Drunkenness

Cases of Mere Passive Drunkenness.—(a) Involuntary Drunkenness.—This occurs when there is invincible ignorance of fact (e.g., when an adult becomes intoxicated in good faith, because he had no reason to suspect that a cocktail or eggnog was very strong, or that his stomach was very weak), or of law (e.g., when a child gets drunk because he does not know that it is wrong to do so), or when there is lack of intention (e.g., when drink is forced on a person who does not want it).

(b) Excusable Drunkenness.—This occurs according to most theologians when there is a proportionately grave reason which justifies the evil of intoxication (see 103 sqq.). Such grave reasons are the saving of life (e.g., to escape death from snake bite), the cure of serious disease (e.g., cholera or influenza), the avoidance or mitigation of severe suffering (e.g., before a surgical operation, or after a very painful accident, or when there is no other means of helping a grave case of insomnia). In all these cases it is generally admitted that one may bring on unconsciousness by the use of anesthetics and sedatives (such as chloroform, ether, morphine, opium); and there is no reason why we should not view intoxicants also in the light of remedies which may be taken on the advice of physicians or other competent persons if other remedies cannot be had. Some theologians, however, refuse to excuse intoxication for any reason, since they regard drunkenness as intrinsically evil. In addition to the excuses just mentioned some also give that of escape from violent death, as when a burglar threatens to kill unless those present make themselves helpless by intoxication. But all agree that intoxication is not excused by ordinary advantages, such as escape from slight physical pain (e.g., toothache, seasickness), nor by the desire to avoid what can be avoided by other and more suitable means (e.g., worry about one’s troubles, an unpleasant meeting or conversation).

The Morality of Total Abstinence.—(a) Obligation.—Per se, there is no obligation of abstaining from every or any kind of intoxicating beverage, either perpetually or temporarily, for food and drink were intended by God for the use of man and the moderate use of intoxicants, especially when the percentage of alcohol is light, is found by many to be a help to digestion, a refreshing stimulant, an excellent tonic and remedy. The example of Our Lord, who changed water into wine, who partook of wine at banquets, and who made wine one of the elements of the most sacred of rites, is proof that it is not sinful to drink strong liquors. This is also clearly taught in the Bible, which praises moderate drinking of wine (Ecclus., xxxi 36), recommends that a little be taken for a weak stomach (I Tim., v. 23), and declares that it is not what enters the mouth that defiles (Matt., xv. 2).

But, per accidens, there is an obligation of total abstinence when a greater good requires that one sacrifice intoxicants, whether the good be of self (e.g., when intoxicants are a serious danger to one’s health or morals, or when one is bound by vow or pledge to abstain from them) or of another (e.g., when the use of intoxicants gives serious scandal, Rom., xiv. 21). If the common safety is seriously imperilled through drunkenness, and obligatory abstinence can be enforced and will be the most reasonable method of correcting the evil, we can see no objection to prohibition laws. But whether these conditions exist in this or that particular place or case is a question of fact and has to be decided by impartial study.

(b) Lawfulness.—Per se, it is also permissible to abstain freely from all intoxicants, for the sake of some higher good (e.g., in order the better to apply the mind to studies, Ecclus., ii. 3), to silence calumnious tongues, to practise mortification, or to give good example. But, per accidens, it is not lawful to abstain when law (e.g., in the celebration of Mass) or necessity (e.g., a man dying from influenza who cannot be saved without whiskey) requires one to drink spirits. Examples of total abstinence are the Nazarites (Num., vi. 3), Samson (Judges, xiii. 7), Judith (Jud., xii. 2, 19), and John the Baptist (Luke, i. 15).

Degrees of the Sin of Drunkenness.—(a) The sin of perfect or complete drunkenness is a voluntary excess in intoxicants carried so far that one loses temporarily the use of reason. This does not mean that one must become insensible or fall in a stupor or be unable to walk or have delirium tremens (dead drunk), but only that one loses the mental power to direct oneself morally, even though one still retains enough judgment to direct oneself physically (e.g., to cross the street or ascend the stairs safely, or to find one’s own quarters without help). The indications of perfect drunkenness are that the intoxicated person no longer distinguishes between right and wrong, perpetrates evils he would abhor in his right senses (e.g., beats his wife, runs down a pedestrian, blasphemes, or provokes quarrels), and cannot remember on sobering up the chief things he said or did while drunk.

(b) The sin of imperfect or incomplete drunkenness is a voluntary excess in intoxicants carried so far that one is somewhat confused in mind, but does not lose the use of reason. Hence, a person who is physically impeded though not mentally incapable on account of drink, who staggers, speaks incoherently, or sees uncertainly, but who knows that he should not beat his wife, or kill, or blaspheme, or quarrel, etc., is imperfectly drunk. There are also circumstances that aggravate the evil of perfect or imperfect drunkenness. Thus, it is worse to be a toper or habitual drunkard than to be an occasional drunkard, and worse to go on a long spree than to be drunk only for an evening.

Malice of the Sin of Drunkenness.—(a) Perfect drunkenness is a mortal sin, because it is a grave disorder to deprive oneself of moral judgment and thus expose oneself to the danger of perpetrating serious crimes and injuries. Moreover, it is a monstrous thing to despoil oneself unnecessarily of reason, the greatest natural good of man, and to make oneself for the time being a maniac, more like a beast than a human being. St. Paul declares that those who would put on Christ must put away drunkenness with other works of darkness (Rom., xiii. 13), and that drunkards shall not inherit the kingdom of God (Gal, v. 21). The opinion that perfect drunkenness is only venial if not habitual is now obsolete, and the opinion that perfect drunkenness is not mortal unless it lasts a considerable time (say, more than an hour) is commonly rejected; for the essential malice of drunkenness depends on its nature, not on its frequency or duration. A person who takes enough to make himself completely drunk and then escapes the consequences by artificial means (e.g., by using a drug or bringing on a vomit), does not sin mortally by drunkenness; but it seems that such a swinish person must sin mortally by reason of gluttony, injury to health, or scandal.

(b) Imperfect drunkenness is a venial sin, because the harm done is not considerable, for a tipsy man usually suffers nothing more than a slightly fuddled brain and some unsteadiness of body. Indeed, if wine or beer produces nothing more than a spirit of moderate hilarity and talkativeness, there is no sin.

Accidentally, imperfect drunkenness may be a mortal sin by reason of circumstances, as when the person who is intoxicated gives great scandal on account of his position or office, or when the motive is to inflame passion or to commit other serious sin, or when the drunkenness is constantly repeated, or when the drunkard seriously neglects his business, family, or religious duties, or does other grave harm in consequence of his love of the bottle. In fact, there may be grave sin when one is not intoxicated at all, but is only a tippler. For the habit of drinking alcoholic beverages frequently (e.g., a nip or dram of whisky several times a day) is, according to medical authority, more harmful to the system (alcoholism) than intoxication at long intervals, especially if the portion is generous and the drinker is young.

Drunkenness Compared with Other Sins.—(a) It is not the worst of sins. Sins against the theological virtues are more wicked, since they offend against divine good, whereas drunkenness is against human good. Many sins against the moral virtues are worse, since they injure a greater human good; for example, it is more harmful to take away life than to suspend the use of reason.

(b) It is one of the most ruinous of sins in its consequences (see 2472, 2473): first, for society, since a large percentage of crime, insanity, destitution, and misery is due to intemperance; secondly, to religion, since indulgence in one sensual pleasure sharpens the appetite for others, while creating a distaste for spiritual things, for effort and self-sacrifice; thirdly, to the intellect, for strong drink steals away the mind and memory; fourthly, to the body, for drunkenness not only prostrates the nervous system at the moment and has most painful after-effects in bursting headaches and disabled stomach, but it also causes permanent disasters (to brain, heart, nerves, kidneys, and liver), weakens the resistance to disease and brings on an early death; fifthly, to goods of fortune, since drunkards squander their all for drink; sixthly, to posterity, since intemperate parents transmit constitutional weakness to their children.

Responsibility of Drunkard for Sins Committed While Intoxicated.—(a) If the drunkenness is fully voluntary and culpable, he is responsible for all the sins he foresaw or should have foreseen; for then these sins are willed in their cause (see 94 sqq.). Hence one who is accustomed while under the influence of liquor to blaspheme, betray secrets, quarrel, etc., should confess that he committed them while drunk, or that he was prepared to commit them in getting drunk. Under similar conditions one who misses Mass because he was drunk is responsible for the omission; one who is too drunk to attend to a business appointment and thereby causes loss to another is held to restitution. But, if grave sins are foreseen only in a very confused way, generally they will be imputable only as venial in themselves.

(b) If the drunkenness is fully voluntary and culpable, but the sins that ensued were not foreseen and could not humanly have been foreseen, the drunkard is excused at least in part from the guilt of these sins. Hence, a person who gets drunk for the first time or who usually sleeps after getting drunk is not responsible for the bad language he uses, if the thought of profanity was farthest from his mind when he became drunk. But if this person was not completely drunk and had some realization of the malice and scandal of bad language, he is at least venially guilty of profanity and scandal.

(c) If the drunkenness was involuntary, the drunken person is excused entirely in case of complete drunkenness; he is excused partially in case of incomplete drunkenness that did not exclude some realization of the sinfulness of what he said or did while intoxicated (see Canon 2201, Sec.3). In the civil law drunkenness is not held to be an excuse for a criminal act, but it may negative a specific intent (Robinson, Elements of Law, Sec.Sec.471, 525, 531).

Material Cooperation in the Sin of Drunkenness—(a) If there is no grave reason for the cooperation, it is illicit. Mere hospitality is not a sufficient reason for furnishing a table with a great supply of strong drinks when some of the guests are dipsomaniacs, and mere good fellowship does not justify one who has been treated to order another round of treats if some of the drinkers are already inebriated. Parents or others in authority who get drunk before their subjects are guilty of scandal; those who encourage drunkenness are guilty of seduction; those who supply others with drink in order that these may become drunkards are guilty of formal cooperation.

(b) If there is a grave reason for cooperation, it is not illicit (1515 sqq., 1538 sqq.). Whether it is lawful to persuade another to get sinfully drunk in order to keep him from the commission of a greater evil (e.g., homicide or sacrilege), is a disputed question (see 1502).

Is it lawful to make another person drunk when he will be guiltless of sin, and there is a grave reason?

(a) According to one opinion this is not lawful, because drunkenness, like impurity, is intrinsically evil and never permissible, since the end does not justify the means. Hence, just as it would be wrong to induce a drunken person to impurity, so it would also be wrong to intoxicate a child or an insane person (see 306).

(b) According to the common opinion, it is lawful to intoxicate oneself for a grave reason (see 2477 b), and hence also it is lawful to intoxicate another for a similar reason. Thus, if a criminal were about to blow up a building and destroy many lives, it would be permissible or even obligatory to put powerful intoxicants into his drink so as to make him helpless. If one were about to be roasted by cannibals and could escape by making the cannibals drunk, it would not be sinful to make them drunk.

Licit Use of Narcotics.—There are a great many substances that produce the same effects on mind and body as intoxicating liquors, namely, the narcotic poisons, such as morphine, opium, chloroform, ether, or laughing gas. To them then will apply the principles given above in reference to strong drink. Thus, it would be a serious sin to make oneself insensible by using morphine, if there were no just reason; but it is lawful to take ether for an operation, gas when having a tooth pulled, morphine when it is ordered by a physician to relieve pain, etc. In his address of Feb. 24, 1957 to a symposium of the Italian Society of Anaesthesiology (The Pope Speaks, Summer, 1957, pp. 33 ff.) Pope Pius XII considered some special aspects of the use of drugs in the practice of analgesis. Among the questions submitted to him for consideration were the following:

1. Is there a general moral obligation to refuse analgesis and to accept physical pain in a spirit of faith? After indicating that in certain cases the acceptance of physical suffering is a matter of serious obligation, the Pope responded that there was no conflict with the spirit of faith to avoid pain by the use of narcotics. Pain can and does prevent the achievement of higher goods and interests and may licitly be avoided; obviously, too, the pain may be willingly accepted in fulfillment of the Christian duty of renunciation and of interior purification.

2. Is it lawful for the dying or the sick who are in danger of death to make use of narcotics when there are medical reasons for their use? The Pope responded; “Yes—provided that no other means exist, and if, in the given circumstances, that action does not prevent the carrying out of other moral and religious duties.” The duties referred to include settling important business, making a will, or going to confession. (Should a dying man refuse first to attend to these duties and persist in asking for narcotics, the doctor can administer the drugs without rendering himself guilty of formal co-operation in the fault committed, which results, not from the narcotics but from the immoral will of the patient.) Among the conditions and circumstances laid down for the licit use of narcotics in the case in question are the following: “if the dying person has received the last Sacraments, if medical reasons clearly suggest the use of anaesthesia, if in delivering the dose the permitted amount is not exceeded, if the intensity and duration of the treatment is carefully reckoned, and finally, if the patient consents to it, then there is no objection, the use of anaesthesia is morally permissible.”

3. Can narcotics be used even if the lessening of pain probably be accompanied by a shortening of life? The Pope responded that “every form of direct euthanasia, that is, the administration of a narcotic in order to produce or hasten death, is unlawful because in that case one presumes to dispose directly of life ... If between the narcotics and the shortening of life there exists no direct causal link, imposed either by the intention of the interested parties or by the nature of things (as would be the case if the suppression of the pain could be attained only by the shortening of life), and if, on the contrary, the administration of narcotics produces two distinct effects, one, the relief of pain and the other the shortening of life, then the action is lawful. However it must be determined whether there is a reasonable proportion between these two effects and whether the advantages of the one effect compensate for the disadvantages of the other. It is important also to ask oneself whether the present state of science does not make it possible for the same result to be obtained by other means. Finally, in the use of the narcotics, one should not go beyond the limits which are actually necessary.”