Section — Koch–Preuss
Section 1: General Division
To enable men to understand the nature of sin, and for the practical purposes of catechetical instruction and Penance, Catholic moralists have divided sins into classes.
The most important division is that of mortal and venial sins, already dealt with in the previous chapter.
Other divisions are based respectively on the Decalogue, the duties violated by sin, the nature of man, the intrinsic character of different sins, man's relation towards himself and others, and the development of evil in the soul.
1. Sins Against the Ten Commandments
—The most popular division of sins is that which follows the Decalogue or Ten Commandments. This classification was confirmed by Christ Himself and adopted by St. Paul.1 The order is not strictly logical, however, nor is it quite exhaustive, and hence the enumeration of sins based upon it is more or less external and does not, in fact, transcend the standpoint of the Old Law, except in so far as it interprets the Decalogue in the light of the New Testament. Nevertheless this division is useful, especially for the examination of conscience, which is one of the requisites of a good confession.2
2 This division is adopted by Sabetti, Slater, Noldin, and other present-day moralists.
1 Matth. V, 21 sqq.; XV, 19; XIX, 18; Mark X, 19 (a different order in Mark VII, 21 sq.); 1 Tim. I, 9 sq. (different in Rom. XIII, 9).—Cfr. N. Peters, Die älteste Abschrift der zehn Gebote und der Papyrus Nash, Freiburg 1905; M. Hetzenauer, Theologia Biblica, Vol. I, Freiburg 1908, pp. 634 sqq.
The sins against the Ten Commandments are enumerated in the following verses, handed down by the Schoolmen:
There is God, there is His name, there are sabbaths and parents; killing, adultery, theft, false witness, house, and wife.
Or, in amplified form:
Scorn idols; let God’s name not be vain to you; sanctify the sabbaths; hold parents in honor; be not a killer, adulterer, thief, or unjust witness; desire neither another’s wife nor another’s property.
- SINS OF COMMISSION AND OMISSION. —This classification is purely formal and of no particular value for judging the nature of sin. a) When all other conditions are equal, a sin of commission is worse than a sin of omission because the negative precepts of the law bind under a more serious penalty than those which are affirmative, and to transgress them involves a more determined effort of the will. Since, however, sins of omission suppose a positive act of the will —refusal to obey God —and hence are voluntary, they, too, may be mortal.3 Sins of omission, furthermore, are often more dangerous to the soul than sins of commission, because less attention is paid to them, and they are rarely made the object of contrition and penitence by the careless. b) The division of sins into sins against God, against oneself, and against one’s fellowmen4 is likewise purely external, because every sin is by its very nature an offense against God and oneself, and in a certain sense also against one's fellowmen. Nevertheless, this classification is useful, and derives additional justification from the fact that some sins are more directly opposed than others to the duties which man owes to God, to his fellowmen, and to himself.
3 Cfr. Matth. VII, 19; XXV, 30. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 72, art. 6.
4 Cfr. Matth. XXII, 36-40; Tit. II, 12.—St. Thomas, ibid., art. 4.
3. Sins of the Spirit and Sins of the
FLESH. —This distinction is based on the composite nature of man and is mentioned in Sacred Scripture. St. Paul writes to the Corinthians: "Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit." 5 Man is a compound of body and soul, and hence none of the sins that he is able to commit is either entirely spiritual or entirely carnal. True, the Bible sometimes applies the term "flesh" (σάρξ) to human nature as corrupted by sin, and St. Paul enumerates envy, wrath, dissension, etc., among "the works of the flesh." 6 But this cannot alter the obvious fact that a real distinction exists between spiritual sins (peccata spiritualia) and carnal sins (peccata carnalia).
5 2 Cor. VII, 1. —Cfr. Matth. IV, 1-11; 1 Pet. II, 11; 1 John II, 16.
6 Gal. V, 19-21; cfr. 1 Cor. III, 3.—Cfr. H. H. Wendt, Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist im biblischen Sprachgebrauch, Gotha 1878, pp. 42 sqq., 78 sqq.
A carnal sin is one by which man gratifies some disorderly inclination of his sensitive nature —concupiscence of the eyes or concupiscence of the flesh. By the commission of such a sin man, who is a rational creature, subjects himself, as it were, to matter. The chief sins of the flesh are fornication, luxury, gluttony, avarice, greed, idolatry, and witchcraft.
Sins of the spirit are committed by indulging the disorderly inclinations that have their seat in the mind, e. g., pride, envy, hatred.7 These, to borrow a phrase from St. Thomas, are "the sins which consist in mental gratification."
Which of these two species is the more dangerous or the more grievous is difficult to say. Sins of the flesh easily attain consummation and develop into habits; but their guilt is diminished by the weakening of the will due to concupiscence. Sins of the spirit, on the other hand, involve greater malice and self-deception, —a circumstance that renders conversion more difficult, nay often impossible. Christ Himself assured the haughty Pharisees: "The publicans and the harlots shall go into the kingdom of God before you." 9 No sin is greater or more dangerous than pride and excessive self-esteem. St. Augustine observes that "A humble sinner is better than a just man puffed up with pride." 10 Christ says that the publican "went down into his house justified," whereas the Pharisee did not; and He adds: "Every one that exalteth himself, shall be humbled, and he that humbleth himself, shall be exalted." Broadly speaking, we may say that the sins of the flesh are less culpable than those of the spirit, but involve greater shame.11
8 St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 72, art. 2: "Those sins which are completed in spiritual delight are called spiritual sins; but those which are completed in carnal delight are called carnal sins, as gluttony, which is completed in delight in food, and lust, which is completed in venereal delight. Hence the Apostle also says: Let us cleanse ourselves from every defilement of flesh and spirit." subiecti, oMatth. XXI, 31; cfr. Matth. XXIII, 13-33; Luke VII, 36-48; XVIII, 14; John VIII, 3-1 1. •verti cata
10 Serm., 170, n. 7: "A humble sinner is better than a proud just man." (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 930).
11 Cfr. Luke XVIII, 14. St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 93, n. 15: "See, brethren: humility in evil deeds pleased God more than pride in good deeds; thus God hates the proud." (P. L., XXXVII, 1203). —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 73, art. 5: “Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal sins. This is not to be understood as though every spiritual sin were of greater guilt than every carnal sin, but because, considering only this difference of spirituality and carnality, spiritual sins are graver than carnal sins, other things being equal. Three reasons can be assigned. The first is taken from the subject: spiritual sins are perfected in the spirit, whose office it is to turn to God and to turn away from Him; carnal sins, however, are consummated in the delight of the carnal appetite, whose principal tendency is to turn to bodily good. Therefore carnal sin as such has more of turning toward, and consequently also of attachment; but spiritual sin has more of turning away, from which the nature of guilt proceeds. Therefore spiritual sin as such is of greater guilt. The second reason can be taken from the one against whom the sin is committed. By carnal sin as such one sins against one’s own body, which according to the order of charity is to be loved less than God and one’s neighbor, against whom spiritual sins are committed. Therefore spiritual sins as such are of greater guilt. The third reason can be taken from the motive: the stronger the impulse to sin, the less a man sins; but carnal sins have a more vehement impulse, namely the concupiscence of the flesh innate in us. Therefore spiritual sins as such are of greater guilt.” —IDEM, De Verit., qu. 25, art. 6, ad 2: "Sins of the irascible appetite are graver, but sins of the concupiscible appetite are more shameful." —St. Gregory the Great, Moral., l. 33, c. 12, n. 25: "We know that it is sometimes a lesser thing to fall into corruption than to sin in silent thought from deliberate pride; but because pride is believed less shameful, it is less avoided. Men blush at lust all the more because all alike know it to be shameful. Hence it often happens that some, after pride, through an open fall into lust, blush at the evil of their hidden fault; and then they correct even greater things when, cast down in lesser matters, they are more gravely confounded. They recognize themselves as guilty among lesser sins who believed themselves free among graver ones." (Migne, P. L., LXXVI, 688).
Psychologically, we may distinguish between sins of thought, word, and deed. The Angelic Doctor explains the underlying process as follows: "The first beginning of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the heart; the second degree is the sin of word, in so far as man is ready to break out into a declaration of his thought. The third degree consists in the consummation of the deed. Consequently these three differ in respect of the various degrees of sin. Nevertheless it is evident that all three belong to the one complete species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man, through desire of vengeance, is at first disturbed in thought, then breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly goes on to wrongful deeds; and the same applies to lust and to any other sin."12 Thus every sin is a sin of thought (peccatum cordis), because every sin originates in the mind.13 But not every evil thought "breaks out into words," much less does it culminate in sinful deeds.14 a) A thought, as such, is mortally sinful if the will consents to, and takes pleasure in, the evil suggestion offered by the senses or the imagination. The technical term of Scholastic theology for such wilfully entertained evil thoughts is morose pleasure (delectatio morosa). "Pleasure is said to be morose, not from a delay of time (mora), but because the mind in deliberating dwells (immoratur) thereon, and fails to drive it away, 'deliberately holding and turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched the mind/ as Augustine says." 15 To take pleas- ure in an evil thought deliberately and with full advertence, is always a sin, —whether mortal or venial depends on the character of the thought itself. Not every thought of evil is in itself sinful. There is a distinction between taking pleasure in the thought of evil (delectatio de cogitatione ret malae) and taking pleasure in an evil object (delect atio de re mala cogitat a). Thinking about a sin for a good and sufficient reason, e. g., to study its nature and effects, to find an antidote against it, to protect others from its ravages, is not delectatio morosa.16*® Nor is it sinful to reflect with pleasure on the adroitness with which a sin has been committed, or other circumstances surrounding the same. Note, however, that the line of demarcation between what is sinful and what is permitted in such thoughts is difficult to draw. To rejoice over a sin (gaudium de peccato), whether it be one's own or that of another, is always forbidden.17 b) A thought becomes sinful as soon as the will harbors a desire to commit the evil deed (desiderium pravum inefficax). However, there is a distinction between conditional and unconditional desires.
12 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 72, art. 7: "Peccatum dividitur per these three—sin of the heart, mouth, and deed—not as though they were diverse complete species; for the consummation of sin is in the deed, whence sin of deed has the complete species. Its first beginning, however, is as a foundation in the heart; its second stage is in the mouth, insofar as a man readily breaks forth to manifest the conception of his heart; and the third stage is now in the consummation of the deed. Thus these three differ according to diverse stages of sin. It is evident, nevertheless, that these three belong to one complete species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man, because he desires vengeance, is first disturbed in his heart, secondly breaks forth into insulting words, and thirdly proceeds as far as injurious deeds; and the same is evident in lust and in every other sin." —Cfr. St. Gregory the Great, Moral., I. 4, c. 27, n. 30: "Kinds of sin are either committed secretly in the heart or perpetrated openly in deed." (P. L., LXXV, 661).
13 Cfr. Matth. IX, 4; XII, 34; XV, 18-19; Mark VII, 20-23. —St. Jerome, In lerem., I, c. 4. —P. A. Kirsch, Zur Geschichte der kath. Beicht, Wiirzburg 1902, pp. 50 sqq.
14 Cfr. Ps. XXXIII, 13 sqq.; Prov. XVIII, 21; Matth. XII, 36 sq.; XXIII, 3; Rom. II, 6; Gal. V, 19; Eph. IV, 29; V, 4; Jas. I, 26; III, 2; 1 Pet. III, 10.
15 St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 74, art. 6, ad 3: “Delec- Delight is called morose, not from delay, but because deliberating reason lingers about it and nevertheless does not repel it, willingly retaining and turning over things which ought to have been rejected as soon as they touched the mind, as Augustine says.” (Migne, P. L., XLII, 1008).
16 St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 74, art. 8: "Since every delight follows upon some operation, and again every delight has some object, any delight can be related to two things: the operation which it follows and the object in which one delights. It happens that an operation is the object of delight just as some other thing is, because the operation itself can be taken as a good and an end in which the person delighted rests. Sometimes the very operation which the delight follows is the object of delight, insofar as the appetitive power, to which delight belongs, reflects upon the operation itself as upon a certain good, as when someone thinks and delights in the very fact that he thinks, insofar as his thought pleases him. At other times the delight that follows one operation, for example some thought, has another operation as its object, as the thing thought of; and then such delight proceeds from an inclination of the appetite, not toward the thought, but toward the operation thought of. Thus someone thinking about fornication can delight in two things: in one way in the thought itself, in another way in the fornication thought of. Delight in the thought itself follows the inclination of the affection toward that thought; but the thought itself is not in itself a mortal sin—indeed, sometimes it is only venial, as when someone thinks about it uselessly, and sometimes it is entirely without sin, as when someone thinks about it usefully, as when he wishes to preach or debate about it. Consequently the affection and delight which is thus about the thought of fornication is not of the genus of mortal sin, but is sometimes a venial sin, sometimes none at all; hence even consent to such delight is not a mortal sin. But that someone thinking about fornication delights in the act thought of happens because his affection is inclined toward that act. Hence for someone to consent to such delight is nothing else than to consent that his affection be inclined toward fornication, for no one delights except in what conforms to his appetite. But for someone deliberately to choose that his affection should conform to things which are mortal sins in themselves is a mortal sin." Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., 1. 2, n. 12-29.
17 Prov. II, 14. —Cfr. Prop. Damnat. sub Innocentio XI., n. 15: "It is lawful for a son to rejoice in the murder of his parent committed by himself while drunk, because of the immense riches consequently obtained from the inheritance." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1032).
A conditional desire (desiderium conditional um) is sinful unless the condition takes away the malice of the act. Father Slater explains this as follows: "There is no harm, for example, in saying: T should like to eat meat on a Friday, unless the Church forbade it;' and the same is true generally whenever the condition, 'If it were lawful/ is annexed to a merely positive prohibition If this condition is annexed to a desire against the natural law, as 'I should like to steal if it were lawful/ or 'I should like to commit fornication if it were not forbidden/ the condition does not remove all the malice of the vicious will, for the very tendency of the will toward such objects is against right reason. Such conditional desires then are sinful, unless they indicate a mere propensity towards such sins without any voluntary affection of the will. In any case, however, they are dangerous, and should not be indulged or expressed."18
18 Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, p. 150.— Cfr. Gen. III, 6; 1 Cor. X, 6; Gal. V, 24.
c) A sin of thought, lastly, is a complete sin, divided from the external act only by an accident, if there is present an efficacious desire (desiderium pravum efficax) and a definite intention to take the necessary means to accomplish the desired end (decretum peccandi).19
19 Cfr. Ex. XX, 17; Matth. V, 28.
Sins of word, taken generically, receive a specific malice when they are accompanied by deeds, as in contumely, lust, and the like, or when they give scandal.
St. Augustine, St. Gregory the Great, and other Fathers compare the evolution of sin from thought through word to deed with the three different ways in which our Lord raised the dead to life.20 The analogy is striking and offers food for meditation.
20 Cfr. St. Augustine, De Serm. Dom. in Monte, I, c. 12, n. 35 (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 1247); Serm., 98, n. 5-7 (XXXVIII, 593); Serm., 128, n. 14 (P. L., XXXVIII, 720). —St. Gregory the Great, Moralia, 1. 4, c. 27, n. 52.
- COOPERATION IN INJUSTICE. —Man, as a social being placed in the midst of his fellowmen, may become an occasion of, or accessory to, the sins of others.21 The distinction between peccata propria and peccata aliena is popular rather than scientific, for in the last analysis every sin is a peccatum proprium, inasmuch as it is caused by the ego of the sinner. But a man may share the guilt of another's sin by becoming accessory to it, i. e., by lending formal cooperation. This he may do negatively, by failing to prevent the other's sin, or by concealing or omitting to punish it if it is his duty to do so; or positively, by directly or indirectly seducing others, participating in, or at least consenting to, their evil actions, or glossing them over.
21 Cfr. Prov. XXIX, 24; Matth. XVIII, 6; Rom. I, 32; 1 Tim. V, 22; 2 John 10-11; Apoc. XVIII, 4. —St. Augustine, De Morib. Eccl., II, c. 17, n. 57: "It makes no difference whether you commit the crime yourself or wish it to be committed by another for your sake." (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 162).
The different ways in which one may become accessory to the sins of others have been brought into hexameters as follows: Command, counsel, consent, flattery, harboring; participation, silence, not hindering, not disclosing; or:
He who persuades, commands, assents, incites, praises evil; he who keeps silent, indulges, helps, and tries to defend. As we know from the Catechism, a man may become accessory to the sins of others:
a) By counsel (consilium), i. e., by giving advice or urging motives, or by showing how an evil deed may be done, or the punishment due to it escaped.22 b) By command (iussio), i. e., by inducing another to do an injury, especially if one is a superior.23 c) By consent (consensus), i. e., by agreeing to sinful proposals or suggestions.24 As Father Slater points out, this sin is committed by members of legislative bodies when they agree together to pass an unjust law, and also by jurymen who concur in a wrong verdict.25 d) By provocation (irritatio), i. e., by employing anger or ridicule for the purpose of persuading another to commit an injustice or to omit to make reparation for an injury committed. This sin is also committed by those who dress indecently, exhibit obscene pictures, sell or loan bad books, carry on unchaste conversations, etc., thereby causing others to sin.26 e) By praise or flattery (palpo), i. e., by commending the wicked conduct of others, instigating them to rebellion against lawful authority, eulogizing their crimes, etc.27 f ) By silence (reticentia), i. e., by omitting to dissuade others from sin or failing to censure their misdeeds, if one is in duty bound to do so; tolerating evil company or dangerous occasions, etc.28 g) By connivance (conniventia), i. e., by neglecting to punish sinful conduct in children or subjects. Heli was punished "because he knew that his sons did wickedly, and did not chastise them." 29
22 As when Caiphas advised the Jews to put Jesus to death. (John XI, 50).
23 Cfr. Ex. I, 15 sqq.; 2 Kings XI, 14; Matth. II, 16.
24 Cfr. Gen. XXXIX, 10; Acts VII, 57; XXII, 20; Eph. V, 6 sq.
25 A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 420 sq.
26 Cfr. Gen. III, 1-6.
27 Cfr. Ez. XIII, 18; Rom. I, 32.
28 Cfr. Lev. V, 1; Is. LVI, 10; Prov. XXIX, 25.
29 Cfr. 1 Kings III, 13; II, 23 sqq.
h) By sharing in unjustly acquired goods (participatio, recursus), i. e., by knowingly buying them, accepting, receiving or selling them for the thief or robber, affording protection to wrong-doers, permitting one's property to be used for sinful purposes, assisting in forbidden commerce by carrying letters and messages, making or furnishing articles designed to destroy human life, etc.30
i) By defense of the evil done (prava defensio), i. e., by excusing the evil conduct of others by word of mouth or in writing (novels, poems, plays), representing vice as mere weakness, etc.31
30 Cfr. Matth. XXVIII, 12; Luke XXII, 3 sqq.
31 Cfr. Luke XI, 47 sqq.
The gravity of these sins depends upon the degree of cooperation furnished. Positive is always more culpable than negative cooperation. Among the various forms of positive cooperation the most reprehensible are those which exercise the greatest influence upon the conduct of others. Thus, to command a sinful act is a greater sin than merely to counsel it, and to counsel it a greater sin than merely to consent to its commission.
- GENETIC DIVISION. —Sins may also be divided with respect to the various stages of malice through which they pass from their first beginning to the moment of consummation. There are three such stages. a) The first is represented by what are commonly known as the seven so-called capital sins, in which all others have their wellspring and root. Every sin is essentially an inordinate desire manifested in a "lusting of the flesh against the spirit" 32 through concupiscence of the eyes, concupiscence of the flesh, or pride of life, according to each man's character or social position. 33 Concupiscence of the flesh reveals itself as gluttony and unchastity; concupiscence of the eyes, as avarice and envy; pride of life, as conceit and anger. To these palmary forms of inordinate desire must be added sloth, i. e., that lack of moral energy which enters into every sin and sometimes assumes the character of moral indifference. Actual sins, explains St. Bonaventure, have one beginning, a twofold root, a threefold stimulus, and a sevenfold source. The beginning is pride; the two roots are false respect and misdirected desire; the threefold stimulus is concupiscence in its three distinct forms; the seven sources are pride, envy, anger, sloth, avarice, intemperance, and unchastity, of which the first five are spiritual and the last two carnal sins.34 b) The second stage is characterized by the sins of which Sacred Scripture says that they cry to heaven for vengeance. They mark the height of viciousness and are absolutely opposed to man's rational nature. c) The third stage consists in that wilful malice and impenitence which is known as the sin against the Holy Ghost.
32 Rom. VII, 14-23; Gal. V, 17; 1 Pet. II, 11.
33 Cfr. 1 John II, 16; Matth. IV, 1-10.
34 Brevil., P. III, c. 9: "Concerning the origin of the capital sins, this is to be held in summary: sin has one beginning, a twofold root, a threefold fuel, and a sevenfold head or capital sin. The one beginning is pride, according to the words of Scripture: Pride is the beginning of every sin. The twofold root is fear that wrongly abases and love that wrongly inflames. The threefold fuel corresponds to the three things in the world: concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life. The sevenfold head is pride, envy, anger, sloth, avarice, gluttony, and lust. Of these, the preceding five are spiritual sins, but the last two are carnal.” (Opera, ed. 2a, Vicetia, p. 225).—-Cfr. Hugh of St. Victor, De Fructibus Carnis et Spiritus, c. 3-10 (Migne, P. L., CLXXVI, 999); St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 84, art. 4.
READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a 2ae, qu. 72, art. 1-7. —Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 149 sqq.; 418 sqq. —H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 320 sqq. —A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor. et Pastor., Vol. I, pp. 276 sqq., 282 sqq—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 199 sqq.