Section — Koch–Preuss
Section 1: The Right to Life
As every man is strictly bound to provide for his bodily welfare, that is, his life, health, and liberty, so he is also obliged, both in justice and charity, to respect the bodily welfare of his fellowmen by protecting and promoting their life, health, and liberty, and abstaining from whatever might unjustly endanger or injure these possessions.1
1 See this Handbook, Vol. III, 11 sqq., 21 sq., 24 sqq., 29, 33, 36, 57, 97.—Cfr. St. Augustine, De Moribus Eccl. Cath., l. I, c. 28, n. 56 (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 1334).
This general obligation assumes special form in the duties known as proper to one's state of life, e. g., those which bind parents in relation to their children, superiors in relation to their subjects, employers in relation to their employees, and so forth.
But life, health, and liberty are not supreme blessings, and may consequently be sacrificed whenever higher interests require or permit it. In other words, it is morally permissible, for the sake of some higher good,—for example, the public welfare,—to employ compulsion toward one's neighbor, to deprive him of minor goods, to subject him to bodily suffering, or to take away his liberty. Such higher goods are, for instance, education, life, health, and the public order.2
2 St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 65.—IDEM, Contra Gent., III, 146, n. 3: "That which is necessary for the preservation of good cannot be evil in itself. But for the preservation of concord among men it is necessary that punishments be inflicted on the wicked. Therefore to punish the wicked is not evil in itself"; n. 4: "Likewise, the common good is better than the particular good of one person. Therefore the particular good must be taken away so that the common good may be preserved"; n. 5: "Furthermore, just as a physician in his operation intends health, which consists in the ordered harmony of the humors, so the ruler of a city in his operation intends peace, which consists in the ordered concord of the citizens. But a physician cuts off a putrid member well and usefully if corruption of the body threatens through it. Therefore the ruler of a city justly and without sin kills pestilential men, lest the peace of the city be disturbed."—Cfr. Linsenmann, Moraltheologie, pp. 462 sqq.
- A father in raising his child may apply bodily force by inflicting pain or curtailing liberty, provided he does not endanger the child's life, health, or morals. But the application of such means must always proceed from morally good motives (causae correptionis et disciplinae) and not exceed reasonable bounds (correptio moderata).3
3 St. Augustine, Serm., 13 (al. 94 De Tempore), n. 8: "Let punishments be applied—I do not refuse them, I do not forbid them—but with the mind of one who loves, the mind of one who cherishes, the mind of one who corrects."—Ibid., n. 9: "For you do not fail to instruct your son. And first you act so that, if it can be done, he may be instructed by generosity, and may blush to offend his father, and not fear him as a severe judge. You rejoice in such a son. But if perhaps he despises those measures, you also apply blows, inflict punishment, bring pain upon him, but you seek his salvation. Many have been corrected by love, many by fear, but through the trembling of fear they have arrived at love." (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 111).—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 65, art. 2.—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 405.
- With the consent of the patient a competent physician may perform operations on his bodily organs, mutilate him or amputate a limb for the purpose of preserving his life and health, and, providing no danger arises therefrom to health or good morals, employ narcotics (opium or chloroform) in order to deaden or ease pain. In the case of children or mental defectives the necessary consent may be given by the parents or guardians; in the case of unconscious or seriously injured patients consent may be reasonably presumed.4
4 A. v. Gschmeidler, Der ärztliche Versuch am lebenden Menschen, Vienna 1906.
- In the interest of the public welfare, the civil authorities have the right and the duty to employ compulsory measures in order to curb immorality and prevent the spread of opinions or views dangerous to society, for instance, to forbid the sale of obscene books and pictures. But this duty binds only when there is a political or moral necessity of taking such measures, i. e., when they are demanded by the common welfare and it is likely that they will produce the desired results. Since spiritual actions cannot be imposed or prevented by physical force, it is advisable at first to employ moral rather than physical means. The truth is strong enough to hold its own against any error.
“Take unto you the helmet of salvation and the sword of the spirit, which is the word of God,” says St. Paul.5 On the other hand, whatever does not come from God must die for want of vitality, for “if a council or a work be of men, it will come to nought”; but if it be of God, no human agency can overthrow it.6
5 Eph. VI, 17.—Cfr. The profession of faith prescribed for the Waldensians by Innocent III: “We believe that by disputing and exhorting in every way according to God we ought to confound them and oppose them with the word of the Lord . . . with unfettered brow even unto death.” (See Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 426).—H. Roeren, Die öffentliche Unsittlichkeit und ihre Bekämpfung, Cologne 1906.—Marx, Der Kampf gegen die öffentliche Unsittlichkeit, Freiburg i. B. 1907.
6 Acts V, 38.
It must be admitted that physical force used against a man ill accords with his dignity as a human being, and is apt to dull his sense of honor. Nevertheless there may be circumstances in which corporal punishment appears as the only adequate means of retribution, for instance, for brutal crimes. Corporal punishment cannot abolish these crimes, but it usually acts as a deterrent on the criminals, for experience shows that even the most brutal criminals can be accustomed to some sort of order and discipline by whipping or imprisonment. The right of those in authority to inflict corporal punishment, nay, if necessary, even death, corresponds to their duty of protect- ing and defending the community against criminals, as well as to the right of self-defense.
In regard to punishment it is well not to lose sight of the fact, which modern humanitarianism endeavors to obscure, that punishment is primarily and essentially retributive in character, and corrective or deterrent only in a secondary way. Its effect is retrospective rather than prospective, and whatever other function may belong to punishment depends upon and presupposes the retributive or retrospective function. M. Guyau and others, therefore, err in maintaining that if punishment were not corrective, it would be as blameworthy as the crime for which it is inflicted.7
7 For a discussion of this question see M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 555 sqq.
The milder discipline prevailing in our prisons is undoubtedly a credit to modern civilization, because in inflicting punishment for crime, even though that punishment be primarily retributive and administered in social self-defense, the reformation of the criminal should likewise be kept in view. Besides, it is being recognized that many persons who would formerly have been considered as criminals, are in reality mental defectives and should be treated in special institutions. However, Dr. Ross is undoubtedly right in warning against excessive sentimentality in dealing with criminals. “While humane standards are gratifying,” he says, “there is a danger of sentimentality. There are some vicious criminals who will not respond to kindness, and there are also some men who need to be deterred from committing crimes by fear of condign punishment. Such criminals, whatever their intellectual status, are moral defectives, and if found incorrigible and not amenable to teaching or helping, should be made life prisoners.”8
8 Christian Ethics, p. 409.—Cfr. Stade, Gefängnisbilder, pp. 205 sqq.; F. Berolzheimer, Die Entgeltung im Strafrecht, Munich 1903, pp. 449 sq., 460.—F. Auer, Zur Psychologie der Gefangenschaft, Munich 1905, pp. 11, 50.—R. Wrede, Die Körperstrafen bei allen Völkern von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart, Dresden 1899.
READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 108, art. 1, 4; 1a 2ae, qu. 87.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 353 sqq.—J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, pp. 266 sqq., 409 sqq.—J. Rickaby, S.J., Moral Philosophy, pp. 202 sqq., 359 sqq.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 554 sqq.; Vol. II, pp. 109 sq.