Section 6: The Development of Free-Will

1. INSTINCT. —Instinct, which is the first and lowest stage of the appetitive faculty, may be defined as "an impulse of the sensitive appetite towards certain acts and objects, the suitableness of which transcends the range of knowledge of the agent that performs them."¹ All instinctive actions are performed under internal compulsion. The primary form to which all instincts may be reduced, is an impulse towards happiness. This impulse is irresistible, i. e., the will cannot decide against it because no man has it in his power not to will to be happy. The case is different with the secondary forms that proceed from this primary form of instinct —the impulse to self-preservation, the sexual instinct, and others. These are subject to the will. Intimately connected with the instinct of self-preservation are modesty, anger, and fear. (a) Modesty is directed to the preservation of personal integrity. This instinct reacts with particular vigor to attacks against chastity and truth. Modesty furnishes an invaluable protection against sin, and for this reason it should be assiduously cultivated, especially since it is weak and tender and can easily be destroyed. Under conscientious cultivation modesty ceases to be a mere instinct and becomes a virtue.² (b) Anger is defined as a violent desire to wreak vengeance on persons or objects that oppose or thwart the Ego in the prosecution of its ends. This instinct tends to destroy that which opposes it. Anger is a dangerous instinct because it makes deliberation difficult. For the same reason, of course, it diminishes accountability and inspires foolish and injurious actions.

¹ Cfr. E. Wasmann, S.J., Modern Biology and the Theory of Evolution (tr. by A. M. Buchanan), London 1910; IDEM, Instinct and Intelligence in the Animal Kingdom, St. Louis 1903.

² Cfr. St. Ambrose, De Offic., I, c. 18, n. 69: "Modesty is the companion of chastity, in whose company chastity itself is safer. For shame is a good companion in governing chastity; if it places itself before the first dangers, it does not allow chastity to be violated." (Migne, P. L., XVI, 44). —Cfr. W. Schneider, Die Naturvölker, Vol. II, pp. 426 sqq.

Anger is essentially a craving for vengeance on account of wrong done. Though there is a just and holy anger, the stirrings of this passion in the weakened state in which humanity exists since the Fall, mostly spring from sinful egotism. Anger, in the words of Father Rickaby, "is then only a safe course to enter on, when it proceeds not upon personal but upon public grounds; a nd even by this maxim many deceive themselves." ³ (c) Fear (metus) will be treated later.⁴

³ Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, p. 64. —Cfr. Mark III, 5; Matth. XXI, 12; John II, 15-17.

⁴ Infra, p. 116.

2. AFFECTIONS AND PASSIONS. —When the intellect proposes some good to the will, or when sensual perception presents something as desirable to the lower appetites, there ensues a tendency towards that object. This tendency is either spiritual or sensual, according to the nature of the object. The stirrings of the rational appetite are called affections; those of the sensual appetite, passions (passiones).

The passions, in so far as they are excited by external objects, are involuntary in their origin because independent of free-will. Consequently man is not accountable for them, unless he has willed them in the cause (voluntarium in causa).

The affections, on the other hand, whether pure or mixed, are either wholly or partially subject to the will, according as they proceed from it either entirely or in part.⁵

⁵ Cfr. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XIV, c. 6: "It matters what sort of will a man has; for if it is perverse, it will have these movements in a perverse form; but if it is right, they will be not only blameless but even praiseworthy. For the will is in them all [that is, the movements]; indeed, they are all nothing other than wills. For what are desire and joy but a will consenting to the things we will? And what are fear and sorrow but a will dissenting from the things we do not will?" (Migne, P. L., XLI, 409).

There is a difference between the affections and passions on the one hand, and instinct on the other. The former may proceed mediately from the will and presuppose a clear knowledge of their object, whereas the latter springs from sentiment and cannot be elicited by an act of the will. However this difference is not always easy to discern.

An affection is distinguished from a free act of the will in that, when a man is under the influence of an affection, willing immediately follows knowledge, and no choice takes place. For this reason the affections, though they may be voluntary in the highest degree, are not free, unless indeed the knowledge from which they spring was caused by the will, or if they are made the object of reflection. But the will is never accountable for an affection unless it has cooperated in its production, or consented to it after due deliberation, i. e., from the moment when it began to participate in what was originally no more than a physical impulse. (a) A motus primo primus is an impulse which, resulting immediately from an involuntary act of knowledge, precedes all rational deliberation and therefore is neither free nor imputable. (b) A motus secundo primus is an impulse which causes the desired object to enter more or less into the consciousness of the subject, thus affording a possibility of deliberation and free choice. Such acts are not entirely compulsory; nor, on the other hand, are they entirely free. It follows that while they may be to some extent imputable, they never constitute more than a venial sin. (c) If the knowledge that gives birth to an impulse is caused by the will, or if the will positively and deliberately acquiesces in the impulse and makes its own the object towards which it tends, we have a motus secundus. This happens, e. g., when the will, instead of rejecting sinful thoughts, deliberately entertains and nourishes them. Hence the Scholastic maxim, "Motus sentire est naturale, motibus consentire est criminale." ⁶ The motus secundus, being a voluntary and deliberate act of the will, is fully imputable and, when the matter at stake is sinful and important, involves a mortal offence.

⁶ Cfr. St. Augustine, In Ep. ad Rom., prop. 13-18: "We sin not in the evil desire itself, but in our consent." (Migne, P. L., XXXV, 2066). —IDEM, Enarrat. in Ps., CXVIII, s. 3, n. 1: "What does sin accomplish when we are unwilling except illicit desires alone? If the assent of the will is not given to them, some affection is indeed stirred, but no effect is permitted to it." (P. L., XXXVII, 1507).

It needs no argument to show how strongly man's actions are influenced by the affections and the passions. As affectus antecedentes they precede, incite, and elicit the decision of the will, and are frequently the very requisites of freewill actions, capable of becoming concurrent causes in their production, thus entering as important factors into man's accountability for his deeds. Not every good impulse or emotion —enthusiasm, love, hatred, anger —is supernaturally meritorious. Neither is every evil impulse sinful. Many of these stirrings are purely natural and involve no deliberate choice.

On the other hand, the will can enlist the affections and the passions in its service. When thus enlisted, they are called affectus subsequentes, and intensify the will, increase its power, and strengthen its every act, whether good or bad. "Rightly ordered, the affections are virtues/' says a Scholastic axiom; "when lacking proper direction, they disturb the soul." ⁷

⁷ "Ordered affections are virtues; disordered affections are disturbances." — Cfr. St. Augustine, Serm., 344 (al. 31), n. 1: "Two loves struggle with one another in this life in every temptation: love of the world and love of God; and whichever of the two conquers draws the lover in that direction as by a weight. For we come to God not by wings or feet, but by affections. And in turn we cling to the earth not by bodily knots and chains, but by contrary affections." (Migne, P. L., XXXIX, 1512). — IDEM, De Civitate Dei, XIV, c. 9, n. 1: "According to the Sacred Scriptures and sound doctrine, the citizens of the holy city of God, while living according to God during the pilgrimage of this life, fear and desire, grieve and rejoice. And because their love is right, they have all these affections rightly ordered. " — L. c., n. 3: "If these movements, these affections coming from love of the good and from holy charity, are to be called vices, let us allow the things that are truly vices to be called virtues. But since these affections follow right reason, when they are employed where and when they ought to be, who would dare then to call them diseases or vicious passions? Therefore the Lord Himself also, having deigned to live a human life in the form of a servant, yet having no sin at all, employed them where He judged they ought to be employed. For in Him in whom there was a true human body and a true human soul, human affection was not false." (P. L., XLI, 413, 414 sq.). —Cfr. St. Jerome, In Ezech., I, c. 1, n. 12 (P. L., XXV, 23); Ep., 130, n. 13: "As long as we dwell in the tabernacle of this body and are surrounded by frail flesh, we can moderate and govern the affections and passions; we cannot cut them off." (P. L., XXII, 1118).—St. Bernard, De Gratia et Lib. Arbitr., c. 6, n. 17: "Simple affections are naturally present in us as though from ourselves; their additions are from grace. And it is assuredly nothing else than that grace orders the affections which creation gave, so that virtues are nothing other than ordered affections." (P. L., CLXXXII, 1010).

The affections and the passions, therefore, are not in themselves evil or unworthy of human nature. The Church has condemned the Stoic assertion that a perfect man should be totally devoid of passions.⁸ Her ideal is not stolid apathy but rational control of the affections and passions.⁹ To subject them to right reason is an imperative duty, not only in regard to single acts, but also in regard to the conditions created by the continued activity of these impulses. Even the most vicious habit, no matter how strongly developed, can be overcome with the aid of divine grace.

⁸ Cfr. Prop. Damn. Mich, de Molinos, prop. 1, 55 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1221, 1275).

⁹ Cfr. St. Jerome, In Epist. ad Gal., III, c. 6: "Anger itself, lust, and injury that desires revenge become for me an occasion of triumphs if I restrain myself, if I remain silent for God's sake, and if, amid each sting of agitation and incentive to vice, I remember God seeing me from above." (Migne, P. L., XXVI, 432 sq.).—W. Schneider, Das andere Leben, 10th ed., Paderborn 1909, pp. 17 sqq.

"Passion is the natural and in a certain degree the inseparable adjunct of strong volition. To check one is to check the other. Not only is the passion repressed by repressing the volition, but the repression of the passion is also the repression of the volition. A man then who did his best to repress all movements of passion indiscriminately, would lay fetters on his will, lamentable and cruel and impolitic fetters, where his will was bent on any object good and honorable and well-judged."

"The effort made as the Stoics direct, would mean no yielding to excitement, no poetry, no high-strung devotion, no rapture, no ecstasy, no ardor of love, no earnest rhetoric spoken or listened to, no mourning, no rejoicing other than the most conventional, to the persistent smothering of whatever is natural and really felt, no tear of pity freely let flow, no touch of noble anger responded to, no scudding before the breeze of indignation, —all this, that reason may keep on the even tenor of its way undisturbed." ¹⁰ " A man who in the heat of passion commits a crime that was far from his thoughts only a minute before, is guiltless in comparison with him who for months and years has revolved the same crime in his brain, without ever proceeding to action. An envious man may deserve a severer punishment than a thief, and one who harbors hatred and plans vengeance may be worse than a murderer." ¹¹ 3. FREE-WILL. —Freedom of the will (libertas arbitrii seu naturae) is distinguished by two essential notes: self-determination, and the power of choosing between different actions.

¹⁰ Jos. Rickaby, Moral Philosophy, pp. 45 sq.

¹¹ Op. cit., p. 46.

a) The rational soul has within itself the tendency or inclination to proceed from potency to action (a potentia ad actum). In so far as the intellect operates consciously through the will, all intellectual acts are ethical. Hence, while there may be indifferent acts in genere, or in the abstract, no act is indifferent in individuo. That is to say, every individual concrete act is either good or bad. b) To say that man has the power of choosing between two or more actions (liberum arbitrium) is not the same as to assert, as the ancient Pelagians did, that man can choose good or evil with equal facility (equilibrism). It is in the power of choosing freely that the will demonstrates its superiority over the sensitive appetite. Whereas the latter acts under intrinsic compulsion, the will can determine itself freely, i. e., choose either good or bad.

According to the objects between which choice is made, the freedom of the will is called libertas contradictions s. exercitii, libertas specific ationis or libertas contrarietatis.

By libertas contradictions s. exercitii is meant active indifference to act or not to act.

Libertas specificationis may be defined as the power of choosing between specifically different acts of the same kind, for instance, love and desire.

Libertas contrarietatis is the faculty of choosing between contraries, e. g., love and hate, good and evil.

The first of these species of freedom (libertas contradictionis) is included in the other two.

Moral indifference is not a prerogative but rather a defect of the will.¹²

¹² Cfr. 1 Cor. VII, 37.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 10, art. 4.—V. Frins, S.J., De Act. Human., Vol. I, pp. 112 sqq.

The natural freedom of choice with which the human will is endowed, furnishes the foundation and groundwork of that libertas virtutis seu gratiae which Sacred Scripture calls the freedom of the children of God.¹³ It is to this prerogative that Christ refers when He says: "If you continue in my word, you shall be my disciples indeed, and you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.... If therefore the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed." ¹⁴ This liberty of grace, which is the work of the Holy Ghost,¹⁵ involves a continued cooperation of the will and an incessant struggle against sin and concupiscence. It manifests itself in that constant and unswerving tendency towards moral goodness ¹⁶ which is the special mark of the loyal Catholic.¹⁷ Its highest stage is moral inability to sin (non posse peccare), which attains its climax in the world beyond, where it is transformed into that freedom of glory which is the inheritance of the Blessed (libertas gloriae filiorum Dei).¹⁸

¹³ 1 Cor. XV, 28; 2 Cor. III, 17; Gal. V, 13.

¹⁴ John. VIII, 31-32, 36.

¹⁵ 2 Cor. III, 17.

¹⁶ John VIII, 34-36; Rom. VI, 16-23; 1 Cor. VII, 22. —Cfr. St. Augustine, In Ps., XCIX, n. 7: "Servum te caritas faciat, quia liberum te veritas fecit." (Migne, P. L., XXXVII, 1275).

¹⁷ John VIII, 32, 36; 2 Cor. III, 17.

¹⁸ Rom. VIII, 21. —Cfr. St. Augustine, De Corr. et Grat., XI, n. 32: "What will be freer than free choice when it will be unable to serve sin? This will be the reward of merit for man, just as it has been made so for the holy angels." —IDEM, ibid., XII, n. 33: "The first liberty of the will was the ability not to sin; the last will be much greater, the inability to sin. The first immortality was the ability not to die; the last will be much greater, the inability to die. The first power of perseverance was the ability not to forsake the good; the last will be the happiness of perseverance, the inability to forsake the good." (Migne, P. L., XLIV, 936).

To be able to sin is not a proof of liberty, but a moral defect. This power may at most be called a sign of liberty in the sense in which disease is sometimes called a sign of life. In the final state of perfection the will is no longer able to choose evil in preference to good. To choose evil is always an abuse of liberty, the sole purpose of which is moral goodness.¹⁹ "Deo servire regnare est," to serve God is to rule.

¹⁹ Cfr. J. Uhlmann, Die Persönlichkeit Gottes, p. 118; St. Thomas, De Veritate, qu. 22, art. 6.

Inability to sin (non posse peccare) is what constitutes true liberty. "Let no one believe," says St. Bernard of Clairvaux, "that liberty is called liberum arbitrium because the will is moved with equal facility between good and evil...; if this were the case, it would be impossible to ascribe liberty to God and the holy angels, who are so good that they cannot be wicked, or to the fallen angels, who are so bad that they can no longer be good. Nay, we ourselves [in that hypothesis] should lose our liberty after the Resurrection [of the flesh], when we shall be inseparably united either with the good or with the wicked."²⁰

²⁰ St. Bernard of Clairvaux, De Gratia et Lib. Arbitr., X, n. 35 (Migne, P. L., CLXII, 1019); St. Anselm, De Lib. Arbitr., c. 1: "I do not think that freedom of choice is the power of sinning and of not sinning. For if this were its definition, neither God nor the angels, who cannot sin, would have free choice—which it is impious to say." (P. L., CLVIII, 489).

(The highest freedom, O Lord Jesus, is to obey Thy commands; no man is free unless he serves Thee; no man can rule unless he is Thy faithful servant).²¹

²¹ Alexander Hegius. On this famous pedagogue of the Humanist school († 1498) see Buchberger's Kirchliches Handlexikon, Vol. I, col. 1874 sq. —A similar sentiment is expressed by Seneca, De Vita Beata, XV, 7: "Deo parere libertas est."

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 22-48.—IDEM, De Veritate, qu. 26, art. 1-10. —J. Gardair, Les Passions et la Volonté, Paris 1892. —E. Janvier, Exposition de la Morale Catholique, Vol. III. —Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, pp. 41 sqq. —M. Maher, S.J., Psychology, pp. 214 sqq. —M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, pp. 43 sqq. —A. Tanquerey, S.S., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, Tournai 1905, pp. 38 sqq., 53 sqq. —Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Political and Moral Essays, New York 1902, pp. 249-265. —W. McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science, Dublin 1904, pp. 69 sqq.