Section — Koch–Preuss
Section 4: The Duty and Virtue of Veracity
- DEFINITION.—Veracity or truthfulness (veritas sive veracitas) means habitual regard for the truth, and may be defined for our present purpose as the duty of adhering to the truth in our intercourse with others.
St. James teaches: "If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man; he is able also with a bridle to lead about the whole body."1
1 Jas. III, 2: “If anyone does not offend in word, he is a perfect man. For he can lead the whole body about with a bridle.”
Commenting on this passage, Dr. Belser says:
"What does it mean not to offend in word, and to be perfect in speech? It means to tell the truth always, to speak exactly as one thinks, to say neither too much nor too little, to speak in the right place and at the proper time, without anger, bitterness, or exaggeration. It is not enough to be cautious in speech for prudence sake or to observe a diplomatic reticence, but we should habitually control our tongue and employ it exclusively for the honor of God and the edification and salvation of our fellowmen."2
2 J. E. Belser, Die Epistel des hl. Jakobus, Freiburg i. B. 1909, pp. 140 sq.
- VERACITY A SOCIAL NECESSITY.—Man is an ethical and a social being. He is made for intercourse with his fellowmen and cannot live without their assistance. Now, community life depends upon mutual fidelity and veracity.3
3 St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 2: “Truth is a certain special virtue by which a man arranges his outward things—whether words, deeds, or signs—in due order.”—Ibid., qu. 129, art. 3, ad 1: “Every man needs first divine assistance, and secondly also human assistance, because man is naturally a social animal, since he is not sufficient unto himself for life.”
"Men could not associate with one another," says St. Thomas, "if they did not believe each other."4 This is but another way of saying that the virtue of veracity is one of the fundamental conditions of a well-ordered community life and, therefore, a duty resting upon each individual member of society. "Putting away lying," says St. Paul, "speak ye the truth every man with his neighbor; for we are all members one of another."5
4 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 3, ad 1: “Because man is a social animal, one man naturally owes another that without which human society could not be preserved. Men, however, could not live together unless they believed one another as persons manifesting truth to one another. And therefore the virtue of truth in some way bears the character of a debt.”—Cfr. Hirscher, Die christliche Moral, Vol. III, pp. 274 sqq.
5 Eph. IV, 25: “Putting away lying, speak ye the truth every man with his neighbor; for we are all members one of another.”—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 2, ad 1: “Because man is naturally a social animal, he owes to other men, from a certain honorableness, the manifestation of truth, without which human society could not endure.... Man could not live in society without truth.”
- VERACITY A DUTY.—Faith and mutual confidence, without which human society could not exist, are essentially conditioned upon vera- city, which consequently is a postulate of the moral order or, in other words, a natural duty. But it is more than that: it is also a supernatural duty, enforced by Revelation.6
6 Ex. XX, 16; Lev. XIX, 11; Ps. XIV, 3; XXX, 24; Zach. VIII, 16, 19; Prov. VI, 16 sq.; XII, 22; Ecclus. IV, 30; Matth. V, 37; 2 Cor. VI, 7; Eph. IV, 25; VI, 14.
Veracity as a duty has a positive as well as a negative side. Positively, it obliges a man to tell the truth; negatively, it obliges him not to lie. a) As a positive duty veracity obliges not absolutely, but merely in a conditional way; that is to say, we are not bound to tell our fellowmen all we know, but to reveal our thoughts to them only when obliged to do so by strict justice (as when questioned by legitimate authority) or by charity (as when it becomes necessary to uncover a harmful error or to aid an innocent man in obtaining his release from prison).
We are allowed to withhold the truth when we are not under positive obligation to reveal it and when to speak out would cause harm and inconvenience to ourselves. It is permitted to feign sleep or death in order to escape being murdered, to disguise oneself to avoid danger, and to dress poorly in order to conceal one's wealth or to avoid inconvenience or annoyance. By such acts one merely withholds facts or conditions which one is not obliged to reveal and allows others rather to deceive themselves. Even when asked by legitimate authority, one who is accused of a crime may refuse to confess if he can do so without being guilty of positive or negative untruth and without violating commutative justice, i. e., without seriously injuring his fellowmen, for instance, by causing an innocent person to be condemned.
Finally, there is the duty of not revealing to others what has been entrusted to us as a secret, or which we have bound ourselves by a promise or by the assumption of an office to keep to ourselves. Thus priests, physicians, counsellors-at-law, and editors are not allowed to divulge secrets they have learned in the exercise of their profession.
Besides this there is the general duty binding every Christian to guard his tongue at all times and to avoid useless or frivolous gossip, mindful of the fact that on the day of judgment he shall have to give an account of every word he has uttered.7
7 Matth. XII, 36; Jas. I, 19; III, 5 sqq.
A higher degree of veracity is frankness or simplicity of heart (simplicitas), which consists in habitually saying what one thinks, without reserve, exaggeration, or ulterior motive.8 Sim- plicity differs from veracity only in concept (in ratione), as the former has reference to the agreement between a sign and that which it signifies, while the latter aims at harmonizing the internal intention with its external expression.9 It is simplicity that constitutes the childlike disposition so highly extolled by our Divine Lord in conjunction with prudence. Simplicity renders the soul receptive to the influence of grace, fills the heart with joy, and is a mark of supernatural perfection.10
8 St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 2, ad 4: “Simplicity is named by opposition to duplicity, namely, whereby someone has one thing in his heart and shows another outwardly; and thus simplicity pertains to this virtue [truth]. It makes the intention right, not indeed directly (because this pertains to every virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a man pretends one thing and intends another.”
9 Ibid., qu. 111, art. 3, ad 2: “The virtue of simplicity is the same as the virtue of truth, but differs only in concept, because truth is said according as signs agree with the things signified, whereas simplicity is said according as it does not tend to diverse things, namely, that one should intend one thing inwardly and pretend another outwardly.”
The vice opposed to simplicity is duplicity, i. e., deceitfulness in character, speech, or conduct, more commonly called double-dealing. b) On the negative side the duty of veracity or truthfulness binds absolutely,—that is to say, we are not permitted, under any circumstances and for any reason, to lie, i. e., knowingly to tell an untruth in order to deceive others. Ecclus. VII, 14: "Be not willing to make any manner of lie: for the custom thereof is not good."11
11 Ecclus. VII, 14. Cfr. Ex. XXIII, 7; Eph. IV, 25; Col. III, 9.
READINGS.—Hugh of St. Victor, Summa Sent., tr. 4, c. 5 (Migne, P. L., CLXXVI, 122 sqq.).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 109 (Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus, II, 212 sqq.).—St.
Bonaventure, Comment. in Sent., III, dist. 38 (Opera Omnia, III, 836 sqq.).—Kössing, Über die Wahrheitsliebe, pp. 1 sqq., 55 sqq.—J. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, pp. 124 sqq.—H. Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, p. 647.—Jos. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and Its Antagonists (tr. by A. M. Buchanan; N. Y. 1914, pp. 113 sqq.).—Jos. Rickaby, S.J., “The Catholic Doctrine of Lying and Equivocation,” in Political and Moral Essays, N. Y. 1902, pp. 215–233.—Th. Meyer, S.J., Inst. Iuris Nat., Vol. II, pp. 60 sqq.