A Theological Virtue

Charity

St. Thomas treats it at II-II, qq. 23-46. See also every passage on the topic page.

How the Authors Compare

The manuals agree that God's own goodness is the motive of charity. Prümmer gives this as “the most common opinion of theologians against a few” (n. 554), and Merkelbach rejects the few: to make God “our highest good and the one beatifying us” the motive is “against the nature and perfection of true friendship” (I, n. 876). Concina: “The formal object of charity is the infinite goodness of God, lovable for its own sake” (III, diss. II, ch. III, n. II); Billuart: “uncreated goodness as lovable in itself and for itself”, under the reason of divine good “not as advantageous to us, but as it is in itself” (Comprising all that concerns charity…, n. 11, Comprising all that concerns charity…, n. 12).
Sins against charity toward oneself are set out differently. Prümmer says they “are all comprehended in hatred of self” (n. 568). Noldin divides them by excess and defect, egoism on one side and hatred of self on the other (n. 70). Merkelbach also names “disordered egoism” by excess (I, n. 888), but by defect names preferring the goods of the body to those of the soul and neglecting the means of salvation and of life (I, n. 888). Wouters treats under this head killing and mutilating oneself (nn. 523, 526).
St. Thomas and Merkelbach arrange the sins by the act or effect of charity they oppose: love, joy, peace, beneficence (II-II, qq. 34-43, I, nn. 944-957). Prümmer, Noldin and Wouters arrange them by whom they injure, God, oneself or the neighbor, and Wouters then divides those against the neighbor into internal and external sins (n. 545).
Prümmer, Noldin and Wouters treat cooperation in another's sin here, among the sins against charity (n. 617). Merkelbach treats it earlier, in the treatise on sins (I, n. 489), and St. Thomas has no question on it here.
War is placed differently. St. Thomas treats it here, Merkelbach adds that such sins “are better considered in the treatise on Justice” (I, n. 955), and Prümmer defers it to the second volume because “by war not only charity but also justice is usually violated” (n. 604).
Whether God may be loved with charity for one perfection. Noldin: the motive is “constituted not only by the accumulation of all perfections, but also by each single attribute of God, whether absolute or relative” (n. 55), and the relative attributes move us most. Wouters, who reports that some hold “any divine perfection whatever suffices” (n. 364), holds with St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus “that this goodness is composed of all God's perfections” (n. 364); so Marc, for whom it “is not some particular attribute of God” (n. 465), and Merkelbach, against those who make it “some divine perfection abstracted from the rest” (I, n. 876). Prümmer: “In practice this controversy is of little or no utility” (n. 554), for whoever passes from one attribute to love God above all has charity.
The desire to possess God: charity or hope. Marc: “The desire of POSSESSING GOD is an act of charity”, indeed more perfect than others (n. 468); Vermeersch: it “is practically an act of charity” unless “explicitly thrust down to one's own consequent happiness” (n. 71). Wouters: the desire of possessing God for His glory is charity, “but the desire of possessing God on account of attaining one's own beatitude is an act of hope” (n. 364). Noldin calls such love “imperfect charity” and places it in hope (n. 54); Merkelbach lets charity itself elicit it, “provided it is subordinated to it” (I, n. 879). Prümmer rejects the older authors for whom “the love of noble concupiscence” justifies, unless what is meant is the desire to be united to God, which is charity (n. 558). Concina calls the love of God for His benefits “a love of chaste concupiscence”, the more imperfect, and the love of Him because He is good “one of charity and of friendship” (III, diss. II, ch. V, n. XI); against those condemned by Innocent XII he holds that “The two respects are distinct; but the one does not exclude the other” (III, diss. II, ch. V, n. XII). Billuart: it is lawful to serve God for the eternal reward as an end “not ultimate, but further orderable to God”, “so affected, that if no beatitude were to be hoped for, we would nonetheless love him and serve him” (Whether, and in what sense, it is…, n. 6, Whether, and in what sense, it is…, n. 10).
How charity grows. St. Thomas: “charity can by no means increase by addition of charity to charity”; it grows by its subject partaking of it more (II-II, q. 24, a. 5); Merkelbach: “not indeed by addition of charity to charity” but by the same charity inhering more firmly (I, n. 867); McHugh-Callan: it grows “in that it becomes more deeply rooted” (n. 1124). Bontempi sets this down as the Thomists' view, a growth “by a deeper rooting alone in the subject” (Whether charity increases, and how, n. 3), and holds against it: “The TRUE opinion of the Theologians, however, is that charity is increased by the addition of degrees” (Whether charity increases, and how, n. 4), so that “the augmentation of charity is made by a newly added degree of charity” (Whether charity increases, and how, n. 43).
When charity grows. St. Thomas: “charity does not actually increase through every act of charity, but each act of charity disposes to an increase”, which comes when one “breaks out into an act of more fervent love” (II-II, q. 24, a. 6); Merkelbach follows: “not that every act of charity in fact increases it, but that this is done only through an intense act” (I, n. 870). McHugh-Callan: “Every act of charity, even the less fervent, contributes to an increase” (n. 1126), and the increase merited by the less fervent acts “is not conferred until the moment one enters into heaven or purgatory” (n. 1127). Bontempi, against Scotus, calls it “the common opinion of the Theologians” (Whether charity increases, and how, n. 44) that “this augmentation is made immediately after meritorious acts” (Whether charity increases, and how, n. 44). Billuart with McHugh-Callan: “Every act of charity, even remiss, whether elicited or imperate, merits de condigno the increase of charity”, but the increase owed to remiss acts “is not conferred in this life, but deferred until entry into glory”, with John of St. Thomas and Gonet against Báñez and Contenson (On the Subject, Cause, Increase, and…, n. 19, On the Subject, Cause, Increase, and…, n. 31, On the Subject, Cause, Increase, and…, n. 28).
Whether charity can grow without limit. St. Thomas: “it is not possible to fix any limits to the increase of charity in this life” (II-II, q. 24, a. 7); Merkelbach: “Charity can be increased without end, as was defined in the Council of Vienne” (I, n. 868); McHugh-Callan: “as long as a person lives here below, he may continually grow in charity” (n. 1128). Bontempi, with St. Bonaventure, holds that “the supernatural disposition” does not “dilate the power of capacity to infinity, but unto a limited term” (Whether charity can be increased w, n. 1), for “if it were augmentable to infinity, it would have no end”; to St. Thomas's answer that its end lies in the other life he replies, “Yet this does not resolve it” (Whether charity can be increased w, n. 9, Whether charity can be increased w, n. 10). The opening of Bontempi's question is lost with a page of the only copy of the volume.
Whether an act of charity is necessary as a means. Prümmer: it is, for the sinner who cannot receive the sacrament, and “after habitual charity has been obtained, at some times in life” (n. 561); McHugh-Callan: “The act of charity is also necessary as a means of salvation to all adults”, since one justified with attrition and the sacrament, “by his voluntary acceptance” of grace, “thus makes an act of charity” (n. 1604, n. 1604). Merkelbach: “in the present economy of the New Law it is not necessary by necessity of means” (I, n. 971); so Noldin, “except in defect of a sacrament” (n. 58), Marc, “except hypothetically” (n. 469), and Vermeersch (n. 75). Wouters sets out both opinions for the sinner (n. 517) and denies it for the just (n. 517).
How often an act of charity is due. Prümmer: nothing certain “except that an act of charity must be elicited more often than every five years” (n. 563); Merkelbach, “more probably: several times, at least three or four times a year” (I, n. 972); Sabetti-Barrett: “the opinion of those who oblige to it only once a year can safely be held” (n. 167); Marc gives St. Alphonsus: “the opinion of those who require it once a month is more pleasing to me” (n. 472), and Spirago teaches with him that one who neglects it a whole month “can scarcely be exempt from mortal sin” (III. THE PRECEPT OF THE LOVE OF GOD). McHugh-Callan runs from “once in three years” to daily (n. 1597); Noldin: “it must not be said that they are obliged to this either each week, or each month, or each year” (n. 59); Vermeersch: “What son asks how often he must actually demonstrate his affection toward his parents?” (n. 74). Concina will not let the question be put. He reproves Castropalao's “a few times in his life” (II, diss. II, ch. II, n. VI), calls the question of once a year “most like this one: Whether a living man is bound to produce acts of life once in a year?”, and warns that the just who love God “only once — I do not say in a year or in a month, but in a week — they will gradually become lukewarm, then cold, and at last sinners”: “Those disputations proceed from the brain of men, not from the holy Scriptures, which command a continued and perennial love” (III, diss. II, ch. IV, n. X, III, diss. II, ch. IV, n. XIV). Billuart: “But how often and when, is uncertain”; some assign feast days, others “once or twice in the week”, and the faithful “are to be exhorted to exercise themselves often” (On the precept of charity, n. 21, On the precept of charity, n. 22).
Whether an act of charity is due of itself at death. Prümmer: “Thus the by far more probable opinion” (n. 563); so Merkelbach (I, n. 972), Marc, “Most probably” (n. 472), and Wouters: “if the precept did not then urge, it would never urge” (n. 519). Noldin: “this obligation exists only for those who are in mortal sin and cannot receive the sacrament” (n. 59); Sabetti-Barrett: one absolved with attrition is “not to be obliged”, “because a special precept is not established, even though the contrary opinion is much more common” (n. 167). McHugh-Callan: the duty for one already in grace “is considered as doubtful by some authorities” (n. 1600); Vermeersch: “as many wish” (n. 74). So Billuart: “It obliges per se at the end of life” (On the precept of charity, n. 20); and Concina, against Castropalao, who had found the obligation not altogether certain: “When the moment of separation from this world, and of conjunction with God, is at hand, are we not commanded to elicit an act of love”? (III, diss. II, ch. II, n. IV).
After mortal sin. That one must at once make an act of charity “today has been abandoned by all” (Prümmer, n. 563), and an obligation soon after justification by attrition “cannot be demonstrated by any probable argument” (Noldin, n. 59). Yet Merkelbach: “those do not satisfy this precept who remain for a long time in the state of mortal sin, or are justified only with imperfect contrition” (I, n. 971), and Marc says the same of those who remain so “for months” (n. 473); McHugh-Callan: “a delay beyond four or five months according to some authors would be notable” (n. 1598). Wouters binds one of itself after hatred of God (n. 519).
A natural friendship with God. Bontempi, against Vasquez (Whether besides infused charity th, n. 3): “The true opinion therefore is, that a twofold love of God is given, certainly of friendship”, one toward God as natural end, the other as supernatural (Whether besides infused charity th, n. 4). Merkelbach: in a state of pure nature “there would have been no equality nor friendship between God and us, although nevertheless on each side there would have been love of benevolence” (I, n. 854); Vermeersch: “in the natural order, love between God and man would not have been a love of friendship” (n. 71). McHugh-Callan grants that “Natural love of God, indeed, is possible without grace” (n. 1122).
How mortal sin takes charity away. St. Thomas: by placing an obstacle to God's outpouring of it, as light ceases in the air when the sun is blocked (II-II, q. 24, a. 12). Merkelbach: mortal sin takes it away “not only meritoriously, but also physically and efficiently expels it” (I, n. 873). Bontempi, with St. Bonaventure and Scotus, against the Thomists: “grace and sin are opposed morally, not physically” (Whether charity can be lost, and h, n. 45); “Charity is not expelled in combat by sin, but fails from the demerit of the sinner and God refusing influx” (Whether charity can be lost, and h, n. 39). Billuart: that one act does not destroy a habit “is true of acquired habits, but not of infused habits, such as charity is” (On the Subject, Cause, Increase, and…, n. 49).
Heart, soul and mind in the great commandment. St. Thomas reads the heart as the will's intention, the mind as the intellect, the soul as the lower appetite, the strength as the outward act, and notes that Chrysostom, St. Augustine and Gregory of Nyssa read them otherwise (II-II, q. 44, a. 5). Spirago reads the heart “with the will”, the soul “with the understanding” and the mind “with the affections” (II. THE TWO COMMANDMENTS OF CHARITY). Vermeersch: “Among the Hebrews, the heart signifies intellect and affection” (n. 73); Merkelbach and McHugh-Callan allow that all may mean one thing, “synonymous significations of the one thought” (I, n. 974, n. 1558).
Where charity resides. St. Thomas puts it in the will and denies it to the concupiscible, which belongs to the sense appetite: “the concupiscible cannot be the subject of charity” (II-II, q. 24, a. 1, ad 1). Bontempi gives St. Bonaventure's teaching that “it is in the concupiscible part, as Hope is in the Irascible” (What is the proximate subject of c, n. 3), meaning not the sense appetite “but in the concupiscible of the rational appetite” (What is the proximate subject of c, n. 4). Spirago, in the catechism: “love to be an act of the understanding, the affections, and the will” (III. THE PRECEPT OF THE LOVE OF GOD).
Giving one's life for another's bodily life. St. Thomas: “if a man of his own accord offer himself for that purpose, this belongs to the perfection of charity” (II-II, q. 26, a. 5, ad 3). The later authors allow it from a motive of virtue. Merkelbach: charity “often permits and advises him to expose his life” for friendship, gratitude, the honor of God or the common good (I, n. 909); Noldin: “he can licitly prefer the life of the neighbor for preserving even an equal or inferior person” (n. 77); Marc: one “can per se, and from the motive of virtue, immolate his own life for preserving another's” (n. 482); Vermeersch: “we can per se, but are not bound to” (n. 84); Prümmer, after St. Thomas, because one “loves the good of virtue more than bodily good” (n. 580). McHugh-Callan is more guarded: “At least, it is more probable that this is lawful” (n. 1169), and he forbids offering oneself “as substitute for a condemned criminal” (n. 1169). Bontempi reports that the older authors divided. Durandus, Richard, Gabriel, Paludanus and Bellarmine denied it, citing St. Augustine that such a death “exceeds the rule of doctrine” (Whether a man ought to love himsel, n. 8), and Hurtado “lays down that it is a sin to die for the life of a neighbor” (Whether a man ought to love himsel, n. 9). Azor, Soto, Victoria and Tanner held it lawful (Whether a man ought to love himsel, n. 10). Bontempi himself, with St. Bonaventure, calls it heroic charity when the death is undergone “in order to God” (Whether a man ought to love himsel, n. 12).
A mother's life and her child's baptism. Marc holds flatly: “A mother is bound to undergo a dangerous operation so that the infant can be extracted and baptized” (n. 483). Prümmer grants the obligation in principle, “even with danger to life”, but adds that “almost never is a strict obligation to be imposed on her”, since the infant may not survive the operation and can be baptized in the womb (n. 583). McHugh-Callan frees her from the operation “if it is uncertain that the baptism can be administered” (n. 1166), and Sabetti likewise: “A mother is not bound to undergo danger of life so that her offspring may be baptized, when it is uncertain whether it will survive for baptism” (n. 170). Bontempi holds with the common teaching that the neighbor's salvation comes before our life (Whether the eternal salvation of t, n. 1), and reports that Sancius and Sà denied any duty to prevent a neighbor's spiritual harm at the cost of one's body, “otherwise a pregnant mother would be held to allow herself to be cut open so that the infant could be baptized” (Whether the eternal salvation of t, n. 3). Concina holds the opposite of Marc, with St. Thomas: “A pregnant mother who is unable to give birth is not bound to suffer a deadly cutting of the womb, that the child enclosed in the womb may be baptized: because evils are not to be done that goods may come” (III, diss. III, ch. III, n. XIV).
How much a neighbor's extreme bodily need requires. Merkelbach: he must be aided “under grave sin, with notable proper temporal detriment”, though not by extraordinary means nor at the cost of life (I, n. 909); the rule that charity does not oblige with great inconvenience “does not hold in extreme necessity” (I, n. 910). Noldin: “with great inconvenience indeed, yet not with danger to life or of an almost equal good” (n. 79); Marc: “he must be helped with great inconvenience” (n. 483). Prümmer denies it: in extreme bodily necessity “no one is bound to assist neighbor with grave harm, because he is not even bound to preserve his own bodily life with great harm”, so that “a rich man is not bound to give a great sum of money to save a sick neighbor from certain death” (n. 584). Sabetti stands between: “with a great inconvenience indeed, but not with the greatest, such as the donation of a great sum of money would be even for a rich man” (n. 169).
When parents are helped before wife and children. Ordinarily the wife comes first, then the children, then the parents. Prümmer reverses the order “in extreme necessity, namely, if there is question of danger of life” (n. 581), and so Merkelbach, Vermeersch and McHugh-Callan (I, n. 914; n. 86; n. 1181); Sabetti says parents are there “more probably” to be preferred (n. 169). Marc extends the reversal to quasi-extreme necessity: “if the necessity is extreme, or quasi-extreme, on both sides” (n. 484). Wouters extends it to grave: “In extreme or grave necessity parents are to be preferred to spouse and children” (n. 573); Bontempi reports Tanner holding “that even in a grave necessity, which is not extreme, parents are rather to be helped than children”, Cajetan and Valencia holding the opposite, “that in extreme necessity the obligation of helping a son prevails”, and Sà, who “simply prefers the wife to the mother” (Whether a man ought to love his sp, n. 1). St. Thomas says only that “in certain cases a man ought to succor his parents rather than his wife” (II-II, q. 26, a. 11, ad 1). Concina sets the parents first outright: “First of all are to be preferred father and mother; then wives and children. Wives are to be preferred to parents only as regards habitation and a more tender love”, the preference binding “only when extreme necessity presses” (III, diss. III, ch. III, n. XV). Billuart: “Speaking absolutely, however, the father in necessity is to be preferred to the son”, and the wife is loved “more intensively than father and children” but the father “more objectively and appreciatively” (What order is to be kept in the love…, n. 13).
When inverting the order of charity is a grave sin. Merkelbach: it “is not mortally evil unless there is question of extreme necessity; - or unless it is very notable and is done without any reason” (I, n. 915). Marc makes grave necessity enough: inversion “if it is a question of grave or extreme necessity, contains grave sin” (n. 484); Wouters asks both “extreme or grave necessity” and a notable inversion (n. 573). Prümmer says only that in “light necessity, some inversion of the order does not exceed the guilt of venial sin” (n. 582). Among the nearest kin they agree it is light; Bontempi reports Tanner, Bonacina and Filliucius judging it venial “because the distance is small and on either side the opinions are probable” (Whether a man ought to love his sp, n. 3).
Whether every man is bound to labor. Noldin: though no divine precept binds each man directly, “there exists a universal precept of labor for the human race”, and “indirectly labor is prescribed more or less to all” (n. 67); to avoid the dangers of idleness a man is bound “to apply himself to some honorable labor”, and games do not suffice (n. 68). Marc speaks of “the obligation of laboring and of embracing a certain state of life” (n. 476). Prümmer concludes “that every man is not strictly obliged to labor”, since idleness “can also be avoided in other ways” (n. 569). On strikes, Noldin counts it an injury when a willing worker is hindered, “which is done by socialists especially in strikes” (n. 69); Prümmer holds “that a work stoppage is not intrinsically evil, although it is to be avoided as far as possible” (n. 569).
Going to law against an enemy. St. Alphonsus, quoted by Prümmer: “In practice I have never dared to absolve any of those who said that they had spared their enemies, but had wished justice to have its place”. Prümmer answers: “This opinion seems to be rather strict”; without hatred or disordered revenge “it does not seem to be sinful to go to a judge”, though it is “rather rarely expedient” (n. 574). Noldin allows it in principle and adds: “in practice this must altogether be dissuaded” (n. 84). Merkelbach allows it too, but in practice a sufficient satisfaction offered must generally be accepted, since “it is difficult that someone seek public vengeance from a judge from pure love of justice” (I, n. 898). Vermeersch: “Yet this is dangerous”; if a very grave penalty awaits the enemy, the fault “will easily have been grave against charity” (n. 88). Bontempi: “remission is to be urged, especially if he is to be punished by death, mutilation, etc.” (Whether we are bound to show the e, n. 19). Concina: “Absolutely, it is wiser to remit all things”; and if the offender spontaneously offers fitting satisfaction, “when the offended party appeals to the tribunal, he does not seek to have his injured right repaired, but to indulge vengeance and hatred” (III, diss. III, ch. IV, n. VII). Billuart: the offended party may seek satisfaction before a judge, but not “when he himself offers a reasonable one”, since “this can scarcely happen without some appetite for vengeance” (Whether enemies are to be loved from…, n. 15).
Refusing to speak to or greet one another. Prümmer: “ordinarily it is sin if two students of the same seminary, or two religious of the same convent” stop speaking and greeting, “since this is usually from hatred or from enmity and causes scandal” (n. 576). Noldin makes the same case a light sin when “the cause of enmity is light” (n. 83), and Vermeersch light where “two nuns, because of a moderate quarrel, break off communication for some days” (n. 88). Merkelbach: “it seems too general, what some say without restriction, that a religious who after ten days does not wish to speak to a confrere is not to be absolved” (I, n. 897), and in his regions the omission of a greeting “once or twice is often a venial sin” (I, n. 897). Vermeersch: “the mere omission of the signification of love will rarely today be able to be condemned as grave” (n. 95). Bontempi reports Fagundez and Suarez holding “that it is mortal to deny these signs of Charity”, while not to return a salutation “is per se only venial” (Whether we are bound to show the e, n. 12); Sabetti, with St. Alphonsus, says that where a greeting is a special sign the obligation to give it “is not grave” (n. 174). Concina: to return the greeting of one who greets you “is a duty, which cannot be neglected with deliberate mind without grave fault”, and the common signs are not to be suspended among “associates of the same body, college, and community”; yet “those who omit these signs are not straightway to be condemned of grave fault” (III, diss. III, ch. IV, n. IV). He sets among the lax opinions Vidal's, that those living in one college or order “can without the stain of mortal fault mutually deny particular signs of love” (III, diss. III, ch. II, n. VI). Billuart: to deny an enemy the common signs is to be “a scandal to him and to others” (Whether enemies are to be loved from…, n. 8).
Wishing a parent's death for an inheritance. Bontempi reports the dispute: Navarre held such desires mortal, “because the life of the neighbour is a good higher than riches”, while Sà, Azor, Sancius, Palaus and Bassaeus held them lawful; Bassaeus's proof he calls “frivolous” (How, and when, the precept of the, n. 3). Bontempi wrote before Innocent XI condemned the proposition “It is licit by an absolute desire to wish for the death of one's father, not indeed as an evil of the father, but as a good of the one wishing, because namely a rich inheritance will come to him”; Sabetti draws from it that “a wife cannot desire the death of her husband from the fact that she is unjustly badly treated by him” (n. 170). Concina sets out the lax opinions he rejects, Tamburini's and Castropalao's among them (III, diss. III, ch. II, n. II), and concludes: “Never, then, is it licit either to rejoice over, or to wish, evil to one's neighbor — and much less to oneself” (III, diss. III, ch. IV, n. VIII).
Wishing that another fall into sin. Merkelbach: “it is illicit to desire for any wayfarer that he be damned or that he sin, because this is simply evil” (I, n. 889). McHugh-Callan agrees that “He who wishes sin approves of the offense to God”, but adds: “it does not seem unlawful to wish that God permit a person to fall into sin, as a means to a spiritual awakening” (n. 1144). St. Thomas reads the curses of Scripture as wishing “that the sin be destroyed, but that the man may live” (II-II, q. 25, a. 6, ad 3).
A proximate danger of sin to help a neighbor in extreme spiritual need. Prümmer: one may never “expose himself to a certain danger of sinning” for any good of a neighbor, though a less proximate danger may be borne (n. 580). Marc: not “unless the danger by some reason becomes remote” (n. 482); McHugh-Callan forbids exposing oneself “to the certain and proximate danger of sin for the sake of another’s spiritual progress” (n. 1163). Merkelbach allows a proximate danger to be “rendered remote” by suitable remedies, and says that “sometimes it is necessary so to act” for a neighbor in extreme spiritual necessity (I, n. 907); Noldin: “it is permitted to expose oneself to proximate danger of sinning, with remedies nevertheless applied against sin” (n. 77). Sabetti, after St. Alphonsus, goes furthest: one may even be bound “when a fall is otherwise very probable”, if one arms oneself with the means (n. 170). Concina is stricter than any: “you are not bound — nay, you ought not — to expose yourself to a probable danger of sinning” (III, diss. III, ch. III, n. XIV).
Ourselves and our neighbors in heaven. St. Thomas: as to the good wished, the blessed love better men more than themselves, but “a man will love himself more than even his better neighbors, because the intensity of the act of love arises on the part of the person who loves” (II-II, q. 26, a. 13); Merkelbach: “appreciatively and intensively, ourselves more” (I, n. 915); McHugh-Callan: “each loves self with a more intense love” (n. 1182). Bontempi sets out St. Bonaventure's second opinion, that the order which charity has from the nature of its subject will not remain in heaven, so that each “will rejoice as much in the good of his neighbor as in his own” (Whether the order of charity remai, n. 8), with St. Anselm's words, “where no one loves another less than himself” (Whether the order of charity remai, n. 9). The first opinion, that the order of this life remains entire, St. Bonaventure calls “that of very many” (Whether the order of charity remai, n. 4).
Whether nature itself inclines us to love God more than ourselves. St. Thomas: “not only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired, loves God above all things and more than himself, but also every single creature, each in its own way” (II-II, q. 26, a. 3). Bontempi reports that Coninck denied it (Whether nature inclines more to lo, n. 1); that Scotus, who holds the conclusion, attacks St. Thomas's argument from the part and the whole (Whether nature inclines more to lo, n. 6), as does Durandus (Whether nature inclines more to lo, n. 12); and that Coninck tried to reconcile the two sides by saying nature dictates an appreciative love of God above all, “but not a more intense one” (Whether nature inclines more to lo, n. 26). Bontempi answers: “But our question concerns appreciative love” (Whether nature inclines more to lo, n. 27).
Whether works done for the neighbor must come from charity's motive. Noldin: “to satisfy this precept it is not required that works of beneficence toward the neighbor be done from the motive of charity, but it suffices that they be done from another lower motive, for example, mercy, kindness” (n. 72). McHugh-Callan: “The motive of charity is absent, therefore, when one loves only one’s friends, when one is kind to others out of pity”, if there is no thought of God (n. 1582); the precept is met when “the supernatural motive directs our love of neighbor, if it is present virtually”, and natural motives are good “provided their influence is subordinated to the divine friendship” (n. 1584). Bontempi gives St. Gregory: “If anyone loves anyone, but does not love him for God's sake, he has not Charity” (Whether God, and the neighbor, are, n. 13). Prümmer: purely natural love of neighbor “is licit per se, provided it is not disordered”, but it is not the charity commanded (n. 570). Concina treats a related point, whether the love of neighbor needs an act distinct from the love of God: “Certain authors of a more benign turn deny it; but their opinion is false” (III, diss. III, ch. III, n. IV). Billuart: to love the neighbor “for benefits received, for his outstanding qualities” as his own perfections “is not the love of charity” but natural love (Comprising all that concerns charity…, n. 17).
Whether alms bind gravely in common necessity. Prümmer holds “a grave obligation of sometimes giving alms from goods superfluous to status”, with St. Alphonsus, while granting that the denial “is at least extrinsically probable” (n. 594). Merkelbach: “Indeed also probably in common necessity” (I, n. 931); Marc: “St. Alphonsus affirms, with the more common opinion” (n. 488); McHugh-Callan: the obligation “as it appears, is also grave” (n. 1238); Wouters affirms it, but a rich man sins gravely only “if he proposed never, or scarcely ever, to give alms except to one constituted in grave necessity” (n. 533). Noldin denies it can be established: “since the opinion affirming a grave obligation is not certain, but only probable, it cannot be established”, and names St. Antoninus and St. Thomas among those who deny it (n. 92). Vermeersch: “a grave obligation is not proved, although it is affirmed by many”, and less so today, when public subsidies provide for the poor (n. 105). Sabetti: “it is controverted among the Doctors” (n. 177). All say the confessor should not refuse absolution on this ground. Concina: “those rich are damned, unless they come to their senses, who do not fulfill the precept of almsgiving”, against Diana's objection that then “all the rich and their Confessors are damned” (III, diss. III, ch. VII, n. XV). Billuart: one who “never gave alms, or proposed never to give out of what is superfluous to status in common necessities, would not seem excusable from mortal sin” (Whether to give alms is a matter of…, n. 23).
Alms in grave necessity: from which goods. Prümmer: from goods superfluous to one's station; “Thus the opinion today is common” (n. 593); Noldin: “from goods simply superfluous” (n. 91). Merkelbach adds “indeed even from things necessary to one's state, when this can be done without grave inconvenience” (I, n. 930); Sabetti, when the necessity “approaches extreme necessity”, from goods in some way necessary to one's state (n. 176). St. Thomas says that to give from what one's station needs “is a matter not of precept but of counsel” (II-II, q. 32, a. 6). Bontempi sets out the dispute: Cajetan, Sanchez, Navarre and others deny any such duty outside extreme necessity, while Paludanus, Victoria, Cano, Valencia and Tanner, with St. Bonaventure, hold one bound “provided it can be done with less inconvenience than that which the needy neighbor undergoes” (Whether anyone is bound at some ti, n. 2); he sides with them: “nor is it true, as Diana says, that the rich have a right to live splendidly in their own state at so great damage and misery to the poor” (Whether anyone is bound at some ti, n. 7). Prümmer adds that St. Antoninus and Medina held such alms “not of precept, but only of counsel. This opinion today is obsolete.” (n. 593). Vermeersch notes a second dispute, whether one must relieve the man in grave need oneself or may keep the alms for another good work: “Many permit this option” (n. 105). Concina: “Not only out of superfluities, but even out of what is necessary to the becomingness and seemliness of their state”, “as the more common opinion — and to me the true one — teaches” (III, diss. III, ch. VII, n. XVI). Billuart, of grave necessity: “we are bound under mortal sin to relieve him from some way out of things necessary to status”, calling it “more common” (Whether to give alms is a matter of…, n. 18).
How much the rich must give. St. Alphonsus held that in common necessity the fiftieth part of the revenue beyond one's station suffices, “and a proportionally smaller part if the income is enormous”; Merkelbach adds that the estimate “can be regarded as rather benign” (I, n. 931). The smaller part for great wealth is not an easier rule for the very rich: the precept binds the rich together, so that each must give what would suffice if all did the same, and Konings gives the reason, “if individual rich persons spent that quantity on the poor, it would already be sufficient for meeting common necessities” (n. 285); so Bucceroni, “this precept does not oblige all in solidum, but commonly all the rich” (n. 411). In the Theologia moralis St. Alphonsus gives the fiftieth part as the more common opinion (II, n. 32); in the Homo apostolicus he states it as his own, of the revenues that remain over, as Ballerini notes (Gury-Ballerini). Sabetti: “it seems more probable that it is enough” (n. 177); Wouters: St. Alphonsus held it “for the circumstances of his time” (n. 534). Prümmer: “Nothing certain can be answered in this question” (n. 595); Noldin: the figure “seems to lack a solid foundation” (n. 91); McHugh-Callan: “other moralists believe that today the amount cannot be fixed mathematically” (n. 1253). Vermeersch reverses the scale. Since the needs are now national and inexhaustible, the part given should follow capacity, as taxes do, and he proposes one that rises with revenue, from 20 to 40 per cent for one without a family to support, half that with three to six children; he notes that “in the age of St. Alphonsus they rather diminished the same proportion” (n. 108). For beneficed clerics Bontempi reports the broadest opinion as “the fourth part of revenues” (Whether alms ought to be given fro, n. 27). Concina will name no figure: “Some of the Theologians assign a tenth part of the revenues”, others more or less, and since superfluities “are enclosed within no certain limit” they have no precise measure (III, diss. III, ch. IX, n. IV); with St. Augustine he would have the rich “Keep for your Lord the place of one child” (III, diss. III, ch. IX, n. VII).
Whether all one's superfluities must go to the poor. McHugh-Callan: “There are theologians who hold that one is bound to give away all one’s superfluous wealth in alms, even apart from cases of extreme or grave necessity; but others teach that, while this is of counsel, it is not obligatory” (n. 1251). Wouters judges “that doctrine is not sufficiently proved”, and lets superfluous goods be partly kept “for greater security regarding the future time, and for greater honest delights” (n. 534); Marc: “The rich are indeed not bound to distribute the whole of what is superfluous” (n. 488); Noldin: the rich who spend on superfluous uses or set goods aside to increase their riches “are not to be accused of sin” (n. 91). Vermeersch, taking alms in the fuller sense, would have one without family burdens “assign all, at least, of the revenues which are left over to pious works” (n. 108). Concina holds the strict side: “Christ commands, and the Fathers inculcate, that all superfluities be distributed” (III, diss. III, ch. IX, n. IV), the rich being bound “to lay out what is superfluous both to nature and to state upon the poor pressed by common necessity” (III, diss. III, ch. VII, n. XIV). Billuart the other: in common necessity the rich man “is not held straightway to give everything superfluous to status, but he can reserve it” for other pious uses or “for rationally augmenting his status” (Whether to give alms is a matter of…, n. 22).
Whether alms to one in extreme need are owed in justice. Bontempi sets out two opinions: that alms are then given “out of mercy alone” (Soto, Bellarmine, Suarez, Vasquez, Molina and many others) (Whether alms is owed in justice to, n. 1), and that they are owed in justice (St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, Cajetan, Navarre, the Fathers); he holds the second: “I ASSERT, with this opinion, that alms are owed to one in extreme indigence out of justice”, since goods were made private on that condition (Whether alms is owed in justice to, n. 4). Prümmer: “the obligation of giving alms is properly an obligation of charity and of general justice, but not of commutative justice”, so that a poor man unduly refused “cannot in the least secretly compensate himself”, unless his need is extreme (n. 589); McHugh-Callan: a mere refusal brings no duty of restitution, for “restitution is the giving back to another of what strictly belongs to him” (n. 1240). Bontempi also reports many (Diana, Coninck, Vasquez and others) who allow a poor man “even in a grave but not extreme necessity” to take from rich men who are bound to give (Whether alms is owed in justice to, n. 15).
A wife's alms from the household. Bontempi, with St. Augustine: “a married woman cannot make alms from the goods of her husband, but only from her own”, though of earned revenues “at least the twentieth part she can give” (Whether alms ought to be given fro, n. 18). The later authors allow more. Merkelbach: “in our regions, without consent, she can give moderate, not extraordinary” alms (I, n. 932), though if he forbids it altogether “sometimes perhaps it would be better to abstain” (I, n. 932); Marc: “and this even if the husband were unwilling, because custom grants her this right” (n. 489); Prümmer: if the husband “were too greedy and did not wish to give due alms”, she may still give moderately, especially to her poor parents (n. 596); Vermeersch: “A wife, as such, can, in our regions, give moderate alms” (n. 107).
How much hope of success makes correction binding. Merkelbach: “if correction is doubtfully going to profit but certainly not going to harm, it must be done”, and it is to be omitted only when amendment is “equally hoped for and harm feared” (I, n. 938; I, n. 938). Vermeersch says both that the conditions are such “that in doubt you are excused” and that “In doubt, however, correction is to be presumed useful” (n. 115). Noldin: “In doubt whether it will profit, admonition should be omitted” (n. 96); Marc: “in doubt whether it will be profitable or harmful, you are not bound” (n. 493). Wouters asks “That there be great hope of fruit” (n. 538); Sabetti, “some hope, indeed a greater probability, of amendment” (n. 179). St. Bonaventure, in Bontempi: one is bound when he “believes with probability that it will profit, and not harm” (Whether fraternal correction is a, n. 2). St. Thomas: correction is foregone “when it is deemed probable that the sinner will not take the warning, and will become worse” (II-II, q. 33, a. 6). Concina: “When it is doubted whether the correction will bring forth more evil than good, one must abstain from it. But if the doubt is not of a greater evil, but only of the profit, correction must be made” (III, diss. III, ch. X, n. XVIII); Billuart: “If it be doubted whether it will profit, and it is certain it will not harm, it is to be applied”, and where harm is as doubtful as profit, “the greater is to be preferred to the less” (Whether fraternal correction is a…, n. 10).
Warning one who breaks a law in ignorance. Noldin: “A strict obligation of admonishing the neighbor does not exist in a private man, whether the neighbor sins against the natural law or against positive law”, against St. Alphonsus and many others, who hold that one who breaks the natural law in ignorance must be warned; these, he says, grant that one who breaks a human law need not be (n. 98). Merkelbach: “according to many it is probable that private persons are not bound to instruct others as regards material sins committed only against positive law (divine or human)” (I, n. 941). Wouters: the warning binds of itself “if there is question of divine law, whether natural or positive”, but for human law “it quite probably does not oblige”, citing St. Alphonsus (n. 540). Marc, citing the same place of St. Alphonsus, holds the opposite for human law: “Yet the affirmative opinion is more probable and more common” (n. 496). The place itself explains it. There St. Alphonsus calls it probable that private persons are not bound to correct sins against a law that is only positive, but holds the contrary more probable and more common, that all are bound, since the transgression, though material, is still evil once the law is laid down (Theologia moralis II, n. 36); and he lists this among the questions on which he changed his mind, the negative having seemed more probable in his first edition (Elenchus quaestionum reformatarum, q. 5). Wouters follows the opinion St. Alphonsus allows as probable, Marc the one he prefers, in St. Alphonsus's own reason; Noldin's report that he grants the negative does not match n. 36. Vermeersch: “there is at least a light obligation of warning him who materially violates that law” of nature (n. 113), while for a human precept broken by forgetfulness “not a few deny every obligation” (n. 113). Prümmer: “Equals who are private men are commonly not bound to warning”, unless harm, scandal or an intrinsic evil is in question (n. 603). All bind superiors and confessors. Concina binds even in invincible ignorance: “the precept presses above all when the neighbor labors under a double misery”, and “If the invincible ignorance be only of ecclesiastical law, the precept presses even then” (III, diss. III, ch. X, n. VIII).
Taking a hidden fault straight to the superior. Most of the later authors allow it, the superior acting as a father, when that promises better amendment: Noldin, if amendment “is more easily and efficaciously obtained through the superior” (n. 97); Wouters: “it suffices that this seem more expedient” (n. 539); Vermeersch quotes St. Thomas's Quodlibet, that one who intends the brother's amendment “by denouncing he does not sin” (n. 116). In the Summa St. Thomas lets the matter be made known to the prelate before the witnesses “in so far as the prelate is a private individual who is able to be of more use than others” (II-II, q. 33, a. 8), but holds that if a prelate commands against the Lord's order “both would sin, the one commanding, and the one obeying him” (II-II, q. 33, a. 7). Bontempi reports the permissive opinion as widely held, by St. Antoninus, Gerson, Sylvester “and all the Theologians of the Society of Jesus” (Whether the order of fraternal cor, n. 2), and rejects it: “IT MUST BE ASSERTED, with this opinion, that in fraternal correction the order of the Gospel is to be observed by commandment” (Whether the order of fraternal cor, n. 10), for “No one is the Lord of another's reputation” (Whether the order of fraternal cor, n. 16); the prelate may not be told “before witnesses have been called in, or at least one” (Whether the order of fraternal cor, n. 29). Concina keeps the order with Bontempi: “Rarely, however — nay, most rarely — is this correction better performed by the Prelate”, for “private men very easily deceive themselves and feign this greater efficacy at their pleasure” (III, diss. III, ch. X, n. XXV). Billuart allows it when the prelate “is pious, discreet, spiritual, not bearing rancor or hatred against the subject” (On the order of fraternal correction, n. 8).
Whether a sinner must amend himself before correcting another. St. Thomas: sin does not take away right judgment, “and in this respect he may be competent to find fault with others for committing sin”, though a sin of one's own is a hindrance (II-II, q. 33, a. 5). McHugh-Callan: “there does not seem to be any obligation of correcting self before correcting others”; it is counseled, and required only for special reasons (n. 1281); Noldin: the sinner “is not exempted from the obligation” (n. 96); Merkelbach requires a sinner to amend first only if he is a superior, gives scandal, or alone can save a dying neighbor (I, n. 943). Marc: “if he is a public sinner, ordinarily he ought to abstain from correction” (n. 492). Bontempi reads Christ's “Take heed to yourselves” as: “First make yourself fit, that you may be able to correct another” (Whether fraternal correction is a, n. 8). Concina: “Sinners, then, just as they are bound to corporal almsgiving, are likewise bound to spiritual”, though it is their duty “before they correct others, to detest their own crimes” (III, diss. III, ch. X, n. XI).
Whether the gift of wisdom is speculative or practical, and where it resides. St. Thomas: “wisdom as a gift, is not merely speculative but also practical”, contemplation coming first (II-II, q. 45, a. 3); its essence is in the intellect, its cause in the will (II-II, q. 45, a. 2). Merkelbach: “at once speculative and practical” (I, n. 922); McHugh-Callan: “Primarily, Wisdom is speculative” (n. 1612). Bontempi, after St. Bonaventure, sets it against the gift of understanding, which “is for speculation”: “the gift of Wisdom, however, is practical” (On the spiritual delights of wisdo, n. 14). He makes the intellect only its “quasi-subject”, “overflowing its operations into the will” (What kind of gift wisdom is, n. 9), and defines the gift as a habit “rendering the soul easily mobile toward loving and tasting” (What kind of gift wisdom is, n. 8). He also defends the old reading of wisdom as “sapid knowledge” against St. Thomas, who doubts that this is the true sense of the text cited for it (What kind of gift wisdom is, n. 11).
Whether God must be loved more intensely than any creature. Concina: “It is agreed among all that this precept does not command intensive love”, but “appreciative love, by which we choose God before, and prefer him to, all other goods” (III, diss. II, ch. III, n. IX). Billuart grants that it would be inordinate “to choose to love a creature more intensely than God”, reports that “Some of the Louvain theologians affirm this, with Peter Soto” when the act falls short of that intensity, some calling it mortal, others venial, and holds with “The more common opinion”: “He does not sin against the precept of charity who loves his neighbor with a more intense love, whether natural or supernatural, than God” (Whether God is to be loved from…, n. 7, Whether God is to be loved from…, n. 8).
How often private men are bound to correct. Billuart reads the four conditions as seldom met together: “since these conditions are rarely found all together, rarely also are private men held, at least under grave sin, to fraternal admonition” (Whether fraternal correction is a…, n. 14). Concina reads the same conditions the other way: “Rare is the amendment of offenders — not so much on account of their malice, as on account of the defect of correctors”, and “As for me, I have found more who have received correction than who have scorned it” (III, diss. III, ch. X, n. XVIII).

What It Is

St. Thomas: “charity is the friendship of man for God”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 23, a. 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 552; Merkelbach I, n. 852; McHugh-Callan n. 1112; Bontempi Whether charity is properly the fr, n. 4; Billuart Comprising all that concerns charity…, n. 5; Concina III, diss. II, ch. III, n. III
Defined: “a virtue divinely infused, by which we love God as the highest good on account of Himself, and ourselves and neighbor on account of God”	Prümmer n. 552In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 850; Noldin n. 53; Wouters n. 363; Marc n. 465; Sabetti-Barrett n. 165; Concina III, diss. II, ch. III, n. I; Billuart Comprising all that concerns charity…, n. 3
Naming the friendship: “A supernatural virtue infused by God, through which we love with friendship God, the author of our beatitude, on account of His own goodness, and our neighbor, on account of God.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1114In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 69
Bontempi, after St. Bonaventure: “Charity is a created supernatural virtue, by which men love God inasmuch as he is a certain Good looking to a supernatural order for himself”	Bontempi What charity is, n. 32
The word, from carum or charis: “Charity originally and primarily signifies a gratuitous, liberal, honorable, benevolent, excellent love toward someone who is highly esteemed.”	Merkelbach I, n. 842In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1105; Bontempi What charity is, n. 1
Love, dilection and charity: “But charity adds over and above love a certain perfection of love, insofar as that which is loved is esteemed of great price and is dear”	Prümmer n. 551In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 842; Marc n. 465; Bontempi What charity is, n. 3
“Love is of nature; dilection of the deliberative will; and Charity of grace.”	Bontempi What charity is, n. 13In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 53
“By force of the word itself, charity (Greek agape) is named more nobly than love.”	Vermeersch n. 70
In common speech kindness to others; in theology “But in theological speech and in the strictest sense, only supernatural and divine friendship is called charity”	Merkelbach I, n. 842In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1105
Charity uncreated and created: “Uncreated charity is God Himself.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1113

Its Place Among the Virtues

The first of the virtues: “charity is more excellent than faith or hope, and, consequently, than all the other virtues”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 23, a. 6In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 559; Merkelbach I, n. 858; McHugh-Callan n. 1116; Bontempi Whether charity is the most excell, n. 1; Wouters n. 362
For “charity attains God Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that something may accrue to us from Him”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 23, a. 6In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 858; McHugh-Callan n. 1116
Even above faith, though faith is in the intellect: “the love of the things that are above us, especially of God, ranks before the knowledge of such things”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 23, a. 6, ad 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 859
In heaven, otherwise: “And therefore vision is more perfect than dilection.”	Merkelbach I, n. 859In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1116
“it belongs to Faith to direct; to Hope to raise up; and to Charity to unite”	Bontempi What charity is, n. 14
Without it no virtue is perfect: “Accordingly no strictly true virtue is possible without charity.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 23, a. 7In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 860; McHugh-Callan n. 1117
With St. Augustine: “the prudence of the miser, whereby he devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 23, a. 7
Their form: “it is charity which directs the acts of all other virtues to the last end, and which, consequently, also gives the form to all other acts of virtue”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 23, a. 8In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 861; Prümmer n. 559; Wouters n. 366
“Charity is called the form of the other virtues not as being their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way of efficient cause”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 23, a. 8, ad 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 861; McHugh-Callan n. 1118; Bontempi Whether charity is the form of the, n. 10
“Is it an exemplary form? St. Thomas seems here to deny it, ad 1; but in the Q. D. de Charitate he affirms it. But it is a question of words.”	Merkelbach I, n. 861In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 559
Their root, end and mother: “charity is called the mother of the other virtues, because, by commanding them, it conceives the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last end”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 23, a. 8, ad 3In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 861; McHugh-Callan n. 1118
“Prudence is the form of the moral virtues because it gives order to a particular end according to right reason; charity is the form of the theological virtues, of prudence, and of the moral virtues because it gives perfect order to the ultimate end”	Merkelbach I, n. 862
For merit, its influence on the other virtues must be at least: “Virtual direction”	McHugh-Callan n. 1120In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 559
Not habitual alone, as Vasquez held, nor actual in each act, as the Jansenists: “Some, e.g. Vasquez, teach that habitual charity and the habitual influence of charity suffice”	Prümmer n. 559In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1120

What It Rests On

Its motive: “The formal or proximate motive object of charity toward God is the absolute goodness of God in himself, lovable on account of himself, insofar as it is the object of supernatural beatitude.”	Merkelbach I, n. 874In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 554; Wouters n. 364; Noldin n. 55; Vermeersch n. 69; McHugh-Callan n. 1115
“God is loved by charity for His own sake: wherefore charity regards principally but one aspect of lovableness, namely God's goodness, which is His substance”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 23, a. 5, ad 2
Not God as good to us: “This is the most common opinion of theologians against a few, e.g. Vinc. Bolgeni, Ballerini, who think that God as good to us is the motive of charity.”	Prümmer n. 554In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 876
That is hope's: “the formal object of hope is the relative goodness of God”	Wouters n. 364In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 55
God's goodness taken whole, “that this goodness is composed of all God's perfections, and therefore of the goodness of the essence and of all the attributes”	Wouters n. 364In nearly the same words: Marc n. 465; Merkelbach I, n. 876
or in any one attribute: “constituted not only by the accumulation of all perfections, but also by each single attribute of God, whether absolute or relative”	Noldin n. 55In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 554
The relative attributes move most strongly: “Therefore there is no easier way of arriving at an act of divine charity than by considering the benignity of God by which, being born, He gave Himself as companion; eating with us, as food; dying, as price; reigning, as reward.”	Noldin n. 55
So the act: “My God, because thou art infinite goodness, or, because thou art infinitely good, I love thee above all things”	Marc n. 465
It may include our good, as second: “charity is principally a love of benevolence; nevertheless nothing prevents it from secondarily including some love of concupiscence”	Merkelbach I, n. 879In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether charity is of a most speci, n. 19; Prümmer n. 555
Benefits dispose to it: “we are disposed by certain things to advance in His love, for instance, by favors bestowed by Him, by the rewards we hope to receive from Him, or even by the punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 27, a. 3In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 879
“Therefore if benefits are considered as goods conferred upon us and we rest there, it is an act of gratitude; if they are considered as communications of divine goodness, it can be an act of charity”	Merkelbach I, n. 879In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 364; Marc n. 468; Prümmer n. 554
The communication of beatitude: “For this communication, although it is not the motive of charity, is nevertheless a necessary condition”	Vermeersch n. 69

Its Object

God, and All That Is His
One act: “it is specifically the same act whereby we love God, and whereby we love our neighbor”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 1In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether God alone is to be loved o, n. 3; Merkelbach I, n. 881
As friendship with a man reaches his household, “so the friendship of charity extends itself to all the members of God's household, whom he calls to his society and beatitude”	Merkelbach I, n. 881
One habit, though some later authors posited a second for loving the neighbor's own perfections: “there is one habit of Charity, and one formal act of it toward God and neighbor”	Bontempi Whether God, and the neighbor, are, n. 10
St. Gregory: “If anyone loves anyone, but does not love him for God's sake, he has not Charity”	Bontempi Whether God, and the neighbor, are, n. 13
Whom It Reaches
Whom else it reaches: “The secondary material object is all rational creatures which can communicate in the beatitude of God: we ourselves, all wayfaring men, the saints in heaven, the good angels, souls dwelling in purgatory; but not irrational creatures, the damned, and evil angels.”	Merkelbach I, n. 881In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 71; Prümmer n. 570; Marc n. 476; Vermeersch n. 80; McHugh-Callan n. 1141
The rule: “Everything which is beatifiable is to be loved from charity.”	Marc n. 476
In the catechism: “Every human being is our neighbor, without distinction of religion, of race, of age, of sex, or of occupation.”	Spirago V. THE COMMANDMENT OF CHARITY TOWARDS OUR NE
Four things, with St. Augustine: “One above us, that is, God; one, which we ourselves are; a third next to us, that is, the Neighbor; a fourth below us, that is, our Body.”	Bontempi Whether it is fitting that four th, n. 1In nearly the same words: St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 12
Ourselves and Our Bodies
Ourselves: “properly speaking, a man is not a friend to himself, but something more than a friend”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 4In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 886; Bontempi Whether a man ought to love himsel, n. 5; McHugh-Callan n. 1136
“the love with which a man loves himself is the form and root of friendship”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 4
Not natural self-love, nor hope's, but the “supernatural love of self of charity, by which a man loves himself on account of God and in God, insofar as he is a son of God”	Prümmer n. 565In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1136
Blameworthy self-love: “Those who love themselves are to be blamed, in so far as they love themselves as regards their sensitive nature, which they humor.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 4, ad 3In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1136
Our bodies: “out of the love of charity with which we love God, we ought to love our bodies also, but we ought not to love the evil effects of sin and the corruption of punishment”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 5In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1138; Bontempi Whether a man ought to love his ow, n. 6
Sinners
Sinners: “For it is our duty to hate, in the sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in him, his being a man capable of bliss”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 6In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 889; Bontempi Whether sinners are to be loved ou, n. 2; Spirago VIII. THE COMMANDMENT TO LOVE OUR ENEMY
While they live: “we may love them with charity or as friends, if they are still in the present life”	McHugh-Callan n. 1142
A friend who falls: “when our friends fall into sin, we ought not to deny them the amenities of friendship, so long as there is hope of their mending their ways”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 6, ad 2In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1147
Their company: “The weak should avoid associating with sinners, on account of the danger in which they stand of being perverted by them.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 6, ad 5
“But it is commendable for the perfect, of whose perversion there is no fear, to associate with sinners that they may convert them.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 6, ad 5In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1145
Sinners do not love themselves aright: “Wherefore, since they know not themselves aright, they do not love themselves aright, but love what they think themselves to be.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 7In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1137
Angels, Demons and the Damned
The angels: “the friendship of charity extends also to the angels”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 10In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether angels are to be loved out, n. 1
Not the demons and the damned: “we cannot have the friendship of charity towards the demons”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 11In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether demons, and the damned, ar, n. 1; McHugh-Callan n. 1142
Yet their nature: “we can love the nature of the demons even out of charity, in as much as we desire those spirits to endure, as to their natural gifts, unto God's glory”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 11In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 882
Irrational Things, Charity Itself, and the Gifts
Irrational things, not as friends: “Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we regard them as the good things that we desire for others, in so far, to wit, as we wish for their preservation, to God's honor and man's use”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 3In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether irrational creatures are t, n. 1
St. Bonaventure's likeness: “in the manner in which someone who loves a friend also loves his dog”	Bontempi Whether irrational creatures are t, n. 2
Charity itself: “charity is loved out of charity, because charity is the good which we desire for all those whom we love out of charity”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 2In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether charity is to be loved out, n. 1
The gifts of grace: “spiritual gifts are loved by Charity; yet not with friendship, because for those gifts no good is wished; but with the love of concupiscence”	Bontempi Whether all gratuitous gifts are t, n. 6
Friendships
Other friendships: “charity commands each act of another friendship”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 7In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 79
Not a virtue of its own: “Hence, it seems that there is no such thing as a special and distinct virtue of human friendship.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1140
In the catechism: “It is not wrong to have friends, and to love them more than other men; for Christ had friends whom He loved with a special predilection.”	Spirago VII. LOVE OF ONE’S FRIENDS
“Those only are true friends whose friendship is based upon principles of religion.”	Spirago VII. LOVE OF ONE’S FRIENDS
St. Augustine: “he only loves his friend aright who loves God in him”	Spirago VII. LOVE OF ONE’S FRIENDS
“One must not be rash in forming friendships, nor must one do wrong to please a friend.”	Spirago VII. LOVE OF ONE’S FRIENDS

Its Subject

In the will: “the subject of charity is not the sensitive, but the intellective appetite, i.e. the will”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 24, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 863; Wouters n. 365; McHugh-Callan n. 1121; Bontempi What is the proximate subject of c, n. 1
“Consequently the concupiscible cannot be the subject of charity.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 24, a. 1, ad 1
St. Bonaventure places it in the concupiscible, as hope in the irascible; not, Bontempi explains, the sensitive concupiscible, “but in the concupiscible of the rational appetite”	Bontempi What is the proximate subject of c, n. 4
Ruled by: “Yet charity is regulated, not by the reason, as human virtues are, but by God's wisdom”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 24, a. 1, ad 2In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1121
Spirago, in the catechism: “Thus we see love to be an act of the understanding, the affections, and the will.”	Spirago III. THE PRECEPT OF THE LOVE OF GOD
Not sanctifying grace: “Charity is given with sanctifying grace, but differs from it, inasmuch as grace is a principle of being and makes man himself holy, whereas charity is a principle of acting and makes acts holy.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1114In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 856; Wouters n. 365; Noldin n. 53
“The opinion of certain theologians is excluded (Scotus, several Scotists, Bellarmine, etc.), teaching that charity is identified with sanctifying grace.”	Prümmer n. 552
In whom: “The subject which and total of the theological virtue of charity is everyone, and only one, who is supernaturally just.”	Wouters n. 365In nearly the same words: Spirago II. THE TWO COMMANDMENTS OF CHARITY

Its Act and Its Inward Effects

To Love
Its act: “To love belongs to charity as charity.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 27, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 916; McHugh-Callan n. 1183
To love rather than be loved: “a mother, whose love is the greatest, seeks rather to love than to be loved”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 27, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 916
More than goodwill: “to love, considered as an act of charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds union of affections”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 27, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 917; McHugh-Callan n. 1183
How God Is Loved
How God is loved: “Charity loves God: (a) for His own sake; (b) immediately; (c) entirely; (d) without measure.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1185In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 918; Merkelbach I, n. 918; Merkelbach I, n. 918; Merkelbach I, n. 918
Without measure: “the mode in the love of God, must not be taken as in a thing measured where we find too much or too little”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 27, a. 6In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1190
Its outward works have a measure, though: “In external acts proceeding from charity, however, there is a possibility of excess”	McHugh-Callan n. 1190
Benefits, rewards and fears dispose to it: “for on account of other things we are disposed to loving God in himself, for example, through benefits received from him, or through rewards hoped for, or through punishments which we intend to avoid through him”	Merkelbach I, n. 918In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1187
“And thus hope and fear lead to charity.”	Merkelbach I, n. 918
Friend and enemy: “love of one's friend surpasses love of one's enemy, because a friend is both better and more closely united to us”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 27, a. 7In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 919; McHugh-Callan n. 1192
Yet love of an enemy proves the love of God: “our love for God is proved to be so much the stronger, as the more difficult are the things we accomplish for its sake”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 27, a. 7
God and neighbor: “love of our neighbor includes love of God, while love of God does not include love of our neighbor”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 27, a. 8In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 919
Joy
Joy: “Therefore spiritual joy, which is about God, is caused by charity.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 28, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 920; McHugh-Callan n. 1193; Bontempi Whether joy is an effect of charit, n. 2
Commanded: “The precept of charity includes a precept of joy”	McHugh-Callan n. 1194
Mixed with sorrow here: “but not now on earth, where from it there can also follow sadness concerning those things which are opposed to the perfection of participation of the divine good”	Merkelbach I, n. 920In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1194; Bontempi Whether joy is an effect of charit, n. 6
Not a virtue of its own: “joy is not a virtue distinct from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for which reason it is numbered among the Fruits”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 28, a. 4In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 920
Peace
Peace: “Peace includes concord and adds something thereto.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 29, a. 1In nearly the same words: Bontempi Sole Question: What peace is, n. 9
“each of these unions is effected by charity”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 29, a. 3In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 920; McHugh-Callan n. 1193
With St. Augustine: “Peace is the serenity of the mind, the tranquillity of the soul, the simplicity of the heart, the bond of love, the fellowship of Charity.”	Bontempi Sole Question: What peace is, n. 1
Only in grace: “without sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely apparent”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 29, a. 3, ad 1In nearly the same words: Bontempi Sole Question: What peace is, n. 10
Not the same opinions: “nothing hinders those who have charity from holding different opinions”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 29, a. 3, ad 2In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1197
“Disputes may offend against charity, however, if they become too personal or too heated”	McHugh-Callan n. 1197
Not a virtue of its own: “there is no other virtue except charity whose proper act is peace”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 29, a. 4In nearly the same words: Bontempi Sole Question: What peace is, n. 18
Commanded: “The precept of charity also includes a precept of peace”	McHugh-Callan n. 1195
In the catechism: “Peaceableness consists in willingly making a sacrifice for the sake of remaining at peace with one’s neighbor, or reconciling one’s self with him.”	Spirago PEACEABLENESS
“However, one must not for the sake of peace omit or give up anything which God commands”	Spirago PEACEABLENESS
Mercy
Mercy, with St. Augustine: “mercy is heartfelt sympathy for another's distress, impelling us to succor him if we can”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 30, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 920; Bontempi What mercy is, n. 2
As a virtue: “the virtue inclining the will to due compassion for, and alleviation of, another's misery”	Prümmer n. 587In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 86
A virtue, ruled by reason: “it follows that mercy is a virtue”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 30, a. 3In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 920; Bontempi What mercy is, n. 4
Taken as charity's own will, though, “according as it is a charitable will of alleviating another's misery, and then it is not a virtue distinct from charity”	Prümmer n. 587
Sin as its object: “and thus the sin of another is also an object of mercy, insofar as it has certain evils annexed which are contrary to the will of the one sinning”	Merkelbach I, n. 920
“But wilful evil, such as sin, provokes not mercy, but rather indignation”	McHugh-Callan n. 1205
Not mere pity: “mere pity, like prejudice, blinds the mind to what is true and right”	McHugh-Callan n. 1205
The greatest toward our neighbor: “of all the virtues which relate to our neighbor, mercy is the greatest”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 30, a. 4In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 921; McHugh-Callan n. 1207
Below charity in man: “as regards man, who has God above him, charity which unites him to God, is greater than mercy”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 30, a. 4In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1208
Bontempi, after St. Bonaventure: “Therefore mercy, considered in itself, surpasses Charity.”	Bontempi What kind of virtue mercy is, n. 6
“Mercy is the sum of the Christian religion as far as external works are concerned, but charity is the sum of Christianity as regards internal acts.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1208
Against the pagans: “Plato wanted the poor to be banished from the republic, and Seneca thought mercy a vice of the soul”	Noldin n. 86In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1209

Whom It Loves, and in What Order

Charity has no parts in the sense the cardinal virtues do. It is one virtue with one motive, reaching God, ourselves and our neighbor. The lines set out the order the authors keep among them.

Why There Is an Order
Why there is an order: “there must needs be some order in things loved out of charity, which order is in reference to the first principle of that love, which is God”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 1In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether there is order in charity, n. 1
St. Augustine: “he lives justly and holily who is an integral estimator of things”	Prümmer n. 578In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 902
Loving more, in three ways: “someone is loved more than another in a threefold way: a) objectively, we love more him to whom we will a greater good; b) appreciatively or estimatively, we love more him whom simply we prefer and esteem more highly than another, so that we fear more to lose his friendship than that of another; c) intensively, we love more him whom we love with a more fervent affection”	Merkelbach I, n. 903In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1159; St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 7
God Above All
God above all: “God ought to be loved chiefly and before all out of charity”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 2In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 579; Merkelbach I, n. 904; Wouters n. 571; Bontempi Whether God is to be loved more th, n. 1
More than ourselves: “man ought, out of charity, to love God, Who is the common good of all, more than himself”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 3
Not of necessity in feeling: “Nevertheless we are not bound to love God more intensively; for sensible and present or proximate goods are accustomed to move us more vehemently than remote, absent, and divine goods.”	Merkelbach I, n. 904In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 571; Prümmer n. 579; McHugh-Callan n. 1160
Even by nature: “not only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired, loves God above all things and more than himself, but also every single creature, each in its own way”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 3In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether nature inclines more to lo, n. 3
First in practice, though, comes the neighbor: “Charity as to exercise is first borne toward the neighbor, as the more imperfect act”	Bontempi Whether God is to be loved more th, n. 6In nearly the same words: St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 2, ad 1
Ourselves Before Our Neighbor
Ourselves before our neighbor: “a man ought, out of charity, to love himself more than he loves any other person”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 4In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 580; Merkelbach I, n. 906; Noldin n. 76; Marc n. 481; Sabetti-Barrett n. 169; McHugh-Callan n. 1158; Spirago V. THE COMMANDMENT OF CHARITY TOWARDS OUR NE
For “just as unity surpasses union, the fact that man himself has a share of the Divine good, is a more potent reason for loving than that another should be a partner with him in that share”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 4In nearly the same words: Sabetti-Barrett n. 169; Vermeersch n. 81
Vermeersch adds that “the true question concerning practical preference, by which we prefer one to another, arises rather among various neighbors than between ourselves and neighbors”	Vermeersch n. 81
Never a sin, even venial, for another: “a man ought not to give way to any evil of sin, which counteracts his share of happiness, not even that he may free his neighbor from sin”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 4In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 907; Noldin n. 77; Prümmer n. 580; Marc n. 482; Sabetti-Barrett n. 170; McHugh-Callan n. 1163
“The desire of lacking eternal beatitude for the sake of any good whatever of another is illicit; but it is permitted to will the delay of beatitude in order to labor longer for the glory of God and the salvation of neighbors.”	Noldin n. 77In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1163
St. Paul's wish to be anathema for his brethren: “what the Apostle desired, to be an anathema, understand for a time, or under a condition”	Bontempi Whether a man ought to love himsel, n. 24
The danger of sin: “it is permitted to expose oneself to danger if it is remote, - and even, for a grave cause, if, suitable remedies having been employed, so that there is founded hope of not falling, the proximate danger can be rendered remote, - indeed sometimes it is necessary so to act that help may be given to neighbor in extreme spiritual necessity”	Merkelbach I, n. 907In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 77; Sabetti-Barrett n. 170; Prümmer n. 580; Marc n. 482
Lesser spiritual goods may be given up: “Someone can licitly, and indeed sometimes ought, to give up his own non-necessary or less necessary spiritual goods for the salvation of neighbor”	Prümmer n. 580In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 907; McHugh-Callan n. 1163; Sabetti-Barrett n. 170; Noldin n. 77
Bound to give them up only for an office: “Spiritual good which is not necessary, but certain, we must postpone to office, but to no utility of neighbor whose care has not been imposed upon us.”	Vermeersch n. 84
The heroic act: “It is not only licit but also laudable to offer all one's satisfactions for the souls in purgatory.”	Noldin n. 77In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1163
“Formerly theologians indeed disputed whether this oblation is consonant with ordered charity; but since the Church approved it by granting indulgences, there can be no doubt concerning this matter.”	Noldin n. 77
Our Neighbor's Soul, Our Body
Our neighbor's soul before our body: “as regards the welfare of the soul we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 5In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 908; McHugh-Callan n. 1164; Bontempi Whether the eternal salvation of t, n. 1
So the order of goods: “God, our soul, the soul of neighbor, our body, the body of neighbor.”	Marc n. 480
The Degrees of Necessity
Necessity: “The necessity which the neighbor can suffer is one thing when spiritual, another when bodily; each is either extreme, or grave, or light, or common.”	Noldin n. 75In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 579; McHugh-Callan n. 1165
Extreme: “extreme, when danger of damnation, or of death, or of another equivalent evil, morally certainly threatens, and cannot morally be avoided without the help of another”	Merkelbach I, n. 905In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 83
Quasi-extreme, treated nearly as extreme: “He is found in quasi-extreme necessity who is in danger of falling into extreme necessity or into a grave evil, either perpetual or at least long-lasting, grave imprisonment, loss of goods, loss of state”	Noldin n. 75In nearly the same words: Marc n. 480; Vermeersch n. 83
Where the lines fall: “In the material description of necessities not all strictly agree.”	Vermeersch n. 83
Noldin ranks extreme bodily necessity below grave spiritual, “yet it can happen that in this necessity there urges a greater obligation of assisting than in the former”	Noldin n. 75
A Neighbor in Spiritual Necessity
Extreme spiritual necessity, even at the risk of life: “We ought to assist a neighbor constituted in extreme spiritual necessity even with danger to our bodily life, if nevertheless a) there is founded hope of saving the neighbor, and b) the common good does not stand in the way.”	Prümmer n. 583In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 908; Noldin n. 78; Sabetti-Barrett n. 169; Marc n. 483; Vermeersch n. 84; McHugh-Callan n. 1166; Bontempi Whether the eternal salvation of t, n. 2
St. Thomas: “charity does not necessarily require a man to imperil his own body for his neighbor's welfare, except in a case where he is under obligation to do so”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 5, ad 3
Grave spiritual necessity: “Man is not bound to assist the neighbor placed in grave spiritual necessity with danger to life or grave temporal damage, unless by office he ought to care for the spiritual salvation of the neighbor, as a pastor of souls”	Noldin n. 78In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 584; Merkelbach I, n. 908; McHugh-Callan n. 1167
Pastors: “Hence pastors of souls are bound, even with danger to life, to administer the sacraments to their subjects”	Prümmer n. 584In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1167; Noldin n. 78
Another priest, in a plague: “in a time of plague (or persecution) a priest not having care of souls is bound to assist the dying, if there is no other”	Merkelbach I, n. 908In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 583; Marc n. 483
Common spiritual necessity: “It does require that one be willing to undergo a slight bodily inconvenience or deprivation.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1168
A Neighbor in Bodily Necessity
Extreme bodily necessity: “The neighbor placed in extreme temporal necessity must be assisted with great inconvenience indeed, yet not with danger to life or of an almost equal good”	Noldin n. 79In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 909; Marc n. 483; Sabetti-Barrett n. 169
“the principle, "Charity does not oblige with great inconvenience," holds in common and grave necessity, and indeed only generally, but it does not hold in extreme necessity, in which charity obliges even with the greatest inconvenience”	Merkelbach I, n. 910
Prümmer, otherwise: “In the first case no one is bound to assist neighbor with grave harm, because he is not even bound to preserve his own bodily life with great harm”	Prümmer n. 584
Grave necessity: “A neighbor constituted in grave necessity, whether spiritual or bodily, is to be assisted with only moderate inconvenience”	Prümmer n. 585In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 909; Sabetti-Barrett n. 169
Common necessity: “Neighbor living in common or light necessity is to be assisted with only light inconvenience.”	Prümmer n. 586
Our Life and Our Neighbor's
Our life and our neighbor's: “Man indeed is bound, absolutely speaking, to love his own life and the goods necessary for its conservation more than the life of the neighbor”	Noldin n. 77In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1169
For the common good: “Thus a man can and sometimes ought to give his life for the common good”	Prümmer n. 580In nearly the same words: Marc n. 483; Noldin n. 77; McHugh-Callan n. 1169; Vermeersch n. 86
For another's life, of one's own accord: “if a man of his own accord offer himself for that purpose, this belongs to the perfection of charity”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 5, ad 3In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 909; Noldin n. 77; Marc n. 482; Vermeersch n. 84; Prümmer n. 580; McHugh-Callan n. 1169
Not when others depend on us: “for per accidens it is sometimes not licit, for example if someone is necessary to children, wife, parents”	Marc n. 482In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1170
St. Augustine, as some older authors read him: “If anyone lose his bodily life for the bodily life of a friend, he does not love his neighbor as himself, but more than himself; which exceeds the rule of doctrine.”	Bontempi Whether a man ought to love himsel, n. 8
Among Neighbors
Among neighbors, unequally: “even as regards the affection we ought to love one neighbor more than another”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 6In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 581; Wouters n. 573
Against those who held that “some have said that we ought, out of charity, to love all our neighbors equally, as regards our affection, but not as regards the outward effect”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 6
Two measures: “since the principle of love is God, and the person who loves, it must needs be that the affection of love increases in proportion to the nearness to one or the other of those principles”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 6In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1172
The better, the greater good: “out of charity, we should wish a greater good to one who is nearer to God”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 7In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether one neighbor is to be love, n. 2
The nearer, more intensely: “man loves those who are more closely united to him, with more intense affection as to the good he wishes for them, than he loves those who are better as to the greater good he wishes for them”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 7In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 912; Vermeersch n. 86; McHugh-Callan n. 1173
“it is possible for one, out of charity, to wish this man who is more closely united to one, to be better than another, and so reach a higher degree of happiness”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 7In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1173
Those near us “we love them in more ways”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 7In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 912
No imperfection: “The preferences for those nearer to self, therefore, far from being wrong or the expression of mere natural love, are expressions of charity itself.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1173In nearly the same words: Spirago VII. LOVE OF ONE’S FRIENDS
In help: “if one had to choose between helping either a relative or a stranger who was more virtuous, one would have to decide in favor of the relative”	McHugh-Callan n. 1174In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 80; Wouters n. 573
The greater need first: “But we ought to assist a stranger placed in spiritual necessity before one joined to us placed in temporal necessity.”	Noldin n. 80
Kinds of Tie
Each tie in its own matters: “in matters pertaining to nature we should love our kindred most, in matters concerning relations between citizens, we should prefer our fellow-citizens, and on the battlefield our fellow-soldiers”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 8In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 913; McHugh-Callan n. 1177
Blood first among them: “the union arising from natural origin is prior to, and more stable than, all others”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 8In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 913; McHugh-Callan n. 1176; Noldin n. 80
In spiritual goods, spiritual kin: “a man ought to provide for his spiritual children whom he has begotten spiritually, more than for the sons of his body”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 8, ad 2In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1177
Bannez, in Marc: “Yet Bannez probably teaches that carnal parents, even in spiritual matters, are to be preferred before all others”	Marc n. 484In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1178
Friends, in companionship: “In as much as the friendship of comrades originates through their own choice, love of this kind takes precedence of the love of kindred in matters where we are free to do as we choose”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 8, ad 1In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1176
Among Kinsfolk
Parents and children: “a man ought to love his father more than his children”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 9In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether a son is to be loved more, n. 1
“a man's children are more lovable to him than his father”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 9
Wife and parents: “a man loves his wife more intensely, but his parents with greater reverence”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 11In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 915; Vermeersch n. 82; McHugh-Callan n. 1179
Father and mother: “Strictly speaking, however, the father should be loved more than the mother.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 10In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 915; Bontempi Whether a man ought out of charity, n. 1
“Per accidens, however, more is often owed to the Mother, who loves more, and sometimes endures more in rearing her son.”	Bontempi Whether a man ought out of charity, n. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 915
Virtue can change it: “Good servants should be preferred to wicked children.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 10In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 914; McHugh-Callan n. 1180; Marc n. 484
Whom to help first, in common necessity: “1. spouse, 2. children, 3. parents, 4. brothers and sisters, 5. other relatives, 6. friends, benefactors.”	Prümmer n. 581In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 914; Wouters n. 573; Vermeersch n. 85; Sabetti-Barrett n. 169; McHugh-Callan n. 1181; Marc n. 484
In extreme necessity: “But in extreme necessity, namely, if there is question of danger of life, parents are to be preferred to all others; therefore even to spouse and children.”	Prümmer n. 581In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 914; Vermeersch n. 86; Sabetti-Barrett n. 169; McHugh-Callan n. 1181; Marc n. 484; Bontempi Whether a man ought to love his sp, n. 1; St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 9, ad 3
Wouters puts grave necessity with extreme: “In extreme or grave necessity parents are to be preferred to spouse and children, because life is owed to the former.”	Wouters n. 573
St. Thomas: “in certain cases a man ought to succor his parents rather than his wife”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 11, ad 1
Benefactors, “we ought to love our benefactor most”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 12In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 915
though “we love those more who have received benefactions from us”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 12
The Common Good
The common good before kin: “public interest demands that in conferring positions, making appointments, or voting for candidates, one should not be guided by family affections or private friendships, but only by the common welfare”	McHugh-Callan n. 1175In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether the order of charity is co, n. 9; Wouters n. 573; Prümmer n. 582
Inverting the Order
Inverting the order: “The rules given indeed oblige in conscience; yet if there is question of light necessity, some inversion of the order does not exceed the guilt of venial sin.”	Prümmer n. 582In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1180; Bontempi Whether a man ought to love his sp, n. 3
Merkelbach: “An inversion of the order of charity is not mortally evil unless there is question of extreme necessity; - or unless it is very notable and is done without any reason.”	Merkelbach I, n. 915
Marc and Wouters, in grave necessity too: “Inversion of order as regards necessity, if it is a question of grave or extreme necessity, contains grave sin”	Marc n. 484In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 573
Among the nearest: “An inversion between son, wife, and parents is not notable; but it is notable between wholly strange persons and those very conjoined.”	Merkelbach I, n. 915In nearly the same words: Marc n. 484
In Heaven
In heaven: “The order of charity must needs remain in heaven, as regards the love of God above all things.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 13In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 915
“a man will love himself more than even his better neighbors, because the intensity of the act of love arises on the part of the person who loves”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 13In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 915; McHugh-Callan n. 1182
St. Bonaventure, with St. Anselm: “he will rejoice as much in the good of his neighbor as in his own”	Bontempi Whether the order of charity remai, n. 8
Neighbors, by nearness to God: “each one will love more and reckon to be nearer to himself those who are nearer to God”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 26, a. 13In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 915; McHugh-Callan n. 1182

The Virtue Itself

A friendship
True friendship: “since there is a communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of friendship must needs be based on this same communication”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 23, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 852; Prümmer n. 556; McHugh-Callan n. 1112
Against those who denied it: “Some have denied that there is friendship between God and men.”	Bontempi Whether charity is properly the fr, n. 2
Unequal as it is: “friendship is not of equality, but of excellence toward one supernal end”	Bontempi Whether charity is properly the fr, n. 7In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 856
Mutually known: “and by probable conjectures and sufficiently certain signs we are able to discern whether we truly love God”	Merkelbach I, n. 852
Not so in a state of pure nature: “For in that state we would have been only servants relative to God; but now we are his friends”	Merkelbach I, n. 854In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 71
Bontempi, against Vasquez: “The true opinion therefore is, that a twofold love of God is given, certainly of friendship; one, God being the natural end; the other, the end being supernatural.”	Bontempi Whether besides infused charity th, n. 4In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1122
A created habit
Not the Holy Spirit Himself, as the Master taught: “Therefore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of charity, there should be in us some habitual form superadded to the natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity, and causing it to act with ease and pleasure.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 23, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 855; Bontempi Whether charity is a created habit, n. 2; McHugh-Callan n. 1113
To deny it, Bontempi says, is not heresy; “Yet I say it is rash, and proximate to error”	Bontempi Whether charity is a created habit, n. 26
“the charity whereby formally we love our neighbor is a participation of Divine charity”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 23, a. 2, ad 1
One special virtue
“Therefore charity is a special virtue.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 23, a. 4In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 857; Bontempi Whether charity is one special vir, n. 4
“Hence it follows that charity is simply one virtue, and not divided into several species.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 23, a. 5In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 857; Prümmer n. 552; McHugh-Callan n. 1115; Marc n. 465
Infused, and in what measure
“Therefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor through acquisition by the natural powers, but by the infusion of the Holy Ghost”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 24, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 864; McHugh-Callan n. 1122
No acquired charity grows from its acts, against the Scotists: “I assert with this opinion, that no acquired habit of Charity is given.”	Bontempi Whether besides infused charity th, n. 23
“the quantity of charity depends neither on the condition of nature nor on the capacity of natural virtue, but only on the will of the Holy Ghost”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 24, a. 3In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 865; McHugh-Callan n. 1123
“Those who receive charity through repentance, have it, “everyone according to his proper ability””	McHugh-Callan n. 1123In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 865
Its increase
“The charity of a wayfarer can increase.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 24, a. 4In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 867; Bontempi Whether charity increases, and how, n. 7; McHugh-Callan n. 1124
How: “Therefore charity increases by being intensified in its subject, and this is for charity to increase in its essence; and not by charity being added to charity.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 24, a. 5In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 867; McHugh-Callan n. 1124
Bontempi otherwise: “Therefore let there be the third Assertion, and proved, that the augmentation of charity is made by a newly added degree of charity.”	Bontempi Whether charity increases, and how, n. 43
When: “charity does not actually increase through every act of charity, but each act of charity disposes to an increase of charity”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 24, a. 6In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 870
Others: “Every act of charity, even the less fervent, contributes to an increase of the charity one already possesses.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1126In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether charity increases, and how, n. 44
Without limit: “It is therefore evident that it is not possible to fix any limits to the increase of charity in this life.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 24, a. 7In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 868; McHugh-Callan n. 1128
Bontempi, with St. Bonaventure, otherwise: “neither does the supernatural disposition dilate the power of capacity to infinity, but unto a limited term”	Bontempi Whether charity can be increased w, n. 1
By whom: “God is the principal efficient cause of the increase of charity, as of its production; but charity is increased instrumentally through the sacraments, dispositively and meritoriously through good works.”	Merkelbach I, n. 869In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether charity increases, and how, n. 15
Its perfection and degrees
Perfect on earth, as all the just have it: “Thirdly, so that a man gives his whole heart to God habitually, viz. by neither thinking nor desiring anything contrary to the love of God; and this perfection is common to all who have charity.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 24, a. 8In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 871; McHugh-Callan n. 1129
As some have it: “Secondly, so that man makes an earnest endeavor to give his time to God and Divine things, while scorning other things except in so far as the needs of the present life demand.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 24, a. 8In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 871; McHugh-Callan n. 1129
Beginners, the proficient, the perfect: “this concerns beginners, in whom charity has to be fed or fostered lest it be destroyed”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 24, a. 9In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 557; Merkelbach I, n. 871; McHugh-Callan n. 1130
“The first is prescribed under mortal sin, the second under venial sin, the third is not of precept; nevertheless it would be a sin to contemn it”	Merkelbach I, n. 871
Its diminution and loss
“The charity which can fail by reason of itself is no true charity”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 24, a. 11, ad 2
Not diminished: “The consequence is that charity can by no means be diminished, if we speak of direct causality, yet whatever disposes to its corruption may be said to conduce indirectly to its diminution, and such are venial sins, or even the cessation from the practice of works of charity.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 24, a. 10In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 872; McHugh-Callan n. 1131; Bontempi Whether charity can be diminished, n. 1
“Thus, charity differs from human friendships, which grow cold through neglect or slights.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1131
Lost: “the charity of heaven cannot be lost, whereas the charity of the way can”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 24, a. 11In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 873; Bontempi Whether charity can be lost, and h, n. 3
“it follows that the habit of charity is lost at once through one mortal sin”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 24, a. 12In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 873; McHugh-Callan n. 1132; Spirago III. THE PRECEPT OF THE LOVE OF GOD
How mortal sin takes it away: “therefore takes it away not only meritoriously, but also physically and efficiently expels it”	Merkelbach I, n. 873
Bontempi, with St. Bonaventure and against the Thomists: “where I showed that grace and sin are opposed morally, not physically”	Bontempi Whether charity can be lost, and h, n. 45

Its Necessity

What its act does
The habit: “Habitual charity (or the virtue of charity) is necessary for salvation for all, infants as well as adults, and always has been necessary by necessity of means.”	Prümmer n. 560In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 971; Noldin n. 58; Wouters n. 366; Marc n. 469; McHugh-Callan n. 1604; Vermeersch n. 75
“Without the love of God and of our neighbor no man can be saved.”	Spirago II. THE TWO COMMANDMENTS OF CHARITY
The act: “Actual charity (or an act of charity) is necessary by necessity of means for all adults capable of the use of reason, a) if, existing in the state of mortal sin, they cannot receive a sacrament of the dead (baptism or penance); b) after habitual charity has been obtained, at some times in life.”	Prümmer n. 561In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1604
Others: an act of charity is necessary, “nevertheless in the present economy of the New Law it is not necessary by necessity of means”	Merkelbach I, n. 971In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 58; Marc n. 469; Vermeersch n. 75
Wouters sets out both: “According to others, the act of charity is not necessary by necessity of means for obtaining justification”	Wouters n. 517
Its act justifies: “An act of perfect charity justifies man of itself without a sacrament, though not without the desire of the sacrament”	Noldin n. 57In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 518; Prümmer n. 558; Merkelbach I, n. 866
Nor is it hard: “The third degree of charity is not required, but the first suffices. Therefore such an act of charity is not as difficult as is asserted by some authors.”	Prümmer n. 558In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 54; Vermeersch n. 71
Not as cause of grace, “but in the mode of material and dispositive cause, or in the mode of a dispositive cause meritorious de congruo”	Wouters n. 518In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 57; Prümmer n. 558

The Precept of Loving God

When it binds of itself
A special precept; St. Thomas: “Nevertheless the act of dilection falls under special precepts”	Prümmer n. 562In nearly the same words: St. Thomas II-II, q. 44, a. 1, ad 1; Merkelbach I, n. 971; Noldin n. 58; Marc n. 470; Sabetti-Barrett n. 166
The greatest: “wherefore the greatest precept is that of charity”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 44, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 973
Not in the Decalogue: “the precepts of charity had not to be enumerated among the precepts of the decalogue, since they are included in all of them”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 44, a. 1, ad 3In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1547; Spirago II. THE TWO COMMANDMENTS OF CHARITY
Two precepts: “Therefore it behooved us to receive precepts not only of the love of God but also of the love of our neighbor, on account of those who are less intelligent, who do not easily understand that one of these precepts is included in the other.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 44, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 973; McHugh-Callan n. 1549
“With thy whole heart”: “Therefore some kind of totality was to be indicated in connection with the precept of the love of God.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 44, a. 4
“Accordingly we are commanded to direct our whole intention to God, and this is signified by the words “with thy whole heart”; to submit our intellect to God, and this is expressed in the words “with thy whole mind”; to regulate our appetite according to God, in the words “with thy whole soul”; and to obey God in our external actions”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 44, a. 5In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 563; Merkelbach I, n. 974
Spirago otherwise: “with thy whole heart (_i.e_., with the will) and with thy whole soul (_i.e_., with the understanding) and with thy whole mind (_i.e_., with the affections)”	Spirago II. THE TWO COMMANDMENTS OF CHARITY
“(Among the Hebrews, the heart signifies intellect and affection.)”	Vermeersch n. 73In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 974; McHugh-Callan n. 1558
Above all things in esteem, not in feeling: “Charity ought to be appretiatively supreme”	Prümmer n. 557In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 58; Wouters n. 519; Sabetti-Barrett n. 166; Marc n. 467; Vermeersch n. 73; McHugh-Callan n. 1556
“Therefore, e.g., a man does not sin who feels a more vivid love toward parents, friends, etc., than toward God; provided, however, that he is always prepared to lose all things rather than the friendship of God.”	Prümmer n. 557In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 58; Marc n. 471
“We love God more than anything else in the world, if we are ready to give up everything unhesitatingly, if such be His will.”	Spirago III. THE PRECEPT OF THE LOVE OF GOD
At the beginning: “At the beginning of the moral life, i.e. when man, having already obtained sufficient use of reason, knows sufficiently clearly that God is lovable and to be loved above all things.”	Prümmer n. 563In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 972; Noldin n. 59; Wouters n. 519; Marc n. 472; McHugh-Callan n. 1594; Sabetti-Barrett n. 167
Not in the first instant: “I do not urge, however, that in the first instant he is bound”	Bontempi How, and when, the precept of the, n. 5In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 59
“The faithful who cannot remember having made this first act of charity when they came to the use of reason, should not disturb themselves at this, for the commandment was fulfilled by any service they freely offered to God.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1595In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 563
At death: “At the article of death. Thus the by far more probable opinion.”	Prümmer n. 563In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 972; Marc n. 472; Wouters n. 519
Others only for one in mortal sin without the sacraments; Noldin: “but this obligation exists only for those who are in mortal sin and cannot receive the sacrament”	Noldin n. 59In nearly the same words: Sabetti-Barrett n. 167
“The duty of making an act of love of God when one is at the point of death is admitted by all for the following cases”	McHugh-Callan n. 1599In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 74
With the dying: “He should not speak of the act of love of God, if the obligation is uncertain and harm would result from his doing so”	McHugh-Callan n. 1601In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 972; Marc n. 473; Vermeersch n. 74
Often in life; how often, “but nothing certain can be established”	Noldin n. 59In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 563; McHugh-Callan n. 1598
“Some determine this by saying: at least once a year; others, every month (St. Alphonsus), or even every week (Scotus); others finally, more probably: several times, at least three or four times a year.”	Merkelbach I, n. 972In nearly the same words: Sabetti-Barrett n. 167; Marc n. 472; Spirago III. THE PRECEPT OF THE LOVE OF GOD
“What son asks how often he must actually demonstrate his affection toward his parents?”	Vermeersch n. 74
By accident, or by force of another duty
In temptation: “As often as someone is engaged in a danger of sinning which cannot be removed without an act of charity.”	Prümmer n. 563In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 972; Noldin n. 59
To recover grace without a confessor: “As often as someone, existing in the state of mortal sin and lacking a confessor, is bound to recover the state of sanctifying grace”	Prümmer n. 563In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 60; Marc n. 472; Sabetti-Barrett n. 167
Bontempi adds, with Soto and Valencia, adult baptism, martyrdom, the defense of God's violated honor, and “The fourth time is when someone receives a singular benefit from God, as Sotus probably judges”	Bontempi How, and when, the precept of the, n. 8
Outwardly: “one is obliged to signify one’s love of God, if silence would cause scandal or convey an expression of hatred of God”	McHugh-Callan n. 1588
After mortal sin
“Those who remain in the state of mortal sin for months do not of themselves satisfy the precept of charity. Nor do they satisfy it if with attrition alone they receive the sacrament of penance”	Marc n. 473In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 971
“Some theologians have asserted that after mortal sin has been committed a man is bound immediately to elicit an act of contrition and charity; this opinion today has been abandoned by all”	Prümmer n. 563In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 59
“a delay beyond four or five months according to some authors would be notable”	McHugh-Callan n. 1598
How it is fulfilled
“For even in the mere recitation of the Lord's Prayer three acts of charity are contained”	Prümmer n. 563In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 56; Marc n. 473; Vermeersch n. 74
“Yet this is easily fulfilled by leading a good Christian life; whence those who live as Christians abundantly satisfy the precept.”	Merkelbach I, n. 972In nearly the same words: Marc n. 473; McHugh-Callan n. 1598
“Benedict XIV exhorts bishops that in any parish church they have the acts of faith, hope, and charity read aloud to the people on all Sundays and feast days”	Prümmer n. 563In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 519
Fully only in heaven: “Hence this precept will be observed fully and perfectly in heaven; yet it is fulfilled, though imperfectly, on the way.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 44, a. 6In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 974

Love of Ourselves

True and False Love of Self
St. Thomas, in Prümmer: “Disordered love of self is the cause of every sin”	Prümmer n. 566
“Therefore true and most perfect love of self consists in the imitation of Christ.”	Prümmer n. 566
In the catechism: “The true love of one’s self shows itself herein, that we strive to attain that which will procure our real happiness; first and foremost our eternal felicity, and then such earthly things as are conducive to the attainment of eternal felicity.”	Spirago IX. THE LOVE OF ONE’S SELF
“We ought to love ourselves because God wills it; furthermore because we are made after God’s image, redeemed by the blood of Christ, and called to eternal felicity in heaven.”	Spirago IX. THE LOVE OF ONE’S SELF
Its ground: “The foundation and condition of moral love and charity toward oneself is a fitting esteem of oneself (Selbstachtung)”	Noldin n. 65
The Precept
A precept: “I ASSERT that the love of oneself is also included in the precept of Charity.”	Bontempi Whether a man ought to love himsel, n. 1In nearly the same words: Marc n. 476
No precept of its own was given, because “from natural inclination we are sufficiently inclined toward ourselves”	Bontempi Whether a man ought to love himsel, n. 4
What it binds to: “each one is bound to wish for himself and procure those goods which are fitting to himself”	Marc n. 476
Learning, today: “they are bound to use an occasion offered to them of acquiring such knowledge through suitable schools”	Noldin n. 66
“To satisfy these precepts of charity of acquiring for ourselves necessary goods, whether supernatural or natural, it is not necessary that we act from the motive of charity.”	Noldin n. 67
Life and Health
Life and health: “The obligation of preserving life and health extends to ordinary means, but not (except rarely) to extraordinary means.”	Prümmer n. 567In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 66; Merkelbach I, n. 887; Wouters n. 522
“As extraordinary means are held, e.g., a long journey into a healthier climate, a surgical operation very painful or burdensome, such as the amputation of both thighs.”	Prümmer n. 567
“Today, however, on account of the great perfection of surgical art, ordinary operations, such as an operation of the appendix or of a hernia, are no longer considered extraordinary means.”	Prümmer n. 567
Sometimes even extraordinary: “a mother ought to use extraordinary means for preserving life if otherwise her children would remain orphans living in great distress”	Prümmer n. 567In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 522
“a virgin quite probably is not bound, for preserving life, to permit herself to be treated in the more secret parts by a man, if this would be a cause of great shame to her”	Wouters n. 522
Recreation: “Necessary recreations are of the highest moment for conserving and perfecting the life of body and soul”	Noldin n. 66
“bodily games and gymnastic exercises (Sport), especially for young people, ought to be earnestly commended”	Noldin n. 66
And mortification: “we must restrain the concupiscence of the flesh and disordered desires out of hatred of sin, and inflict reasonable mortification upon the body”	Merkelbach I, n. 887
Labor
Labor: “Although there does not exist a divine precept directly obliging all and individual men to labor, nevertheless there exists a universal precept of labor for the human race”	Noldin n. 67In nearly the same words: Marc n. 476
From the danger of idleness, “therefore man is bound, for avoiding the dangers of sinning which arise from idleness, to apply himself to some honorable labor”	Noldin n. 68
“But certainly occupation which consists in mere games and recreations does not suffice”	Noldin n. 68
Prümmer concludes “that every man is not strictly obliged to labor; but from right love both of himself and of human society, reasonable work is to be most highly commended to everyone”	Prümmer n. 569
“Yet this dangerous idleness can also be avoided in other ways”	Prümmer n. 569
Strikes: “Therefore an injury is inflicted upon one willing to labor if he is impeded from seeking and exercising labor as he wishes, which is done by socialists especially in strikes.”	Noldin n. 69
“that a work stoppage is not intrinsically evil, although it is to be avoided as far as possible”	Prümmer n. 569
Sins Against It
Sins against it: “The sins opposed to charity toward oneself are all comprehended in hatred of self.”	Prümmer n. 568In nearly the same words: Spirago IX. THE LOVE OF ONE’S SELF
“They sin against charity toward themselves: a) More by excess, those who indulge disordered egoism”	Merkelbach I, n. 888
In confession: “one need not attend specially in confession to that malice by which these sins are opposed to charity toward oneself, because it is included in every sin”	Merkelbach I, n. 888

The Precept of Loving Our Neighbor

The Precept
A precept, inward and outward (Innocent XI condemned the denial): “There exists a special precept of loving neighbor with supernatural love, both affective and effective.”	Prümmer n. 570In nearly the same words: Sabetti-Barrett n. 168
Given in the Old Law; “In the New Testament, which is the law of love, the precept of charity to neighbors is given with greater clearness and perfection.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1580
As thyself: “The mode of this love is that it should be similar, though not equal, to the love one has for oneself.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1581In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether a man ought to love himsel, n. 16
Its Properties
Its properties: “Charity ought to be affective and effective, i.e. it ought to produce internal and external acts.”	Prümmer n. 570
“Charity ought to be universal, i.e. it ought to extend itself to all capable of heavenly beatitude, so that no one is excluded.”	Prümmer n. 570In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 72
“Charity ought to be well ordered both as to persons and as to goods.”	Prümmer n. 570
How It Is Fulfilled
How it is fulfilled: “Rather, general love suffices, which excludes no one from the affection of benevolence and is prepared, when there is need, to assist the needy.”	Noldin n. 72In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 80; McHugh-Callan n. 1583
Its motive: “Yet to satisfy this precept it is not required that works of beneficence toward the neighbor be done from the motive of charity, but it suffices that they be done from another lower motive, for example, mercy, kindness, etc.”	Noldin n. 72
“The motive of charity is absent, therefore, when one loves only one’s friends, when one is kind to others out of pity, or generosity, or admiration for their good qualities, if there is no thought of God in this philanthropy or humanitarianism.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1582
“Even a certain amount of natural repugnance is not inconsistent with charity”	McHugh-Callan n. 1584
In the Catechism
In the catechism: “We ought to love our neighbor because this is Christ’s command; furthermore because he is a child of God, made after His image, and also because we are all descended from the same parents and we are all called to attain eternal felicity.”	Spirago V. THE COMMANDMENT OF CHARITY TOWARDS OUR NE
“The love of our neighbor shows itself in desiring the good of our neighbor from our heart; in abstaining from injuring him, and in doing him good.”	Spirago V. THE COMMANDMENT OF CHARITY TOWARDS OUR NE
“All that we do to our neighbor, whether it be good or evil, we do to Christ Himself”	Spirago V. THE COMMANDMENT OF CHARITY TOWARDS OUR NE
“The love of one’s neighbor is the distinctive mark of the true Christian.”	Spirago V. THE COMMANDMENT OF CHARITY TOWARDS OUR NE

Love of Enemies

The Precept
Who is an enemy: “Enemies are those who hate us or ours, or have offended us, or have affected us with injury, or at least are apprehended as such.”	Merkelbach I, n. 891In nearly the same words: Spirago VIII. THE COMMANDMENT TO LOVE OUR ENEMY; Bontempi Whether it is necessary to love en, n. 1
“Offense is compensated by friendly reconciliation; injury is compensated by satisfaction, by the fact that the offender undergoes something troublesome so that the wounded person may be reconciled to him; damaging is compensated by restitution, by the fact that the damage inflicted is repaired for the wounded person.”	Noldin n. 81
Loved as men: “They are not, however, contrary to us, as men and capable of happiness: and it is as such that we are bound to love them.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 8, ad 2In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 571; McHugh-Callan n. 1148; Bontempi Whether it is necessary to love en, n. 3
A precept, not a counsel: “Christ, expressly rejecting this interpretation, commanded (and not merely counseled) sincere love toward enemies”	Prümmer n. 571In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether it is necessary to love en, n. 4; Noldin n. 82
Of the natural law: “The obligation of loving enemies is already contained in natural law: for an enemy also is our neighbor, whom the law of nature commands to be loved.”	Noldin n. 82In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1149; Bontempi Whether it is necessary to love en, n. 11
“It was renewed by Christ, who corrected the false interpretation of Leviticus, xix. 18, given by the scribes and Pharisees”	McHugh-Callan n. 1149In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether it is necessary to love en, n. 16
In general: “charity requires that we should love our enemies, namely, that in loving God and our neighbor, we should not exclude our enemies from the love given to our neighbor in general”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 8In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 892; McHugh-Callan n. 1151
In particular, a ready mind: “Nevertheless charity does require this, in respect of our being prepared in mind, namely, that we should be ready to love our enemies individually, if the necessity were to occur.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 8In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1152
“That man should actually do so, and love his enemy for God's sake, without it being necessary for him to do so, belongs to the perfection of charity.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 8In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1152
Not with feeling: “Finally, we are not bound to love enemies with sensible affection, as we love a friend”	Prümmer n. 572
The Signs of Love
Common signs are owed: “the fulfilment of the precept requires that we should show such like favors or signs of love towards our enemies”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 9In nearly the same words: Sabetti-Barrett n. 173; Bontempi Whether we are bound to show the e, n. 1
“These are generally reckoned common signs: to return greeting to one who greets, to respond to one asking or writing, to sell exposed merchandise to one wishing to buy, not to exclude from common prayers or alms, to provide common services”	Noldin n. 81In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 529
Common also within a class: “or are customarily exhibited mutually by all men of such a state or condition (for example, by a neighbor to neighbors, by a relative to relatives, by a father to sons, by a student to fellow students, etc.)”	Merkelbach I, n. 893In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 529; McHugh-Callan n. 1154
“But what these are must be judged from the estimation of the prudent and from received custom: for there is great diversity according to region, state, and time.”	Merkelbach I, n. 893In nearly the same words: Sabetti-Barrett n. 174; Vermeersch n. 88
Prayer: “he who excludes his enemies from prayers offered for his neighbor sins against charity”	McHugh-Callan n. 1153In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 576; Bontempi Whether we are bound to show the e, n. 10
Special signs: “Special signs are generally reckoned these: to receive as a guest, to invite to a banquet, to console one who is sad, to visit the sick, to speak familiarly, to foster frequent exchange of letters, to greet first someone encountered”	Noldin n. 81
“it is not necessary for salvation that we show our enemies such like favors and signs of love, except as regards being ready in our minds, for instance to come to their assistance in a case of urgency”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 9In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 576; Sabetti-Barrett n. 173
For “otherwise the enemy would be of better condition and would have greater rights toward us than other common neighbors”	Prümmer n. 576
Yet sometimes owed: “We must exhibit special signs of dilection accidentally and extraordinarily; which then are already common signs owed to all”	Merkelbach I, n. 896In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 82; Sabetti-Barrett n. 173
Common signs withheld for a cause: “To omit common signs and benefits of dilection sometimes is permitted, but accidentally and extraordinarily, for a time, on account of a just cause”	Merkelbach I, n. 895In nearly the same words: Sabetti-Barrett n. 173; Prümmer n. 576
“The rule that common signs of charity must be shown does not apply, if some higher or more urgent duty requires that they be omitted: however, internal charity must persist all the while.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1155
When their denial is grave: “In a few words, the denial of common signs is grave when it proceeds from grave hatred, or gravely offends the enemy, or is a scandal to others.”	Vermeersch n. 88In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 83; Merkelbach I, n. 897
Greeting first: “Anticipated greeting is owed to no one except certain persons constituted in greater dignity.”	Prümmer n. 576In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether we are bound to show the e, n. 12
“To refuse to salute another first, where custom expects this, is a mark of uncharity, unless one has a sufficient excuse.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1157
Returning it: “The return of a greeting is owed to all men from affability, and consequently even to an enemy.”	Prümmer n. 576In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1157
Hatred and Wishing Evil
Hatred of enmity: “Every hatred of enmity and every desire of revenge must be put away, since such hatred is directly opposed to the virtue of charity, and consequently is a mortal sin from its genus.”	Prümmer n. 573In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 88
Hatred of abomination: “Hatred of abomination does not affect the person himself but his malice.”	Vermeersch n. 88In nearly the same words: St. Thomas II-II, q. 25, a. 6, ad 1; McHugh-Callan n. 1143
“Antipathy is one thing, hatred another”	Vermeersch n. 89In nearly the same words: Sabetti-Barrett n. 174
Wishing temporal evil: “But sometimes it is permitted to desire a temporal evil for him under the aspect of a greater good”	Merkelbach I, n. 889In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 573; Sabetti-Barrett n. 170; McHugh-Callan n. 1143
Never damnation or sin: “But it is illicit to desire for any wayfarer that he be damned or that he sin, because this is simply evil.”	Merkelbach I, n. 889
Condemned by Innocent XI: “It is licit by an absolute desire to wish for the death of one's father, not indeed as an evil of the father, but as a good of the one wishing, because namely a rich inheritance will come to him.”	Sabetti-Barrett n. 170
“Cursing (Verfluchung) is from its genus a mortal sin, as directly opposed to the virtue of charity.”	Prümmer n. 573
In the catechism: “The love of our enemy is shown in this: That we do not revenge ourselves on him, that we return good for evil, that we pray for him and forgive him willingly.”	Spirago VIII. THE COMMANDMENT TO LOVE OUR ENEMY
Forgiving, and What Is Owed
Forgiving: “We are bound interiorly to remit the offense to an enemy”	Merkelbach I, n. 898In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 84; Vermeersch n. 95; Bontempi Whether we are bound to show the e, n. 14; Spirago VIII. THE COMMANDMENT TO LOVE OUR ENEMY
“Not immediately: for it surpasses human frailty that the wounded person, immediately, while internal disturbance has not yet been quieted, be compelled to exhibit signs of reconciliation.”	Noldin n. 84In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 92
The old friendship need not return: “If before the offense there existed a special friendship between the offender and the offended person, it is not required that even this friendship be restored through reconciliation, unless nevertheless some scandal would arise otherwise.”	Prümmer n. 577In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 898; Vermeersch n. 95; Bontempi Whether we are bound to show the e, n. 13
Satisfaction may still be claimed: “No one is bound of himself to remit to the neighbor a good owed to him; but satisfaction for injury and restitution for damage is a good which is owed to him who has suffered injury or damage.”	Noldin n. 84In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 898; Bontempi Whether we are bound to show the e, n. 15
Even before a judge: “but we can seek them by juridical action, provided that we do not principally intend the evil of the enemy”	Merkelbach I, n. 898In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 88; Prümmer n. 574
Yet in practice: “But in practice this must altogether be dissuaded, because it is very difficult to demand punishment of an enemy with every depraved affection of hatred and revenge excluded.”	Noldin n. 84In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 898; Vermeersch n. 88; Prümmer n. 574; Bontempi Whether we are bound to show the e, n. 19
“But especially let clerics guard as far as they can, lest they bring laymen, or, what is worse, other clerics, before a civil tribunal on account of reparation for an offense.”	Prümmer n. 574
Reconciliation
Who makes the first move: “He who alone, or more gravely, or first, has offended must be the first to attempt reconciliation through pardon sought formally or at least virtually.”	Vermeersch n. 95In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 899; Bontempi Whether we are bound to show the e, n. 16
Asking pardon in words: “Nevertheless, when the offense was grave, and no other means of reconciliation is present (or if a superior or judge imposes it), the offender also must directly ask pardon”	Merkelbach I, n. 899In nearly the same words: Sabetti-Barrett n. 174
“Yet not rarely a Superior who is not ashamed to ask pardon gains for himself confidence and love, nor does he derogate from his authority.”	Vermeersch n. 93
The confessor: “the confessor ought to persuade each one to begin the reconciliation”	Prümmer n. 577
“Let the confessor beware lest ever, because of an occult delict which would thus be manifested, he impose a formal petition for pardon”	Vermeersch n. 93
Helps to Loving Them
St. Thomas's remedies for hatred, in Bontempi: “to fear the vengeance of God, who does not remit the sins of him who hates”	Bontempi Whether it is necessary to love en, n. 25
St. Augustine: “love what God has made, not what man has done”	Spirago VIII. THE COMMANDMENT TO LOVE OUR ENEMY
“We love our friends for our own sake, but we love our enemies for God’s sake.”	Spirago VIII. THE COMMANDMENT TO LOVE OUR ENEMY
“By conferring benefits on your enemy, you will heap coals of fire upon his head”	Spirago VIII. THE COMMANDMENT TO LOVE OUR ENEMY

Beneficence and Almsgiving

Beneficence
Beneficence: “Beneficence simply means doing good to someone.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 31, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 924; Bontempi Sole Question: What beneficence is, n. 1
“beneficence in its general acceptation is an act of friendship or charity”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 31, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 924; McHugh-Callan n. 1210
“if the good which one man does another, be considered under some special aspect of good, then beneficence will assume a special character and will belong to some special virtue”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 31, a. 1In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1211
To all: “Good must be done to all.”	Merkelbach I, n. 925In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1212
First to those nearest: “we ought to be most beneficent towards those who are most closely connected with us”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 31, a. 3
“in certain cases one ought, for instance, to succor a stranger, in extreme necessity, rather than one's own father, if he is not in such urgent need”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 31, a. 3In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1214
The Works of Mercy
The works of mercy: “The corporal works of mercy are: (1), To feed the hungry; (2), To give drink to the thirsty; (3), To clothe the naked; (4), To harbor the stranger; (5), To visit the sick; (6), To ransom the captive; (7), To bury the dead.”	Spirago The Corporal Works of MercyIn nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 587; Bontempi Whether the kinds of almsgiving ar, n. 2
“The spiritual works of mercy are: (1), To instruct the ignorant; (2), To counsel the doubtful; (3), To admonish sinners; (4), To bear wrongs patiently; (5), To forgive offences willingly; (6), To comfort the afflicted; (7), To pray for the living and the dead”	Spirago The Spiritual Works of MercyIn nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether the kinds of almsgiving ar, n. 5
Spiritual alms are the greater, “spiritual almsdeeds hold the first place”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 32, a. 3In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1224
yet in a case “a man in hunger is to be fed rather than instructed”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 32, a. 3In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 927
The manuals treat two: “Hence here we treat only of two works of mercy, namely, almsgiving and fraternal correction, to which all the others can be reduced.”	Prümmer n. 587
Almsgiving
Almsgiving: “a work by which something is given to one in need from compassion on account of God”	Prümmer n. 588In nearly the same words: St. Thomas II-II, q. 32, a. 1; Merkelbach I, n. 926; Marc n. 486; Noldin n. 89; McHugh-Callan n. 1216; Wouters n. 531
“almsgiving is an act of charity through the medium of mercy”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 32, a. 1In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 588; Merkelbach I, n. 926; McHugh-Callan n. 1216
Wouters notes: “It is disputed whether it is an act of charity, or of mercy as a special virtue”	Wouters n. 531
“Yet almsgiving can also be given from another honorable motive, e.g. for making satisfaction for sins, for divine worship, etc.”	Prümmer n. 588
“almsgiving can be materially without charity, but to give alms formally, i.e. for God's sake, with delight and readiness, and altogether as one ought, is not possible without charity”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 32, a. 1, ad 1In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1219
The Precept
A precept: “Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 32, a. 5In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 589; Merkelbach I, n. 928; Noldin n. 90; Marc n. 486; Sabetti-Barrett n. 175; Bontempi Whether almsgiving is a matter of, n. 1; Spirago THE PRECEPT TO PERFORM WORKS OF MERCY
Two conditions: “On the part of the giver, it must be noted that he should give of his surplus”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 32, a. 5In nearly the same words: Marc n. 487
Ownership and use, with St. Thomas: “Temporal goods, which are conferred upon man by God, are indeed his as to ownership, but as to use they ought to be not only his, but also those of others”	Prümmer n. 589In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 90; Vermeersch n. 105
“the obligation of giving alms is properly an obligation of charity and of general justice, but not of commutative justice”	Prümmer n. 589In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1240
In the catechism: “The rich are chiefly bound to assist the needy.”	Spirago THE PRECEPT TO PERFORM WORKS OF MERCY
“Even the poor man can help his neighbor who is in need.”	Spirago THE PRECEPT TO PERFORM WORKS OF MERCY
From Which Goods
Not from what life needs: “it is altogether wrong to give alms out of what is necessary to us in this sense”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 32, a. 6In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 591; Merkelbach I, n. 930; Marc n. 488
Goods needed for one's station: “The second genus is of goods which are necessary (conditionally) to one's state”	Merkelbach I, n. 929In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 590; McHugh-Callan n. 1229
With latitude: “one might add much more to a man's property, and yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one might take much from him, and he would still have sufficient for the decencies of life in keeping with his own position”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 32, a. 6In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1230
Superfluous goods; though Vermeersch says “Absolutely superfluous goods today morally are not had in our regions”	Vermeersch n. 105
In extreme necessity: “There is a grave obligation of giving from things superfluous to life and from things necessary to one's state, even with great inconvenience, as much as is necessary for removing the necessity”	Merkelbach I, n. 930In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 91; Prümmer n. 592; Marc n. 488; Sabetti-Barrett n. 176; Wouters n. 533; Vermeersch n. 105; Bontempi Whether almsgiving is a matter of, n. 9
“Nor therefore is someone bound to fall from his state or to suffer great diminution in it”	Merkelbach I, n. 930In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 91
In grave necessity: “A neighbor constituted in grave necessity is to be assisted from goods superfluous to status.”	Prümmer n. 593In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 91; Marc n. 488
Merkelbach adds: “indeed even from things necessary to one's state, when this can be done without grave inconvenience”	Merkelbach I, n. 930In nearly the same words: Sabetti-Barrett n. 176
St. Thomas, of giving from what one's station needs: “it is a matter not of precept but of counsel”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 32, a. 6
In common necessity: “There is an obligation, from things superfluous to one's state, of sometimes during life giving something”	Merkelbach I, n. 930In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 91; McHugh-Callan n. 1237; Sabetti-Barrett n. 176
“Nevertheless there is not an obligation of giving to all, nor precisely to this one or that one, nor of removing the necessity totally, because all the rich are obliged”	Merkelbach I, n. 930In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 594
Its Gravity and Measure
Its gravity: “The obligation of almsgiving is grave from its genus”	Merkelbach I, n. 931In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1238
The confessor: “Let the confessor not easily deny absolution on account of omission of almsgiving”	Merkelbach I, n. 934In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 594; Marc n. 489; McHugh-Callan n. 1238
How much: “In ordinary circumstances, according to St. Alphonsus, it suffices to give the fiftieth part, or 2%, of income, if that part is superfluous, and a proportionally smaller part if the income is enormous”	Merkelbach I, n. 931In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 595; Sabetti-Barrett n. 177; Marc n. 488
“there is no better and more expedient rule than that each one should accommodate himself to the uses of pious persons of his own condition”	Vermeersch n. 106
Vermeersch's conclusion: “the positive precept of charity resists accurate definition; it is to be exercised not by perturbation of fear but by a freer and more generous impulse”	Vermeersch n. 108
“that the rich determine beforehand what proportional part they wish to distribute for pious ends”	Vermeersch n. 108
To several rather than one: “it would be better to give to several that are in need”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 32, a. 10In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1254
“Steady employment is a better charity than temporary doles”	McHugh-Callan n. 1249
Who May Give, and From What
From one's own goods: “From one's own goods, of which one has free administration.”	Marc n. 489In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 596
Not from stolen goods: “of such things a man may not give alms since he is bound to restore them”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 32, a. 7In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 932
“Justice comes before generosity.”	Spirago IN WHAT SPIRIT SHOULD THE WORKS OF MERCY BE
Shameful but not unjust gain: “it is lawful to keep and to give in alms what is thus acquired by an unlawful action”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 32, a. 7In nearly the same words: Bontempi Whether alms ought to be given fro, n. 13
“Though shameful gain may be used for almsgiving, it should not be devoted to sacred purposes, when this will cause scandal or be irreverent to religion.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1242
A wife: “indeed also, in our regions, without consent, she can give moderate, not extraordinary, alms from domestic things according to her condition”	Merkelbach I, n. 932In nearly the same words: Marc n. 489; Prümmer n. 596; McHugh-Callan n. 1245; Vermeersch n. 107
Bontempi, with St. Augustine: “a married woman cannot make alms from the goods of her husband, but only from her own”	Bontempi Whether alms ought to be given fro, n. 18
“Servants cannot give without certain permission”	Merkelbach I, n. 932In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 596
Vermeersch, more freely: “Thus faithful servants, especially those who, because of long-standing services, are shown as pertaining almost to the family properly so called, do not seem to be prohibited from presuming consent of this kind”	Vermeersch n. 107
To Whom, and How
Not to the idle: “No one is obliged (indeed sometimes it is illicit) to give alms to poor persons unwilling to work”	Merkelbach I, n. 933In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 597; Noldin n. 93
“For these it would be more advisable to procure or supply work from which they might live.”	Merkelbach I, n. 933
To none excluded: “nevertheless no one can be systematically excluded (neither unbelievers, nor pilgrims, nor enemies)”	Merkelbach I, n. 933In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 597; McHugh-Callan n. 1247
“In giving alms, preference should be shown to our relatives, our fellow Catholics, and those who are in the greatest need.”	Spirago IN WHAT SPIRIT SHOULD THE WORKS OF MERCY BE
Marc's order, other things equal: “an old man is preferred to a young man, a noble to an ignoble, an invalid to a strong person, a faithful person to an unbeliever, a Catholic to a heretic, a good man to a bad man, a native to a stranger”	Marc n. 489
Beggars in the street: “one is rarely bound from precept to give assistance even from superfluities”	Merkelbach I, n. 933In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 535; Vermeersch n. 105
“it is a less evil that an unworthy person be helped than that a worthy one be refused”	McHugh-Callan n. 1235In nearly the same words: Spirago IN WHAT SPIRIT SHOULD THE WORKS OF MERCY BE
The manner: “Let it be just and prudent, swift, secret, and willing”	Prümmer n. 597In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 934
“We should do good to our neighbor promptly and pleasantly.”	Spirago IN WHAT SPIRIT SHOULD THE WORKS OF MERCY BE
“We ought not to question the poor at too great length”	Spirago IN WHAT SPIRIT SHOULD THE WORKS OF MERCY BE
“We ought not to do good to our neighbor in order to be seen and praised by men”	Spirago IN WHAT SPIRIT SHOULD THE WORKS OF MERCY BE In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1217
A loan may suffice: “if he needs only the use of the thing, it is sufficient to lend it”	Noldin n. 91In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1218
“Physicians, advocates, and others performing a public office are bound to spend their work gratis for the poor, if it does not appear how otherwise help can be given to them.”	Merkelbach I, n. 933In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 109
False beggars: “Fictitious poor persons, i.e. those who, not pressed by true want, feign great misery and thereby hunt for alms, sin in three ways”	Prümmer n. 598In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 932
“Nevertheless alms which are of minimal value need not necessarily be restored to those who gave them”	Noldin n. 93
The State and the Poor
The state and the poor: “The care of the poor is committed in the first place to private men and to the Church.”	Noldin n. 93
“Public charity done by the State is useful and necessary under the conditions of modern life, but it does not and cannot take the place of charity done by the Church or by private individuals.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1257In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 597
“By the payment of this tax the obligation of giving alms is certainly diminished”	Noldin n. 93In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 933; McHugh-Callan n. 1257
Catholic schools, in Vermeersch: “a grave obligation presses the faithful of striving so that a supply of this kind of education be everywhere available”	Vermeersch n. 100
“today alms of a more prudent method must be cultivated rather than trivial money given to a poor person; and especially spiritual needs must be aided”	Vermeersch n. 154
Its Fruits
Its fruits, in the catechism: “Almsgiving obtains for us the remission of our sins”	Spirago OF WHAT BENEFIT ARE THE WORKS OF MERCY TO US
“By almsgiving we obtain an eternal recompense, provided that at the time we are in a state of grace.”	Spirago OF WHAT BENEFIT ARE THE WORKS OF MERCY TO US
“By almsgiving we make the poor our friends; they pray for us, and their prayers have great power with God.”	Spirago OF WHAT BENEFIT ARE THE WORKS OF MERCY TO US
St. Bonaventure: “Almsgiving is not to be done after death, but before death”	Bontempi On Almsgiving, n. 1

Fraternal Correction

What It Is
Defined: “an admonition of a neighbor who is a sinner, made by a private or quasi-private person so that the neighbor may be amended”	Merkelbach I, n. 936In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 599; Noldin n. 94; Marc n. 490; McHugh-Callan n. 1258; Wouters n. 536; Vermeersch n. 112
“Consequently fraternal correction also is an act of charity”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 33, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 936
Judicial correction, by contrast: “This correction is an act of justice”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 33, a. 1
Between them, “paternal, by which a superior, not indeed as judge, but as father (the judicial order having been passed over), corrects a subject”	Prümmer n. 599In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 936
By words or signs: “Fraternal correction can be done either by suitable speech, or by equivalent deeds or signs: by showing a sorrowful face, by diverting the conversation to other things, by withdrawing temporal help”	Merkelbach I, n. 939In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 94; Prümmer n. 599
“It is the proper remedy for sins of negligence, as judicial correction is for sins of malice.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1258
The Precept
A precept: “Fraternal correction is a matter of precept.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 33, a. 2In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 600; Merkelbach I, n. 937; Marc n. 491; Sabetti-Barrett n. 179; Wouters n. 537; Bontempi Whether fraternal correction is a, n. 2
All the more than alms: “if from charity we are bound to assist neighbor in his bodily necessities through material almsgiving, a fortiori we are bound to bestow on him the spiritual almsgiving of fraternal correction”	Prümmer n. 600In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1259; Bontempi Whether fraternal correction is a, n. 7
Binding only as it serves its end: “it is a matter of precept, in so far as it is necessary for that end”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 33, a. 2
St. Augustine: “If you neglect to correct, you have become worse than he who sinned.”	Bontempi Whether fraternal correction is a, n. 2
Who must correct: “such like correction belongs to anyone who has charity, be he subject or prelate”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 33, a. 3In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 937; Marc n. 492
“But superiors are more strictly bound to the correction of their subjects; for not only from charity, but also from their office”	Prümmer n. 601In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 95; Vermeersch n. 114
Bishops, parish priests, magistrates: “they are bound both from office and from justice to correct and admonish subjects, even with danger of life, in their necessity not only extreme but also grave”	Marc n. 495In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1282
Superiors too may be corrected: “Even inferiors are held by the obligation of admonishing Superiors; yet with modesty, discretion, and reverence”	Marc n. 492In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1277
“Wherefore servants and subjects are rarely bound under grave sin to the correction of superiors”	Prümmer n. 601
Even a sinner: “and in this respect he may be competent to find fault with others for committing sin”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 33, a. 5In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1280; Noldin n. 96
When It Binds
When it binds: “Five conditions are simultaneously required so that this precept obliges here and now”	Merkelbach I, n. 938In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 96; Prümmer n. 601
Grave matter: “Certain matter, that is, a grave sin certainly committed”	Merkelbach I, n. 938In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 113; Noldin n. 96
Not ordinarily venial sins: “slight sins or transgressions should not be corrected in ordinary cases”	McHugh-Callan n. 1270In nearly the same words: Vermeersch n. 113; Wouters n. 538
Yet in a religious house: “if in some religious order it is foreseen that through light violations of the rules the vigor of discipline will be relaxed, there lies upon one a grave obligation of correction”	Marc n. 491
No prying: “a private person ought not and cannot inquire into the life of neighbor”	Merkelbach I, n. 938In nearly the same words: Sabetti-Barrett n. 181; Vermeersch n. 115; McHugh-Callan n. 1269
Need: “Necessity, that is, probability that neighbor is not going to amend himself spontaneously and that another equally fit is not going to correct him.”	Merkelbach I, n. 938
Hope of fruit: “when it is deemed probable that the sinner will not take the warning, and will become worse, such fraternal correction should be foregone”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 33, a. 6In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 938; McHugh-Callan n. 1264
“if correction is doubtfully going to profit but certainly not going to harm, it must be done”	Merkelbach I, n. 938In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1263
No great cost to oneself: “Possibility, that is, that it can be done without too great inconvenience of the one correcting, such as is not the danger of some indignation, which is almost always present.”	Merkelbach I, n. 938In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 601
The right time: “Indeed sometimes the repetition of sin can be permitted so that the sinner may come to his senses more fervently, if immediate fruit is not hoped for.”	Merkelbach I, n. 938In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 538; Noldin n. 96
So private persons are rarely bound: “a grave obligation of making fraternal correction is also rarely present for a private man”	Prümmer n. 601In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 943; Marc n. 493; Sabetti-Barrett n. 181; Wouters n. 538; Vermeersch n. 115
“But the scrupulous are entirely excused from this obligation”	Noldin n. 96In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 601; Wouters n. 538
Omitting it: “To omit fraternal correction is a mortal sin from its genus.”	Merkelbach I, n. 940In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1265
“But if someone from these is only made slower to correct, yet in such a way that, if it were clear to him that he could draw his brother back from sin, he would not omit it, he sins only venially”	Merkelbach I, n. 940In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1265; Marc n. 493
“he who by fraternal admonition can remove or prevent the mortal sin of the neighbor without any inconvenience, and neglects this from vain fear, sins gravely”	Noldin n. 96In nearly the same words: Sabetti-Barrett n. 180
The Manner and the Order
The manner: “toward inferiors and equals it is to be made with kindness and love”	Prümmer n. 602In nearly the same words: Sabetti-Barrett n. 181; McHugh-Callan n. 1285
In the catechism: “We must admonish our neighbor with gentleness and charity.”	Spirago The Spiritual Works of Mercy
“Before rebuking any one, it is well to mention something praiseworthy in his conduct, and afterwards to speak a word of encouragement.”	Spirago The Spiritual Works of Mercy
“Rebuke him by all means, but wait until he is sober.”	Spirago The Spiritual Works of Mercy
Christ's order: first in secret, “One must begin from a secret admonition”	Prümmer n. 602In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 939; Spirago The Spiritual Works of Mercy
then before witnesses, “it is befitting that a citation of witnesses should be placed between the two extremes”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 33, a. 8In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 602
then to the superior: “and if it still does not profit, let denunciation be made to the superior, who first corrects paternally, then, if it shall have been necessary, also judicially”	Merkelbach I, n. 939
Vermeersch, as customs now are: “it will not often happen that other witnesses besides the Superior, or before the Superior, must be called in”	Vermeersch n. 116
Why the order: “The order to be followed in fraternal correction is not only of the positive divine law, but it is also of the natural law.”	McHugh-Callan n. 1285In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 97
Not needed when the sin is public: “if the fault is public, known to the greater part of the community or shortly to be made known”	Merkelbach I, n. 939In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 97
or harms others: “it is necessary to take steps to denounce him at once, in order to prevent him doing such harm”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 33, a. 7In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 939
or the superior will do better: “if the amendment of the delinquent cannot otherwise be obtained, or at least is more easily and efficaciously obtained through the superior”	Noldin n. 97In nearly the same words: Wouters n. 539; McHugh-Callan n. 1293
Bontempi holds the order binding even so: “IT MUST BE ASSERTED, with this opinion, that in fraternal correction the order of the Gospel is to be observed by commandment.”	Bontempi Whether the order of fraternal cor, n. 10
or the right has been yielded: “if the one to be corrected has renounced his right, which obtains in some religious communities”	Noldin n. 97
With St. Alphonsus: “If it is certainly clear that a brother has perfectly amended a hidden sin, and from it there is no danger of relapse or of damage to himself or to another, it is not licit to denounce him to a father or prelate”	Merkelbach I, n. 943
“A superior, by force of knowledge obtained through private denunciation made to him as father, cannot publicly warn or judicially proceed”	Merkelbach I, n. 943
“Voluntary accusers not only are not easily to be heard, but rather to be guarded against”	Sabetti-Barrett n. 181In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1292
Hidden corrupters in a school: “If common damage is feared, as the corruption of several or the infamy of the house, they are bound to denounce even with grave inconvenience”	Noldin n. 97
“But if only the damage of one or another is feared, they are not bound with grave inconvenience”	Noldin n. 97
Teaching the Ignorant
One who sins in ignorance: “these are matter of instruction (to teach the ignorant)”	Merkelbach I, n. 941In nearly the same words: Sabetti-Barrett n. 180; McHugh-Callan n. 1274
“Superiors, confessors, parish priests, parents, and teachers are of themselves always bound to instruction”	Wouters n. 540In nearly the same words: Noldin n. 98
“Anyone, whether superior or private person, ought to admonish and instruct an ignorant person in the following cases”	Noldin n. 98
“if from the warning material sins would easily be transformed into formal sins, the warning ought to be omitted”	Prümmer n. 603In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 942
Exhortation, and the Fruit
Exhortation: “a most suitable exercise of spiritual mercy consists in the pious exhortation by which neighbor is stimulated to good actions”	Vermeersch n. 111
“By sincere and temperate encomium, alien from flattery, men are wonderfully stimulated to attempt better things”	Vermeersch n. 111
Its fruit: “He who causeth a sinner to be converted from the error of his ways shall save his soul from death, and cover a multitude of sins”	Spirago The Spiritual Works of Mercy
St. John Chrysostom: “the merit would be nothing in comparison with that of having converted one sinner”	Spirago The Spiritual Works of Mercy

The Gift of Wisdom

What It Is
The gift: “it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge aright about them on account of connaturality with them”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 45, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 922; McHugh-Callan n. 1610; Noldin n. 33; Wouters n. 475
Defined: “A divinely infused habit by which the mind is rendered easily movable by the Holy Spirit for contemplating divine things, and for judging concerning them, and concerning human things according to divine reasons.”	Merkelbach I, n. 922
Bontempi, after St. Bonaventure: “It is a habit, infused by God, rendering the soul easily mobile toward loving and tasting the Gifts out of love, or Charity.”	Bontempi What kind of gift wisdom is, n. 8
The highest gift: “The gift of wisdom is the highest, and corresponds to the noblest virtue, namely charity.”	Prümmer n. 447In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 922
Not the acquired virtue, which “it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to pronounce right judgment about Divine things after reason has made its inquiry”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 45, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 922
As the chaste judge of chastity: “he who has the habit of chastity judges of such matters by a kind of connaturality”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 45, a. 2In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1611
Where It Resides
Where it resides: “wisdom which is a gift, has its cause in the will, which cause is charity, but it has its essence in the intellect, whose act is to judge aright”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 45, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 922; McHugh-Callan n. 1611
Bontempi: “The quasi-subject of Wisdom is indeed the intellect, but one overflowing its operations into the will”	Bontempi What kind of gift wisdom is, n. 9
Its name, from savor: “in so far as it denotes a certain sweetness”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 45, a. 2, ad 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 922; Bontempi What kind of gift wisdom is, n. 9
Contemplating and Directing
Speculative and practical: “wisdom as a gift, is not merely speculative but also practical”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 45, a. 3In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 922; McHugh-Callan n. 1612
Bontempi, setting it against understanding: “the gift of Wisdom, however, is practical”	Bontempi On the spiritual delights of wisdo, n. 14
“the result of wisdom is to make the bitter sweet”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 45, a. 3, ad 3
Who Has It
Not with mortal sin: “the wisdom of which we are speaking cannot be together with mortal sin”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 45, a. 4In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 922; McHugh-Callan n. 1615; Bontempi What kind of gift wisdom is, n. 15
“This measure is wanting to none who is without mortal sin through having sanctifying grace”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 45, a. 5In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1615; Merkelbach I, n. 922
A higher degree: “This degree of wisdom is not common to all that have sanctifying grace, but belongs rather to the gratuitous graces”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 45, a. 5In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1616
Its grades: “conformably there is a threefold grade of wisdom”	Merkelbach I, n. 922
Origen, in Bontempi: “Beginners love, the proficient burn, but the perfect languish in love.”	Bontempi On the spiritual delights of wisdo, n. 7
Its Beatitude
Its beatitude: “The seventh beatitude is fittingly ascribed to the gift of wisdom, both as to the merit and as to the reward.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 45, a. 6In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 922
“It belongs to charity to be at peace, but it belongs to wisdom to make peace by setting things in order.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 45, a. 6, ad 1
How It Is Sought
How it is sought: “Wisdom is found through cognition; but possessed through love”	Bontempi How the gift of wisdom is obtained, n. 1
“this gift, which is a supernatural habit, is to be earnestly asked of God”	Bontempi How the gift of wisdom is obtained, n. 4
St. Bernard's signs: “You have plainly found wisdom, if you weep for the sins of your former life, if you esteem lightly the desirable things of this age, if you desire eternal beatitude with your whole desire.”	Bontempi How the gift of wisdom is obtained, n. 3

The Vices Opposed to Charity

Each entry opens the passage. A dash means only that the author does not name it there. Sloth and envy are also capital vices, with pages of their own.

St. ThomasII-II, qq. 34-46	Prümmernn. 564-620	MerkelbachI, nn. 944-967	Noldinnn. 62-109	Woutersnn. 520-570
Against love
hate God	On hatred of God	Hatred of God	On hatred of God	Hatred of God
hatred of one's neighbor	hatred of enmity	Hatred of neighbor	On Hatred	hatred
Against charity toward oneself
—	hatred of self	disordered egoism	egoism	Direct killing of oneself
Against joy
sloth	Acedia	Acedia	sloth	sloth
envy	envy	Envy	Envy	Envy
Against peace
discord	discord	Discord	—	Discord
contention	contentions	contention	—	Contention
strife	quarrels	strife	—	quarrel
schism	schism	schism	schism	Schism
war	war	illicit war	On War	On War
Sedition	sedition	sedition	sedition	sedition
Against beneficence
scandal	On scandal	Active scandal	On Scandal	On Scandal
—	On cooperation in evil	cooperation	On Cooperation	On Cooperation
—	—	—	On Induction	—
Against wisdom
Folly	—	—	—	—

Each of these is set out by author, with its kinds and gravity, on The Vices Against Charity.

Their Gravity

Hatred
“Wherefore hatred of God is more grievous than other sins.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 34, a. 2In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 945; Noldin n. 64; Wouters n. 520; Marc n. 475; Vermeersch n. 76; McHugh-Callan n. 1301; Bontempi What sin hatred is, and what kind, n. 3; Prümmer n. 564
Sloth
“sloth is a mortal sin in respect of its genus”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 35, a. 3In nearly the same words: Prümmer n. 434; Merkelbach I, n. 950; Noldin n. 350; Wouters n. 328; McHugh-Callan n. 1322; Marc n. 372; Vermeersch n. 487; Bontempi Sole Question: What sloth is, and, n. 5
Sins Against Charity Toward Oneself
“The gravest harm which man inflicts upon himself is mortal sin itself, by which he kills his soul and destroys true supernatural charity in himself”	Prümmer n. 568
Envy
“Envy is a mortal sin from its genus”	Merkelbach I, n. 952; Wouters n. 314In nearly the same words: St. Thomas II-II, q. 36, a. 3; Prümmer n. 422; Noldin n. 338; McHugh-Callan n. 1338; Marc n. 368; Vermeersch n. 474; Bontempi Question II: How perverse envy is, n. 2
Discord
“This is a mortal sin in respect of its genus, because it is contrary to charity, although the first movements of such discord are venial sins by reason of their being imperfect acts.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 37, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 954; Wouters n. 568; McHugh-Callan n. 1350; Bontempi What discord is, and what kind of, n. 2; McHugh-Callan n. 1350
Contention
“Accordingly if we take contention as denoting a disclaimer of the truth and an inordinate manner, it is a mortal sin.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 38, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 954; Wouters n. 569; McHugh-Callan n. 1357; Bontempi What sin contention is, and how gr, n. 2; Marc n. 504
Strife
“it is a mortal sin in the man who attacks another unjustly, for it is not without mortal sin that one inflicts harm on another even if the deed be done by the hands”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 41, a. 1In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 954; McHugh-Callan n. 1430; Bontempi What quarreling is, and what kind, n. 2; Marc n. 504
Schism
“Nevertheless of all sins committed by man against his neighbor, the sin of schism would seem to be the greatest, because it is opposed to the spiritual good of the multitude.”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 39, a. 2, ad 3In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1372; Bontempi How great a sin schism is, n. 2
War and Sedition
“He who declares war without a just cause sins gravely: first and formally against charity, because he disturbs peace, which is an effect of charity; at the same time, however, against justice, on account of the unjust damages which war is apt to inflict.”	Merkelbach II, n. 275In nearly the same words: Bontempi What conditions are required for a, n. 20
Scandal
“On like manner active scandal is always a sin in the person who gives scandal, since either what he does is a sin, or if it only have the appearance of sin, it should always be left undone out of that love for our neighbor which binds each one to be solicitous for his neighbor's spiritual welfare”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 43, a. 2In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1465
Cooperation in Another's Sin
“Formal cooperation in the sin of another is intrinsically evil and therefore is never licit.”	Prümmer n. 618In nearly the same words: Merkelbach I, n. 489; Noldin n. 118; Marc n. 518; Sabetti-Barrett n. 195; McHugh-Callan n. 1513; Vermeersch n. 132
Folly
“by plunging his sense into earthly things, whereby his sense is rendered incapable of perceiving Divine things”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 46, a. 2In nearly the same words: McHugh-Callan n. 1624
Refusing Alms
“It is certainly a mortal sin to refuse alms to one in extreme or grave need, and probably also a grave sin to refuse ever to give alms to those in common need”	McHugh-Callan n. 1239
Omitting Correction
“To omit fraternal correction is a mortal sin from its genus.”	Merkelbach I, n. 940

How It Is Gained, Kept and Increased

Infused, Increased, Lost
“Charity is a virtue infused in itself”	Merkelbach I, n. 864
“God is the principal efficient cause of the increase of charity”	Merkelbach I, n. 869
“every mortal sin is contrary to charity by its very nature”	St. Thomas II-II, q. 24, a. 12
“it cannot be together with mortal sin”	Prümmer n. 558
Spirago: “The love of God may be increased in the soul by meditation upon the perfections of God and the benefits He confers on us; by practising detachment from earthly things and by frequently making acts of the love of God.”	Spirago III. THE PRECEPT OF THE LOVE OF GOD
“The love of God is lost by mortal sin.”	Spirago III. THE PRECEPT OF THE LOVE OF GOD
Merkelbach's Means of Progress
Merkelbach: “Suitable means for progressing in the love of God are to be employed.”	Merkelbach I, n. 885
“To diminish the obstacle and gradually eradicate disordered love of self, which is directly contrary to divine love and is the cause of every sin”	Merkelbach I, n. 885
“Therefore the nourishment of charity is the diminution of cupidity, and we progress in charity so much as we depress love of ourselves.”	Merkelbach I, n. 885
“To consider the reasons for loving God, namely, a) God is the lover of us, who first loved us”	Merkelbach I, n. 885
“God in himself is infinitely lovable”	Merkelbach I, n. 885
“directly, by eliciting an act of love toward God”	Merkelbach I, n. 885
“indirectly, by eliciting acts of the moral virtues which are informed by charity, especially observance of the commandments”	Merkelbach I, n. 885
With St. Augustine: “nothing is difficult to those who love”	Merkelbach I, n. 885
St. Alphonsus's Means of Divine Love
St. Alphonsus, to religious: “The first means is, to desire ardently to attain that perfect love that will make your heart entirely belong to him.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XXII
“The second means necessary to love God with the whole heart is, detachment from all love that is not for God.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XXII
St. Francis de Sales: “If I knew that there was a single fibre in my heart that was not for God, I would instantly pluck it out.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XXII
“The third means of obtaining the perfect love of Jesus Christ is to meditate frequently on his Passion.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XXII
“The fourth means to attain perfect love is to make frequent acts of love.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XXII
“It will be enough to say to him, My God, I love Thee: or, my God, my all.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XXII
“We should love him, at least through gratitude for the love that he has borne us.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XXII
“Infirmities prove the true lover.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XXII
By Prayer
Deshon, on increasing in the love of God: “It will depend chiefly on one thing, whether you pray, and have regular daily habits of prayer.”	Deshon Guide, ch. VIII
“One little prayer with a great deal of heart in it, a great deal of the simple talking of the heart with God, is worth more than whole pages of prayers read off without heart from a book.”	Deshon Guide, ch. VIII
“But in order to pray well you must pray regularly and constantly.”	Deshon Guide, ch. VIII
Against the Love of the World
What drives it out, in the catechism: “The love of the world consists in loving, above all, money, or the gratification of one’s appetite, or earthly honors or anything else in the world, instead of giving the first place to God.”	Spirago IV. THE LOVE OF THE WORLD IS OPPOSED TO THE
“Through love of the world we incur the loss of sanctifying grace, and eternal felicity.”	Spirago IV. THE LOVE OF THE WORLD IS OPPOSED TO THE
Fraternal Charity in Thought, Word and Work
St. Alphonsus: “To love God without at the same time loving our neighbor is impossible.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XII
“To practise charity in thought you must, in the first place, endeavor to banish all rash judgments, suspicions and doubts.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XII
“Charity obliges us to rejoice at a neighbor’s good, and to banish envy”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XII
St. Mary Magdalene de Pazzi's rule: “Never to utter in their absence what you would not say in their presence.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XII
Cardinal Bellarmine: “That an ounce of charity is more valuable than a hundred carloads of reason.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XII
“If you love charity, endeavor to be affable and meek to all.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XII
“whenever the soul is disturbed, it is better to be silent”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XII
St. Bernard: “humility alone is the reparation of wounded charity”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XII
“Give alms as often as it is in your power.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XII
“The most perfect charity consists in zeal for your neighbor’s spiritual good.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XII
“If you wish to know whether the Spirit of God reigns in a Community, ask how the sick are treated.”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XII
St. Paulinus: “to love an enemy is heavenly revenge”	St. Alphonsus True Spouse, ch. XII
Motives to Mercy
Bontempi, after St. Bonaventure, on the motives of mercy: “The first motive is to consider the miserable to be of our nature.”	Bontempi What kind of virtue mercy is, n. 10
“The second motive of mercy is one's own need and misery”	Bontempi What kind of virtue mercy is, n. 10
“The third motive is the unity of Christ and his members”	Bontempi What kind of virtue mercy is, n. 11
In the catechism: “We must do good to our neighbor for Christ’s sake.”	Spirago IN WHAT SPIRIT SHOULD THE WORKS OF MERCY BE
St. Mary Magdalene de Pazzi: “when I do good to my neighbor, I assist God”	Spirago IN WHAT SPIRIT SHOULD THE WORKS OF MERCY BE

Where Each Author Treats It

St. Thomas	After hope, the longest treatise on the theological virtues	II-II, qq. 23-46
St. Thomas	Its precepts	II-II, q. 44
Prümmer	Its own tract: toward God, toward ourselves, toward neighbor	nn. 551-624
Merkelbach	Five parts: charity itself, object, acts, opposed sins, precepts	I, n. 842 ff.
Noldin	Under the precepts of the theological virtues	Vol. II, nn. 53-109
Wouters	The virtue among the theological virtues; its duties and sins in Book II	nn. 363-366