§ 1. On the End of Morally Good Intercourse

224. - We consider here the proximate end of the agent. Now, with attention to the end:

1. Intercourse is honorably requested for the generation of offspring; for testifying love; and for calming concupiscence.

For nature itself has placed these utilities in conjugal intercourse; nor, by the separate pursuit of one end, is the other or the third impeded per se. "Because, although intercourse is not had for the sake of propagating offspring, nevertheless the propagation of offspring is not obstructed for the sake of this lust, either by an evil wish or by an evil deed": thus St. Augustine ¹ confirms this doctrine, relying upon the very passage of the Apostle: "Defraud not one another, except perhaps by consent, for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer; and return together again, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence" ².

¹ De nuptiis et concupiscentia, chapter 15, no. 17 (M. 44, 423).

² 1 Corinthians 7:5.

2. Intercourse is honorably rendered to the spouse requesting it whenever no grave harm, whether one's own, that of the other spouse, or that of offspring already conceived, stands in the way.

For one who complies with the requesting spouse observes the right acquired by that spouse in an honorable matter.

a) One's own harm can nevertheless stand in the way, for example, on account of a disease with which the rendering spouse is affected or of which he must fear certain contagion to himself.

Nevertheless, if a grave reason for assenting is added, for example, lest the requesting spouse sin formally, especially lest he become an adulterer, or lest domestic peace be banished, the rendering spouse can permit this evil to himself on account of a proportionate cause of this kind, provided death itself does not seem to threaten from intercourse. For then intercourse is excused only on account of a most grave and most urgent necessity, such as can arise from serious threats of death or infamy.

b) The harm of the other spouse can also stand in the way, who, for example, on account of a cardiac disease is prohibited by a physician from every use of marriage. For from charity and piety, one spouse ought to meet the grave harm of the other. This obligation, however, does not subsist with grave inconvenience, for the harm of one who wills it can more easily be disregarded than one's own harm. But if death threatens the other spouse who requests, the other cannot cooperate in that rash outpouring of life which the spouse requesting intercourse contemplates, unless excused by a most grave inconvenience ³.

³ Cf. Lehmkuhl, II, 1083.

c) The harm of offspring already conceived can also stand in the way. This harm must be guarded against more absolutely: for the offspring has an inviolable right, concerning which no other person can dispose, lest harm be inflicted upon it; and the parents are bound by a grave duty of piety to guard against these harms. Therefore, in order that a spouse, by rendering the debt, may cooperate materially in this harm, the harm must at least be truly grave. Nor will the rationale of preventing the sin of the other be sufficient.

But if it is a question of offspring to be conceived, which is foreseen to be born either dead or infected with disease, some hold the use of marriage not for that reason unlawful, since it is better for the offspring to be or to have been than not to have been ⁴; others concede the use of marriage, at least in the danger of incontinence ⁵.

⁴ Cf. Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 21, nos. 24 and 25; Génicot, II, 544.

⁵ Thus Lehmkuhl, II, 1064, 3.

Unless we were prohibited by a consideration of a different order, we would rather assent to the former. For the patrons of the other opinion also concede that it is better for the offspring to be born infirm than not to be born, and they consequently require the condition of the danger of incontinence less consistently. But the essential subordination of spouses to the species, or the primary end of marriage, not only forbids them to generate contrary to the order which the good of the species demands, but also imposes upon them the positive duty of bringing it about that birth occur in that manner which the good of the species demands, and consequently that a living and healthy fetus be brought forth. Yet, because the duty is positive, it admits excuse from a proportionate reason; and such a reason is had more easily here because fertilization after intercourse is uncertain and because no harm is inflicted upon the offspring perhaps to be conceived. And the harm of incontinence is also social. Wherefore intercourse is excused by the danger of incontinence.

225. - Hence the following cases are resolved:

1. If a physician declares that a new conception will certainly be fatal to the wife, the wife ought to decline intercourse. But if death does not threaten so closely, the wife can place herself in the danger for a grave cause. For, since conception itself is doubtful, the danger seems neither certain nor proximate. (Cf. Lehmkuhl, II, 1082.)

On these matters, however, one must approach a physician who is at once expert and God-fearing. For there are not lacking those who, because of slight indications, inconsiderately prohibit persons who are little continent from the honorable use of marriage. Wherefore Génicot ⁶ judges that it is very rarely established that there is such a danger from a future birth on account of which there is a grave obligation to abstain from the use of marriage.

⁶ Vol. 2, no. 544, 5.

2. For those suffering from consumption, intercourse is harmful to themselves rather than to the other party, though not always gravely so. Therefore, spouses of this kind are not bound per se by a grave obligation of abstaining; but excuse from a moderate obligation is easily at hand. Wherefore, while nevertheless observing the diseased condition and the counsels of the physician, moderation alone in use is to be preached to them. This will be very opportune, since they are accustomed to be ardent.

3. That, for a grave cause, the infected party should request intercourse by which venereal disease seems likely to be introduced, after the other has been admonished and consents, can be tolerated ⁷. But the other party is certainly permitted to admit that intercourse on account of a cause of this kind, for example, if otherwise prolonged abstinence would be imposed with danger of the husband's incontinence.

⁷ Génicot, II, 544; Lehmkuhl, II, 1083, V, 2.

4. Necessity or common utility of having, for example, one who may succeed to a kingdom can make intercourse, although it be gravely dangerous, not only morally good but also obligatory ⁸.

⁸ Cf. Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 24, no. 11.

5. Unless they are excused by a grave cause, such as the danger of incontinence, spouses cannot use marriage when they foresee a certain necessity of applying a remedy or treatment from which abortion, although not intended, will certainly or probably follow if the intercourse has been fruitful.

6. Furthermore, intercourses harmful to either party, or which give no hope of living offspring, are prudently to be dissuaded, just as they are condemned by the common opinion of men. Prudently, I say, that is, with the cause for using marriage also considered. But above all we shall turn away from intercourse those who thence incur common reproach, such as those who, infected with syphilitic disease, have not recovered sufficiently to be judged harmless by an upright and expert physician. The use of an antiseptic ointment can sometimes be permitted here, at least if the probability of conception is not removed by its use.

226. - You will ask whether one who has requested intercourse for pleasure alone sins.

Concerning this matter there is this statement of St. Thomas: "It is disordered and vicious if anyone uses food and venereal things for pleasure alone" ⁹. And among the propositions condemned by a decree of the Holy Office on 2 March 1679 by Innocent XI, at least as scandalous and pernicious in practice, there is found this one, no. 9: "The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free from all guilt and venial defect."

⁹ Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 83.

The question, however, is easily answered in this manner. One who explicitly thinks of nothing except pleasure either positively excludes or does not exclude a further or different end. If he has positively excluded a further or different end, he sins, because he repudiates an honorable good, or refuses to act honorably; for man was created for an honorable end.

But if he has not excluded a different end, he will not sin except through an immoderate desire, by which he wishes to be delighted contrary to some duty, or through immoderate use. For it is honorable in this life to admit permitted pleasures moderately. Therefore, while he explicitly seeks moderate pleasure alone, he tacitly approves and intends that moral goodness. Wherefore one who acts thus will also be conscious of an honorable action, unless he has been deceived by the dicta of the rigorists.

To use other words: one who wishes pleasure only moderately wills it insofar as it is suitable to man, and consequently refers it tacitly to the utility which pleasure is seen to have in the present life.

Although, therefore, we profess that it is unlawful for you to use marriage, even moderately, for pleasure alone, we shall bring no scruple of sin to those who seek pleasure in the moderate use of marriage, as though they had acted for pleasure alone. Indeed, we shall tear scruples of this kind from the soul, lest Catholics appear fearful, but rather that they may strive toward better things with a nobler affection.

But the sin of a spouse who has wished to use marriage immoderately is to be measured from the duty which he omits, and does not exceed a venial sin ¹⁰.

¹⁰ Cf. the learned dissertation of Ballerini, Opus theologicum, vol. 6, nos. 323-361.

Moreover, it is established among all that no one is prohibited from receiving the pleasure joined to the right use of marriage. For "the pleasures of good operations are good, but those of evil operations are evil" (I-II, q. 34, art. 1).