Chapter I: Definition and Division of Society

1. Definition.—Man is not a lone individual, but a social being.¹ That is evident not only from the innate attraction he feels for his fellowmen, but likewise, and in a particular manner, from his physical and intellectual dependence upon others. In the words of Jesus, the son of Sirach, “all flesh consorts with the like of itself, and every man shall associate himself to his like.”²

¹ ζῷον πολιτικόν, animal rationale et sociale.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 96, art. 4; 2a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 3, ad 1; qu. 114, art. 2, ad 1; qu. 129, art. 6, ad 1; 3a, qu. 65, art. 1. The term animal rationale et sociale in Scholastic parlance means a rational and social being, not animal. Animal is brutum. Animal in Latin is a generic term comprising homo and brutum.

² “Every man shall associate with one like himself.”—Ecclus. XIII, 20.

“Man’s natural instinct,” says Pope Leo XIII in his famous encyclical on the Christian Constitution of States, “moves him to live in civil society, for he cannot, if dwelling apart, provide himself with the necessary requirements of life, nor procure the means of developing his mental and moral faculties. Hence it is divinely ordained that he should lead his life—be it family, social or civil—with his fellowmen, amongst whom alone his several wants can be adequately supplied.”³

³ Encyclical “Immortale Dei,” Nov. 1, 1885: “It is implanted in man by nature that he should live in civil society: for if he lives in solitude, he cannot obtain the necessary sustenance and preparation for life, nor likewise the perfection of mind and soul; therefore it has been divinely ordained that he should be born for union and human association, both domestic and civil, which alone can furnish the perfect sufficiency of life.” (The Pope and the People, p. 73.)

Another proof that men are destined to consort with their like is the gift of language, by which they can communicate to one another their thoughts, desires, and aspirations. Finally mutual love also has its part in the constitution of society.

The principal requirements of a society are: (a) multiplicity of individuals, (b) a common end, and (c) a stable union for the attainment of that end. A single individual can not constitute a society. It is only when several persons come together and unite their aims for the attainment of a common object that a society is established. Since rational beings alone are capable of forming such a union, which involves rights and duties on the part of each member, the term society is inapplicable to irrational brutes, no matter how many analogies may be found among them reminding us of human society, as in a colony of bees or ants.⁴

⁴ V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 4th ed., p. 377; M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 385 sqq.

An essential requirement flowing from the very nature of society is authority, i. e., the right of certain members to compel others to do or to omit certain things in relation to the common purpose. In view of its object, authority can be but one, and must always remain the same, so that it becomes extinguished only when the society itself ceases to exist or undergoes an essential change. Being a moral person with well-defined objects and scope, every society is the bearer of rights and duties, towards other societies as well as towards its own members. Hence a society may be more comprehensively defined as the permanent union of a number of free beings who, under the direction of an authority, strive by common effort to achieve a common purpose.

2. Division.—Societies are distinguished from one another in purpose, origin, and extent.

a) In regard to its purpose a society may be perfect or imperfect, according as its object is to procure for its members all the things they need for their welfare, and it possesses all the means necessary for this purpose within itself, or according as it aims only at the one or other necessity, and consequently requires to be supplemented in its efforts by other societies. The State (civitas sive communitas civilis) is a perfect society because it possesses all the means required for the attainment of its objects and is self-sufficient within the natural order. The Church, too, is a perfect society, because it is equipped by its Divine Founder with all the means necessary to attain its end. The family (familia domestica), on the other hand, consisting of father, mother, and children, is an imperfect society, for the reason that, though it aims at providing its members with all they need, it cannot fully attain this purpose without the aid of other social organisms of a wider scope, namely, State and Church.⁵

⁵ St. Thomas, Comment. in Polit., I, l. 1: “Since every association of all men is ordered to something necessary for life, that community will be perfect which is ordered to this: that man have sufficiently whatever is necessary for life; but such a community is the State.”—Cfr. V. Cathrein, S. J., Phil. Mor., n. 433: “For a twofold reason a society can be called perfect: 1. because it is ordered to the perfect sufficiency of human life and is sufficient unto itself for this end, and in this sense it is the same as a society complete intrinsically and extrinsically; 2. because it possesses in and of itself (actually or virtually) the means necessary for attaining its end, and does not depend, at least directly, upon other societies: in this sense both the State and the Church are perfect societies; all the others are imperfect.”—Cfr. M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 388 sq.

b) In respect to its origin a society is either natural (necessary) or free, according as its peculiar character is based upon the very nature of man or depends upon free choice, exercised within the limits of justice and order.

c) In regard to extent, a society is either general or particular, according as it includes all men or only one race, community, or body of men. The only general society in this sense is that which comprises the whole race, human society, i. e., all men, in as far as all have the same final end, namely, to glorify God and work out their eternal salvation, and in so far as they are all subject to one supreme Legislator and bound together by mutual rights and duties. This general society—“society” par excellence—is divided into a large number of particular societies, of which the basic groups are the family and the State.⁶

⁶ Is. XLVIII, 11; Prov. XVI, 4; Gal. VI, 2; Jas. IV, 12.—Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, c. 1.—St. Augustine, De Bono Coniugali, c. 1: “Since every man is a part of the human race, and human nature is something social and has the great and natural good of the power of friendship, for this reason God willed to create all men from one, so that in their society they might be held together not only by likeness of kind but also by the bond of kinship. Therefore the first natural bond of human society is husband and wife. God did not create even these as separate individuals and join them as strangers, but created the one from the other, signifying also the power of union in the side from which she was taken and formed (Gen. II, 21–22). For those are joined at their sides who walk together and together look to where they walk. There follows the connection of society in children, who are the one honorable fruit, not of the union of male and female, but of intercourse. For in each sex there could have been, even without such commingling, a certain friendly and genuine union, the one ruling, the other obeying.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 373).

The respective relations to State and Church give rise to the further distinction between public and private so- cieties. Public societies are those which are acknowledged as juridical persons by the authority, either of State or Church, and enjoy definite public rights. All others are private.

Readings.—Theo. Meyer, S. J., Inst. Iuris Naturalis, Vol. I, n. 347 sqq.—V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 388 sqq.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 385 sqq.—J. E. Ross, C. S. P., Christian Ethics, pp. 190 sqq.—C. Antoine, S. J., Cours d’Economie Sociale, Intr. and Ch. I of Part I.—T. Slater, S. J., Questions of Moral Theology, pp. 191 sqq.