Section 3: Binding Force of the Natural Law

1. The natural law is universal, that is to say, it embraces all the actions of man.¹ Because of this universality it is the foundation and measure of all positive law, divine as well as human, ecclesiastical as well as civil.² No law is valid unless it conforms to the moral law of nature. Hence it is false to say that politicians and diplomats are bound by a different law than that which governs private life.

¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 93, art. 1: "The eternal law is nothing other than the reason of divine wisdom insofar as it directs all acts and movements."

² Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 99, art. 2, ad 1: "Just as grace presupposes nature, so the divine law must presuppose the natural law." —Ibid., qu. 95, art. 2: "Every humanly established law has the character of law to the extent that it is derived from the law of nature. But if in anything it disagrees with the natural law, it will no longer be law, but a corruption of law." —F. Suarez, De Legibus, II, c. 9, n. 10: "Nature is the foundation both of grace and of every human law. The natural principles by which man ought to be governed in moral matters are so general that they virtually comprehend every obligation, so that none can be applied to man except through those principles." (Opera Omnia, V, 120).

The natural law, moreover, is universal because it binds all men. Its divine Author recognizes no "super-man." No human being is "beyond good and bad," as Nietzsche would have it, but all without exception are subject to the precepts of the moral law.³ Human nature is essentially the same in all men, and hence all are equal before the natural law without distinction of time, place, sex, or intellectual attainments. "The natural law" the Schoolmen were wont to say, "is one for all."⁴

³ Pius IX condemned the following propositions in his famous Syllabus (No. 56): "Moral laws do not need divine sanction, and it is by no means necessary that human laws conform to natural right or receive their binding force from God." No. 64: "Both the violation of any most sacred oath and any wicked and shameful action contrary to the eternal law is not only not to be condemned, but is altogether lawful and to be extolled with the highest praises when it is done for love of country." (Denzinger-Bannwart, numbers 1756 and 1764).

⁴ Cfr. Cicero, De Republica, III, 22: ''Nor will there be one law at Rome and another at Athens, one now and another later; rather, one eternal and immutable law will embrace all peoples at every time, and God will be, as it were, the one common master and ruler of all, the discoverer, judge, and giver of this law. Whoever does not obey Him will flee from himself and, having spurned human nature, will by this very fact pay the greatest penalties." — St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 91, art. 5, ad 3: "The natural law directs man according to certain common precepts in which both the perfect and the imperfect agree, and therefore it is one for all. But the divine law also directs man in certain particular matters toward which the perfect and imperfect are not similarly disposed, and therefore the law had to be twofold." —On the foolish notion of the "superman" see W. Schneider, Göttliche Weltordnung, 2nd ed., pp. 165 sqq., 233 sqq.; F. Sawicki, Das Problem der Persönlichkeit und des Übermenschen, Paderborn 1909.

In view of the fact that the light of reason was darkened by the fall of our first parents, we must distinguish between primary and secondary precepts of the natural law.⁵ The knowledge of the former (prima et communissima principia), though often impaired by sin, cannot be effaced from the human conscience. Man may, however, through internal and external influences, so completely lose all knowledge of the secondary principles of the natural law (praecepta secundaria) that he is led to commit evil actions without being aware of their true character.⁶ Such actions are morally guiltless, which is but another way of saying that with regard to the secondary precepts of the natural law there may be what theologians call ignorantia invincibilis et inculpabilis. ⁷ Many writers distinguish three species of moral precepts:

⁵ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 94, art. 6: "To the natural law belong first certain most general precepts known to all, and secondly certain more particular secondary precepts, which are as it were conclusions closely derived from the principles."

⁶ Cfr. Tertullian, De Anima, c. 41: "There is also in the soul that principal good, that divine and genuine good which is properly natural. For what is from God is not so much extinguished as overshadowed. It can be overshadowed because it is not God; it cannot be extinguished because it is from God." (Corpus Script. Eccles. Lat., Vol. XX, pp. 1, 368). —St. Augustine, Confess., II, c. 4: "The law written in the hearts of men, which not even iniquity itself erases." (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 678). —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 94, art. 6: "As regards those common principles, the natural law can in no way be erased from the hearts of men universally; it is nevertheless erased in a particular matter of action insofar as reason is prevented from applying the common principle to the particular action because of concupiscence or some other passion. As regards the other secondary precepts, however, the natural law can be erased from the hearts of men either because of evil persuasions—in the same way that errors concerning necessary conclusions also occur in speculative matters—or because of depraved customs and corrupt habits, as among some peoples robberies, or even vices contrary to nature, were not considered sins, as the Apostle also says." (Rom. I, 18-32).

⁷ Among the propositions condemned by Alexander VIII, Dec. 7, 1690, is the following (prop. 2): "Although invincible ignorance of the natural law be granted, in the state of fallen nature this ignorance does not of itself excuse the person acting from formal sin." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1291). —On the theological controversy regarding the ignorantia invincibilis, cfr. K. Werner, Franz Suarez, Vol. I, pp. 354 sqq.

(1) First, highest, and most general precepts (praecepta primaria), as, "We must do good and avoid evil," "We must worship God," etc.; (2) Secondary precepts (praecepta secundaria), derived by direct deduction from the first, as: "We must not blaspheme," "We must not lie," etc.; (3) Remote precepts (praecepta remota), which are deducible from the first indirectly, by a process of logical reasoning, as: "It is wrong to practice usury," "Lost articles should be restored to their rightful owners," etc.

With regard to precepts of the second class (secundaria), persons intellectually undeveloped or unfamiliar with the common teaching of morality may occasionally err, though only for a time. The precepts of the third class are easily subject to invincible, and therefore guiltless, error.

It is impossible, however, to draw a hard and fast line between the precepts of the second and those of the third class. Some theologians (Scotus, Gerson, etc.) have held that the unity and indissolubility of marriage, the right of private property, and other important principles, cannot be deduced with certainty from the primary precepts of the natural law.⁸

⁸ Cfr. A. Stöckl, Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Vol. II, pp. 852 sq.

2. With respect to its binding force, the moral law of nature is absolute or unchangeable, that is to say, it cannot be abrogated by positive divine or human law.⁹ Not even God can change it or dispense from its precepts. The reason is that, as He commands man absolutely through the voice of conscience to do good and avoid evil, it would be a contradiction were He to permit anyone to disobey that voice.¹⁰

⁹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 94, art. 5; V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, 4th ed., pp. 401 sqq.

¹⁰ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 100, art. 8, ad 2: "The Apostle says (2 Tim. II, 13): 'God remains faithful; He cannot deny Himself.' But He would deny Himself if He removed the order of His justice, since He Himself is His justice. And therefore God cannot dispense in this matter so that it would be lawful for man not to be rightly ordered toward God or not to be subject to the order of His justice, even in those matters according to which men are ordered toward one another. "

Those who hold that God can dispense from the precepts of the natural law, regard that law as an arbitrary fiat or else think there is no other way of explaining certain incidents recorded in the Old Testament (the sacrifice of Abraham, the appropriation of the golden vessels by the Israelites, the marriage of Osee,¹¹ etc.). The former assumption is manifestly false. The latter may be characterized as a clumsy subterfuge. The exegetical difficulties which it was devised to meet, are real; but they cannot be solved by the assumption that God, as the Sovereign Lord and Lawgiver, can dispense from the precepts of the natural law and arbitrarily dispose of the lives and property of men.¹² For, though there are some technical difficulties in the text,¹³ it is clearly impossible for God to dispense any man from the natural law because that law is an effluence of His voluntas ordinata, i. e., His will as governed by His wisdom and benevolence.¹⁴ Whatever the natural law commands is good and whatever it forbids is evil, not because it is commanded or forbidden by lawful authority, but because it is in conformity with, or opposed to, man's rational nature; or, as the Scholastics say, "Things are not good because they are commanded, but are commanded because they are good."

¹¹ Gen. XXII, 2; Ex. I, 15-21; III, 22; XI, 2; XII, 35-36; Os. I, 2.

¹² Cfr. St. Augustine, Quaestiones in Heptateuch., VII, qu. 36 (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 803); IDEM, De Civitate Dei, I, c. 21 (P. L., XLI, 35); IDEM, De Divers. Quaest., 83, qu. 53 (P. L., XL, 34-38); St. Bernard, Liber de Praec. et Dispens., c. 3, n. 6-8 (P. L., CLXXXII, 864); St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 100, art. 8, ad 3.

¹³ With regard to the sacrifice of Abraham cfr. P. Scholz, Die hl. Altertümer des Volkes Israel, Vol. II, Ratisbon 1868, pp. 119 sq.; on the marriage of Osee, W. Riedel, Alttestamentliche Untersuchungen, Leipsic 1902, pp. 1 sqq. (The prophet's consort was a servant of Baal and an idolatress, and in this sense is called "a wife of fornications"). On Ex. III, 22 see F. Bennewitz, Die Sünde im alten Israel, Leipsic 1907, pp. 70 sqq.—Cfr. Ph. Kneib, Die "Jenseitsmoral," pp. 200 sqq.

¹⁴ Cfr. Rom. VII, 14; Eph. I, 1 1; Kneib, Die "Jenseitsmoral," pp. 38 sqq.; P. Minges, O.F.M., Der Gottesbegriff des Duns Scotus, pp. 101 sqq., 120 sqq.

To this consideration may be added another. God's action furnishes the ideal for the moral conduct of men. "Be ye holy, because I the Lord your God am holy."¹⁵ He is absolute goodness. "One is good, God."¹⁶ 1G Jesus Christ, the second Person of the Trinity, is the pattern-exemplar of all perfection, "as a kind of law and living justice."¹⁷ Were God, therefore, even in one single instance, to dispense from the natural law, He would set up a different rule of conduct for Himself and His rational creatures, and thus confuse the minds of men, give scandal, and render His own example ineffective.¹⁸

¹⁵ Lev. XIX, 2; cfr. Lev. XI, 44; Matth. V, 48; i Pet. I, 16.

¹⁶ Matth. XIX, 17: "Unus est bonus, Deus."

¹⁷ "... quasi quaedam lex et quaedam iustitia animata." (St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, qu. 59, art. 2, ad 1).

¹⁸ St. Thomas, De Veritate, qu. 23, art. 6: "The will does not have the character of the first rule, but is a right rule. For it is directed by reason and intellect, not only in us but in God. ... To say that justice depends upon sheer will is to say that the divine will does not proceed according to the order of wisdom, which is blasphemous." —IDEM, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 21, art. 1, ad 2: "Since the good understood is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything except what the reason of His wisdom has. This reason is like a law of justice, according to which His will is right and just. Hence what He does according to His will He does justly, just as we too act justly when we act according to law. We, however, act according to the law of someone superior, whereas God is a law to Himself.

To-day not a few who reject the teaching of Christianity demand an ethical system in which man is his own law. This demand is to some extent justified. Man has a right to insist that the moral yoke imposed on him should conform to his rational nature. But reason is not the highest and final authority. Man, far from being independent and autonomous, is a creature subject to God. On the other hand we must not exaggerate the heteronomous side of Christian ethics. The moral law is not an arbitrary fiat of the Almighty which demands blind obedience without regard to the dictates of reason. Heteronomy in this sense would be unworthy of human nature and of God. In matter of fact Christian morality is by no means onesidedly heteronomous. It combines autonomy with heteronomy by teaching that, though God is the Author of all law, His will is not arbitrary, but based on His wisdom. Human reason being a reflection of the divine Intellect, its dictates must coincide with the laws of God. In other words, the will of God is promulgated in our rational nature, which thereby becomes for us the proximate, though only a secondary, source of the moral law. Man sins when he acts against his reason or conviction. But reason does not get its authority from itself. God, from whom all authority comes, has inscribed the natural law into the hearts of his rational creatures.

Thus, according to the Catholic view, man serves God by obeying the dictates of his reason, and morality is alike autonomous and heteronomous.

READINGS. —E. Sawicki, Wert und Würde der Persönlichkeit im Christentum, Cologne 1906. —IDEM, Das Problem der Persönlichkeit und des Uebermenschen, Paderborn 1909. —Ph. Kneib, Die "Heteronomie" der christlichen Moral, pp. 17 sqq. —IDEM, Die "Jenseitsmoral" im Kampfe um ihre Grundlagen, pp. 7 sqq. —M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 615 sqq. —E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 5th ed., pp. 137 sqq.—W. McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science, Dublin 1904, pp. 92 sqq.