Section — Koch–Preuss
Section 2: Justice
I. DEFINITION.—The respect we owe our fellowman refers immediately to his person, whilst justice (iustitia) is concerned with the rights which belong to him by nature.1
1 Cfr. Walter, Naturrecht, PP. 66 sqq.; J. Haring, Der Rechts- und Gesetzesbegriff, Graz 1899.
Justice may be defined as a habitual and constant disposition which inclines the will to give to every man his due or right (suum cuique) and, if necessary, to sacrifice ones own interests in favor of the common welfare.2 Justice is essentially a virtue that governs man's relations to others (virtus ad alterum).
2 M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, N. Y. 1917, pp. 81 sqq.—St. Ambrose, De Offic., I, c. 24 (n. 115): "Justice is that which gives to each his due, claims nothing belonging to another, and neglects its own advantage in order to preserve the common equity." (Migne, P. L., XVI, 57).—St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, l. XIX, c. 21, n. 1: "Iustitia ea virtus est, quae sua cuique tribuit." (P. L., XLI, 649).—St. Bernard, De Diversis, s. 102, n. 1: "Iustitia est virtus, quae suum cuique reddit." (P. L., CLXXXIII, 728).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 58, art. 1: "Iustitia est virtus, qua quis constanti et perpetuâ voluntate ius suum unicuique tribuit."
- DIVISION.-In view of the various relations of justice existing in society we may distinguish three species of this virtue: 3
3 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 61, art. 1-2. * Cfr. Rom. XIII, 1-2, 5-7; 1 Pet. II, 13-16.
a) Legal justice, which defines the duties of the individual in relation to the social order. It is called legal (iustitia legalis) because these duties are generally determined by positive law.* b) Distributive justice, which regulates the distribution by the State of burdens and rewards among its subjects (iustitia distributiva secundum proportionalitatem).5 c) Commutative justice, which governs the relations between men as private individuals (iustitia commutativa). This species of justice demands a perfect adjustment of rights and prescribes that they be duly observed and respected.6 Commutative justice is the most perfect species of justice, and its violation not only involves moral guilt, but in addition entails the duty of restitution.
5 Jer. XXI, 12; XXII, 3; Prov. VIII, 15 sq.; Wisd. VI, 1-8.
6 Cfr., for instance, Ex. XX, 15, 17; Tob. IV, 15 sq.; Slater, A Manual of Moral Theology, I, 341 sq.; M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 81 sqq.
A subspecies of distributive justice is vindictive justice, which metes out condign punishment to those who commit crimes and thereby injure the common weal.7 Vindictive justice (iustitia vindicativa) may be reduced to legal justice, in so far as the superior who punishes or the subject who is punished promotes the common weal, or to commutative justice, in so far as every judge is supposed to punish by virtue of his office and in accordance with the law.
It is objected that this conception of justice unduly stresses the demand of suum cuique and thus, by favoring selfishness, runs counter to the social ethos. This is a mistake. Egotism is absolutely excluded by the principle of giving to every one that which is his due or right. Commutative justice, in a sense, interferes with the freedom of the individual; however, legal and distributive justice counteract this effect by reuniting the separated members. One-sided insistence on commutative justice leads to extreme individualism, whilst undue emphasis on legal and distributive justice is apt to entail extreme Socialism. Here, as everywhere, it is necessary to stick closely to the golden mean.8 3. Justice in all its forms is a duty inculcated both by the moral law of nature and by Divine Revelation.9 It is not only one of the so-called fundamental virtues, but a general virtue. "As the will of God directed to the creature, regarded in its total content, constitutes right, i.e., that which directs and governs human actions, so the totality of the free actions corresponding • to the divine will is justice, as virtus generalis. "> 10 "Justice," says St. Bonaventure, 'is said to surround all the powers of man, for it is not only a cardinal virtue, but likewise a general virtue, comprehending the entire rectitude of the soul, because it is defined as the right governance of the will. Hence it comprehends not only those virtues which control man's relations to his fellowmen, as, for example, equity and liberality, but also those that govern his relations to himself, for example, penance and innocence, as well as his relations towards God, e. g., worship, piety, and obedience." 11 That which is due to a man according to the dictates of justice is called his right. Every man has a right to live, to enjoy a good name, to hold property, etc. Whoever deprives him of any of these rights is guilty of an injustice (iniuria), which is a mortal sin ex genere suo, because it destroys charity, though it admits of smallness of matter (parvitas materiae).12
8 F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. II, 7th ed., pp. 75 sq.
9 Cfr. S. Lueg and B. Mairhofer, Bibl. Realkonkordanz, Vol. I, 5th ed., Ratisbon 1900, pp. 534 sqq. 10J. E. Pruner, Lehre vom Recht, und von der Gerechtigkeit, I, 5.
11 Breviloquium, P. V. c. 4: "Prudence rectifies the rational power, fortitude the irascible power, and temperance the concupiscible power; justice, however, rectifies all these powers in relation to another. And because that other may determinately be one's neighbor, the same man may also be related to himself as to another, and the other may also be God Himself. Hence justice is said to encompass all the powers, for it is not only a cardinal virtue but also a general virtue, comprehending the rectitude of the whole soul, since it is itself called rectitude of the will. Therefore it comprehends not only the virtues ordering one toward one's neighbor, such as equity and liberality, but also those ordering one toward oneself, such as penance and innocence, and likewise toward God, such as worship, piety, and obedience."—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 58, art. 5.
12 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 59, art. 1-4; J. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, Pp. 45 sqg. 18 Slater, Mor. Theol., I, 343г
Rights, then, are the subject-matter of justice.
A right may be defined as the moral power of having, doing, or exacting something.! Justice and right, therefore, are by no means synonymous terms. A right is a claim inhering in the human personality; whereas justice regulates the proper distribution of rights. A right is something definite and concrete, whereas justice is that which defines, determines, or guides. Rights, strictly speaking, appertain to jurisprudence, whereas justice belongs to ethics. The virtue of justice may be derived and developed from the principles of moral science. Christian revelation, containing within itself the highest and most perfect system of morality, also furnishes the most complete notion of justice. But the knowledge of what is "right" must be gathered from the science of jurisprudence, and in discussing the "rights" of men, theology is as dependent upon jurisprudence as jurisprudence in its turn is dependent upon the fundamental truths of Christianity for the correct notion of justice. We have a divine revelation concerning justice, but none concerning rights. 14 It is easy to be a jurist, but it is difficult to practice justice.
14 Cfr. Linsenmann, Moraltheol., P. 408.
READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 58-61 (Jos. Rickaby, S. J., Aquinas Ethicus, or the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, Vol. II, [London 1896, pp. 11 sqq.]).-J. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, Freiburg 1873.-A. Van Gestel, De Iustitia et Lege Civili, 2nd ed., Gröningen 1896, pp. 9 sqq., 46 sqq.—V. Cathrein S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, 5th ed., pp. 355 sqq.-Thos. Slater, S. J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, PP. 340 sqq.- V. Cathrein, S.J., Recht, Naturrecht und positives Recht, Freiburg 1901.- A. Vermeersch, S. J., Quaestiones de Iustitia, Bruges 1901, pp. 6 sqq.-J. E. Pruner, Lehre vom Recht und von der Gerechtigkeit, Vol. I, Ratisbon 1857, Pp. 5 sqq.—J. Kiefer, Die Tugend der ausgleichenden Gerechtigkeit, 2nd ed., Eichstätt 1908. -J. A. Ryan, Distributive Justice, New York 1916.-J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, Pp. 241 sqq., New York 1919.-M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, Dublin 1917, pp. 80 sqq. -H. Woods, S. J., A First Book in Ethics, N. Y. 1923, pp. 71 sqq.