Section 2: The Social Position of Woman

I. Holy Scripture teaches that while man and woman are united by God in a most intimate union, woman is not man’s equal, but his helpmate and companion. The husband is the head of the family, and the wife is subject to him as such, though his equal in personality and dignity.¹ This was the relation originally established by the Creator. In course of time it became essentially altered, to the great disadvantage of woman, but Christianity restored the lost equality by teaching that every human soul, regardless of sex, has the same value before God.²

¹ Gen. I, 26 sq.; II, 18, 22–24; III, 16; V, 2.—Cfr. St. Augustine, De Mor. Eccl. Cath., l. I, c. 30, n. 6: “You (the Church) subject women to their husbands, not for the satisfying of lust, but for the propagation of offspring and for the partnership of the household, in chaste and faithful obedience. You place men over their wives, not to mock the weaker sex, but by the laws of sincere love.” (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 1336).—Dionys. Rickel, Comment. in Sent., I, dist. 3, qu. 6: “Man is no more intellectual in himself than woman.”

² John III, 5; Gal. III, 27 sq.; V, 6; VI, 15. Cfr. Apoc. V, 14 sqq.—J. Döllinger, Heidentum und Judentum, Ratisbon 1857, pp. 697 sqq.; 781 sqq.; C. S. Devas, Studies in Family Life, London 1886, pp. 4 sqq.; C. Bader, La Femme Romaine, Paris, 1877; Schneidewin, Die antike Humanität, pp. 175 sqq.; Aug. Roesler, C. SS. R., Die Frauenfrage, 2nd ed., pp. 144 sqq.; C. S. Devas, The Key to the World’s Progress, London 1906, pp. 174 sqq., 151 sqq.

In emphasizing the moral equality of both sexes, however, and their equal worth in the eyes of God, the Catholic Church does not dispense the wife from the duty of being subject to her husband. It follows that woman in public and social life may legitimately aspire to no other rôle than that of a true helpmate to man. To attempt to raise her to a state of complete independence would be contrary to the principles of Christianity.³

³ 1 Cor. XI, 7–12; XIV, 34; Eph. V, 22–24; Col. III, 18; 1 Tim. II, 11 sqq.—J. Schell, Kath. Dogmatik, Vol. III, ii, pp. 666 sqq.; A. Harnack, Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 51 sqq.; H. Jordan, Das Frauenideal des Neuen Testamentes und die älteste Christenheit, Leipsic 1909.

“The enemies of the Christian Church,” says Cathrein, “who would fain tear one jewel after another from the crown of her merits, assert that it was not Christianity, but the progress of civilization that emancipated woman from slavery. But this contention is refuted by the fact that in Rome and Greece woman’s position deteriorated in proportion as civilization and culture,—taking these terms in their commonly accepted sense,—advanced. At the time of Homer and under the Roman kings, woman occupied a respectable position; but when pagan civilization reached its climax, she became a slave. In ancient Egypt, too, and in China, the progress of civilization was marked by the degradation of the female sex. And even to-day, among the nations that have shut themselves off against the influence of Christianity, the status of woman is no better than it was in pagan antiquity. Especially Mohammedanism, in spite of all the external cul- ture which it produced at one time in Spain and Arabia, has degraded woman to the rank of a slave.”⁴

⁴ H. Dacier, La Femme d’après Saint Ambroise, Paris, 1900.—St. Augustine, Serm., 192 (al. 16 De tempore), c. 2: “Rejoice, virgins of Christ; your fellow is the mother of Christ. You could not bear Christ, but for Christ’s sake you chose not to bear. He who was not born from you was born for you. Yet if you remember His word, as you ought to remember it, you too are His mothers, because you do His Father’s will (Mt. xii, 50). Rejoice, widows of Christ; to Him who made virginity fruitful you vowed the holiness of continence. Rejoice also, nuptial chastity, all you who live faithfully with your spouses; what you have lost in the body, preserve in the heart. Where the flesh can no longer be intact from intercourse, let the conscience be virgin in faith, according to which the whole Church is virgin. In Mary pious virginity bore Christ; in Anna aged widowhood recognized Christ as a little child; in Elisabeth conjugal chastity and aged fruitfulness served Christ. All ranks of the faithful members contributed to the Head what by His grace they were able to contribute.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 1012).—Breviar. Rom., d. d. 8 Julii, l. 1, resp. 1: “Sprung from royal stock, Elisabeth (queen of Portugal) triumphs in heaven, surrounded by a threefold variety of merits. For on earth, in the threefold state of life, she left to posterity examples of virtues to be imitated: she passed with unoffending foot through the virgin, married, and widowed states.”—Cfr. A. Roesler, Die Frauenfrage, 2nd ed., pp. 292 sqq. and this Handbook, Vol. I, n. 92, note 7.—C. S. Devas, The Key to the World’s Progress, pp. 45, 50.

We are told that the theological writers of the Patristic and those of the medieval period had a very low opinion of women and marriage. This is demonstrably untrue.⁵ While it cannot be denied that some medieval preachers were guilty of deplorable exaggerations in their treatment of the fair sex, we must not overlook the fact that the great majority of theologians speak of woman and Matrimony in the highest terms.⁶

⁵ V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 409 sqq. Cfr. J. Schmitz and G. Hütten, Gattin und Mutter im Heidentum, Judentum und Christentum, Einsiedeln 1904; Wilke, Das Frauenideal und die Schätzung des Weibes im Alten Testament, Leipsic 1907; Ehrlich, Randglossen zur hebr. Bibel, Vol. I, pp. 10, 180 sqq.; Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. IV, pp. 153 sqq.

⁶ Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. IV, pp. 153 sqq.; Landmann, Das Predigtwesen in Westfalen, 180 sq.; Braun, Die kath. Predigt, 6 sqq.; Pilatus (V. Naumann), Quos ego? Fehdebriefe wider den Grafen Paul Hoensbroech, 2nd ed., Ratis- bon 1903, pp. 430 sqq.; H. Crohns, Die Summa Theologica des Antonin von Florenz und die Schätzung des Weibes im Hexenhammer, Berlin 1903; J. Mausbach, Altchristl. und moderne Gedanken über Frauenberuf, pp. 7 sqq.; E. Vacandard, “La Question de l’âme des Femmes et le Concil de Macon,” in the Revue du Clergé Français, Vol. LVIII (1900), pp. 216 sqq.—Cfr. this Handbook, Vol. I, p. 243, note 12; J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists, pp. 301 sqq.

II. The modern movement for the emancipation of the feminine sex is not purely revolutionary, but had its origin in the more or less justifiable desire of women to enlarge the sphere of their industrial activity and to make a decent living under morally and economically acceptable conditions. While the women of the so-called lower classes, that is, laboringmen’s wives and daughters, find their work in the family circle or in clerical and industrial pursuits, those of the so-called educated classes, who cannot or will not marry, feel they lack adequate opportunities to earn a livelihood and make themselves useful to humanity. This condition of affairs is aggravated by the displacement of house industries by factories. Hence there is an excess of work for the so-called proletarian women and an insufficiency of occupations for the women of the middle and higher classes. This fact has led to a division of the feminist movement into two camps. One demands a widening of the sphere in which women can work for their own support and the benefit of society, whereas the other wishes to withdraw the female sex from such occupations as destroy family life and make woman’s lot harder, especially since men have learned to regard women as competitors.

In conformity with this division of opinion there are two distinct groups of emancipationists or women’s rights advocates.

1. The radical or extreme group favors the extinction of all differences in social life and demands absolute equality for the two sexes in economic and all other relations,⁷ including politics. It cannot be denied that in some countries there are inequalities which violate justice and favor a double standard of morality. But the fact that the male sex has in course of time appropriated unto itself certain privileges which are not based upon the natural law, does not justify the conclusion that all male privileges in globo are contrary to the natural order and that woman should not be subject to man in any respect. Nature herself has made the sexes unequal and woman dependent on man, and any attempt to wipe out this inequality would be unnatural. Moreover, complete equality of the sexes would not only lead to the abolition of the family and the education of children by the State, but it would render the social position of woman worse instead of better. For the emancipated woman, when compelled to enter into free and unlimited competition with man, would necessarily succumb because her physical constitution and mental make-up incapacitate her for many kinds of labor to which man is fully equal. Complete equality between the sexes, therefore, would not solve, but rather intensify the problem, especially if it were worked out on the basis of radical Socialism.⁸

⁷ L. Braun, Die Frauenfrage, ihre geschichtliche Entwicklung u. wirtschaftliche Seite, Leipsic 1901, pp. 156 sqq.; E. Gnauck-Kühne, Die deutsche Frau um die Jahrhundertwende, Berlin 1907, 2nd ed.; Turgeon, Le Féminisme Français, Vol. I, pp. 67 sqq., 173 sqq., 341 sqq.; Vol. II, pp. 10 sqq., 201 sqq., 341 sqq.; S. Deploige, L’Émancipation des Femmes, Louvain 1902.

⁸ John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, 5th ed., London 1895; V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 251 sqq.

“Women do not have less rights than men,” says Dr. Linsenmann, “but their rights are different. They are no less capable than men of being educated and trained, but their nature requires a different education and training. They are as efficient as men, but in another sphere. Therefore, to give them the education and training that befits their nature, and to open to them those industrial occupations for which they are fitted, is entirely just. But the differences of natural and intellectual organisation existing between the two sexes must not be denied or disregarded. Woman is fit for nursing, but not so fit for medical practice, for many duties of which she lacks the necessary strength. She is fit for sanitary service in war, but not for military operations, and even in hospitals she cannot entirely supply the place of man. Her adaptation for the teaching profession is limited, and whether she should devote her life to scholarly research, to authorship, or to art, is a question that has not yet been definitively settled. On the other hand there are industrial pursuits which are peculiarly adapted to her nature, and it may be regarded as an act of unfairness if men crowd into these pursuits, thereby narrowing the circle within which women must seek their livelihood. There are other pursuits which women can follow with nearly the same ability and success as men, e. g., bookkeeping, telegraphy, etc., and it will not require a very strenuous battle to conquer these occupations for them. They can obtain them without difficulty if they show that they can do the required work as efficiently as, and more cheaply than, men. They can work more cheaply, because their demands are smaller; but as soon as they begin to acquire artificial and costly habits, which it takes larger incomes to satisfy, male labor will again crowd out female labor.”⁹

⁹ Linsenmann, Lehrb. der Moraltheol., pp. 642 sq. Dr. J. A. Ryan does not agree with this view. He says (Social Reconstruction, p. 43 sq.): “If women and men are paid at different rates in the same occupation, one of two things will happen; either the man’s wage will be reduced to the level of the woman’s, or men will insist that women get out of that industry. It is not possible for the two sexes to work side by side and receive different rates of wages,—I say, it is not economically possible. Sometimes one of these alternatives takes place and sometimes the other. In the telephone industry, at least in the telephone exchanges, what has happened is that the men have abandoned it, and the wage has gone down to the woman’s level. In other places, where the men are strongly organized, they insist on monopolizing the occupation. This is a simple reason and a sufficient one why women should have the same wages as men when engaged in the same work.” Further down in the same lecture Dr. Ryan contends that the living wage for woman should not be based on the needs of possible dependents, but on her individual needs, and it is hard to reconcile his theory on women’s wages with his well-known stand on a living wage (i. e., a family wage) for men.

2. The conservative wing of the woman’s party, more commonly known as “Liberal,” demands both political and social equality.¹⁰

¹⁰ J. Duboc, Fünfzig Jahre Frauenfrage, pp. 123 sqq.; S. Gerok, Frauenabende, Stuttgart 1896, pp. 96 sqq.; C. Hilty, Frauenstimmrecht, Bern 1900, pp. 63 sqq.

a) The political emancipation of women consists in their admission to public life and political government on equal terms with men. Its first demand is that all women, or at least all not subject to husbands and at the head of their own household, shall be given the right to vote and hold office. This demand militates not only against an almost universal tradition, but likewise against the natural relationship existing between husband and wife, woman’s innate modesty, and especially her weakness of allowing emotion rather than reason to guide her conduct.¹¹

¹¹ Cfr. V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 432 sqq.; IDEM, Die Frauenfrage, 3rd ed., pp. 171 sqq.

One of the latest and ablest Catholic writers on the subject of feminism, Msgr. Joseph Mausbach, says on this head: “It seems venturesome to pronounce either for or against the political emancipation of women. Though custom and our traditional notions of female character, virtue, and beauty seem to argue in favor of keeping her out of the political arena, yet it is difficult to say on what principle of Moral Theology we shall deny her the exercise of such a general civic right. Modern civilization brings so many surprises that an unconditional veto or prophecy in such questions would be hazardous, even though one may personally hold the opinion that in the long run the female sex is likely to lose more than it can possibly gain by participation in politics.”¹²

¹² J. Mausbach, Die Stellung der Frau im Menschheitsleben, p. 54.

This opinion was shared by the late Archbishop J. L. Spalding, of Peoria, who, in his essay, “Woman and Education,” in answer to the question: “Should women vote?” says: “The rule of the people is good only when it is the rule of the good and wise among the people, and of these women, in great numbers, are part. The leadership of the best comes near to being the leadership of God. But the question of the suffrage for women is grave; it is one on which an enlightened mind will long hold judgment in suspense. Does not political life, as it exists in our democracy, tend to corrupt both voters and office-seekers? Is it not largely a life of cant, pretence, and hypocrisy, of venality, corruption, and selfishness, of lying, abuse, and vulgarity? Do not public men, like public women, sell themselves, though in a different way? Is the professional politician, the professional caucus-manipulator, the professional voter, the type of man we can admire or respect even? The objection so frequently raised, that political life would corrupt women, has at least the merit of a certain grim humorousness. Could it by any chance make them as bad as it makes men? To tell them they are the queens of the home, to whom the mingling with plebeians is degrading, is an insult to their intelligence. We have foresworn kings and queens, both in private and in public life, and at home women are, for the most part, drudges. What need is there of a hollow phrase when the appeal to truth is obvious?

‘A servant with this clause Makes drudgery divine; Who sweeps a room as for thy laws, Makes that and the action fine.’

Active participation in political life is not a refining, an ennobling, a purifying influence. Is it desirable that the half of the people to which the interests of the home, of the heart, of the religious and moral education of the young are especially committed, should be hurled into the mælstrom of selfish passion and coarse excitement? The smartness and self-assertiveness of American women are already excessive; they lack repose, serenity, and self- restraint. If they rush into the arena of noisy and vulgar strife, will not the evil be increased? Will not the political woman lose something of the sacred power of the wife and mother? Are not the primal virtues, those which make life good and fair, and which are a woman’s glory,—are they not humble and quiet and unobtrusive? The suffrage has not emancipated the masses of men, who are still held captive in the chains of poverty and dehumanizing toil. Do women themselves, those, at least, in whom the woman soul, which draws us on and upward, is most itself, desire that the vote be given them? But whatever our opinions on the subject may be, let us not lose composure. ‘If a great change is to be made,’ says Edmund Burke, ‘the minds of men will be fitted to it, the general opinions and feelings will draw that way. Every fear, every hope will forward it; and then they who persist in opposing the mighty current will appear rather to resist the decrees of Providence itself than the mere designs of men. . . .’”¹³

¹³ J. L. Spalding, “Woman and Education” in Means and Ends of Education, 5th ed., Chicago, 1909, Ch. IV, pp. 108 sqq.

b) In consequence of their social emancipation women have been admitted to practically all professions and occupations, and we now have women ministers of religion, doctors, university professors, druggists, lawyers, judges, police officers, streetcar conductors, post-office clerks, etc., etc. The opening of new occupations for the female sex is morally permissible and economically desirable in so far as these occupations are compatible with woman’s nature, especially with her duties as wife and mother, and with public morality. As regards in particular her admission to the higher branches of learning, it should be noted that while woman on the whole is not inferior to man in mental endowment, she lacks physical endurance and capacity for the learned professions, and though it may be desirable to have female physicians for women patients, they are neither an ethical nor a hygienic necessity.

Generally speaking, therefore, we may outline the Catholic attitude by saying that female emancipation is reasonable and just only in so far as it does not break down the bulwarks erected around women by their own nature and by the moral law.

It is praiseworthy for women to desire a higher education and to test their strength in essaying difficult tasks. But this endeavor involves a great danger. For woman to strive forward and upward is ennobling and conducive to moral progress only if she is inspired, not by pride and selfishness, but by a feeling of grave responsibility and a desire to co-operate with man in solving the great tasks imposed upon humanity. Without injustice to anyone we can say that the efforts of women to attain equality with men are not always inspired by such noble motives, but quite often by an inordinate desire for freedom, notoriety, and unlimited opportunities to do what they please. This tendency is incompatible with the Christian ideal of womanhood and entails danger to good morals. In regard to the purity of family life, the education of children, and modesty and chastity, woman will always be a paramount factor, but the most wholesome influence in these important matters is not as a rule exercised by those representatives of the fair sex who publicly insist on absolute equality for the sexes.¹⁴

¹⁴ J. Pachali, “Die moderne Frauenbewegung u. die christliche Sittlichkeit,” in Glaube und Wissen, Stuttgart 1910, p. 76.

It goes without saying that where women have been granted the suffrage, Catholic women are in duty bound to use the vote honestly and intelligently, and the same rules of conduct apply to them in this matter as to men.¹⁵

¹⁵ Cfr. Ross, Christian Ethics, pp. 412 sqq.

READINGS.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 639 sqq.—A. Rösler, C.SS.R., Die Frauenfrage, pp. 8 sqq.;—A. Rösler and J. de Rochay, La Question Féministe, Paris 1899, pp. 22 sqq.—F. X. Godts, C.SS.R., Le Féminisme, pp. 172 sqq.—G. Ratzinger, Die Volkswirtschaft, 2nd ed., pp. 490 sqq.—M. von Nathusius, Die Mitarbeit der Kirche an der Lösung der sozialen Frage, 3rd ed., Leipsic 1904, pp. 345 sqq.—J. E. Ross, Christian Ethics, pp. 31, 412 sqq.—C. S. Devas, Political Economy, pp. 78 sqq.