Definition

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 17-22.)

Definition.—The word “hope” is variously used. (a) In a wide and improper sense, it signifies the expectation of some wished-for evil, or desire without expectation. Hence, colloquially one hopes for misfortune to another (hope of a future evil), or that another has succeeded or is in good health (hope of past or present good), or that some unlooked-for fortune will turn up (hope without expectation). (b) In its strict and proper sense, hope signifies the expectation of some desired good in the future. Thus, one hopes to pass an examination, or to recover from illness.

Hope, strictly understood, is of various kinds. (a) It is an emotion or an affection, according as it proceeds from the sensitive or the rational appetite. The emotion of hope is an inclination of the irascible appetite to possess some object known through the senses and apprehended as good and attainable, and is found both in man and in the brutes. The affection of hope is a spiritual inclination, tending to good as known through the reason.

(b) Hope is either natural or supernatural, according as it tends either to goods that are temporal and within the power of man to acquire, or to goods that are eternal and above the unaided powers of creatures. It is in this latter sense that hope is now taken.

Supernatural hope is understood, sometimes in a wide sense, sometimes in a strict sense. (a) In a wide sense, it is used objectively to designate the object, material or formal, of hope. Thus, St. Paul is speaking of the material object of hope (i.e., of the things hoped for), when he says: “Hope that is seen is not hope” (Rom., viii. 24), “Looking for the blessed hope” (Tit., ii. 13); while the Psalmist is speaking of the formal object of hope (i.e., the motive of hope), when he says: “Thou hast been my hope, a tower of strength against the face of the enemy” (Ps. lx. 4). (b) In a strict sense, hope is used subjectively to designate the act or habit of hope. The act of hope is spoken of in the following texts: “We are saved by hope” (Rom., viii. 24); “Rejoicing in hope” (Rom., vii. 12). The habit of hope is indicated in these verses from Job and St. Paul: “This my hope is laid up in my bosom” (Job, xix. 27); “There remain faith, hope, charity, these three” (I Cor., xiii. 13). Hope is now taken in the strict sense, as a virtue or infused habit, from which proceed supernatural acts.

The virtue of hope is defined: “An infused habit, by which we confidently expect to obtain, through the help of God, the reward of everlasting life.”

(a) It is “an infused habit.” These words express the genus to which hope belongs, and they set it apart from the emotion and the affection of hope, as well as from any acquired habit of hoping for purely natural goods. A natural virtue of hope, strengthening the will with reference to natural happiness, is not necessary in any state of man, fallen or unfallen, for the will does not stand in need of a superadded virtue with respect to those things that fall within its proper sphere of action.

(b) Hope is a habit “by which we expect, etc.” These words express the specific subjective elements of hope, that is, the powers of the soul in which it resides and the kinds of acts it performs.

(c) “Through the help of God.” These words express the formal object or motive of hope.

(d) “The rewards of eternal life.” These words express the material object of hope, that is, the thing that is hoped for.

There is a general similarity between the virtue of hope and natural hope as regards their objects and acts.

(a) Natural hope is the result of a love of some good, and so differs from fear, which is the dread of some evil. Similarly, the virtue of hope springs from a love of heavenly goods (Rom., viii. 24, 25).

(b) Natural hope has to do with a good that is absent, and it is therefore desire, not enjoyment. Similarly, the virtue of hope looks forward to goods not as yet attained: “We hope for that which we see not, we wait for it with patience” (Rom, viii. 25).

(c) Natural hope, unlike mere desire, seeks a good whose attainment is not certain or easy, and hence it presupposes courage. Similarly, the virtue of hope demands strength of soul: “Do ye manfully and let your heart be strengthened, all ye that hope in the Lord” (Ps. xxx. 25).

(d) Natural hope tends towards an objective, which, while difficult, is not impossible; hence, it expects with confidence, for, when an object of desire is impossible, one does not hope for it, but despairs. The virtue of hope also is confident: “Hold fast the glory and confidence of hope unto the end” (Heb. iii. 6).

Christian hope is superior to natural hope, because it is a supernatural virtue.

(a) It is a virtue, since its acts are commanded by God, and through it the will is directed to its beatitude and the secure means of realizing its lofty aspirations: “I have inclined my heart to do Thy justifications for ever, for the reward” (Ps. cxviii. 112); “Trust in the Lord, and do good” (Ps, xxxvi. 3).

(b) Christian hope is a supernatural virtue, since through it man is sanctified and saved: “I (Wisdom) am the mother of holy hope” (Ecclus., xxiv. 24); God “hath regenerated us into a lively hope” (I Pet., i. 3); “We are saved by hope” (Rom., viii. 24); “Everyone that hath this hope in Him sanctifieth himself” (I John, iii. 3).

Though hope seeks its own reward, it is not therefore mercenary or egotistic. Experience shows that hope produces idealism and self-sacrifice, while the lack of it leads to engrossment in the things of time and sense and to selfishness. (a) Thus, the hope of the just man is not separated from charity, and hence he loves God above all, and his neighbor as himself: “I have inclined my heart to do Thy justifications forever, for the reward” (Ps. cxviii. 112). (b) The hope of the sinner is a preparation for charity, since he must desire charity as a means to the beatitude he wishes: “He that hopeth in the Lord shall be healed” (Prov., xxviii. 25).

Just as faith is divided into living and dead faith, so hope is divided into animated and inanimated hope. (a) Animated hope is that to which is joined the state of grace and charity, and which is thereby perfect as a virtue and meritorious. This hope is stronger, because we hope more confidently from friends. An act of animated hope is more perfect when commanded by the virtue of charity, less perfect when not so commanded—that is, he who makes an act of hope out of love of God performs a better work than he who makes an act of hope out of some other motive (such as self-encouragement). (b) Inanimated hope is that to which the state of grace and charity is not joined, and which therefore is an imperfect virtue and not meritorious.

The following divisions of hope made by the Quietists are not admissible:

(a) The division of hope into natural hope (which seeks its own good, and which is permitted to the ordinary faithful) and supernatural hope (which is entirely disinterested, and which is necessary for the perfect) contains Rigorism; for since natural hope is of no avail towards justification or for merit, it would follow that without disinterested love of God one could not obtain forgiveness, nor could an act be meritorious.

(b) The division of hope into two supernatural species, the one disinterested (which desires heavenly goods for the glory of God alone) and the other interested (which desires heavenly goods for the advantage of self), is useless; for acts of disinterested love belong to charity, not to hope (Denz., 1327-1349).