Chapter V: The Object of Catholic Moral Theology

According to the dogmatic teaching of the Church, the final end and object of moral conduct is man's eternal happiness in Heaven (beatitudo).¹ Basing its teaching on Sacred Scripture,² the Council of Trent declares that man is free to do good propter retributionem, i. e., for the sake of gaining a reward.³ But may he do good to be happy?

¹ Cfr. St. Augustine, Confessiones, l. X, c. 22: " This is the happy life: to rejoice concerning You, toward You, and because of You; this is it, and there is no other. But those who think that it is something else pursue another joy, and not the true one. Yet their will is not turned away from some image of joy." — Ibid., c. 23, n. 33: "For the happy life is joy in the truth. For this is joy in You, who are the truth." —St. Ignatius Loyola says: "Man was created that he might praise the Lord our God, show Him reverence, and through these things save his soul." (Lib. Exercit.). — Cfr. E. Janvier, Exposition de la Morale Catholique, Vol. I, Paris 1904, pp. 45 sqq.—J. S. Vaughan, Happiness and Beauty, London 1913.

² Ps. CXVIII, 112 (Vulg.): "I have inclined my heart to perform Your justifications forever, for the sake of reward." (Cfr. G. Hoberg, Die Psalmen der Vulgata, Freiburg 1892, p. 351). —Heb. XI, 26: "For (Moses) looked to the reward."

³ Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, c. 11. — On man's true happiness see St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 1 sqq.; V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, pp. 81 sqq.; M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, Dublin 1909, pp. 78 sqq.; Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, London 1908, pp. 6 sqq.

The Catholic Church has been accused of Eudemonism or Hedonism for answering this question in the affirmative. We are told that the desire for happiness is a mean motive, incompatible with the idea of perfect morality. 1. The Stoics and the followers of Kant⁴ assert that any system of ethics that commands men to do good, not because it is a duty, but in order to obtain a reward, is egoistic and unworthy of a true philosopher. This is a very plausible objection, yet it has absolutely no basis in fact. Those who raise it misunderstand human nature. Man is so constituted that he cannot truly desire anything which does not afford him interior satisfaction. Whatever he may do or omit, he is in a certain sense always seeking his own happiness. Even the wicked sin to be happy.⁵ When a man desires something for others, he does not desire it purely for their sake, but partly also because the desired object has some value for himself. In this sense the desire for happiness and egoism are necessary constituents of every human act. A wholly unselfish act of the will, i. e., one in no way related to the personal satisfaction or happiness of the agent, is impossible. Even the so-called unselfish love that causes men to make sacrifices for others or for the sake of ideals, is not entirely free from "selfishness," because when man makes a sacrifice, he does it for his own satisfaction as well as for the sake of others.

⁴ On Kant's ethical teaching see K. Fischer, Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. IV, 3rd ed., Munich 1882; Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, pp. 115-119, London 1908; Wm. Turner, History of Philosophy, pp. 540 sqq., Boston 1903. —For a refutation of Kant see C. Didio, Die moderne Moral und ihre Grundprinzipien, Freiburg 1896, pp. 64 sqq.; Ph. Kneib, Die "Lohnsucht" der christlichen Moral, Vienna 1904, pp. 7 sqq.; IDEM, Die "Jenseitsmoral," pp. 6 sq. and 109 sqq.; Schneider, Göttliche Weltordnung, 2nd ed., pp. 517 sqq. —On Eudaemonism cfr. F. J. Stein, Historischkritische Darstellung der pathologischen Moralprinzipien, 2nd ed., Würzburg 1879, pp. 55 sqq.; J. Holtzmann, Moderne Sittlichkeitstheorien und christliches Lebensideal, Strassburg 1907; Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. I, pp. 369 sq.; Vol. VI, p. 640; Vol. VII, p. 132.

⁵ St. Augustine, Serm. in Ps., CXVIII, 1, n. 1: "Happiness, which there is no one who does not seek. For who ever can be found, or could have been found, or will be found, who does not wish to be happy? ... Indeed, to be happy is so great a good that both the good and the wicked desire it. It is no wonder that the good are good for this reason; but what is wonderful is that even the wicked are wicked for this reason: that they may be happy. For whoever, given over to lusts, is corrupted by luxury and debauchery, seeks happiness in this evil and considers himself miserable when he does not attain the pleasure and delight of his concupiscence, but does not hesitate to proclaim himself happy when he attains it. And whoever burns with the torches of avarice gathers riches in whatever way he can for this purpose, that he may be happy; ... in all crimes he seeks happiness." (Migne, P. L., XXXVII, 1501 sq.) IDEM, Serm. in Ps., CL, c. 3, n. 4: "For even he who is good is good for this reason, that he may be happy; and he who is wicked would not be wicked unless he hoped that through it he could be happy." (ibid., XXXVIII, 809).—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 29, art. 4.

Moreover, man's will and destiny are inseparable from his nature because it is of the very essence of the will to desire and tend towards beatitude, which, being "a state made perfect by the aggregate sum of all things good,"⁶ is identical with God as the sovereign good and source of all goodness. Now if God and eternal happiness are synonymous terms, it is perfectly consistent to be good in order to attain eternal happiness, and there is no sense in inculcating "pure" duties, i. e., such as abstract entirely from the motive of self-love. Therefore, whilst we do not deny that Catholic moral teaching, like every other rational system of ethics, contains a eudaemonistic element, nay even a strain of "egoism," ⁷ we must insist that this admixture is justifiable and supplies a most effective antidote against precisely that false egotism which our enemies charge against us, inasmuch as it emphasizes true charity (love of God and neighbor).⁸ We claim that the moral teaching of Christ effectively reconciles and combines altruism with egoism.

⁶ "Status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus" (Boethius). — St. Thomas, Summa c. Gent., l. II, c. 48, n. 3; IDEM, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 26, art. 1, ad 1; 1a 2ae, qu. 3, art. 2, ad 2. —Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God, the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1916, pp. 190 sqq.; God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 93 sqq.

⁷ Cfr. S. Huber, Die Glückseligkeitslehre des Aristoteles und des hl. Thomas von Aquin, Freising 1893; C. Gutberlet, Ethik und Religion, pp. 158 sqq.; C. Didio, Die moderne Moral, Freiburg 1896, pp. 21 sqq.; B. Peters, Die christlichen Begriffe der Sittlichkeit und Seligkeit, Münster 1902.

⁸ Cfr. Matth. XXII, 37-39-

2. Certain Quietists and pseudo-mystics denounced the habit of doing good for the sake of obtaining an eternal reward as at best an imperfect virtue, and demanded an absolutely unselfish and disinterested love (amour désintéressé), which expects no reward and would even surrender its claim to eternal beatitude if God so willed. This is construing an imaginary opposition between God as the highest, and eternal happiness as a merely secondary good.⁹

⁹ Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. III, St. Louis 1917, pp. 136 sq.; H. Heppe, Geschichte der quietistischen Mystik, Berlin 1875; E. A. Pace in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 608 sqq.

Such teaching is philosophically untenable and opposed to Revelation. Sacred Scripture again and again exhorts men to strive for eternal happiness and promises the joys of Heaven as a reward for obeying the law of God.¹⁰

¹⁰ Cfr. Matth. V, 12, 46; X, 41 sq.; Luke VI, 23, 32-35.

If God did not reward virtue, He would be unjust, the moral order would hang in the air, and the so-called moral law would be nothing but the fiat of an absolutistic tyrant, and consequently immoral.

The alleged distinction between beatitude as the enjoyment of God and beatitude as a created entity separable from Him, has no basis in fact. Catholic theologians, it is true, often speak of heavenly joys and pleasures; but these are mere accidents. The essence of eternal beatitude consists in the possession of God. "I am thy... reward exceeding great."¹¹ n Therefore the object of morality, and consequently of Moral Theology, is man's perfection and eternal happiness. He is destined to be intimately united to God, without however surrendering his personality or individuality.¹²

¹¹ Gen. XV, 1.—Cfr. Prop. Damnat. Mich. de Molinos, prop. 7, 12, 13 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1227, 1232 sq.); Innocent XII's Brief "Quum alias," of March 12, 1699 (ibid., n. 1327 sqq.)

¹² Cfr. Gal. II, 20.

Fenelon's so-called amour desinteresse is contrary to the teaching of the Fathers. Listen, for instance, to St. Bernard's description of the successive stages through which the soul passes on her way from inordinate self-love to pure charity:

"At first man loves himself for his own sake, for he is carnal-minded and takes pleasure in nothing but himself. When he perceives that he cannot exist by and through himself, he begins to seek and love God as indispensable to his own existence. In this second stage he loves God, but for his own sake, not God's. When, however, impelled by his own need, he has begun to honor God and to occupy his mind with Him in meditation, reading, prayer, and obedience, he gradually learns to know Him better and loves Him more ardently. And when he has tasted how sweet the Lord is, he enters upon the third stage of charity, i. e., he loves God no longer for his own sake, but for God's sake. In this stage he presumably remains, and I do not know whether any man ever attains the fourth stage, in which God is loved solely for His sake. Let those who have experience tell us about it; I for one regard this stage as unattainable [here below], though it will undoubtedly be the portion of the good and faithful servant when he enters into the joy of the Lord and becomes inebriated with the fulness of the house of God." ¹³ READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 1-5. —J. L. Perrier, The Revival of Scholastic Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century, New York 1909, pp. 138 sqq. —M. F. Dinneen, art. "Good, The highest," in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, pp. 640 sqq. —M. Maher, S.J., art. "Happiness," ibid., Vol. VII, pp. 131 sqq. —M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, Dublin 1909, pp. 245 sqq. —C. Gutberlet, Ethik und Naturrecht, 3rd ed., Münster 1901, pp. 3 sqq.—V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, 4th ed., pp. 81 sqq., 89 sqq. —Chr. Pesch, S.J., Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Vol. III, 3rd ed., pp. 232 sqq.

¹³ Epist., XI, n. 8; De Diligendo Deo, c. 15, n. 39 (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, 113, 998).—Cfr. J. Ries, Das geistliche Leben in seinen Entwicklungsstufen, Freiburg 1906, pp. 170 sqq.