Section — Koch–Preuss
Section 7: The Duty and Virtue of Fidelity
- DEFINITION.—Closely related to veracity is fidelity. Veracity consists in speaking the truth or expressing one’s mind without deceit; fidelity (πίστις, fides, fidelitas), in keeping a promise or in performing that to which one is obliged.1
1 Cfr. Matth. XXIII, 23.
Fidelity is a most important virtue both morally and socially. Without mutual confidence there could be no social intercourse and society would fall to pieces. He who can be always trusted and relied upon to do his duty, is not only highly respected among men, but, as Holy Scripture says, worthy of entering into the joys of Heaven.2
2 Prov. XXVIII, 20; Matth. XXV, 21.—Cfr. J. de Lugo, De Iust. et Iure, II, disp. 23, s. 1, n. 13: “Just as truthfulness inclines one to conform outward words to the mind, so fidelity inclines one to conform deeds to previous statements; fidelity obliges one to conform deeds to words signifying a promise.”—Horace, Carm., I, 24, 6: “Iustitiae soror, incorrupta fides nudaque veritas.”—Ibid., III, 3, 1: “Iustum et tenacem propositi virum non civium ardor prava iubentium,” etc.
- The duty of fidelity, which is based upon the same grounds as veracity, may originate:
a) In a promise, i. e., a declaration of willingness to undertake a certain task or to live up to a certain obligation.3 A lawful and valid promise must be kept in the sense in which it was made by one and received by the other, that is, without equivocation or restriction, and it makes no difference whether he to whom it was given is an orthodox believer or a heretic (fides haereticis habenda).4
3 Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 758: “A promise is a contract by which someone freely and spontaneously binds himself gratuitously to perform or omit something in another’s favor. The conditions required for the obligation of a promise are: (1) That there be a will to bind oneself, at least virtual and implicit, which he is judged to have who seriously wishes to promise, even if he does not advert to the obligation. (2) That the promisor’s consent be fully free and spontaneous, and therefore that all error and deceit concerning the substance and final cause, and all compulsion or unjust fear, be absent. (3) That the promise itself be manifested outwardly and accepted; for every agreement must consist in the mutual consent of two or more persons upon the same object, and, moreover, no one is judged to wish to bind himself toward another unless the latter accepts.”
4 St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 3, ad 1: “According to moral rectitude [i. e., in conscience and before God], a man is bound to another man by any promise whatsoever, and this is an obligation of natural law.”—St. Augustine, De Doctr. Christ., l. IV, c. 18, n. 35: “What is least is least, but to be faithful in the least is great.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 105).—IDEM, Epist., 189 (al. 205), n. 6: “When faith is pledged, it must be kept even with an enemy against whom war is waged; how much more with a friend for whom one fights.” (P. L., XXXIII, 856).
If a promise forms the foundation of a legal relation (e. g., a contract, as in a betrothal) it constitutes a serious obligation, the non-fulfilment of which entails the duty of restitution.5 The obli- gation ceases when its fulfilment becomes morally impossible or injurious to the person to whom the promise was given (not so, however, if it would merely injure him who made it), or if the one to whom it was made lifts the obligation or fails to keep his part of the agreement, or, finally, if the promise has become useless or futile, or the circumstances of the case have so completely changed that if they had been foreseen, the promise would never have been made.6
5 Cfr. Aug. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Casus Conscientiae, Vol. I, 3rd ed., n. 835: “A wholly gratuitous promise of itself binds from fidelity alone, and not under grave sin but only under venial sin, unless special circumstances are added.”—Ibid., n. 837: “A promise can bind in justice, and this actually occurs: 1. If an obligation of justice is expressly undertaken; 2. if it is tacitly undertaken, namely by knowingly allowing the risk that the promisee may suffer harm from the promise’s nonfulfilment. In that case the obligation of justice is either to fulfil the promise or to repair the loss caused. Otherwise there would be a harmful deception.”
6 Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 760: “It is asked, when does the force of an accepted promise cease? The answer is: 1. If the promisee voluntarily remits it or yields his right; 2. if the thing promised becomes unlawful or useless; 3. if the promisee does not stand by his own promises; 4. if the state of affairs or persons changes in such a way that the promise does not appear to have been intended to include that event; 5. if something was promised for a reason that does not exist.”—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 3, ad 5: “If [someone] does not do what he promised, he then seems to act faithlessly by changing his mind. Yet he may be excused in two ways: first, if he promised something that is manifestly unlawful, because he sinned in promising it, but does well in changing his purpose; secondly, if the conditions of persons and affairs have changed.”—Seneca, De Benefic., l. IV, c. 35: “All things must remain the same as they were when you promised, in order that you be held to the promisor’s pledge.”
The oft-quoted axiom, “Haereticis fides non est servanda,” says Dr. Linsenmann, could be justified only on the supposition of the medieval law that a heretic was an enemy of the public order and incapable of entering into legal relations with the faithful, in other words, that whoever espoused heresy knew that, as one denying an important truth of Christian Revelation, he would have no legal standing in the community and no right to expect fidelity from others. To-day, in civil society, we place the heretic on the same plane with the loyal Catholic, and therefore any promise made to him must be faithfully kept. It would not be permissible to break one’s word even to a robber or a murderer who had surrendered himself on the promise of immunity, provided, of course, no positive violation of the moral law were involved. A mere advantage to be gained for the commonwealth never justifies the breaking of a promise.7
7 Linsenmann, Moraltheologie, pp. 443 sq.
b) The duty of fidelity may originate, secondly, in the confidential relation existing between members of the same social group. Every social relation freely entered into, whether of superiority or inferiority, as between husband and wife, master and servant, etc., entails the obligation of mutual fidelity, which in some instances is solemnly vowed, in others silently assumed. Fidelity is a mutually binding duty, which must be observed in the spirit and meaning of each relation. It is opposed, on the one hand, to compulsion and slavish servility and, on the other, to a mere desire for remuneration, and forms the one and only ethically effective bond of all relations resting on mutual confidence and of all contracts. Only he who is faithful to his vocation will live up to its duties and make the sacrifices demanded by it, even though they be unforeseen. The duty of fidelity has no limit except when it conflicts with the irreducible demands of the moral law.
Fidelity, says Linsenmann, does not demand slavish obedience, but presupposes a spiritual distinction. A servant will often be able to serve his master more faithfully by using his own judgment than by obeying orders literally. . . . Fidelity’s closest ally is honor. Where fidelity is not esteemed, where conscientious compliance with duty is not gratefully acknowledged, where honest servants are not protected, where services rendered in confidential positions are rewarded with money only, there the spiritual bond which should connect master and servant is missing, and society is in danger of disruption.8
8 IDEM, ibid., pp. 444 sq.
- Opposed to fidelity is infidelity or perfidy. If the promise was confirmed by an oath, infidelity becomes perjury. The guilt of perfidy is gauged by the subjective malice and the importance of the matter involved, and it may, therefore, be either a venial or a mortal sin according to circumstances. Perfidy dishonors a man, places him in opposition to God, who, as St. Paul says, is faithful,9 and destroys mutual confidence among men. The Apostle enumerates this sin among the vices on account of which God delivered the gentiles up to shameful affections.10
9 2 Tim. II, 13; 1 Cor. X, 13.
10 Rom. I, 31; I, 26. On perjury, see this Handbook, Vol. IV, pp. 256, 264 sqq.
A particularly grievous sin of infidelity is that committed by a soldier who deserts his flag, especially when his conduct involves injury to the bonum commune, as it usually does in time of war. A deserter is bound to return to his allegiance, not only ex titulo oboedientiae et iustitiae legalis, but also, if he took an oath to uphold the flag, ex titulo fidelitatis et religionis, unless the punishment he would have to undergo were entirely too severe.11
11 Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, p. 148.
READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 80, art. 1, ad 3; qu. 88, art. 3.—Lessius, De Iust. et Iure, l. II, c. 47, n. 29 sqq.—Kössing, Ueber die Wahrheitsliebe, pp. 29 sqq.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 443 sqq.—Aug. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Casus Conscientiae, Vol. I, 3rd ed., n. 835 sqq.—A. Vermeersch, S.J., Quaestiones de Iustitia, pp. 361 sq.