Section — McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology

Lawfulness of Immediate Cooperation

1526.

Lawfulness of Immediate Cooperation

Lawfulness of Immediate Cooperation.—(a) If one cannot cooperate immediately without performing an act that is intrinsically evil (see 1517), immediate cooperation is, of course, unlawful. Thus, if one helped a trembling assassin to administer poison or to stab or shoot to death the victim, one would be an accomplice in murder; if one assisted a decrepit pagan to burn incense before an idol, one would be an accomplice in false worship. (b) If one can cooperate immediately without performing an act intrinsically evil, immediate cooperation is held lawful by some authorities, but there are others who say that all immediate cooperation is sinful.

1527.

Arguments for the Opposing Opinions on Immediate Cooperation

Arguments for the Opposing Opinions on Immediate Cooperation.—(a) Those who deny the lawfulness of all immediate cooperation argue that immediate cooperation does not differ from complicity, and hence that it is always intrinsically wrong. If theft is the taking away of goods without the knowledge and consent of the owner, what shall we call the act of a servant who assists a thief by carrying out the family silver to a waiting automobile? The fact that the servant does this to save himself from wounds or death cannot change the moral character of the act, else we shall have to say that the end may justify the means. And what is said of theft, can be said likewise of other species of sin.

(b) Those who affirm the lawfulness of immediate cooperation in certain cases argue that circumstances may take away evil from an act of assistance given to a sinner, so that the act becomes indifferent or good. Thus, theft is the taking away of what belongs to another against the reasonable will of the owner. Now, the owner would be unreasonable if he were unwilling that one should cooperate in removing his goods, if one had to do so in order to protect one’s life, at least if one had not engaged to defend his goods; for one is bound to protect one’s life in preference to the goods of another. If a starving man may take a loaf of bread without the owner’s consent, why may not one save one’s life by assisting a desperate criminal to carry off money? Moreover, it is commonly admitted that a person in great need may lawfully ask a Sacrament from a minister who is unworthy and who will sin by conferring it; that is, one may cooperate immediately with the unworthy administration of a Sacrament and yet be free of guilt on account of the circumstances.