Section 1: Definition of a Vow

1. A vow (εὐχή, votum) is a free and deliberate promise made to God to do something that is good and possible, and better than its omission.¹

¹ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 1: “A promise proceeds from a purpose of doing. But a purpose presupposes some deliberation, since it is an act of the deliberate will. Thus, therefore, three things are necessarily required for a vow: first, deliberation; secondly, a purpose of the will; thirdly, a promise, in which the nature of a vow is perfected.”—Cfr. Codex Iuris Can., can. 1307, § 1.

A vow is essentially an act of divine worship (cultus latriae) because it is, so to speak, a contract which a man makes with God and by which he deliberately assumes a new obligation that binds him in conscience.²

² St. Thomas, ibid., art. 5: “A vow is a certain ordination of the things which one vows to divine worship or service. And thus it is clear that to vow is properly an act of latria or religion.”

As a rule the taking of a vow is accompanied by prayers and sacrifices offered for the purpose of obtaining some particular grace. Pious persons wishing to be relieved from evil, or to secure the divine assistance in circumstances of particular difficulty or danger, have long been wont to add to their prayers the promise of some sacrifice, e. g., to perform a work of charity or self-denial, in order to make the appeal to God’s mercy stronger and more efficacious. The vows of which we read in the Old Testament were all hypothetical, i. e., subject to the fulfilment of some condition.³

³ Gen. XXVIII, 20–22; Numb. XXI, 2; Judg. XI, 30 sq.; 1 Kings I, 10 sq.; 2 Kings XV, 7 sq.—Cfr. A. Aust, die Religion der Römer, pp. 29 sq., 126.

Being a formal promise, a vow differs from the mere purpose of doing or omitting something, because a purpose does not per se oblige in conscience, whereas a vow does.⁴

⁴ Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacram., l. II, p. 12, c. 3 says: “A vow is a certain attestation of a spontaneous promise, which is more properly referred to God alone and to those things which are God’s. For to vow is, by the attestation of a spontaneous promise, to bind oneself to God and constitute oneself His debtor. For he who promises simply pledges that he will do something; but he who vows solemnly affirms his promise and confirms the promise itself. Where it is a promise, he is held; where it is an attestation, he is bound.” (Migne, P. L., CLXXVI, 521).

The mere intention of making a vow is not sufficient to constitute a vow, and involves no obligation. The essential constituent of a vow is an obligation assumed in conscience. This is a matter in regard to which the faithful ought to be instructed in confession, lest they erroneously believe that the mere resolve of making a vow or performing some virtuous act entails the same obligations as the vow itself. To fail to keep a good resolution may be a sin, if the failure results from carelessness, sloth, or sensuality; but it is a sin (usually venial) only per accidens, because the sinful character of the omission lies in the cause, not in the act itself.⁵

⁵ Cfr. F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., p. 464.

2. To deny the religious and moral character of vows is to doubt or deny the value of prayer and the significance of sacrifice. To promise God to do something one is not obliged to do, is manifestly a religious act, which derives its moral quality from the fact that it may be made a powerful means of acquiring virtue. By a vow the will, which is so easily moved, is directed toward goodness, i. e., toward God, and thus a fruitful source of heroic virtue is opened.⁶

⁶ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 6: “For three reasons to perform the same work with a vow is better and more meritorious than to perform it without a vow. First, because to vow is an act of latria, which is chief among the moral virtues. But the work of a nobler virtue is better and more meritorious.... Secondly, because he who vows something and performs it subjects himself more to God than he who only performs it. For he subjects himself to God not only as to the act, but also as to the power, because thereafter he cannot do otherwise; just as he would give more to a man who gave him a tree with its fruits than one who gave him only the fruits. And thence it is that thanks are also given to those who promise. Thirdly, because through a vow the will is immovably confirmed in good. But to do something from a will confirmed in good belongs to the perfection of virtue.”—Ibid., qu. 189, art. 2.

It is true that a vow binds the will, but this very fact constitutes it a positive instrument for the acquisition of true Christian liberty, which is the result of self-control, and thus makes a vow a powerful aid to human frailty.

Christ never made a vow because he was God and confirmed in goodness.⁷ But for men vows are expressly approved alike in the Old and in the New Testament.⁸ We read in the Acts of the Apostles that St. Paul and other early Christians shore their heads in pursuance of a vow.⁹ St. Ambrose,¹⁰ St. Augustine,¹¹ and others of the Fathers warmly recommended the practice of making vows.¹²

⁷ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 4, ad 3: “To Christ, considered in Himself, it was not fitting to vow, both because He was God and also because, inasmuch as He was man, He had a will confirmed in good, as one possessing comprehension.”

⁸ Gen. XXVIII, 20; Lev. XXVII, 2 sqq.; Ps. XLIX, 14 sq.; LX, 9; LXXV, 12.

⁹ Acts XVIII, 18; XXI, 23 sqq.—Cfr. J. E. Belser, Die Selbstverteidigung des hl. Paulus, pp. 141 sqq.; and the same author’s Beiträge zur Erklärung der Apostelgeschichte, pp. 89 sqq.

¹⁰ De Offic., l. III, c. 12, n. 76–81 (Migne, P. L., XVI, 137 sqq.).

¹¹ Enarr. in Ps., 75, n. 16: “Let each one vow and render what he can. Do not vow and fail to render, but let each one vow and render what he can. Do not be slow to vow. For you will not fulfil it by your own powers.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 967).—IDEM, ibid., 131, n. 3: “Let no one presume to render by his own powers what he has vowed; He who exhorts you to vow, Himself helps you to render.” (P. L., XXXVII, 1717).

¹² J. B. Wirthmüller, Über das Sittengesetz, pp. 52 sqq.; Kirchberg, De Voti Natura, pp. 167 sqq., 195 sqq.

That abuses have arisen in connection with vows proves nothing against their legitimacy.¹³

¹³ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 189, art. 2, ad 3: “To vow entrance into religion is a certain confirmation of the will toward better things, and therefore, of itself, it does not give man an occasion of falling, but rather removes it. But if one who transgresses a vow falls more gravely, this does not detract from the goodness of a vow, just as the fact that some sin more gravely after baptism does not detract from the goodness of baptism.”—Cfr. H. Denifle, O. P., Luther und Luthertum, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 61 sqq. (English ed. by Volz, I, 73 sqq.); A. Schulze, Das Gelübde in der neueren theologischen Ethik, Gütersloh 1906.

The Church by esteeming and recommending vows imposes no yoke on any one. The vowing individual imposes a yoke upon himself, and this act of self-denial, if prudently and deliberately performed, is truly moral. The Church by her legislation on vows and the binding force thereof does not impair liberty; on the contrary, her laws are liberty’s best guarantee, for, in the first place, they prevent the faithful from binding themselves thoughtlessly and without a divine call; and, secondly, they interpret the obligations incurred by vows leniently and dispense from them when fulfilment would prove harmful. This is a great advantage, especially when we consider that, had not the Church the power to interpret vows, individual Christians would often be sorely troubled in conscience when they wished to withdraw from such an obligation merely on the strength of their own private judgment.¹⁴

¹⁴ F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, p. 331.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88.—IDEM, Comment. in Sent., IV, dist. 38.—IDEM, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, c. 138.—F. Suarez, De Religione, tr. VI, l. 1–6.—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 194–262 (ed. Gaudé, I, 495).—J. B. Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion, pp. 538 sqq.—C. Kirchberg, De Voti Natura, Obligatione, Honestate, Münster i. W., 1897, pp. 5 sqq.—Marsot, Traité Pratique des Voeux, 9th ed., Paris 1919.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Comp. Theol. Moralis, Vol. I, 9th ed., pp. 273 sqq.—Sabetti-Barrett, Comp. Theol. Mor., 27th ed., pp. 229 sqq.—H. Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 222 sqq.—Th. Bouquillon, De Virtute Religionis, Part II, Bruges 1880, n. 302–502.—E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 170 sqq.—J. d’Annibale, Summula Theol. Mor., Vol. III, 5th ed., pp. 178 sqq.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 321 sqq.