I. On Adulterous Copulation

1. - Illegitimate copulation exercised in contempt of the conjugal bond is called adultery. The adulterer, insofar as he joins his body, torn away from his spouse, to another, attempts to divide the flesh which God, by an indivisible bond, had made one from two. Thus breaking the unity of which he is a part, he is seen to sin in himself against piety. He also sins against piety toward the other spouse. And if the matrimony which he contemns was a sacrament, as is every valid matrimony between the baptized, he profanes the sacramental bond, and consequently commits sacrilege ¹, as one who abuses a sacred thing. Finally, insofar as he violates the formal contract made with this spouse, he injures commutative justice.

¹ Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 1491.

We omit the harms which are accustomed to arise from adultery for the legitimate offspring, the innocent spouse, and others also.

2. Innocent XI, on March 2, 1679, reproved as at least scandalous, under no. 50, this proposition: "Copulation with a married woman, with the husband consenting, is not adultery, and therefore it is sufficient in confession to say that one has fornicated."

By his assent, however, the other spouse can certainly remove the final note of violated justice toward himself. In vain do some object that his right is inalienable. For no abdication of the right is necessary in order that an injury not be done to one who consents. It is sufficient that he who possesses the right not positively set that right in opposition. Cf. our work De iustitia. But the other spouse can in no way remove by his consent the malice of violated piety and violated religion. Wherefore:

Adultery perpetrated with the assent of the other spouse differs in species from adultery of which the other spouse was unwilling or unaware. But it is not simple fornication, since it preserves the other malices proper to it; and therefore we by no means defend or excuse the proposition proscribed by Innocent XI.

And so adultery committed with the assent of the other spouse will, as such, have to be distinctly accused. Yet because the opinion which denies the specific distinction of this adultery from common adultery retains some extrinsic probability, the obligation of a distinct accusation is not to be urged. Cf. Palmieri, Opus theologicum, vol. 2, treatise 6, no. 1014; Lehmkuhl, vol. 1, no. 1049.

3. Double adultery, which is committed by a married person who sins with the spouse of another, must be accused as such. Most affirm this ², against Emmanuel Sa ³.

² Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 15, no. 1; Lehmkuhl, I, 1049; Noldin, De sexto, no. 20.

³ Summa, under the word Confessio, § Quidam putat, etc.

The rationale, however, is difficult, since both are committed by a single act of the will; it is the same, as Sanchez himself says, as if you were to kill two persons by one blow. Now, with Cardinal de Lugo ⁴, we judge that there are not several sins in the killing of several persons which is accomplished by a single act. Lugo indeed ⁵ judges that "in the sin of adultery of a married man with a married woman, each marriage must be explained, because the married adulterer contracts one malice in species by reason of his own marriage, and another by reason of the marriage of his accomplice.... The virtue which inclines this spouse to preserve his own matrimony seems to be diverse from that which inclines him to preserve the marriages of others." But this pleases us less. For the same virtues of piety and justice forbid both the principal act and cooperation or complicity. The brief rationale given by Lehmkuhl ⁶, "a twofold right of another is violated," needs explanation in order that we may approve or disapprove it.

⁴ De Paenitentia, disputation 16, nos. 135 and 140.

⁵ In the cited place, no. 140.

⁶ Theologia moralis, I, 1049.

This appears to us to be the truer rationale. Contrary to what occurs in the homicide of several persons, where the killer alone sins of himself, here we have two persons sinning, and consequently two sins in number; but each contracts the guilt of each sin because of complicity. Therefore a spouse who sins with the spouse of another must in his accusation accuse both his own sin and the sin of the other. But he would not accomplish this by saying, "I committed adultery": he would accuse only his own principal act, but not his complicity with the principal act of the other. Moreover, by such an accusation he would positively deceive the confessor, who would understand: "I committed adultery with an unmarried woman," which would be false. In the same manner, one who wished to kill several persons by one blow and did kill them must indicate some plurality in a confused manner, lest the confessor understand: I killed one person. Cf. Lugo, De Paenitentia, disputation 16, no. 141.