Judgment

Judgment.—Judgment, or the right determination of what is just and due to others, is the proper act of the virtue of justice, and hence Aristotle (Ethics, lib. V, cap. 7) declares that people take their disputes to a judge as to justice personified. Judgment is either public or private. (a) Public judgment is passed by a judge who has the authority to compel disputing parties to abide by his decisions. (b) Private judgment is passed by individuals without public authority concerning the morals or conduct of others.

Since judgment is an act of virtue, it is lawful, and we find that both in the Old and the New Testament men have been appointed with authority to judge others. Thus, God ordered that judges be chosen in all the cities of Israel (Deut., xvi. 18); St. Paul declares that the judge is the minister of God (Rom., xiii. 4), and from Apostolic times tribunals have been set up in the Church. But certain conditions are required for moral goodness, both in those who ask for judgment and in those who pass judgment.

(a) Thus, those who seek judgment must be actuated by proper motives and must conduct themselves in a virtuous manner. Our Lord in Matt., v, teaches that it is better to suffer temporal loss rather than to contend in judgment from a motive of revenge to the prejudice of one’s spiritual good, and St. Paul condemns the Corinthians because they gave scandal by reason of their lawsuits before heathen tribunals and had recourse to frauds and injuries in their litigation (I Cor., vi. 1 sqq.).

(b) Those who pass judgment must have a good intention, must proceed according to law, and must decide according to prudence. If the first condition is wanting, judgment is unjust or otherwise sinful, according as the judge chooses against the right or is merely prompted by some human motive (such as hatred, anger, vainglory, avarice); if the second condition is lacking, judgment, if public, is usurped or illegal, if the third condition is not had, judgment is rash. But it should be noted that the Church has condemned the teaching of Wicliff that office and authority are forfeited by sinners (Denzinger, 595, 597).

First Condition of Righteous Judgment.—The first condition of righteous judgment is that the purpose of the judge be just and sincere. But is it possible for judgment to be righteous if the judge is a bad man—that is, if he is in the state of mortal sin?

(a) If the sin of the judge is public, and judgment is given against a sin of the same character (e.g., if a notorious thief passes sentence on another thief), serious scandal is given; for justice is discredited and an occasion offered for criticism of authority and for lawlessness. But if the sin is not of the same character as the one condemned (e.g., if a notorious thief passes sentence on a murderer), the scandal is not grave in so far as justice is concerned.

(b) If the sin is not public, it is clear that no scandal is given; and if the judge is moved by the duty of his office and by zeal for justice to condemn even the same kind of sin of which he himself is guilty, he commits no sin whatsoever in so doing (cfr. 1280). But he is guilty of hypocrisy if he uses the opportunity to pretend a personal righteousness which he does not possess. It is this that Our Lord reprobated in the Pharisees, who, although guilty of many and grave crimes, wished to put to death an adulteress in order that they themselves might thus shine as immaculate. The words, “Let him that is without sin among you cast the first stone” (John, viii. 7), condemn hypocrisy in judges, though they do not require that a judge be free from all sin. But though sinners may act against sin as lawmakers, prosecutors, judges, jurymen, police, etc., they should be admonished by their office to reform themselves according to the words of St. Paul: “In judging another, thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which thou judgest” (Rom., ii. 1).

Second Condition.-The second condition of righteous judgment is legality, if there is question of judgment in court.

(a) Thus, the judge must have public authority, for, just as laws cannot be made except by public authority, neither can they be interpreted except by the same authority (Rom., xiv. 4). Hence, proceedings that are not held in the proper place, at the proper time, or in the manner prescribed by law are void, and the same is true if a court has not jurisdiction over the parties or over the subject-matter in controversy.

(b) The judge must administer justice according to the law and the usual method observed in courts, since his office is to interpret, not to make law or custom (jus dicere, non facere). His opinions as precedents may affect the development and growth of law, and hence he is especially bound to be faithful to general principles that are binding on him. If a statute in its operation is found to impede the just disposition of controversies, judges perform a public service by indicating this to those who have authority to regulate procedure. If the application of a law would work injustice, no judge can in conscience pronounce sentence according to that law; but there are many cases recognized in jurisprudence in which courts of equity afford relief to rights that cannot be defended or protected in courts of law, and in cases of this kind the judge should be guided by recognized principles of natural justice and the rules of his court.

Third Condition.—The third condition of righteous judgment is that the sentence or decision be prudent or well-founded. Thus, in a judicial process the facts of a case must be examined and the rules of evidence be observed in judging the meaning of the facts. Since rash judgment is a sin committed, not only externally and in public, but also and especially internally and in private conclusions formed about the character or deeds of others, and since it is one of the commonest of sins, it will be well to explain its nature somewhat fully.

(a) It is an internal sin, and so it differs from external acts against the neighbor; but calumny, detraction, and unjust sentence are its outward expressions.

(b) Rash judgment is an internal sin of decision in which something is affirmed or denied mentally about a neighbor, and so it differs from a mere representation or thought. This distinction is important for scrupulous persons who think that mere suggestions against others that flash through their minds are rash judgments. These suggestions are a very common temptation, and, if repelled, are an occasion of merit; they become sinful only when entertained with pleasure.

(c) Rash judgment is a decision unfavorable to another in matters of character or honor. Thus, it differs from favorable decisions (as when without reason one holds that another is virtuous or has extraordinary merit), and from unfavorable decisions on matters other than character or honor (as when one concludes that a neighbor is mentally or physically deficient, and these defects are not connected with depravity nor considered as ignominious), and from unfavorable decisions that relate to sin but are not personal (as when one thinks that an expression used by an ignorant man is blasphemous, but passes no judgment on the state of conscience of the man).

(d) Rash judgment is a decision that expresses conviction, and not mere supposition. Thus, it differs from the prudential attitude by which one assumes for the sake of security that a stranger is to be distrusted, since he may be dishonest.

(e) Rash judgment is a certain conviction or judgment, that is, one which holds its own view as true and certain and does not consider the opposite of its view as worthy of consideration. Thus, it differs from doubt (that is, a state in which the mind is suspended between the unfavorable view and its opposite, and does not incline to one more than the other), from suspicion (that is, a state in which the mind inclines to the unfavorable view, but does not assent to it as being either probable or certain), and from opinion (that is, a state in which the mind assents to the unfavorable view as being probably true, but admits that it may be untrue). These various forms of mental reaction were treated in 654 sqq.

(f) Rash judgment is rash, that is, a belief based on insufficient authority, or an inference that is really groundless or not well drawn from premises. Thus, if one judges that one’s neighbor is a thief, because this was told one by an honest and well-informed person, the judgment is prudent; but, if one judges this on the word of a person who is unreliable or who has no knowledge of the facts, the judgment is imprudent. Again, if one judges that it is certain that one’s neighbor is a thief, because one has evidence that removes all doubt, the judgment is prudent; but if the evidence is merely probable, an opinion based on it is prudent, but a judgment based on it is imprudent. It is not rash to hold that the majority of mankind are lost, or that the present generation is not as good as the generation that preceded, if one has good reasons for such beliefs; but a sweeping and all-inclusive pessimism in such matters is unwarranted.

The reasons for a judgment may be sufficient for something else, but insufficient for the judgment actually formed.

(a) Thus, they may be reasons sufficient for judging that one kind or degree of sin has been committed, but insufficient as regards another kind or degree of sin. For example, if one breaks the lock of another’s desk, there is an argument for willful trespass, but this alone does not prove larceny or the intent to steal.

(b) They may be sufficient for doubt and insufficient for suspicion, sufficient for suspicion and insufficient for opinion, or sufficient for opinion and insufficient for judgment.

Rash Judgment.—Opinion, suspicion, and doubt are also rash, if there is no sufficient reason to warrant them.

(a) Thus, if there are no probable reasons for an unfavorable opinion, it is rash to form such an opinion. For example, the mere fact that two men have frequent and whispered conference together does not make it likely that they are plotting evil.

(b) If there are no sufficient reasons for inclining towards an unfavorable opinion or for suspending all assent, suspicion and doubt are rash. For example, the mere fact that a man enters a house when the owners are absent is no reason to suspect him of dishonest purposes, or even to have doubts, if he is of good reputation and enters the house in daylight and in a usual way.

Sinfulness of Rash Judgment.—Rash judgment strictly understood, then, is a firm assent of the mind, based on insufficient data, and given to the view that a neighbor is or has been guilty of sin.

(a) From its nature this sin is mortal, for it consists in a contempt for, and an injury to, what is regarded as one of the chief goods of man, namely, the favorable opinion of him that is entertained by others. It is denounced in Scripture as an injury to the law itself (“He that judgeth his brother judgeth the law,” James, iv. 11), and as meriting condemnation (“Judge not, and you will not be judged, condemn not and you will not be condemned,” Luke, vi. 37).

(b) From the imperfection of the act or from the lightness of the matter rash judgment may be only a venial sin, as when unfounded suspicions arise in the mind without advertence to their sinfulness, or when one rashly judges in some small matter (e.g., that another person stole a pin or a cent).

Rash judgment is not mortally sinful in an individual case unless the following conditions are present:

(a) there must be perfect deliberation, that is, full advertence to the judgment itself and to its sinfulness and gravity (see 175). There is no full advertence to the sinfulness and gravity of the judgment, however, if one does not perceive at least in a confused manner that one is deciding in one’s mind without sufficient reason that one’s neighbor is guilty of serious sin, and is thereby doing the latter a great injury. But it is not necessary that the rash judgment continue for a considerable time, for the malice depends on the evil done, not on the length of time it has lasted;

(b) there must be serious rashness, for the sinfulness of the judgment rests on its rashness. Hence, if one judges a sin to be certain which is very probable or almost certain, there is no great imprudence and therefore no serious sin;

(c) there must be grave injury and contempt, for in these the malice of rash judgment consists. Hence, if one judges that another is a drunkard and neither the latter person nor others in the same place regard drunkenness as very dishonorable, there is no great harm done. Similarly, if one judges that some indeterminate individual of a multitude or group is a rascal, or that a stranger whom one sees on the street late at night is out on an evil errand, or that an unknown party seen from a distance is on his way to a disreputable meeting, it does not seem that there is great injury done; for one does not greatly resent lack of esteem in others to whom one is not known.

Rules on Perfect Advertence to Rashness of Judgment.—(a) There is perfect advertence when one actually perceives that the reasons for one’s unfavorable judgment are very insufficient; (b) there is perfect advertence when one virtually perceives the serious insufficiency of the reasons, that is, when one could and should perceive it, but is vincibly blind to it (see 30, 31) on account of some passion wilfully indulged, such as hatred or envy of the person judged. In these cases one judges with negligence and precipitancy in a serious matter (see Imprudence).

Rules on Insufficiency of Reasons for Unfavorable Judgments.—(a) Those authorities for sin are not sufficiently trustworthy whose reliability is of inferior worth (e.g., because they are enemies of the person against whom they speak, or calumniators, or gossipers, or of bad reputation, etc.), or whose story does not merit the credence they claim for it (e.g., because the person against whom they speak is known as upright). If both the authorities for a story and the person against whom they speak are equal in good qualities, there is sufficient reason for doubts, but nothing more.

(b) Those arguments for sin are not sufficient which create for what is concluded only a slight presumption (see 658), that is, which offer facts that are never, or seldom, or not necessarily causes or effects or indications of sin. Thus, it is rash to judge that a mature man and woman conversing together in a dignified manner and in a public and open place are discussing obscene matters; or that a respectable person whose face is flushed, or whose hand trembles, or who slips on the street, has been imbibing too freely; or that a man climbing into a second story on a frequented highway and in broad daylight is a burglar. This rule may be expressed in other words by saying that reasons for drawing unfavorable conclusions are insufficient when in view of the circumstances and time, place, persons, deed, etc., no prudent person would consider the conclusions as warranted.

Rules on Gravity of Matter in Rash Judgments.—(a) From the nature of the thing ascribed to the other person, only judgments that mortal sin has been committed are grave matter; for only mortal sin is in itself a grave reproach.

(b) From the circumstances of persons or acts, rash judgment of mortal sin may be only venial; for it sometimes happens that certain kinds of serious sins are not considered very ignominious in certain persons or conditions. Thus, in some places it is considered honorable for soldiers or students to have wounded adversaries in duels; some persons of a rough kind are proud of their proficiency in blasphemy or obscenity; where drunkenness is common, it is not considered as very disgraceful.

(c) From the circumstances of persons or acts, rash judgments of venial sin or of what is not sin at all may be mortal; for to those from whom much is expected slighter defects may be causes of great disgrace. Thus, it is very dishonoring to the parties concerned to think that a prelate is an habitual liar, that a nun visits too often, that a public official is illegitimate or stupid or afflicted with syphilis, and therefore unworthy of his position.

The Moral Species of the Sin of Rash Judgment.—(a) It is a sin against justice, because it infringes the strict right of the neighbor that he be not judged guilty of evil without sufficient reason, and that he be not held worthy of contempt until he has clearly forfeited the right to respect. It is true that judgment as here taken is an internal act, and that it was said above that only external acts form the subject-matter of justice; but internal acts that are referred immediately to external acts, as concupiscence tends to lust and anger to injury, may be classed with these external acts. Hence, internal judgment naturally leads up to external judgment, and so it pertains to justice, just as the desire to steal is unjust and the desire to make restitution is just.

(b) It is a sin against charity, because it does not practise benevolence (“Charity thinketh no evil,” I Cor., xiii. 5), and is usually associated with ill-will or envy. He who judges rashly does not love his neighbor as himself, for he does not observe the rule not to do to others what he would not have done to himself.

The moral species of rash judgment is not changed according to the species of sin attributed to another (such as heresy, dishonesty, impurity), and these circumstances of the rash judgment need not be mentioned in confession.

The Moral Species of Rash Opinion, Suspicion and Doubt.—Do the conclusions given above on the theological species of rash judgment apply also to rash opinion, suspicion, and doubt?

(a) Some theologians answer in the affirmative, and argue that the same grave injury and contempt of the neighbor is found in these sins as in rash judgment, and that Scripture makes no distinction between the one and the other. On the contrary, they say, murmurings, detractions, and hatreds are caused oftener by doubts, suspicions, and opinions, since firm and certain judgments are not so often formed; and moreover there is no one who would not prefer to be judged certainly guilty of fornication than to be doubted or suspected of more heinous crimes, such as incest or sodomy.

(b) Other theologians answer in the negative, and argue that suspicion and doubt do not inflict a severe harm, since they stop short of firm decision of the mind and so are incomplete injuries which diminish rather than take away the esteem due to another. But the defenders of the affirmative reply that, while opinion, suspicion and doubt are incomplete as regards assent, they are not incomplete as regards deliberation and consent, and so can be mortally sinful, as is seen in the case of doubts against faith (see 840 sqq.).

(c) Still other theologians hold that rash opinions, suspicions and doubts are from their nature mortal sins on account of the arguments for the first opinion, but that in actual experience they are usually venial on account of the imperfection of the act (since on account of human frailty doubts, suspicions, or evil opinions of others can easily arise before they are noticed), or the lightness of the matter (for there is rarely one of these mental states without some reason that seems to be at least approximately a justification). But it seems likely that rash judgments themselves are seldom mortal sins, since the conditions for mortal sin are not often realized in them.

The Chief Reasons for Rash Conclusions about the Character of Others.—(a) A first reason is that the person who draws the conclusion is bad himself. Evil-doers are very prone to suspect others of evil, for sin seems so delightful to them that they think others must find the same pleasure in it: “The fool when he walketh in the way, since he himself is a fool, esteemeth all men fools” (Eccles., x. 3).

(b) A second reason is that the wish is often father to the thought. Thus, if one hates or envies another or is angered against him, even trifles light as air will suffice to make one judge him guilty of sin. Just as love blinds an infatuated lover to the sins or crimes of the object of his affection, so does prejudice give a distorted vision that can see nothing but evil in the object of its dislike.

(c) A third reason for rash views unfavorable to others is long experience in dealing with human nature. Thus, old men sometimes become not merely cautious, which is reasonable, but unduly suspicious. Similarly, those who have encountered many trials or disappointments in life often become cynical and misanthropic, and to them the actions of all their fellowmen appear either evil or at least spoiled by an evil purpose.

Rash Doubts.—Doubt about the probity of others is sinful, when there are no sufficient reason for it; for example, it would be unreasonable to suspend judgment about a man of excellent reputation because a well-known calumniator had spoken against him. But a doubt may be reasonable, as when a person has had a good reputation for honesty but a reliable witness declares that he is dishonest. In such a case should one decide for the innocence or for the guilt of the party called into doubt, or should one suspend judgment on the matter?

(a) It is not lawful to interpret reasonable doubts in a sense unfavorable to another person, for this would amount to rash judgment, since the reasons are sufficient for doubt but not for decision. Hence, it would be wrong to believe that a person of good repute was a thief, because another person of good repute said so.

(b) It is lawful to suspend judgment in case of reasonable doubts, if there is no obligation of deciding one way or the other, for in so doing one does no injury either to one’s own intelligence (since the doubt is reasonable) or to the honor of another person (since, as supposed, there is no obligation of judging positively in his favor). Just as there is no duty of making acts of love of our neighbor on every occasion, neither is there a duty of deciding doubts to his advantage on every occasion, or of having any opinion about him whatever. Some authors do not admit this, but the common teaching is against them.

(c) It is not lawful to suspend judgment, but the reasonable doubt must be resolved in a favorable sense, if there is an obligation or a wish to decide one way or the other; otherwise one would decide in an unfavorable sense and be guilty of rash judgment. This is what is meant by the well-known maxim that doubts about the character of a neighbor should be settled in favor of the neighbor. Hence, if one were in serious danger of forming a rash judgment and could not otherwise overcome the temptation, a suspension of judgment should give place to favorable judgment. It is true that one may be frequently in error by thus judging well of mankind, since man is inclined to evil from his youth (Gen., viii. 21) and the number of fools is infinite (Eccles., i. 15). But it is a less evil to fall into the speculative error of taking a bad man for good than by adopting another course to fall into the practical error of becoming bad oneself by violating a law of prudence, justice and charity; and it is less harmful that many sinners should receive more credit than they deserve, than that one just man should be deprived of the good opinion that belongs to him. Pseudo-Ambrose (Apol. ii, David, c. 2, n. 5) says that those who judge others rashly often become worse by this act than the persons they judge; and St. Thomas remarks that favorable opinions of others harm no one, whereas unfavorable opinions are a wrong to innocent persons.

The interpretation of doubts in a favorable sense does not mean that one may not take into consideration the possibility of danger or deception and use remedies or precautions. This course is not rash judgment, for even when one judges that another person is good, one knows that the judgment is possibly wrong, and therefore cannot be entirely relied on for external guidance.

(a) It is lawful, therefore, to act as if one did have a bad opinion of another when there is a possibility of harm that must be guarded against. Thus, a father may forbid his children to keep company with other children, for these latter may be corrupt; an employer may keep his money under lock and key, because servants may be dishonest; a traveller may carry weapons, because the inhabitants among whom he travels may be treacherous. Even though appearances are favorable, one may be on one’s guard, for appearances are often deceptive.

(b) It is not lawful, however, to protect oneself or others in such a needlessly conspicuous or offensive manner as to sadden or defame the other party against whom one takes the precautions. Thus, it would be unjust and uncharitable to go about ostentatiously locking safes and drawers whenever a certain person appeared, for this would be equivalent to saying that he was a thief.