Question III: What the offices of prudence are

From the argument recently adduced we have, first, with D. Bonaventure, that the office of Prudence is not to propose to the moral virtues their intrinsic ends, insofar as they are formally ends, but only to propose to them the means by which they may attain such ends. The same is held by D. Thomas here, art. 6. and his disciples, and by Tannerus disput. 3. question 1. dub. 3. against Scotus in 3. dist. 36. single question, art. 2., where he contends that the ends themselves are set before the moral virtues by Prudence.

It is proved by D. Bonaventure loc. cit. from the doctrine of Aristotle 6 Eth. cap. 12., where he affirms that the moral virtue intends the end at the impulse of reason, namely through Synderesis; while Prudence directs and makes right those things that are toward the end: The work (he says) is effected from Prudence and from moral Virtue: for Virtue proposes the goal; Prudence, however, makes right those things that tend toward it, and cap. 13. Virtue [assigns] the end; Prudence [makes right] those things that tend toward the end, so that we may act.

Secondly it is proved by Valentia disp. 4. question 1. punct. 3. with a reason drawn from the difference between Synderesis and Prudence; for the office of Synderesis is to set before the virtue the good appointed to it as an end, as that Temperance should use pleasures moderately, as D. Bonaventure teaches in 2. dist. 39. art. 2. question 1., and this indeed moves the affection as a kind of weight, as S. Bonaventure teaches there, and in 3. dist. 33. question 2.. Prudence therefore directs toward the means, by ordering reason; otherwise, if both were directed to the same thing, it would be necessary to posit another directive habit of reason.

It is proved thirdly from the connection of Counsel and Prudence; for Prudence is concerned only with those things about which there is consultation, as the holy Fathers teach, as related from D. Bonaventure and from other cited places of the Seraphic Doctor, as is evident. But consultation is about means to an end, not about the formal ends of the virtues themselves: Therefore also Prudence. The major is clear from the Philosopher lib. 6. Eth. cap. 5. and 7., where he says: Prudence is concerned with human goods, and with those that fall under consultation. For we say that the chief task of the prudent man is to counsel well. The minor is proved; for consultation is only about doubtful things, and the ends of the virtues themselves are not such, as Aristotle teaches cap. 7., saying: About those things no one consults which cannot come about otherwise, nor about those whose end is not some [end].

Note, however, with D. Bonaventure opusc. de septem donis, cap. 6., that Prudence and Counsel are toward the end: first, insofar as it sets forth means in order to it, and so intends it as that for whose sake, as Caietanus also teaches question 47. art. 6., and Valentia puncto 3..

Then, Prudence is said to tend toward the ends, insofar as it judges and determines, in the manner of Affection, in which mediocrities the reason of the end of the virtue lies, as the S. Doctor teaches in Diaeta, loc. cit., with Aristotle 2 Eth. cap. 6. and D. Thomas art. 7..

The S. Doctor assigns, moreover, in Diaeta, tit. 6. cap. 12., the difference of Prudence from Counsel; for Counsel, he says, [determines] whether something is to be done: Prudence, however, shows for what end and with what circumstances applied, of time, place, etc.; just as it belongs to one science to know whether it is expedient for someone to be saved, and to another to know how he is to be saved, etc.

You will object, first, with Scotus. Every moral virtue supposes the dictate of Prudence: Therefore [it is] toward the end.

It is answered, that it supposes this dictate only in order to the means; but toward the end it supposes the dictate of Synderesis, as I said.

You will object, secondly. Unless prudence sets the end before the virtue, there will not be able to be one prudence in the matter of each moral virtue.

It is answered, that there is one Prudence, common to all the virtues.

I assert, thirdly, that Prudence does not set the means before the virtues by the command of reason.

It is proved, because command belongs to the will, which is as it were the queen, as I showed in the Treatise on the Soul, disp. 9. cap. 5. question 8. and in other places.

Nor indeed does Aristotle 6 Eth. cap. 10. make it preceptive by the command of reason, as Valentia thinks.

I assert, fourthly, that the dictate of Prudence is with a certain solicitude. Therefore Aristotle lib. 6. Eth. cap. 9. says: The things you have counseled are to be done quickly; but one must counsel slowly and at length, especially in grave matters, as D. Gregory also teaches lib. 2. Regist. indic. 10. cap. 6., cited by D. Bonaventure lib. 2. Pharetra, cap. 27., where he says: In the highest matters, counsel ought not to be hasty.

It is proved from the contrary. For negligence, sloth, and torpor are reproved, as you will see in D. Bonaventure p. 1. Centil. sect. 8. and lib. 3. Pharetra, cap. 8. and in Diaeta tit. 1. cap. 7.

Hence he observes there that the slothful man is greatly reproved. Proverb. 21. The desires of the slothful kill him. Proverb. 10. the slack hand has wrought poverty. So Matth. 12. an idle [house] is entered by seven demons. And Matth. 25. Take from him the talent. Eccles. 22. On a lump of mud the slothful shall be stoned. Prov. 18. Fear casts down the slothful. Prov. 24. I passed by the field of the slothful man: and behold it was all filled with nettles. And in the same place: How long, sluggard, do you sleep? And Proverb. 6. Go to the ant, O sluggard. See there the S. Doctor differing excellently.

I ADD, that Prudence sets forth means for all ends, even those of the public good.

IT IS PROVED: For in 6. Eth. cap. 5. Aristotle says that Prudence is right reason of things to be done: Therefore also concerning the public good; especially since this is the more necessary, the more necessary the public good is, truly especially for the Christian; of whom it is said in 1 Cor. 13: Charity seeketh not her own. The Romans observed this, as related by Valerius Maximus lib. 6. cap. 4. For every man was hastening to increase the goods of his country, not his own. The reason is because, as Aristotle says 1. Eth. cap. 2., even if the good be the same for one man and for a city, yet the good of the city seems a greater and more divine thing both to acquire and to conserve. And indeed even each man can be content, if it be for one alone; yet it is more beautiful and more divine if the good be brought about for one people and for cities.

THEREFORE Prudence can be divided, so that one kind is Regal, or Legislative in the community of a Kingdom: another Political in a City: another Oeconomical in a household: another Military in an Army; as Aristotle seems to hold 6. Eth. cap. 8. See D. Thomas at greater length, question 50.