”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 1, ad 5
A virtue, though it does only what is owed: “When a man does what he ought, he brings no gain to the person to whom he does what he ought, but only abstains from doing him a harm.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 3, ad 1
“The latter necessity does not remove merit, when a man does voluntarily that which is necessary in this way.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 3, ad 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 146
Judgment: “Therefore judgment, which denotes a right decision about what is just, belongs properly to justice.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 60, a. 1In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1727
“Accordingly judgment is an act of justice in so far as justice inclines one to judge aright, and of prudence in so far as prudence pronounces judgment”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 60, a. 1, ad 1
Merkelbach puts it under distributive justice: “of judgment, which primarily and formally is an act of distributive justice”	Merkelbach II, n. 132
Bontempi, of private judgment: “But the Judgment which can be made privately by us concerning the inexcusable probity of our neighbor pertains to Prudence, not to Justice”	Bontempi Whether judgment is an act of just, n. 10
Its three conditions: “Those who pass judgment must have a good intention, must proceed according to law, and must decide according to prudence.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1728

The Integral Parts

Each of the two “is required for the perfect act of justice” (II-II, q. 79, a. 1.)

Two: “Now a person establishes the equality of justice by doing good, i.e. by rendering to another his due: and he preserves the already established equality of justice by declining from evil, that is by inflicting no injury on his neighbor.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 79, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 249; Wouters n. 383
St. Ambrose: “Justice assigns his own to each one, does not claim what is another's.”	Marc n. 399In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2140
Not a mere omission: “But it should be noted that to decline from evil does not import a pure negation or mere omission, namely, not to do evil (for this is not an act of virtue), but a positive movement of the will repudiating evil.”	Merkelbach II, n. 249In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2140
“And this act is the more imperfect and secondary act of justice, without which the other cannot be: to do good, which is the principal act and the completion of justice.”	Merkelbach II, n. 249
Why in justice alone: “For justice has this as proper to it, that it can and must be observed in a twofold mode, through a negative act, not taking what belongs to another, and through a positive act, rendering the debt, so that even he is truly called just who does not take what belongs to another.”	Noldin n. 273In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 250
“for he who does not eat is not called temperate”	Noldin n. 273
Their opposites: “To declination from evil there is opposed the special vice which is called transgression, that is, an action against a negative precept, just as to the operation of good there is opposed omission”	Merkelbach II, n. 251In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2140
“Therefore, speaking simply and absolutely, transgression is a graver sin than omission, although some omission can be graver than some transgression.”	Merkelbach II, n. 251
Restitution among them: “From these things it follows that the act of restoring another's good unjustly taken and the act of repairing damage caused, which are sometimes enumerated as acts of justice, are reduced to the act of declining from evil inflicted upon one's neighbor.”	Prümmer II, n. 72
Some moderns: “Some modern authors enumerate as integral parts of justice constitutive justice, which bestows upon each what is his own, and restitutive justice, which repairs injured justice.”	Prümmer II, n. 72

The Subjective Parts

“The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species.” (II-II, q. 48.)

Three Species
Three, by three orders: “Hence a threefold order is required: the order of part to whole — the order of whole to part — the order of part to part.”	Merkelbach II, n. 252In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 269; Marc n. 400; McHugh-Callan n. 1745
“A fourth order is not possible, and therefore neither is a fourth species of justice.”	Merkelbach II, n. 252
Particular justice in two: “Hence there are two species of justice, distributive and commutative.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 61, a. 1
Vermeersch, by kinds of right: “But as many rights as there are in species, so many justices there are.”	Vermeersch n. 342
Legal Justice
Legal: “Legal justice is that by which the members of society as such (whether the prince or the subjects) give to society whatever is owed to it as such for procuring the common good.”	Merkelbach II, n. 252In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 71; Noldin n. 272; Wouters n. 382
Its name: “it follows that the justice which is in this way styled general, is called "legal justice," because thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 5
In prince and subjects: “And thus it is in the sovereign principally and by way of a mastercraft, while it is secondarily and administratively in his subjects.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 6In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 260; Wouters n. 382; Noldin n. 272
“Thus from the command of general justice the brave soldier fights strenuously; any citizen pays taxes and observes laws; the prince establishes good laws and urges their observance.”	Prümmer II, n. 71
Vermeersch, otherwise: “But to establish good laws, to administer well the republic or the Church is for rulers an office of commutative justice.”	Vermeersch n. 347
Not obedience, nor piety toward the fatherland: “a) from obedience, which acts because something is commanded by a legitimate superior”	Merkelbach II, n. 259In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1702
Vermeersch narrows it to what is owed: “To piety or to other virtues belong the various good acts which citizens freely do with regard to the common good.”	Vermeersch n. 347
Distributive Justice
Distributive: “Distributive justice is that by which the republic, or its presiding officers, distribute common goods or offices and burdens among the members of the community according to the gifts, merits, faculties, and needs of each.”	Merkelbach II, n. 252In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 71; Noldin n. 271; Wouters n. 381; Sabetti-Barrett n. 346
“Hence in distributive justice the mean is observed, not according to equality between thing and thing, but according to proportion between things and persons”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 61, a. 2In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 271
In subjects too: “and yet distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom those goods are distributed in so far as they are contented by a just distribution”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 61, a. 1, ad 3In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 253; Sabetti-Barrett n. 346
“Therefore distributive justice is in a certain way subordinated to legal justice, so that citizens must not rarely tolerate the very inequality which the common good has demanded.”	Vermeersch n. 350
Commutative Justice
Commutative: “Commutative justice is that by which a private man, or even society acting as a particular person, renders to a private man that which is owed to him from strict right.”	Merkelbach II, n. 252In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 71; Noldin n. 270; Marc n. 400
“Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing, so that the one person should pay back to the other just so much as he has become richer out of that which belonged to the other.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 61, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 253
In voluntary and involuntary exchanges: “On all these actions, whether voluntary or involuntary, the mean is taken in the same way according to the equality of repayment.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 61, a. 3
“But St. Thomas beautifully shows that this justice has place not only in purchase and sale, but in all the last six precepts of the Decalogue.”	Prümmer II, n. 71
Pay for public service: “When a man who has served the community is paid for his services, this is to be referred to commutative, not distributive, justice.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 61, a. 4, ad 2In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1708
Restitution, and the Other Two
It alone binds to restitution: “Hence commutative justice of itself obligates to restitution, because restitution makes equality of thing to thing”	Merkelbach II, n. 254In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 274; Wouters n. 758; Sabetti-Barrett n. 349
“Yet by accident legal and distributive justice obligate to restitution, if commutative justice is at the same time injured, as often happens”	Merkelbach II, n. 254In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 274
“Wherefore a magistrate or judge is held to restore if, on account of grave negligence in punishing, he is the cause why private persons or the community suffer grave damage”	Sabetti-Barrett n. 349In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 71
Vindicative, Social, International
Vindicative justice: “Corrective (i.e., vindicative or punitive) justice is a virtue inclining a public person or a superior, such as a ruler, magistrate, or judge, to inflict on evil-doers penalties adequate to their faults.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1707In nearly the same words: Marc n. 400; Sabetti-Barrett n. 346
McHugh-Callan: “Thus, corrective justice is elicited by commutative justice”	McHugh-Callan n. 1707
Marc: “This justice primarily pertains to legal justice. Yet often it also pertains to commutative justice”	Marc n. 400
Social justice: “Social justice understood in the strict sense is nothing other than legal justice”	Merkelbach II, n. 256
Pius XI: “it belongs to social justice to demand from individuals all that is necessary for the common good”	Merkelbach II, n. 256
International justice: “In present times they speak much of international justice; but this is not a distinct species of justice, but is easily reduced to the species enumerated.”	Merkelbach II, n. 256
Several in one act: “Different species of justice may be present in one and the same act.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1708

The Potential Parts

“all the virtues that are directed to another person may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to justice” (II-II, q. 80.)

All virtues toward another: “Accordingly since justice is of one man to another as stated above (II-II:58:2), all the virtues that are directed to another person may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to justice.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 80, a. 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 73; Wouters n. 384
“Wherefore in two ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short of the perfection of justice: first, by falling short of the aspect of equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 80, a. 1
Short of equality: religion, piety, observance, obedience. “For certain virtues there are which render another his due, but are unable to render the equal due.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 80, a. 1In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 273; Marc n. 401
Short of strict due: truthfulness, gratitude, vindication, a debt of honesty; “On the other hand, the moral due is that to which one is bound in respect of the rectitude of virtue: and since a due implies necessity, this kind of due has two degrees.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 80, a. 1In nearly the same words: Marc n. 402
and liberality, affability and equity, a debt of greater honesty only: “The THIRD CLASS comprises those virtues which regard a certain debt contributing to greater honesty, and whose omission of itself involves no sin.”	Marc n. 403In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 273
So McHugh-Callan: “Religion, piety, reverence and obedience are annexed to justice on account of a legal debt; the virtues that remain, beginning with gratitude, are assigned to justice on account of a moral debt only”	McHugh-Callan n. 2373

What Each Annexed Virtue Is

Each annexed virtue in the authors' words. Religion and its acts follow.

Piety
Piety, to parents and country: “Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country, after God.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 101, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 816; Wouters n. 394; McHugh-Callan n. 2346
Not religion: “Hence religion, which gives worship to God, is a distinct virtue from piety, which pays homage to our parents and country.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 101, a. 3, ad 2
Nor legal justice: “but legal justice regards the good of our country, considered as the common good”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 101, a. 3, ad 3
What wounds it: “It is more probable that filial piety is violated only when the personal goods (e.g., life, health, body, fame, honor) of parents are injured”	McHugh-Callan n. 2346In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 571
Observance, Dulia and Obedience
Observance, to those in dignity: “so under piety we find observance, whereby worship and honor are paid to persons in positions of dignity”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 102, a. 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 572; Merkelbach II, n. 833; Wouters n. 397
Even the wicked superior: “A wicked superior is honored for the excellence, not of his virtue but of his dignity, as being God's minister”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 103, a. 2, ad 2
Dulia: “Wherefore dulia, which pays due service to a human lord, is a distinct virtue from latria, which pays due service to the lordship of God.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 103, a. 3
Its kinds: “of which nevertheless only three obtain a special name, namely dulia, hyperdulia, and obedience”	Wouters n. 400In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 136
Hyperdulia: “Hyperdulia, from hyper, that is, above, and douleuo, that is, to serve, is that species of observance by which we honor and venerate the Blessed Virgin Mary on account of the special and singular dignity of divine motherhood.”	Wouters n. 400
Obedience: “so too in human affairs, in virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to obey their superiors”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 104, a. 1
“Wherefore obedience is a special virtue, and its specific object is a command tacit or express”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 104, a. 2In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2355; Prümmer II, n. 575
Most praiseworthy: “Therefore, properly speaking, the virtue of obedience, whereby we contemn our own will for God's sake, is more praiseworthy than the other moral virtues, which contemn other goods for the sake of God.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 104, a. 3In nearly the same words: Bontempi What obedience is, and what kind o, n. 6
Its bounds: “Hence a subject cannot obey a superior commanding something which is contrary to natural or positive divine law.”	Prümmer II, n. 578
“But if the doubt persists, the subject is bound to obey, because the presumption stands for the superior”	Prümmer II, n. 578
Gratitude and Vindication
Gratitude: “And it is distinct from the foregoing virtues, just as each of these is distinct from the one that precedes, as falling short thereof.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 106, a. 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 605; Wouters n. 404; Bontempi On gratitude, n. 1
And more: “Therefore gratitude always inclines, as far as possible, to pay back something more.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 106, a. 6In nearly the same words: Bontempi On gratitude, n. 8
“As in injustice, which is a cardinal virtue, we consider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider equality of wills.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 106, a. 6, ad 3
Vindication: “Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on one who has sinned.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 108, a. 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 610; Wouters n. 407
“Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the avenger.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 108, a. 1In nearly the same words: Bontempi On vindication, n. 3
“Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it tends to the prevention of evil.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 108, a. 3
Truthfulness
Truthfulness: “Now there is a special order whereby our externals, whether words or deeds, are duly ordered in relation to some thing, as sign to thing signified: and thereto man is perfected by the virtue of truth.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 109, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 849; Wouters n. 401
A moral debt: “for this virtue does not regard legal debt, which justice considers, but rather the moral debt”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 109, a. 3
Not every truth must be told: “for veracity does not require that always and everywhere the judgment of the mind be opened, which rather sometimes must be hidden”	Noldin n. 634
Annexed to justice: “Veracity is a virtue annexed to justice”	Noldin n. 634
Affability and Liberality
Affability: “Hence the need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this order: and this virtue is called friendliness.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 114, a. 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 612; Wouters n. 413
Liberality: “Liberality is not a species of justice, since justice pays another what is his whereas liberality gives another what is one's own.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 117, a. 5In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 615; Merkelbach II, n. 884
“Therefore a liberal man is praised chiefly for giving.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 117, a. 4
By the giver's means: “"Liberality is proportionate to a man's substance," i.e. his means, "for it consists, not in the quantity given, but in the habit of the giver"”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 117, a. 1
Epikeia and Equity
Epikeia: “Hence "epikeia" is by way of being a higher rule of human actions.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 120, a. 2In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 617
Where the law fails: “On these and like cases it is bad to follow the law”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 120, a. 1
Equity, the humane use of right: “Equity inclining the will to moderate use of right is a virtue annexed to particular justice or a potential part.”	Merkelbach II, n. 892In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 618; Vermeersch n. 685
“This virtue of equity stands, as it were, midway between justice and charity.”	Prümmer II, n. 618In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 685
Penance
Penance, which Merkelbach and Wouters count among them: “It is a virtue connected with justice, a certain species of commutative justice.”	Merkelbach III, n. 396In nearly the same words: Prümmer III, n. 306

Religion and Its Acts

Religion first, then each of its acts, vows, oaths and adjuration among them; at the end, where each author treats each act.

Religion Itself
Its name: “However, whether religion take its name from frequent reading, or from a repeated choice of what has been lost through negligence, or from being a bond, it denotes properly a relation to God.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 81, a. 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 323; Wouters n. 385
Defined: “Religion is a moral virtue inclining us to offer due worship to God as our creator and governor, or as our supreme principle.”	Prümmer II, n. 325In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 646; Noldin n. 131; Wouters n. 385; McHugh-Callan n. 2145
A moral virtue, not theological: “Hence it is evident that God is related to religion not as matter or object, but as end”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 81, a. 5In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 647; Noldin n. 133; Prümmer II, n. 325
First of the moral virtues: “Hence religion excels among the moral virtues.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 81, a. 6In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 133; McHugh-Callan n. 2146
So that “Therefore sins opposed to religion are the gravest after sins against the theological virtues.”	Noldin n. 133
Its matter, worship: “Worship is honor with submission and acknowledgment of dependence exhibited to someone on account of his excellence”	Merkelbach II, n. 649In nearly the same words: Marc n. 531
Inward and outward: “Therefore the internal acts of religion take precedence of the others and belong to religion essentially, while its external acts are secondary, and subordinate to the internal acts.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 81, a. 7In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 654
Sanctity: “so that it differs from religion not essentially but only logically”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 81, a. 8
Its necessity: “The necessity of religion arises from both natural law and positive divine law.”	Prümmer II, n. 327In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 650
Devotion
Devotion: “Hence devotion is apparently nothing else but the will to give oneself readily to things concerning the service of God.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 82, a. 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 328; McHugh-Callan n. 2150; Vermeersch n. 176
Its first act: “The act of religion immediately elicited is devotion, or the prompt will and intention of worshiping God”	Noldin n. 134In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2149
Not the same as devotions: “Certain exercises of piety; in this sense we speak of devotion toward the Eucharist, toward the Five Wounds, etc.”	Prümmer II, n. 328
Its cause: “The extrinsic and chief cause of devotion is God”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 82, a. 3In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 658; Prümmer II, n. 329
Its effect: “Devotion causes per se and principally spiritual joy of the mind; secondarily and by accident, sadness according to God.”	Merkelbach II, n. 659In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 176
Prayer
Prayer, an act of reason: “Accordingly it is evident that prayer, as we speak of it now, is an act of reason.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 83, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 663; Prümmer II, n. 335; Vermeersch n. 189
Defined, after St. John Damascene: “Prayer strictly so called is defined by the same St. John Damascene: a pious petition of fitting things from God.”	Merkelbach II, n. 662In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 138; Wouters n. 582; Marc n. 546
“A twofold description of prayer is proposed: the ascent of the mind to God; the petition of fitting things from God.”	Vermeersch n. 179
Or with St. John Chrysostom: “Prayer can be defined with St. John Chrysostom: a conversation with God.”	Wouters n. 580
Chief after devotion: “after devotion which belongs to the will, prayer which belongs to the intellective part is the chief of the acts of religion”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 83, a. 3, ad 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 664
What may be asked: “It is lawful to pray for that which it is lawful to desire”	Wouters n. 584In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 338
The Lord's Prayer: “Among vocal prayers, the Lord's Prayer is the most worthy, because it has Christ Himself as author, and the most perfect”	Merkelbach II, n. 673
For whom: “It is lawful to pray not only for ourselves, but also for all and each creatures capable of eternal glory.”	Prümmer II, n. 340In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 667
To whom: “God alone is to be prayed to as he who can of himself furnish the things which we ask; but it is lawful and useful to invoke the saints or angels, that they may intercede”	Prümmer II, n. 343
Necessary: “Prayer is not only useful and fitting for all adults, but is also necessary by a necessity of precept, and indeed commonly also by a necessity of means.”	Prümmer II, n. 346In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 676; Noldin n. 146; Wouters n. 585
Infallibly heard: “Prayer furnished with the requisite conditions has, from the promise of God, an infallible efficacy for impetrating the things which are asked.”	Prümmer II, n. 351
On four conditions: “Hence it is that four conditions are laid down; namely, to ask—"for ourselves—things necessary for salvation—piously—perseveringly"; when all these four concur, we always obtain what we ask”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 83, a. 15, ad 2
“On the part of the subject praying, the conditions required for infallible hearing are: a) the state of grace, b) humility, c) confidence, d) perseverance, e) attention.”	Prümmer II, n. 353
Its fruits: “Prayer, besides the spiritual consolation or refreshment which it procures for one praying devoutly and attentively, and which wandering of mind impedes, has a threefold force or efficacy: meritorious, satisfactory for sins, and impetratory.”	Merkelbach II, n. 679
Attention, to God above all: “That last kind of attention is most necessary, and even idiots are capable of it.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 83, a. 13
Distractions: “It is clear that involuntary distractions in themselves are no sin; but voluntary distractions, although they do not corrupt the substance of prayer, nevertheless contain some irreverence toward God, however not grave”	Noldin n. 139In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2172; Marc n. 549
Adoration
Adoration: “Hence the adoration whereby we adore God is an act of religion.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 84, a. 1In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 135; McHugh-Callan n. 2176
In mind and body: “Internal adoration of the mind is more principal, and without it external adoration is pure hypocrisy”	Prümmer II, n. 385In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 682
Latria and dulia: “The former is called the worship of latria, which is adoration strictly taken and owed to God alone; the latter is the worship of dulia.”	Noldin n. 136
Its place: “Internal adoration does not require a determinate place, but external adoration does”	Merkelbach II, n. 683
Sacrifice
Sacrifice, of natural law: “Now this is what we mean by a sacrifice, and consequently the offering of sacrifice is of the natural law.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 85, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 693
Defined: “The external oblation of a sensible and permanent thing, through some alteration or destruction of it, made by a priest to God, for testifying to His dominion and our subjection.”	Merkelbach II, n. 694In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2178
To God alone: “Wherefore just as to God alone ought we to offer spiritual sacrifice, so too ought we to offer outward sacrifices to Him alone”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 85, a. 2
Other works called sacrifices: “in this way the acts also of other virtues may be called sacrifices”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 85, a. 3
The New Law's: “The sacrifice of the New Law exists under a twofold form: as bloody on the cross and as unbloody in the Mass.”	Merkelbach II, n. 697
Oblations, First-fruits and Tithes
Oblations: “If, on the other hand, it be offered with a view to its remaining entire and being deputed to the worship of God or to the use of His ministers, it will be an oblation and not a sacrifice.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 86, a. 1In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2183
First-fruits: “FIRST-FRUITS are the first fruits, coming from lands newly cultivated, to be offered only once to God as giver of all goods and to the ministers of his Church.”	Marc n. 552
Tithes: “Hence the precept about the paying of tithes was partly moral and instilled in the natural reason; and partly judicial, deriving its force from its divine institution.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 87, a. 1In nearly the same words: Marc n. 553; Bontempi Whether tithes are to be paid, n. 18
“In most regions, the obligation of paying predial tithes has in fact CEASED, either by custom or by composition”	Marc n. 553In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2185
But support of the clergy remains: “The Canons reaffirm what is of natural and divine law, namely, that the faithful are obliged to support the clergy”	McHugh-Callan n. 2186
Praise
Praise: “Consequently we need to praise God with our lips, not indeed for His sake, but for our own sake; since by praising Him our devotion is aroused towards Him”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 91, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 764
“It profits one nothing to praise with the lips if one praise not with the heart.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 91, a. 1, ad 2
With song: “Hence the use of music in the divine praises is a salutary institution, that the souls of the faint-hearted may be the more incited to devotion.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 91, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 765
Vows
A vow: “Accordingly three things are essential to a vow: the first is deliberation. the second is a purpose of the will; and the third is a promise, wherein is completed the nature of a vow.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 88, a. 1
Defined: “A vow (Greek εὐχή) is a promise made to God concerning a possible and better good.”	Prümmer II, n. 388In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 209
Not a mere resolution: “Wherefore a vow differs from a resolution conceived before God, which is the will of doing or omitting something, and therefore introduces no obligation.”	Noldin n. 209
Its matter: “The matter of a vow must be morally good.”	Merkelbach II, n. 717In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 718
An act of religion: “Hence a vow is a directing of the thing vowed to the worship or service of God.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 88, a. 5
More meritorious: “For three reasons it is better and more meritorious to do one and the same deed with a vow than without.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 88, a. 6
Binding: “Hence man is obliged before all to fulfill the vows he has made to God, since this is part of the fidelity he owes to God.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 88, a. 3In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 402
Gravely or lightly: “A vow obliges under grave or light sin according to the quantity of the matter and according to the intention of the person vowing.”	Prümmer II, n. 404In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 648; Marc n. 628
Read by the vower's intention: “A vow must be interpreted according to the intention of the one vowing, either expressed or reasonably presumed”	Noldin n. 226
Deliberation and liberty: “Sufficient deliberation is required for the validity of a vow.”	Prümmer II, n. 395
How it ceases: “A vow can cease in two ways: 1. intrinsically, namely, a) from a change of matter or b) from the cessation of the end; 2. extrinsically, namely, through the intervention of legitimate authority”	Prümmer II, n. 409
Dispensation: “Consequently when an ecclesiastical superior dispenses someone from a vow, he does not dispense him from keeping a precept of the natural or of the Divine law”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 88, a. 10, ad 2
Dispensation and annulment differ: “Dispensation is made in the name of God, whereas invalidation is made in the name of the one invalidating.”	Prümmer II, n. 420
With a prelate's authority: “Therefore a commutation or dispensation of vows requires the authority of a prelate who in God's stead declares what is acceptable to God”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 88, a. 12
Commutation: “For the commutation of a vow into a better work, no cause is required; for commutation into an equal work, a light cause is required; for commutation into a notably lesser work, a grave cause is required.”	Prümmer II, n. 433
Oaths
An oath: “Hence the need to have recourse to a Divine witness, for neither can God lie, nor is anything hidden from Him.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 89, a. 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 437; Merkelbach II, n. 745; Wouters n. 682
Assertory and promissory: “Famous is the division of oath into assertory and promissory”	Merkelbach II, n. 746
An act of religion: “and thus in a way he shows reverence to God”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 89, a. 4In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 747
Lawful: “Accordingly in answer to the question in point it must be stated that an oath is in itself lawful and commendable.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 89, a. 2In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 244
Yet a remedy, not to be used often: “Whatever is required merely as a remedy for an infirmity or a defect, is not reckoned among those things that are desirable for their own sake”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 89, a. 5
Truth, judgment and justice: “Hence these conditions are more requisite for an oath than for other human actions.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 89, a. 3, ad 3
Truth, not freedom from error: “thus he swears in truth who swears to something false which he prudently judges to be true”	Merkelbach II, n. 752
The promissory oath: “A promissory oath is an act by which someone, under invocation of the divine name, obligates himself to doing or omitting something.”	Noldin n. 249
It binds: “Accordingly we must conclude that whoever swears to do something is bound to do what he can for the fulfilment of truth; provided always that the other two accompanying conditions be present, namely, judgment and justice.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 89, a. 7
Less than a vow: “Hence a vow by its very nature is more binding than an oath.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 89, a. 8
An assertory oath leaves nothing to fulfil: “In treating of the obligation of an oath, the discourse is principally about a promissory oath.”	Prümmer II, n. 448
Adjuration
Adjuration: “The divine name is invoked in three ways: 1. by way of an oath, for confirming the speaker's own words; 2. by way of adjuration, for inducing others to do or omit something; 3. by way of invocation”	Prümmer II, n. 436
Defined: “Adjuration is the invocation of God in order to bring someone to do or omit something”	Wouters n. 695
“Adjuration is twofold: deprecative and imperative.”	Merkelbach II, n. 760In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 461
An act of religion: “Adjuration is an act of religion, because it is apt for expressing both the submission of the one adjuring to God”	Merkelbach II, n. 761
Solemn and private: “A solemn adjuration is one made in the name of the Church by ministers of the Church according to prescribed ceremonies”	Prümmer II, n. 461
Where Each Author Treats Each Act
Devotion	St. Thomas; Prümmer; Merkelbach; Wouters; McHugh-Callan; Marc; Bontempi
Prayer	St. Thomas; Prümmer; Merkelbach; Noldin; Wouters; McHugh-Callan; Marc; Vermeersch; Bontempi; Sabetti-Barrett
Adoration	St. Thomas; Prümmer; Merkelbach; Noldin; Wouters; McHugh-Callan; Marc; Bontempi; Sabetti-Barrett
Sacrifice	St. Thomas; McHugh-Callan; Bontempi
Oblations and first-fruits	St. Thomas; Merkelbach; McHugh-Callan; Marc; Bontempi
Tithes	St. Thomas; Marc; Bontempi
Vows	St. Thomas; Prümmer; Merkelbach; Noldin; Wouters; McHugh-Callan; Marc; Vermeersch; Bontempi; Sabetti-Barrett
Oaths	St. Thomas; Prümmer; Merkelbach; Noldin; Wouters; McHugh-Callan; Marc; Vermeersch; Bontempi; Sabetti-Barrett
The taking of God's name by way of adjuration	St. Thomas; Prümmer; Merkelbach; Noldin; Wouters; McHugh-Callan; Marc; Vermeersch; Bontempi
praise	St. Thomas; Merkelbach; Wouters

The Virtue Itself

A virtue: “Hence, since justice regulates human operations, it is evident that it renders man's operations good”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 3In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 146
A special virtue: “Justice is a special virtue, because it has a special object: the ordering of man to another, so that it renders to him what is owed.”	Merkelbach II, n. 146In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether justice is a special virtu, n. 2
“Nevertheless, it is not one virtue in the ultimate species, but comprises several species, according to the diversity of the object”	Merkelbach II, n. 146
Legal justice, special in essence: “Accordingly, just as charity which regards the Divine good as its proper object, is a special virtue in respect of its essence, so too legal justice is a special virtue in respect of its essence, in so far as it regards the common good as its proper object.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 6In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 71; Noldin n. 272; McHugh-Callan n. 1702; Marc n. 400; Bontempi Whether justice is a special virtu, n. 15
General in power: “which though special essentially is nevertheless virtually general”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 6
Vermeersch: “But because those acts are already honest from elsewhere according to themselves, and pertain to all virtues (at least moral virtues), it is a general virtue, lacking special matter and commanding in the matter of all virtues.”	Vermeersch n. 349
And particular justice besides: “so too besides legal justice there is need for particular justice to direct man in his relations to other individuals”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 58, a. 7
Acquired and infused: “The definition handed down is verified both of the natural acquired virtue and of the supernatural infused virtue”	Merkelbach II, n. 138
“in the other case he also acts from the supernatural motive of faith in order to a supernatural end”	Merkelbach II, n. 138

Restitution, the Act of Commutative Justice

Restitution owed for particular injuries (theft, damage, homicide, defamation, cooperation) is set out under each vice on the vices against justice. Here are the principles common to all.

What It Is
What it is: “Hence restitution is an act of commutative justice, occasioned by one person having what belongs to another, either with his consent, for instance on loan or deposit, or against his will, as in robbery or theft.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 62, a. 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 203; Wouters n. 979; Bontempi What restitution is, n. 1
Defined: “the return of a thing received or the restoration of damage inflicted”	Prümmer II, n. 202In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 431; Wouters n. 979
Taken more narrowly now: “modern theologians, however, are accustomed to take restitution in a stricter sense, namely, for the reparation of damage inflicted”	Prümmer II, n. 202
Not satisfaction: “It differs from satisfaction, since satisfaction properly regards the person to whom satisfaction is made; but restitution regards the thing which must be returned”	Prümmer II, n. 202In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 979; Bontempi What restitution is, n. 2
Its Necessity
Necessary for salvation: “Since therefore the safeguarding of justice is necessary for salvation, it follows that it is necessary for salvation to restore what has been taken unjustly.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 62, a. 2In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 205; Sabetti-Barrett n. 412; Noldin n. 432
With St. Augustine: “Sin is not remitted unless what was taken away is restored.”	Prümmer II, n. 205In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether restitution is necessary f, n. 1
For “not to restore a thing taken away is continued theft”	Prümmer II, n. 205In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 432
As much as one can: “He who cannot restore as much as he ought is held to restore as much as he can.”	Prümmer II, n. 205In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 513
A negative precept in substance: “Although the precept about the making of restitution is affirmative in form, it implies a negative precept forbidding us to withhold another's property.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 62, a. 8, ad 1In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether restitution is necessary f, n. 4
“In practice this controversy is of small importance”	Prümmer II, n. 206
Grave of its kind: “The obligation of restitution is grave by its kind, that is, grave or light according as the matter to be restored is grave or light”	Wouters n. 980In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 434; Prümmer II, n. 206
A popular error: “Entirely unfounded is the frequent opinion of the common people believing that the souls of the deceased are detained in purgatory for so long as their debts are not paid by their heirs.”	Prümmer II, n. 206
Its Roots
Two roots: the thing held, “By reason of the thing taken, he is bound to restore it as long as he has it in his possession”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 62, a. 6In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 981; McHugh-Callan n. 1762
and the injury done: “in which case the thief is bound to restitution not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of the injurious action, even though the thing is no longer in his possession”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 62, a. 6
Three possessors: “Someone can possess, or rather detain, another's thing in three ways: 1. in good faith; 2. in doubtful faith; 3. in bad faith.”	Prümmer II, n. 208In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1770
The first principle: “A thing cries out to, fructifies for, and perishes for its owner; nor ought anyone to be enriched through another's injury or loss.”	Prümmer II, n. 210
The possessor in good faith: “There are few treatises of moral theology in which there exists so great a diversity and ambiguity of opinions”	Prümmer II, n. 209
“A possessor in bad faith is held to restore insofar as he has damaged”	Prümmer II, n. 216
To Whom
To whom: “Now this equalizing of things is impossible, unless he that has less than his due receive what is lacking to him: and for this to be done, restitution must be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 62, a. 5In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 228; Wouters n. 1010; McHugh-Callan n. 1786
If unknown: “If the person to whom restitution is due is unknown altogether, restitution must be made as far as possible, for instance by giving an alms for his spiritual welfare (whether he be dead or living): but not without previously making a careful inquiry about his person.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 62, a. 5, ad 3
Not to his harm: “When the thing to be restored appears to be grievously injurious to the person to whom it is to be restored, or to some other, it should not be restored to him there and then”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 62, a. 5, ad 1
Not to the simoniac: “Such a man deserves to lose what he gave, wherefore restitution should not be made to him”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 62, a. 5, ad 2
Not to the poor, when the owner is known; St. Alphonsus “He deservedly answers in the negative, because it can in no way be presumed that the owner wills his thing to be distributed to the poor.”	Prümmer II, n. 239In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 1015
When, Where and How
When: “Consequently one is bound to immediate restitution, if possible”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 62, a. 8In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 237; Wouters n. 1014; McHugh-Callan n. 1793
“Hence it is a grave sin, without cause, to defer for a notable time the restitution of grave matter.”	Prümmer II, n. 237
The confessor: “he should not permit restitution to be deferred until death”	Prümmer II, n. 237In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 513
At death, if it is hidden: “the dying man is to be induced to entrust the money to the confessor himself, or rather to another faithful man, so that it may be sent to the creditor in secret”	Merkelbach II, n. 286In nearly the same words: Marc n. 929; Sabetti-Barrett n. 413
How: “Generally it is required and suffices that restitution be made in that manner by which violated justice is repaired to equality.”	Prümmer II, n. 240In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 509; Wouters n. 1016
Even unnoticed: “It is all the same whether restitution is made while the owner notices it or while he does not notice it, for example by increasing the measure or by decreasing the price of merchandise.”	Wouters n. 1016
What Excuses
Their principle: “Those causes excuse from making restitution which bring it about that the creditor is no longer reasonably unwilling”	Prümmer II, n. 240
“Five exempting causes can be enumerated: remission, compensation, prescription, composition, and extreme necessity.”	Prümmer II, n. 241In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 514
Remission: “The express, tacit, or even presumed remission of the creditor exempts from restitution.”	Prümmer II, n. 241
Composition: “Composition, which is a remission of debt made by the Supreme Pontiff, can have place only: a) in ecclesiastical goods; and b) in goods which are owed to uncertain owners.”	Prümmer II, n. 242
Inability: “When one is unable to restore at once, this very inability excuses one from immediate restitution: even as a person is altogether excused from making restitution if he is altogether unable to make it.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 62, a. 8, ad 2In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1797
“He is, however, bound either himself or through another to ask the person to whom he owes compensation to grant him a remission or a respite.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 62, a. 8, ad 2
Extreme need: “Nevertheless, if the debtor by making restitution would fall into extreme necessity, he is not bound to restitution, even if the creditor, through the omission of restitution, should be in grave necessity.”	Prümmer II, n. 243In nearly the same words: Sabetti-Barrett n. 462
A loss of a higher order: “because the good of reputation is of a higher order than the good of fortune; whence an adulteress ought not to reveal her crime lest legitimate children be injured in the division of goods”	Merkelbach II, n. 337In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 243
Cession of goods: “Every cession of goods of itself does not extinguish the obligation of restitution in conscience, but only suspends it for a time.”	Prümmer II, n. 247In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 514

The Precepts of Justice

The Decalogue: “Hence the precepts of the decalogue must needs pertain to justice.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 122, a. 1In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 2434; Merkelbach II, n. 133
“Wherefore the first three precepts are about acts of religion, which is the chief part of justice; the fourth precept is about acts of piety, which is the second part of justice”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 122, a. 1
Their order: “The order of the Commandments is most appropriate, for their purpose is to form man to virtue and to lead him to perfection”	McHugh-Callan n. 2435

The Gift of Piety

The gift: “it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost's instigation, we pay worship and duty to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy Ghost”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 121, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 894
“a habit infused with sanctifying grace, from which the soul is affectioned toward God as a most kindly father”	Prümmer n. 451
“The gift of the Holy Spirit which corresponds to justice is piety toward God.”	Merkelbach II, n. 894
“The gift of piety disposes man to follow the Holy Spirit moving him to honor God as our Father.”	Noldin n. 33
“This gift corresponds to the cardinal virtue of justice and perfects it”	Wouters n. 479
Not the virtue of piety: “The piety that pays duty and worship to a father in the flesh is a virtue: but the piety that is a gift pays this to God as Father.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 121, a. 1, ad 1
“To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion does, is more excellent than to pay worship to one's father”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 121, a. 1, ad 2

The Vices Opposed to Justice

Each entry is that author’s own word or heading, and opens the passage. A dash means only that the author has no such heading here.

St. ThomasII-II, qq. 59-78	PrümmerII, Q. III	MerkelbachII, nn. 236-244	NoldinVol. II	Woutersnn. 380-382
Against commutative justice: life and body
Murder	On Unjust Damaging By Deeds In The Goods Of The Human Body	On Injuries in the Internal Goods of Life and Body	On the Fifth Precept of the Decalogue	homicide and mutilation
suicide	suicide	The killing of oneself	On the Killing and Mutilation of Oneself	Direct killing of oneself
—	Dueling	A duel	A duel	Dueling
—	Abortion	abortion	Abortion	Abortion
Against commutative justice: goods
Theft and robbery	On The Unjust Taking Away Of Another's Thing	On Injuries in the External Goods of Fortune	On the Seventh Precept of the Decalogue	theft, robbery, and fraud of every kind
—	Unjust damaging	damaging action	Unjust damaging	damaging
Against commutative justice: reputation and honor
Reviling	On Unjust Damaging By Words	On Contumely	On Insult	On the Injury of Honor, or on Insult
Backbiting	detraction	On Detraction	On Detraction and Calumny	On Detraction
Tale-bearing	Whispering	Whispering	whispering	On Whispering
Derision	mockery or derision	Mockery	derision	On Derision
Cursing	curse	Cursing	On malediction	—
suspicion	Rash judgment	Rash judgment	Rash judgment	rash
secrets	violation of a secret	secret	secret	secret
Against commutative justice: marriage
adultery	Adultery	On Injuries in the Goods of Marriage	Adultery	especially by the sin of adultery
Against commutative justice: exchanges and contracts
Cheating, which is committed in buying and selling	On Contracts	On Justice and Injustice in Voluntary Commutations or Contracts	On Contracts	On Commutative Justice in Contracts
The sin of usury	On Loan for Consumption and Usury	Usury	On the Prohibition of Usury	usury
In the courts
The injustice of a judge, in judging	On The Obligations And Sins Of The Judge	On Judges	On the Judge and Jurors	On Judges
calumniating	accuser	accuser	accuser	accuser
the accused	accused	the accused	defendant	accused
False evidence	false witness	—	Witnesses	testify
advocate	advocate	advocate	advocate	advocates
Against distributive justice
Respect of persons	acceptance of persons	acceptance of persons	acceptance of persons	acceptance of persons
Against legal justice
illegal injustice	—	illegal or general injustice	injury of legal justice	contempt of the common good

Each of these is set out by author, with its kinds and gravity, on The Vices Against Justice.

The Vices Opposed to the Annexed Virtues

Each entry is the heading under which that author treats the vice, and opens it. A dash means only that the author has no heading of that name here.

St. ThomasII-II, qq. 92-119	PrümmerII, Section II	MerkelbachII, Section C	NoldinQ. III	WoutersSection II
Against religion
Superstition	On Superstition in General	On Superstition	superstition	On Superstition
falsehood	—	Undue worship of the true God	vicious worship	Vicious worship of God
Idolatry	On Idolatry	On Idolatry	On Idolatry	On Idolatry
Superstition in divinations	On Divination	On Divination	On Divination	divination
Superstition in observances	On Vain Observance	On Vain Observance and Magic	On Vain Observance	On Superstitious Observance
—	Hypnotism	—	Hypnotism	Spiritism
The temptation of God	On the Tempting of God	On the Tempting of God	On Tempting God	On the Temptation of God
Perjury	On the Violation of an Oath, or Perjury	On Perjury	On Perjury	perjury
—	vain use of the name of God	—	take the divine name in vain	vain usurpation of the divine name
Sacrilege	On Sacrilege	On Sacrilege	On Sacrilege	On Sacrilege
Simony	On Simony	On Simony	On Simony	On Simony
Against obedience
Disobedience	disobedience	On Obedience and Inobedience	disobedience	disobedience
Against observance
—	—	—	—	irreverence
Against gratitude
Ingratitude	ingratitude	On Gratitude and Ingratitude	—	ingratitude
Against truth
The vices opposed to truth, and first of lying	On Lying	On Lying	On Lying	On the Injury of Truth, or on Lying
—	mental restriction	—	Mental restriction	—
Dissimulation and hypocrisy	On The Simulation And Dissimulation Of The Sacraments	Simulation	hypocrisy	simulation
Boasting	—	Boasting	boasting	—
Against friendliness
Flattery	Flattery	Adulation	—	flattery
Quarreling	Moroseness	Moroseness or contentiousness	—	contentiousness
Against liberality
The vices opposed to liberality, and in the first place, of covetousness	On avarice	On Avarice	—	On Avarice
Prodigality	Prodigality	prodigal	prodigality	prodigality

Injustice and Its Gravity

Each vice against justice is set out by author, with its kinds, gravity, remedies and disputes, on the vices against justice; injustice in general is the first entry there.

What Injustice Is
Injury, the act: “the voluntary and efficacious violation or injury of another's right properly so called”	Merkelbach II, n. 237In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 408; Wouters n. 976; Marc n. 722; Prümmer II, n. 74
Illegal injustice, contempt of the common good: “First there is illegal injustice which is opposed to legal justice: and this is essentially a special vice, in so far as it regards a special object, namely the common good which it contemns”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 59, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 242; McHugh-Callan n. 1720; Bontempi What kind of sin injustice is, and, n. 6; Vermeersch n. 566
Particular injustice: “Secondly we speak of injustice in reference to an inequality between one person and another, when one man wishes to have more goods, riches for example, or honors, and less evils, such as toil and losses”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 59, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 243; McHugh-Callan n. 1720; Bontempi What kind of sin injustice is, and, n. 7
An unjust act does not make an unjust man: “but a man may do what is unjust, unintentionally or through passion, without having the habit of injustice”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 59, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 240
Its Gravity
Mortal from its genus: “it is evident that to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 59, a. 4In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 74; Merkelbach II, n. 239; Noldin n. 410; Wouters n. 978; Marc n. 725; McHugh-Callan n. 1721; Bontempi What kind of sin injustice is, and, n. 7
Because contrary to charity: “every injury inflicted on another person is of itself contrary to charity”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 59, a. 4In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 239; Prümmer II, n. 74; McHugh-Callan n. 1721
Venial from the act or from small matter: “but it can be a light sin either from imperfection of act (i.e. from inadvertence or imperfect consent), or from smallness of matter”	Prümmer II, n. 74In nearly the same words: Merkelbach II, n. 239; Bontempi What kind of sin injustice is, and, n. 7; Noldin n. 410; Marc n. 725; McHugh-Callan n. 1721
Grave matter weighed by the harm to the neighbor and to the community: “from the damage which is inflicted on the neighbor; b. from the damage which would arise for the community if such matter were not prohibited under grave obligation”	Noldin n. 410In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 74; Merkelbach II, n. 239; McHugh-Callan n. 1722
The sign, reasonable grave unwillingness: “injustice is a grave sin as often as both he who suffers the damage and the governor of the community are reasonably gravely unwilling”	Prümmer II, n. 74In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 410; McHugh-Callan n. 1722; Marc n. 725; Wouters n. 978
Restitution
Restitution of itself only for commutative injustice: “nevertheless of themselves they do not oblige with the burden of restitution”	Noldin n. 274In nearly the same words: Prümmer II, n. 71

How It Is Gained, Kept and Perfected

Acquired and Infused
Acquired and infused: “justice, like the other virtues, may denote either the acquired or the infused virtue”	St. Thomas I-II, q. 100, a. 12
“The acquired virtue is caused by works; but the infused virtue is caused by God Himself through His grace.”	St. Thomas I-II, q. 100, a. 12
Not lost with every virtue: “we sometimes see sinners, for example the impure, excel in some virtue, for example in justice; for not all acquired virtues are destroyed through mortal sin”	Noldin n. 31
Within every man's power: “it is in every man's power to acquire that justice whereby he may resist and overcome this inclination”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 77, a. 1
Perfected (Vermeersch)
Perfected by equity, “Justice is perfected by the human use of rights, to which the virtue of equity inclines”	Vermeersch n. 690
by liberality, “II. Justice is perfected by liberality, which uses exterior things according to their first destination.”	Vermeersch n. 690
by gratitude, “III. Justice is perfected by gratitude, which tries to equalize the affection of the benefactor.”	Vermeersch n. 690
and by charity: “IV. Finally, justice is perfected by charity itself.”	Vermeersch n. 690
Eminent probity a gift of God: “that exquisite probity communicates its nobility only to a few, and can scarcely be acquired without the power of the Most High”	Vermeersch n. 689
To be preached: “Therefore let us inculcate and promote better and more perfect honesty by public preaching and private counsels.”	Vermeersch n. 689
Its beatitude: “Blessed are they who hunger and thirst for justice”	Vermeersch n. 689

Where Each Author Treats It

St. Thomas	The longest treatise of the Second Part of the Second Part	II-II, qq. 57-122
St. Thomas	Its precepts	II-II, q. 122
Prümmer	The treatise that fills most of the second volume	II, n. 1 ff.
Merkelbach	Six parts, from justice in general to the precepts	II, nn. 131-898
Noldin	The virtue among the cardinal virtues; its duties under the precepts of the Decalogue	nn. 266-274
Wouters	The virtue among the supernatural moral virtues; its duties under the precepts	nn. 377-415