Section — Koch–Preuss
Section 5: The Sin of Lying
- DEFINITION.—To lie is knowingly to tell an untruth in order to deceive others.1
1 St. Augustine, De Mendacio, c. 4, n. 5: “Whether one who has no will to deceive lies . . . and whether anyone who wishes to state what is true for the sake of deceiving lies can be doubted. But no one doubts that he lies who willingly states what is false for the sake of deceiving; therefore it is manifest that a false statement uttered with the will to deceive is a lie.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 491).—IDEM, Contra Mendac., c. 12, n. 26 (P. L., XL, 537).—IDEM, Enchirid., c. 22: “Everyone who lies speaks contrary to what he feels in his mind, with the will to deceive.” (P. L., XL, 243).—Cfr. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 453: “A lie is speech contrary to the mind, with the will to deceive.”—Cfr. P. Ch. Kierkegaard, De Notione atque Turpitudine Mendacii, Göttingen 1829.
To constitute a lie, the false declaration, whether made in word or deed, must be opposed to the interior conviction or belief of him who makes it (enuntiatio contra mentem), and further, it must be inspired by the intention (voluntas fallendi) of deceiving and misleading others, especially those who have a right to know the truth.
The matter of a lie (materia), therefore, is the untruth uttered,—not objectively, however, but subjectively, i.e., as opposed to that which one knows or believes to be true.
Consequently, an objectively false statement which one believes to be true is no lie, and, vice versa, an objectively true statement which one believes to be false, is a lie. It is the intention that constitutes a lie (ream linguam non facit nisi mens rea).2 One who makes a false statement which he believes to be true, does not wish to deceive others, but is himself deceived.3
2 J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching, pp. 108 sqq.—St. Augustine, Serm., 180 (al. 28 De Verbis Apost.), c. 2, n. 2 (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 973); De Mendacio, c. 3, n. 3: “He lies who has one thing in his mind and states another in words or by any other signs. Hence the liar is also said to have a double heart, that is, a double thought: one concerning the thing which he knows or thinks to be true and does not state, and another concerning the thing which he states in its place, knowing or thinking it to be false. Thus one may state what is false without lying, if he thinks it is as he says although it is not; and one may state what is true while lying, if he thinks it false and states it as true although in fact it is as he states. For a man must be judged a liar or not a liar according to the judgment of his own mind, not according to the truth or falsity of the things themselves. Therefore one who states as true what is false, yet believes it to be true, may be called mistaken and rash, but he is not rightly called a liar, because when he states it he does not have a double heart and does not wish to deceive, but is himself deceived. The liar’s fault, however, is his mind’s desire to deceive in making a statement, whether he does deceive when his false statement is believed, or does not deceive, either when he is not believed or when he states what is true with the will to deceive, not believing it true. When such a statement is believed, he certainly does not deceive, although he wished to deceive—except insofar as he deceives by being thought to know or believe as he states.” Ibid., n. 4: “Although it is most subtly asked whether, when the will to deceive is absent, there is no lie at all.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 488).—IDEM, Enchir., c. 22: “Every lie is therefore to be called a sin, because a man ought to state what he bears in mind not only when he himself knows what is true, but also if he sometimes errs and is deceived, as a man may be, whether that thing be true or only thought true and is not so.” (P. L., XL, 243).
3 Ibid., c. 18: “No one is to be judged a liar who says what is false while thinking it true, because, so far as he is concerned, he does not deceive but is deceived.” (P. L., XL, 240).
Substantially false statements which are not inspired by the intention of deceiving others (e.g., symbolic or figurative locutions, fables, fairy tales, novels, dramas, riddles, etc., in fact poetry in general) do not partake of the formal character of lies because they are designed merely to veil, sugar-coat or elucidate, not to misrepresent, the truth.
Materially untrue phrases and expressions of which everybody knows that they are not to be taken literally, or the true sense of which is sufficiently revealed by the context or the accompanying circumstances, are not properly lies. To this category belong the complimentary phrases customary in polite society, figurative or metaphorical locutions, such as hyperboles, irony, etc., as well as stratagems and deception in war, at games, and on the theatrical stage.
St. Thomas teaches that the intention to deceive does not belong to the essence of a lie, but rather to its perfection.4 Others hold a different view.5 According to the Angelic Doctor all that is required to constitute a lie is the intention of telling an untruth. A common example adduced by the defenders of this theory is that of the convicted criminal who denies his guilt. But what is it that inspires his persistent lying if not the intention of deceiving others? Purposely telling an untruth always includes, at least indirectly, the intention to deceive. If the object is not achieved, this is not owing to the liar or his false statement, but solely to the will of the hearer. A lie, therefore, is more correctly defined as telling an untruth with the intention of deceiving others. It must be admitted, at any rate, that the indirect or interpretative intention to deceive is practically always present in the mind when a man lies, because deception is the natural result of lying, though the actual accomplishment of this purpose is not required for the essence of lying, so that he who knowingly tells an untruth is guilty of lying even though he accidentally finds no credence among his hearers.6
4 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 1: “It does not belong to the species of a lie, but to a certain perfection of it.” On the controverted question whether the purpose to deceive belongs to the essence of lying, the student may consult J. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, pp. 133 sq., and Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Political and Moral Essays, N. Y. 1902, pp. 215 sqq.
5 “A statement of the false (a false statement) uttered with the will to deceive.”—Cfr. Kössing, Ueber die Wahrheitsliebe, p. 166.—St. Augustine, De Mendac., c. 3, n. 3: “He certainly does not deceive, although he wished to deceive.” (P. L., XL, 489).
6 M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 67 sqq.—Lehmen, S. J., Lehrbuch der Philosophie, Vol. IV, 2nd ed., p. 170.
The notion of a lie, therefore, in contradistinction to that of error, includes (a) the conscious telling of an untruth and (b) the intention to deceive. In popular parlance even objective untruths which are not intended to deceive, are often called lies, e. g., historical lies. But such phrases are misleading. A statement may be an untruth without being a lie. The so-called lies of history are for the most part merely errors and blunders.
- DIVISION.—a) A lie may either be uttered in words or indicated by signs. A verbal lie consists either in the denial of a truth (falsiloquium) or the assertion of an untruth with the will to deceive (mendacium).
Other species of lying are simulation (simulatio) and hypocrisy (hypocrisis),7 which may be defined as the act of assuming a false form, appearance, character, or condition in order to deceive others as to one’s real thoughts or intentions, and especially in regard to one’s true character. Simulation frequently takes the form of sanctimony, an assumed or outward show of probity,8 exemplified by the kiss with which Judas betrayed Christ.9
7 St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 63, n. 11: “Simulated innocence is not innocence; simulated equity is not equity, but twofold iniquity, because it is both iniquity and simulation.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 765).—IDEM, Serm., 355 (al. 49 de Divers.), c. 3, n. 6: “It is evil to fall away from a purpose of holiness, but it is worse to feign such a purpose.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIX, 1575).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 111, art. 1: “Just as it is opposed to truth for someone by outward words to signify something other than what he has within himself, which pertains to lying, so it is also opposed to truth for someone by certain signs of deeds or things to signify something contrary to what is in him, which is properly called simulation. Hence simulation is properly a kind of lie consisting in outward signs of deeds.”
8 Matth. VI, 1–6, 16; cfr. 2 Cor. XI, 13–15.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 111.
9 Matth. XXVI, 48–50; Luke XXII, 47 sq.
A subspecies of hypocrisy is flattery, which consists in giving insincere, false, or exaggerated praise to others with a view to influencing their future conduct. As a rule flattery is inspired by purely egotistic motives, and partakes of the malice of such motives.10 b) According to the purpose for which they are uttered, or the effect which they produce, lies are divided into several categories. There is, for instance, the jocose lie (mendacium iocosum); the officious or courtesy lie (mendacium officiosum), inspired by a desire to ward off injury or incon- venience, and the damaging or pernicious lie (mendacium damnosum sive perniciosum), dictated by a desire to injure others in life, property, or good name, perhaps even to prevent them from attaining eternal salvation.11 In lies of this kind the predominant note is not the intention to deceive, but the will to injure others, spiritually or materially.
10 Prov. XXIX, 5; Acts XXIV, 1 sqq.
11 St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 2.
- THE SINFULNESS OF LYING.—a) No statement or act that deserves the name of a “lie” in the formal and proper sense, can be justified by the end for which it is uttered or performed, be that end ever so noble or innocent. Consequently, all kinds of lies, including those told in jest, are strictly forbidden. This is the plain teaching of both the Old and the New Testament. Even if the eighth commandment: “Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor,” referred only to false testimony in the narrower sense of the word, it is more widely applied in Lev. XIX, 11: “You shall not lie, neither shall any man deceive his neighbor.”12 Again and again Holy Scripture warns men not to lie13 and threatens divine vengeance upon those who commit this sin.14 Among the “six things which the Lord hateth,” the Book of Proverbs mentions “a lying tongue.”15 The same book declares that “lying lips are an abomination to the Lord.”16
12 St. Augustine, Enchir., c. 22: “Nor is any lie therefore to be thought not a sin, because we can sometimes benefit someone by lying.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 242).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 3: “Every lie is a sin.”—Ibid., ad 4: “A lie has the character of sin not only from the harm inflicted upon one’s neighbor, but from its own disorder. It is not lawful, however, to use any illicit disorder to prevent the harms and deficiencies of others. . . . And therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order that someone may free another from any danger whatsoever.”
13 Ex. XX, 16; cfr. Matth. XXVI, 59 sqq.
14 Ps. V, 7.
15 Prov. VI, 17 sq.
16 Prov. XII, 22; cfr. Ecclus. VII, 14; XX, 26–28; XXV, 3 sq.
Jesus Christ condemns lying, attributes it to the devil as the “father of lies,”17 and challenges His enemies to convict Him of any sin against the truth.18 St. Paul admonishes the Ephesians to “put away lying and to speak the truth.”19 St. James says: “Be not liars against the truth.”20 St. John says that liars shall have their portion with whoremongers, sorcerers, and idolaters “in the pool burning with fire and brimstone, which is the second death.”21 The story of Ananias and Saphira, who brazenly lied to St. Peter and were struck dead on the spot, is too well known to require repetition.22 b) The sinfulness (malitia) of lying arises principally from the fact that a lie, being a contradiction between thought and speech, constitutes an abuse of language, which is the principal means of intellectual intercourse and was divinely bestowed upon men to enable them to communicate their thoughts to one another.
17 John VIII, 44; cfr. J. E. Belser, Das Evangelium des hl. Johannes, pp. 291 sqq.
18 John VIII, 46.
19 Eph. IV, 25; cfr. Col. III, 9.
20 Jas. III, 14.
21 Apoc. XXI, 8; cfr. XXII, 15.
22 Acts V, 1 sqq.
Untruthfulness counterfeits this spiritual medium of exchange and, by making it impossible for men to live together in mutual trust and confidence, violates the divinely established order of things and the law of nature. Therefore the Apostle exhorts the Ephesians to “put away lying and to speak the truth,” because “we are members one of another.”23
23 Eph. IV, 25. Cfr. St. Augustine, Enchir., c. 22: “And indeed words were instituted for this purpose, not that through them men might deceive one another, but that through them each might convey his thoughts to the knowledge of another. Therefore to use words for deception, not for that for which they were instituted, is a sin.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 243).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 3: “A lie is evil by its kind; for it is an act falling upon undue matter. For since words are naturally signs of thoughts, it is unnatural and undue for someone to signify that which he does not have in mind.”
Lying is sinful also for the reason that it violates or destroys the true dignity of man, which consists in his being an image of God. God is “the God of truth,”24 and if we lie, we become dissimilar to Him, or rather like to the devil, who is a liar from the beginning and has not the truth.25
24 Ps. XXX, 6.
25 John VIII, 44; cfr. John XIV, 6; XVII, 17; Apoc. III, 7, 14.
Finally, lying is sinful because it is opposed to charity or love of neighbor. It robs men of a good to which they have a just claim,—viz.: the truth,—and substitutes for that good an evil, i. e., error. Even if in some cases the truth is not esteemed as a real good, and error is not regarded as an evil, but rather as a service rendered to another, this does not change the nature of truth or of its contrary. Lying always embodies a violation of charity and involves contempt of others.
“You ask what costs you more dearly, falsehood or the truth? I answer: falsehood, because falsehood costs you your very ego, whereas the truth can at most rob you of happiness,” says the poet Hebbel. The well-known anecdote told of St. Thomas is purely legendary, but it conveys an important lesson. “Do you see that ox flying up there?” cried one of his fellow students. When St. Thomas strained his eyes to espy the strange phenomenon, his companion scoffed at his simplicity. The Saint censured him and said: “I would rather believe that an ox could fly, than that a Catholic would tell a lie.”26 But St. Thomas might have known that it was a hoax. To test another’s wit is not deception. c) Though every lie is a sin, not every lie is a mortal sin.27 The gravity or guilt of a lie is to be gauged by the general criteria of mortal and venial sin, by its subject-matter, by the objective and subjective importance of the truth involved, by the end or object aimed at, and by the circumstances of the case.
26 A. Scherer and J. B. Lampert, Exempellerikon, Vol. III, 2nd ed., Freiburg i. B. 1908, p. 191.
27 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 4. Cfr. Kössing, Ueber die Wahrheitsliebe, pp. 167 sqq.
As regards the subject-matter, the denial of a revealed truth of great importance for the eternal or temporal welfare of man is always a mortal sin because it involves serious dishonor to God and a grave violation of charity and justice.
The end or purpose for which a lie is told may be serious or trivial. A jocose lie, or one told to get out of a scrape, may generally be classed as a venial sin.28 But there are cases in which the objective and particularly the subjective momenta weigh heavily in the scale. A lie may be inspired by a totally corrupt motive and, aside from the scandal given, may have incalculable consequences. There are jocose lies that hurt keenly and others which partake of blasphemy, and though not every joking prevarication is a lie, yet every jocose lie, no matter how harmless it appears to be, is incompatible with the dignity of a Christian and the respect he owes the truth. It must also be taken into consideration that many of the “little white lies” of social intercourse are apt to cause grave temporal and spiritual damage to others. The motive of charity by which these lies are often inspired, may diminish their guilt, yet pious frauds can never promote the cause of truth or justice, the welfare of Church or State, or the true ends of scholarship or science.29
28 St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., V, n. 7: “There are altogether two kinds of lies in which the fault is not great, but which nevertheless are not without fault: when we either joke or lie in order to benefit someone. The former, in joking, is therefore not most harmful, because it does not deceive. For the one to whom it is said knows that it was said for the sake of a joke. The latter, however, is milder because it retains some benevolence.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 86).
29 Cicero, De Orat., II, 15: “Who does not know that the first law of history is that it dare say nothing false, and then that it not dare leave anything true unsaid? that there be no suspicion of favor in writing, no simulation?” These words were quoted by Leo XIII in his letter of Aug. 18, 1883, to Cardinal Hergenröther et al., as a norm for all Catholic writers of history.
Luther excused “fat lies” if the cause of the Gospel could be promoted thereby. Who invented the maxim: The end justifies the means?
Let us always remember the query of St. Paul: “Shall we do evil that there may come good?”30 and the pious exclamation of holy Job: “Hath God any need of your lie, that you should speak deceitfully for him.”31 A Catholic must ever be firmly convinced that no lie can be of real advantage and that God will turn the damage which one fears from the truth into an advantage. “We know that to them that love God, all things work together unto good.”32
30 Rom. III, 8.
31 Job XIII, 7.
32 Cfr. Rom. VIII, 28.
When a conflict arises between duty and truth on the one side and various other interests on the other, the injury done to the soul by a lie cannot be compared to any temporary disadvantage. In a conflict between truth and charity, e. g., in the case of a sick person or a lunatic, a conscientious man will always, if necessary, find a way to disguise the truth so that it will not bear the character of a lie. In such cases it should be considered that, on the one hand, by lying to the sick we are apt to undermine their confidence in the physician and those who have them in charge, hinder a correct treatment, and run the danger that the patient may die unprepared, while, on the other hand, persons who have not the full use of reason are rendered suspicious and distrustful if those in whom they have confidence lie to them, and are thus often impeded in their progress towards recovery.
There is a well-known story told by the younger Pliny of the Roman matron Arria, who, having lost her son by sickness, and all but lost her husband, used to tell the latter in his convalescence, when he enquired about the boy: “Oh, he has slept well; he has had quite an appetite.” Then she would rush out of the room to hide her tears. Father Rickaby, commenting on this story, says: “I will not vouch for the objective morality of these replies: they may or may not be justified as broad mental reservations. But they are much more easily justified, if the whole harm of lying consists in the hearer’s unwillingness to suffer a deception rendered necessary by the state of his health. The same doctrine would justify other speeches of a much more objectionable character. It would, in fact, contain the reaffirmation of the old Greek position, that deceit is a medicine and a drug, and may be administered ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει, especially by persons in authority, wherever they judge that it will work a wholesome effect, and wherever the person deceived is not unwilling, or at least ought not to be surprised or complain, considering the circumstances. But this would be to throw the door open wide to the whole crowd of official, officious, and jocose lies. Untruths told for a purpose to enemies, to children, to subjects, to servants; pleasant fictions to gratify a friend; hoaxes unlimited, where we think the victim ought not much to mind,—these will be withdrawn from the category of lying, or will be registered as white lies and lawful. Worst of all, if the whole harm of lying is in the unpleasant effect wrought upon the deceived hearer, or in the scandal and bad consequences to society at large, it is not clear that lying is impossible to God; and our faith, based on the divine veracity, is shaken to the foundation. God, as Master, might bid the deceived listener bear the mortification and shame of being duped. He might by His providence prevent any scandal or general bad consequences to society; or, as Sovereign, He might impose or permit such consequences, as He sends or permits a pestilence. The Lord of life and death, who commanded Isaac to be slain, and who daily ‘taketh away the spirit of princes,’ is not to be restrained from being a deceiver by the mere reluctance of His creatures, unless there be some element in the divine nature itself which makes it utterly impossible for God to deceive and speak false. Undoubtedly there is such an element. It lies even at the root of the sanctity of God. God is holy in that, being by essence the fullness of all Being and all Goodness, He is ever true to Himself in every act of His understanding, of His will, and of His power. By His understanding He abidingly covers, grasps, and comprehends His whole Being. With His will He loves Himself supremely. His power is exercised entirely for His glory—entirely, but not exclusively, for God’s last and best external glory is in the consummated happiness of His creatures. Whatever God makes, He makes in His own likeness, more or less so according to the degree of being which He imparts to the creature. And as whatever God does is like Him, and whatever God makes is like Him, so whatever God says is like Him. His spoken word answers to His inward word and thought. It holds of God, as of every being who has a thought to think and a word to utter:— “‘To thine own self be true, And it must follow, as the night the day, Thou canst not then be false to any man.’”33
33 Rickaby, Political and Moral Essays, pp. 227 sqq.
Lies told for the purpose of injuring others are, as a rule, grievous sins, though subject to parvitas materiae. The guilt in such cases is not to be measured by the damage calculated or foreseen, but primarily and above all by the malice or lack of charity which inspired them. Even a slight injury may be done with great malice.
The principal circumstances to be considered in weighing the guilt of a lie are the scandal given and the importance of veracity as a pillar of social intercourse.
d) By frequent lying a man forms the habit of mendacity, which consists in the inclination and a certain aptitude to tell lies. This vice gradually entails not only absolute indifference to truth, but a real love of lying for its own sake, which sometimes results in a sort of obsession of the soul by the evil spirit. “Why dost thou glory in malice, thou that art mighty in iniquity? All the day long thy tongue hath devised injustice, as a sharp razor thou hast wrought deceit. Thou hast loved malice more than goodness, and iniquity rather than to speak righteousness. Thou hast loved all the words of ruin, O deceitful tongue.”34
34 Ps. LI, 3–6.
St. Augustine calls the controversy that was waged in his time concerning the ethics of lying “magna quaestio, latebrosa nimis,” and treats it as a problem for the solution of which the most learned men have labored in vain.35 It follows that at the time when the Saint wrote, this part of Catholic moral teaching had not yet been fully developed. In practice, however, lying had been condemned absolutely and unreservedly by Clement of Rome, the Shepherd of Hermas, Justin Martyr, Lactantius, and St. Basil.36
35 De Mendac., c. I, n. 1; c. XVIII, n. 38.—IDEM, Contra Mendac., c. XV, n. 33 (Migne, P. L., XL, 487, 513, 541).—V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 82 sqq.—Kössing, Ueber die Wahrheitsliebe, pp. 174 sqq.
36 On the veracity of God, cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 236 sqq.; Kössing, Ueber die Wahrheitsliebe, pp. 186 sqq.
READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 110–111, 115 (Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus, Vol. II, pp. 13 sqq.).—Th. Meyer, S.J., Inst. Iuris Nat., Vol. II, pp. 55 sqq.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 433 sqq.—Kössing, Ueber die Wahrheitsliebe, pp. 161 sqq.—V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 82 sqq.—G. Sodeur, Luther und die Lüge, Leipsic 1904, pp. 5 sqq.—H. Grisar, Luther (tr. by Lamond, London 1913 sqq.), Vol. I, pp. 335 sq.; II, 15 sqq., 49, 385 sqq., 392; IV, 28 sq., 41, 80–178; V, 537 sqq.; VI, 513 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 649 sqq.—Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Political and Moral Essays, N. Y. 1902, pp. 215 sqq.—IDEM, Moral Philosophy, 4th ed., London 1918, pp. 224 sqq.—J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, N. Y. 1919, pp. 141 sqq.—A. Vermeersch, S.J., in the Gregorianum, Rome, Jan., 1920.—J. Brodie-Brosnan, “Father Vermeersch on the Malice of Lying,” in the Irish Ecclesiastical Record, Sept., 1921, No. 645, pp. 266–274.