Section — Koch–Preuss
Section 3: Object of Vows
By the object of a vow we understand its matter, or, in other words, that which is promised to God.
This object must be good, nay something better than its opposite.1 It may be something that is not a matter of duty, but merely of counsel, or something which is a duty, as, e. g., patience in suffering or chastity corresponding to one’s state of life.2 Vows of the last-mentioned kind are often made with the intention of insuring special fervor in the fulfilment of one’s duties. To the original obligation arising from the law a vow adds the additional one resulting from the promise made. The so-called baptismal vow, or a promise made in the confessional to avoid the occasion of sin, to keep the holydays of obligation, etc., are in themselves mere resolutions, but partake of the nature of vows if they are accompanied by a solemn promise to employ extraordinary means of grace.
1 Ths. Slater, S.J., Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, p. 247.
2 St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 189, art. 2: “One and the same work done by vow is more praiseworthy than if it were done without a vow.”—Cfr. qu. 88, art. 6.
Nothing that is sinful, unjust, incompatible with one’s higher duties, or physically or morally impossible, can be made the object of a vow.
The matter of a vow, by its very nature, must be something which is physically and morally possible, for no one can reasonably assume an obligation which it is beyond his power to fulfil.3
3 Cfr. Matt. XV, 5 sq.; Mark VII, 11–13.—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 315: “I. The matter of a vow must be a morally good thing, indeed a better good, because God is not worshipped by an indifferent or less good action; for by a vow special worship is promised to God, which cannot be given except in the promise of a better thing. But a better good is understood not only absolutely in itself, but also relatively to various circumstances. II. The matter of a vow must be a morally possible thing, because a vow is a promise made to God with the intention of binding oneself; but no one can bind himself to something morally impossible for him. But if the thing is divisible and possible in part, the vow is valid for that part; it is not valid, however, if it is morally indivisible.”
If a vow can be kept only in part, and the matter is capable of being divided (materia divisibilis), the vovens is bound to do as much as he can, unless he has promised different acts as parts of one inseparable whole. Thus if a husband or wife had vowed to observe chastity, he or she would at least have to refrain from demanding the debitum. If one had made a vow to give a certain sum to the poor, and found that he was unable to give all he had promised, he would have to give as much as he could.
A similar rule governs all circumstances which may enter into the substance of a vow. Thus, if one has vowed to make a pilgrimage on foot, and finds himself unable to walk, he must go on horseback, or by train, or in some other way, if he can.4
4 F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., p. 471.
A vow to avoid all, even the slightest venial sins, would be invalid because the matter promised is impossible. The case would be different if the vow referred to mortal sins, or to deliberate venial sins, or to venial sins of a determined species. Such vows are valid, though on account of the difficulty involved in keeping them, they are not expedient for all.5
5 Ferreres, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, p. 277; cfr. Mazzella, De Gratia, disp. 2, art. 5.
A vow to marry or get married would be, per se, invalid, even if it referred to some poor and pious person. The reason is that, for the vovens, the celibate state would be bonum maius. If, however, marriage is necessary for any individual, either to remove scandal or to escape the danger of incontinence, it would be for that person a bonum melius and hence a fit object for a vow. The same is true if one who had already made up his mind to enter the matrimonial state, would vow to marry a poor girl in order to rescue her from poverty.6
6 Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, p. 231.
To vow absolutely never to make a vow would be invalid, because it is better to vow than not to vow. To vow never to make a vow except with the permission of one’s confessor, on the other hand, would be valid, because it is better to make a vow without danger of imprudence than with that danger present. If one who has vowed never to make a vow except with the consent of his confessor would afterwards break his promise by making a vow without consulting his confessor, the act would be sinful indeed, but the vow would be valid, unless the vovens had expressly stipulated that any future vow thus taken should be invalid.7
7 Ibid.; cfr. P. Laymann, S.J., Theol. Mor., l. IV, tr. 4, c. 2, n. 5.
READINGS.—Gury, Compendium Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 315–318.—J. B. Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion, pp. 549 sqq.—F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., Paderborn 1909, pp. 471 sqq.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 9th ed., pp. 276 sq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 229 sqq.