Section 4: Conditions of Validity

The conditions required to make a vow valid and licit, are the following:

1. He who makes a vow must have the serious and deliberate intention (animus vovendi) of binding himself by his promise under pain of sin, because every vow is a kind of particular law which the vovens takes upon himself before God.¹

¹ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 310: “For the validity of a vow there is required both a true and deliberate intention of making the vow, or a true promise made to God under pain of sin, because a vow is a kind of particular law which the vower imposes upon himself before God. However, the will and deliberation required for mortal sin suffice.”

2. He must have sufficient knowledge and be free to make or not to make the promise in question. Hence the following classes of persons are incapable of making a valid vow: a) Minors; b) Those entirely or partly intoxicated; c) Those who have not the full use of reason; d) Those who act under the influence of substantial error concerning the nature or purpose of the vow; e) Those impelled by grave fear caused unjustly and with reference to the vow;² f) Those under special obedience, as children, religious, scrupulous persons, in matters falling within the sphere of parental power, religious obedience, or special direction, unless they act with the knowledge and consent of their parents or superiors.

² Op. cit., I, 323: Question: Is a vow made under fear valid? Answer: 1. No, if the fear is grave, unjust, and instilled with reference to the vow. The reason is that God is not deemed to accept such a promise as an honorable man would not accept. 2. Yes, if the fear arises intrinsically or from a necessary cause, unless it deprives the vower of the use of reason, because then that vow is simply voluntary. Likewise, if the fear comes from a slight cause, because that fear is not deemed efficaciously to influence the act and is rather the occasion than the cause of the vow.”—Cfr. Aug. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Casus Conscientiae, Vol. I, 3rd ed., n. 252–256.

A vow made without the serious and deliberate intention of binding oneself (sine animo vovendi) is called votum fictum. It is, per se, a venial sin, unless it involves contempt of God, grave scandal, or serious deception, in which case it is a mortal sin.

A vow is invalid if made in complete or partial ignorance of the obligation which it involves; but it is valid if the subject has at least a cognitio plena habitualis, even though actual advertence be lacking, or implicita, as, for instance, when one vows to do this or that according to common usage or custom.

A substantial error affects either the substance of the matter vowed, or some inherent circumstance of such importance that if the vovens knew of it, he would not make the vow.

The purpose of a vow is the causa motiva or finalis that inspires it. Note that a religious vow always binds unless the error affects the substance, because of the firmitas status religiosi; the religious state being precisely that which one intends to vow primarily and absolutely.³

³ St. Alphonsus explains this seeming inconsistency by saying that if the Church did not insist on the validity of such vows, the commonweal would be injured by many scandals, etc. The vow to enter the religious state, moreover, as Göpfert points out, involves a sort of bilateral contract, analogous to matrimony, and consequently involves a similar obligation.

Grave fear is fear that disturbs reason. To make a vow invalid such fear must be unjustly caused and constitute the motive of the vow. It is plain that a vow taken in this state of mind lacks the essential element of freedom.

A vow of chastity made about the age of puberty is ordinarily valid. So are all vows made in order to obtain the divine help in danger of death, no matter whether this danger arises from sickness, accident, or some other cause.

3. The object of the vow, as we have already seen in a previous section, must be something good and lawful, and subject to the power of the vovens.

A vow, the object of which were physically or morally impossible, would be invalid, as would also a vow by which one tried to obligate another without his consent. Thus a child that has been dedicated to the religious state by a vow of his parents, is not bound to embrace that state unless he has made the parental promise his own. A vow made by a husband without the consent of his wife or by a wife without the consent of her husband (absque pari consensu), in regard to matters over which neither party has exclusive control (e. g., common property or the debitum), does not bind the other party, and binds the party making it only in so far as its fulfilment is not hindered by the other party.⁴ For the same reason, i. e., because a vow binds only him who has made it validly, the heirs of a testator are bound to fulfil a vow made by him, not by reason of the vow itself (ratione voti), but as a matter of justice, inasmuch as, by accepting the inheritance, they have assumed the moral and legal obligations connected therewith.

⁴ Cfr. Numb. XXX, 3–17; 1 Cor. VII, 4–5.—Tertullian, Ad Uxorem, l. I, c. 6: “How many there are who immediately after the laver seal their flesh! How many likewise who by equal consent remove between themselves the marriage debt, voluntary eunuchs for desire of the kingdom of heaven.” (Ed. Leopold, P. II, 67).—St. Jerome, Epist., 148 (al. 14), n. 28: “I have learned that you [the matron Celantia], kindled with a wondrous love of faith, proposed continence some years ago and consecrated the remaining time of your life to chastity. It is a sign of a great soul and an indication of perfect virtue suddenly to renounce experienced pleasure, to flee the familiar enticements of the flesh, and to quench the flames of an age still warm with the love [al. ardor] of faith. But I learned at the same time something else which troubles and pricks me no little: namely, that you began to preserve so great a good without the consent and agreement of your husband, although apostolic authority absolutely forbids this, which in this cause alone subjects not only the wife to the husband but also the husband to the wife’s power (1 Cor. VII, 4). But you, as though forgetful of the nuptial covenant and unmindful of the agreement of law, vowed chastity to the Lord without consulting your husband. Yet that which is still in another’s power is promised dangerously. And I do not know how pleasing the gift is if one offers the property of two. Through ignorance of this kind we have already heard of and seen many marriages torn apart and, what it grieves me to recall, adultery committed on the occasion of chastity. For while one party abstains even from lawful things, the other falls into unlawful things. And I do not know in such a case who should be accused more or who should be blamed more: whether he who, rejected by his spouse, commits fornication, or she who, by repelling her husband from herself, in a certain manner exposes him to fornication. And that you may recognize what the truth holds concerning this matter, a few things must be set down for me from divine authority. The rule of apostolic doctrine neither, with Jovinian, equates the works of continence with marriage, nor, with Mani, condemns marriages. Thus the vessel of election and teacher of the Gentiles walks temperately and in the middle between the two, so that he grants a remedy to incontinence and calls continence to its reward. His whole meaning in this matter is that chastity be proposed by the agreement of both or at least that the common debt be remitted by both.” (Migne, P. L., XXII, 1217).—IDEM, Epist., 123 (ult. 11), n. 11 (P. L., XXII, 1053).—St. Augustine, Epist., 262 (al. 199), n. 2: “I omit the fact that I learned that she had undertaken that very continence while he was not yet willing, contrary to sound doctrine.”—Ibid., n. 3: “What you had both vowed to God by equal consent, you both ought to have rendered perseveringly to the end; if he has fallen from that resolution, at least do you persevere most steadfastly. I would not exhort you to this unless he himself had consented to it for you.” (P. L., XXXIII, 1078).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, Suppl., qu. 64, art. 6,

READINGS.—J. P. Gury, Compendium Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 310–314.—J. B. Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion, pp. 558 sqq.—F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., pp. 467 sqq.—Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, 247 sqq.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 9th ed., pp. 274 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 226 sqq.—A. M. Arregui, S.J., Summarium Theol. Mor., ed. 4a, Bilbao 1920, pp. 114 sq.—E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 172 sqq.