Section 3: The Duties of Citizens

1. The first duty of a citizen is obedience to legitimate authority and to the laws passed by that authority. For, as St. Paul says, he that resists legitimate authority, resists the ordinance of God and purchases for himself eternal damnation.¹

¹ Rom. XIII, 2; cfr. 1 Pet. II, 13–15; Tit. III, 1.—J. P. Gury, S. J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. II, n. 1–18.

“The Catholic Church, as well as natural reason, teaches that civil law obliges in conscience. The ultimate basis of this obligation is the natural law; the immediate basis is the authority of the State. Civil laws of importance are gravely obligatory, unless the legislator formally intends their binding force to be slight. The general teaching of moral theologians is that a law is not binding without at least the implicit intention of the legislator. Some civil laws may be purely penal, but their number is probably small.”²

² Ryan, The State and the Church, Ch. XII, “Moral Obligation of Civil Law,” pp. 244–259.—Cfr. Matth. XVII, 23–26; XXII, 21; Rom. XIII, 6 sq.; 1 Pet. II, 17.

Obedience to the law should be inspired by a sincere respect and reverence, which, of course, presupposes confidence in the lawgiver and faith in the sanctity of the law itself—a confidence and a faith which, unfortunately, modern lawgivers themselves too often undermine.

The individual citizen has the duty to employ the rights and liberties he enjoys under the law in a manner conducive to the public welfare. This means that he must choose for himself a useful profession or occupation, conscientiously perform his duties as a member of his family and of the profession and political community to which he belongs, and take part in public affairs according to the measure of his talent, his professional duties, his physical strength, and his material means.

a) The extent to which a citizen is obliged to participate in politics depends on the constitution of the particular State to which he belongs and on the answer to the question whether it is necessary for him to make his influence felt in public life in order to safeguard liberty, civilization, and religion. Sometimes the interests of religion require that all good citizens should throw their influence into the political balance, and occasionally the individual citizen is compelled to defend himself against unjust aggression on the part of the State. In that case, as St. Peter says, “we ought to obey God rather than men.”³

³ Acts V, 29.

b) Fidelity to one’s country attains its climax in the virtue of patriotism, which is one of the noblest forms of charity.

In the natural order, says St. Thomas, “we observe that the part naturally exposes itself to safeguard the whole; as, for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for the whole body’s safety. And since reason copies nature, we find the same inclination among the social virtues; for it behooves the virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the conservation of the whole State.” And again: “Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, according to their various excellences and the various benefits received from them. On both counts God holds first place, for He is supremely excellent and is for us the first principle of being and government. In the second place, the principles of our being and government are our parents and our country, that have given us birth and nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country, after God.... The worship given to our country includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and to all the friends of our country.”⁴

⁴ Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 60, art. 5: “We see that the part naturally exposes itself for the preservation of the whole, just as the hand is exposed to a blow without deliberation for the preservation of the whole body. And because reason imitates nature, we find an imitation of this kind in the political virtues. For it belongs to the virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the preservation of the whole commonwealth.”—Ibid., qu. 101, art. 1: “A man becomes a debtor to others in different ways according to their diverse excellence and the diverse benefits received from them. In both respects God holds the highest place, who both is most excellent and is for us the first principle of being and government; secondarily, however, the principles of our being and government are our parents and our country, by whom and in which we were born and nourished. And therefore after God a man is most indeb- ted to his parents and country. Hence, just as it pertains to religion to offer worship to God, so in the second degree it pertains to piety to offer homage to parents and country.... In the homage paid to one’s country is understood homage to all fellow-citizens and all friends of the country. And therefore piety principally extends to this.”

The basis of true patriotism is loyalty, which may be defined as “faithfulness and constancy in allegiance and service.”

“The genuinely loyal citizen,” says Dr. Ryan, “is always ready and eager, not only to obey the laws, but to support and maintain the political institutions of his country.... Whether positive or negative, loyalty always implies a certain habitual spirit and attitude toward laws and institutions. It habitually recognizes that a presumption exists in favor of organic and statutory enactments and principles. The loyal citizen is always disposed to give his government and his political institutions ‘the benefit of doubt,’ and to withhold obedience or support only when the doubt is converted into moral certainty that the laws or the government are in the wrong. In a word, the habitual attitude of the loyal citizen is that of sympathetic faith, not that of criticality and distrust.”⁵

⁵ The State and the Church, p. 264.

Dr. Thomas Wright, in his brochure on Christian Citizenship, declares that obedience, respect, and loyalty are the constituent elements of patriotism, and Dr. Ryan, who quotes the passage, thinks “this is as satisfactory as any other analysis of the vague, though apparently elementary sentiment that we call patriotism. The good citizen loves to be acclaimed a patriot,” he adds, “and the orator finds patriotism one of the most appealing and popular subjects. Nevertheless, it is very elusive. To the average man it means love of country, but what does love of country mean? Not merely love of green fields, lofty mountains, and winding rivers; not always love of existing political institutions. In time of actual or threatened war, the idea of patriotism is very simple. It means support and defense of one’s country against armed attack. In time of peace, the phrase, ‘love of country,’ means many things to many minds. The object of the love may be the physical characteristics of the country, or its economic opportunities, or its government, or its political ideals, or its history, or some combination of these entities. As commonly used, the term patriotism has almost always an international connotation. It appeals to the national consciousness. It brings before the mind the facts of national individuality, separateness, distinctness of interests. It lays stress upon the welfare of one’s own country against the welfare of other countries. Too often it takes the form of boasting, jingoism, contempt of foreign nations, and identifies the national welfare with national power, imperialism, and aggression. The aver- age citizen frequently confuses patriotism with national jealousy and provincialism. He does not regularly think of it as having anything to do with internal affairs. Adequate and national patriotism should be quite as active in peace as in war, and it should extend to every matter that affects the common good. If patriotism is love of country, its only rational and concrete meaning is love of the people who inhabit the country and compose the State, in other words, love of one’s fellow citizens. Therefore, its ultimate object is the same as that of the State, namely, the common good.”⁶

⁶ Ibid., p. 266.

c) Of late years, especially in connection with the World War, there has been a recrudescence of pagan patriotism, which is “all the more dangerous because it is untrammelled by any laws of morality. The ancient [Christian] State professed to be scrupulously observant of the laws of justice and fidelity. The modern State adopts the principles of Machiavelli; it acknowledges only one law, the law of success. The watchword ‘Germany over all’ is not confined to Germany; some in England change it to ‘England over all,’ and they add another to it, ‘England, right or wrong.’ A powerful State, fettered by no laws, human or divine, treating its pledged word as only a scrap of paper, commanding the blind obedience of its subjects, becomes a menace to the world.”⁷

⁷ Thos. Slater, S.J., in the Catholic Times, London and Liverpool, Sept. 16, 1922.

d) There is another aspect of patriotism to which atten- tion should be called, namely, its exploitation by the capitalist class to counteract every movement on behalf of social justice for the laboring people. “Loyalty to the State, or to one’s country, to the public weal, does not include belief in, love of, or defense of existing private institutions, industrial or other. The loyalty which is incumbent upon the citizen, as citizen, concerns only political institutions and relations. The organized attempt to make it apply to the economic order, is one of the most extraordinary and brazen performances in the history of human selfishness.”⁸ Most perversions and exaggerations of the duty of loyalty are inspired by selfishness and greed.

⁸ J. A. Ryan, The State and the Church, p. 365.

e) Catholics should uphold the true concept of patriotism both in theory and practice. They should remember that, in the words of Archbishop John Lancaster Spalding, “there is a higher love than love of country,—the love of truth, the love of justice, the love of righteousness; and he alone is a patriot who is willing to suffer obloquy and the loss of money and friends, rather than betray the cause of truth, justice, and righteousness, for only by being faithful to this can he rightly serve his country.... The American’s loyalty to his country is first of all loyalty to truth, to justice, to humanity. He feels that its institutions can be enduring only when they are founded on religion and morality.... If a nobler race is to spring forth in this new world, all the influences that are active and potent in the national life must conspire to form public opinion, by which in the end we are ruled,—a public opinion which shall be favorable to pure religion, to the best education, and to sound morality. The better kind, however otherwise they may disagree, must unite and support one another in ceaseless efforts to create such a public opinion.”⁹

⁹ Opportunity and Other Essays, Chicago, 1899.

2. Genuine Christianity demands that the nations which are politically separated should unite in the higher unity of religion, since in the kingdom of God we are taught to look forward to a time when humanity will constitute one fold under one shepherd. There is a Christian internationalism which does not aim to abolish the virtue of patriotism, but rather to ennoble it and free it from the fetters of egotism and national hate. The unbroken tradition of the papacy with respect to international harmony and peace has been worthily continued to the present time. Pope Benedict XV, during the recent World War, not only made all possible efforts to stop hostilities, but was also one of the first advocates of an international organization for the preservation of peace. In his letter to the American people, Dec. 31, 1918, he expressed his fervent hope and desire for an international organization “which, by abolishing conscription will reduce armaments, by establishing international tribunals will eliminate or settle disputes, and by placing peace on a solid foundation, will guarantee to all independence and equality of rights.”¹⁰

¹⁰ J. A. Ryan, The State and the Church, p. 324.

3. In most countries to-day the people govern themselves by electing their own lawgivers, judges, and executive officers. Hence a second class of duties incumbent on the citizen results from his functions as an elector. The right to vote has for its corollary a special duty, and this duty is one of legal justice. “The citizens are bound to promote the common good in all reasonable ways. The franchise enables them to further or hinder the common weal greatly and fundamentally, inasmuch as the quality of the government depends upon the kind of officials they elect. Not only questions of politics, but social, industrial, educational, moral and religious subjects are regulated by legislative bodies and administered by executive. Therefore, the matter is of grave importance, and the obligation of the citizen to participate in the election and to support fit candidates is correspondingly grave.”¹¹

¹¹ Ibid., p. 271.

a) To omit to vote in an important election without a grave cause, such as the loss of one’s means of livelihood, is a sin. It may even be a mortal sin, namely, if one’s abstention is the cause of others neglecting to vote, for in that case the careless citizen would be responsible for the election of dishonest or incompetent officials, the passing of unjust laws, or neglect to pass measures which are necessary for the public welfare.¹²

¹² S. Poenit., 1 Dec. 1866.

When there is no hope of electing an honest representative, and no reason to fear that the one elected will cause serious injury to Church or State, abstention from voting cannot be regarded as a mortal sin; in fact it may not even be a venial sin if inspired by the desire to avoid grave personal injury or inconvenience. If an election seems to involve the recognition or promotion of an illegitimate government, it may be unlawful or at least inadvisable to take part in it.

b) To vote for a candidate who is known to harbor pernicious principles, is per se illicit and, broadly speaking, a sin against justice. Would the fear of a grave personal loss or inconvenience excuse one in a case of this kind? If the election is certain to go one way, no matter how I vote, I may abstain from voting, or, if I am compelled to vote for the wrong man, I should strive to avert scandal by explaining that I cast my vote under compulsion. To vote for a candidate for the legislature, State, municipal, or national, is in itself an indifferent act, and no one can predict with certainty what attitude the candidate will take after the election.

Material co-operation in the election of a bad candidate may be excused by any grave reason. When of two candidates running for office neither is likely to promote the principles of justice, it is licit to vote for the less objectionable of the two if this appears necessary to prevent the election of the more objectionable one, but only on the following conditions:

α) The danger of scandal must be removed by a declaration stating the reasons for the act; β) Participation in the election must really be necessary to prevent the triumph of the objectionable candidate.

c) A Catholic who possesses all the qualifications necessary for a public office may be in duty bound to become a candidate for that office, namely, if his election is certain, if he can accept the office without grave inconvenience to himself, and if no other equally competent candidate is available.¹³

¹³ Noldin, De Praeceptis, pp. 336–339.—Dr. Ryan (The State and the Church, p. 275) thinks that “in as much as the issues involved in such a situation are of much graver consequence than those dependent upon the ballot of the private citizen, the man who refuses to become a candidate for office will need a much graver reason to excuse him than will the citizen who merely neglects to vote.”

d) A legislator is never allowed to vote for a law which he recognizes as bad and unjust. If it is necessary to accept certain objectionable stipulations in order to get an otherwise good law passed, or to prevent greater evil, he may vote for those stipulations, provided they involve no direct wrong, but should do so under protest. Legislators furthermore have the duty of preventing the passage of unjust laws by diligently attending the sessions and voting whenever an opportunity offers. They owe this duty to their constituents. If by culpable absence or abstention from voting they become responsible for the passage of obnoxious bills, they are liable for the damage done to the community, to their constituents as well as to any others who may be injured. They are in duty bound to promote the public welfare of the community also in a positive way, especially by represent- ing the interests of their voters if they have expressly promised to do so.¹⁴

¹⁴ Göpfert, II, 447 sq.; Scavini-Del Vecchio, Theol. Mor. Universa, Vol. I, 3rd ed., n. 332.

e) The duty to vote for the common welfare instead of for the benefit of private persons or groups is too often forgotten even by well-meaning citizens, who will give their support, for instance, to a friend, or to a member of their own race or religion who has not the required moral or intellectual equipment for the office he seeks or who upholds socially harmful policies. “Too often in such situations,” says Dr. Ryan, “the honest citizen salves his conscience with the excuse that the opposing candidate ‘is just as bad.’ Where this is the fact one might legitimately determine one’s choice on the basis of personal friendship, or racial or religious affiliation, or other extrinsic considerations; but the general fact is that voters who adopt this course do not take adequate care to find out whether the candidate of the opposition is in reality ‘just as bad.’ They too easily decide the question on the basis of their inclinations and predilections.”¹⁵ On another unjustifiable practice; that of ignoring principles and policies in the exercise of the franchise, the same able writer says: “ ‘Vote for a good man, regardless of party,’ is a plausible but essentially inadequate political rule. A distinction should be drawn between legislative offices and those which are merely administrative. In choosing a city treasurer or a city auditor, the only pertinent qualifications are honesty, intellectual capacity, and technical equipment. There is involved no question of legislative policy. When the office to be filled is that of governor of a State, president of the United States, member of a State legislature, or congressman, other qualifications are essential in addition to those just mentioned. The ‘good man’ may have some very harmful views concerning political and industrial policies. He may sincerely favor national imperialism and jingoism, or legislation to promote the undue aggrandizement of one social class or the oppression of another social class. Obviously the citizen does not fulfill his duty when he votes for a ‘good man’ of this sort. Sometimes the common welfare will suffer less through the election of a man whose political policies are right but whose moral or intellectual equipment is deficient, than through the elevation of a ‘good man’ who gives his adhesion to wrong policies.”¹⁶

¹⁵ The State and the Church, pp. 271 sq.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 272.

f) Excellent advice to citizens in regard to the duties of voters is contained in a letter addressed by the late Cardinal Amette, Archbishop of Paris, to his people in 1921:

“In the joint letter which they recently addressed to the French Catholics, the bishops of France said: ‘It is a duty of conscience for all citizens honored with the right of suffrage to vote honestly and wisely with the sole aim of benefitting the country. The citizen is subject to the divine law as is the Christian. Of our votes, as of all our actions, God will demand an account. The duty of voting is so much the more binding upon conscience because on its good or evil exercise depend the gravest interests of the country and of religion.’ It is your duty to vote. To neglect to do so would be a culpable abdication of duty on your part. It is your duty to vote honestly; that is to say, for men worthy of your esteem and trust. It is your duty to vote wisely; that is to say, in such a way as not to waste your votes. It would be better to cast them for candidates who, although not giving complete satisfaction to all our legitimate demands, would lead us to expect from them a line of conduct useful to the country, rather than to cast your vote for others whose programme would indeed be more perfect, but whose almost certain defeat might open the doors to the enemies of religion and of the social order.”¹⁷

¹⁷ Quoted ibid., pp. 273 sqq.

g) Tanquerey¹⁸ points out that, in order to possess the specific knowledge required to vote intelligently and rightly, upright citizens should organize and participate in political organizations. Dr. Ryan approves this advice. “Men unite in trade unions, manufacturers’ associations, chambers of commerce, and professional societies of various kinds for the promotion of their economic interests. Hundreds of thousands of good men, thus occupationally organized, fail to see the necessity of organizing politically for the protection of their civic interests and the effective performance of their duties to the commonwealth. The conduct of political organizations they leave to professional politicians, who are usually in the service of selfish private interests. When the inactive citizens see the evil results of this arrangement, they attempt to justify their aloofness by the reflection that politics is essentially corrupt. This lazy pessimism is not warranted by anything inherent in political affairs. It represents a vain attempt to evade moral responsibility. If politics is rotten, a large part of the responsibility rests upon well meaning but indolent citizens.”¹⁹

¹⁸ Synopsis Theol. Mor. et Past., Vol. III, pp. 475 sq.

¹⁹ Ryan, op. cit., p. 274.

4. The citizens of a country owe particular respect and reverence to the higher administrative officials to whom is entrusted the execution of the laws. These are the servants and representa- tives of God, and even if they do not always do their duty, they must be honored because of the exalted office they hold. Reverence for the highest representative of the State, whether he be king or president, is allied to the worship of God, for St. Peter says: “Fear God; honor the king.”²⁰ And Leo XIII: “Hallowed in the mind of Christians is the very idea of public authority, in which they recognize some likeness and symbol as it were of the Divine Majesty, even when it is exercised by one who is unworthy.”²¹ In addition the Christian citizen should pray for those in high station, in order that “we may lead a quiet and a peaceable life in all piety and chastity.”²²

²⁰ Rom. XIII, 4–6; 1 Pet. II, 17.—Tertullian, Ad Scap., c. 2: “A Christian is the enemy of no one, much less of the emperor, whom, knowing that he must have been appointed by his God, he must also love and revere and honor and wish safe. . . . Therefore we also honor the emperor thus, in such a manner as is both lawful for us and expedient for him: as a man second after God, who has obtained from God whatever he is, inferior to God alone.” (Ed. Leopold, P. I, 248).—St. Justin Martyr, Apol., l. I, n. 17.—Athenagoras, Supplic., c. 1, n. 17.—Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autol., l. I, c. 14.—St. Augustine, Enarrat. in Ps., CXXXIV, n. 7: “Christian soldiers served an unbelieving emperor; when the cause of Christ was reached, they acknowledged none but Him who was in heaven. . . . They distinguished the eternal Lord from the temporal lord, and yet for the sake of the eternal Lord they were subject even to the temporal lord.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVII, 1654).

²¹ Encycl. “Sapientiae Christianae,” Jan. 10, 1890: “Therefore the name of public authority is sacred to Christians, for in it they recognize a certain likeness and image of the divine majesty, even when it is exercised by an unworthy man.”

²² 1 Tim. II, 1 sq.—Tertullian, Apol., c. 30: “For the safety of the emperors we invoke the eternal God, the true God, the living God, whom the emperors themselves desire to have propitious to them above all others. They know who gave them their authority; they know, being men, who also [gave them] a soul; they perceive that He alone is God, in whose power alone they are, from whom they are second, after whom they are first, before all and above all gods.” (Ed. Leopold, I, 101 sq.)—IDEM, Ad Scap., c. 2: “Thus [the emperor] is greater than all, since he is lesser only than the true God; thus he is greater even than the gods themselves, since they themselves are in his power. And so we sacrifice for the emperor’s safety, but to our God and his, and, as God commanded, with pure prayer. For God, creator of the universe, has no need of any odor or blood.” (Ibid., 248).—Cfr. Pius IX, Encycl. “Etsi multa luctuosa,” Nov. 21, 1873 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1841).

“Let those who assert that Christianity is opposed to the public welfare,” says St. Augustine, “provide us with soldiers such as Christian doctrine demands, with subjects, husbands, wives, parents, children, masters, servants, kings, judges and, finally, taxpayers and tax collectors such as they ought to be according to Christian standards, before they dare to assert that Christian teaching runs counter to the welfare of the State. [If they are honest] they will, on the contrary, not hesitate to admit that the Christian religion, when obeyed, is apt to promote the public welfare in a high degree. The Catholic Church instructs the little children in a manner adapted to their understanding; she teaches the boys and young men with power; she speaks to the old in a manner becoming their age and state of mind. She subjects the wife in faithful obedience to her husband, not as a tool of lust, but for the propagation of the race and the community of domestic life. She appoints man the head of woman, not to abuse the weakness of her sex, but to exercise her in the duty of sincere affection. She makes children subject to their parents in a sort of voluntary servitude and constitutes parents as the affectionate masters of their children. . . . She unites citizen with citizen, nation with nation, and the whole race of men in memory of their common progenitors, not merely for sociability, but also in a kind of brotherliness. She teaches kings to provide for their peoples, and exhorts nations to be obedient to their rulers. She points out particularly to whom honor is due, to whom love, to whom respect, to whom fear, to whom consolation, to whom admonition, to whom warning, to whom instruction, to whom censure, to whom punishment, at the same time pointing out that not everything is due to everyone, but love is due to all, injustice to none.”²³

²³ St. Augustine, Epist., 138 (al. 5), c. 2, n. 15 (Migne, P. L., XXXIII, 532).—IDEM, De Moribus Eccl. Cath., l. I, c. 30, n. 63 (P. L., XXXII, 1336).—St. Ambrose, De Offic., l. III, c. 9, n. 59: “If one person cannot be aided without another being harmed, it is better that neither be helped than that the other be burdened. . . . [The priest’s] duty is therefore to harm no one and to wish to benefit everyone; but the power to do so belongs to God alone.” (P. L., XVI, 162).

Let both powers instituted by God, Church and State, each supreme in its own particular sphere,²⁴ co-operate harmoniously for the welfare of humanity and the honor of God. Dante justly says that true religion makes for good government— “La sana religione fa sano il governo.”

²⁴ Cfr. Leo XIII, Encycl. “Immortale Dei,” Nov. 1, 1885: “God has divided the care of the human race between two powers, namely, the ecclesiastical and the civil, appointing the one over divine matters and the other over human affairs. Each is supreme in its own order; each has fixed limits within which it is contained, limits defined by the nature and proximate cause of each; hence there is traced, as it were, a sphere within which the action of each is exercised by its own right.”

READINGS.—J. M. Sailer, Handbuch der christl. Moral, Vol. III, pp. 40 sqq.—K. Werner, System der christl. Ethik, Vol. III, pp. 609 sqq.—J. Schwane Die Gerechtigkeit, pp. 181 sqq.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 625 sqq.—J. A. Ryan, “The Duties of the Citizen,” in The State and the Church, New York 1922, pp. 260–275.—J. A. Lapp, The Catholic Citizen, N. Y. 1922.—Ad. Tanquerey, S.S., Synopsis Theol. Mor. et Past., Vol. III, pp. 475 sqq.—Theo. Meyer, S.J., Inst. Iuris Nat., Vol. II, pp. 480 sqq.