Article — Vermeersch, On Chastity

Article II. On Incomplete Exterior Acts

356.

The principle of specific unity.

Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

356. - One must begin from this great principle: in lustful but incomplete exterior acts there is one and the same common rationale of formal malice, so that they are blameworthy only for this reason, that they express a use, certainly incomplete, of venereal things. Thus also Billuart 1, against not a few who falsely judge that these acts are specified by their origin from diverse faculties.

1 Summa S. Thomae, treatise De Temperantia, dissertation VI, article 15, section 3, at the beginning. Cf. also Noldin, De sexto, no. 51.

¶1883.
Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

In themselves, therefore, the intention and power of arousing lust being excluded, these acts are not reprehensible.

¶1884.
Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

Wherefore, one who has sinned alone, whether by looking, by touching himself, or by lustful reading, sufficiently accuses his sins by saying: "So many times I was imperfectly lustful with myself"; or: "So many times I voluntarily had carnal movements; so many times I accepted them when they arose." For the distinction between sins through effecting and through assenting, concerning which above, no. 336, must be preserved here.

¶1885.
Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

And indeed, why should one guilty of an imperfect act, more than one guilty of a perfect act, have to indicate the means employed?

357.

Specific distinctions.

Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

357. - 1. Nevertheless, he certainly cannot omit a vow by which the sinner alone is bound, or

¶1886.
Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

a special affection by which he was led. Such an affection being excluded, the conjugal bond will not have to be declared under grave obligation, unless it is necessary in order that a married person be excused from mortal guilt in performing these acts.

¶1887.
Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

2. Whenever culpable complicity has intervened, the circumstance of the accomplice adds the sin of another, which will therefore have to be accused.

¶1888.
Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

3. Exterior acts which, according to themselves, express the beginning or preparation of a complete act with another person participate in the specific malices of that complete act.

¶1889.
Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

Hence we gather these various corollaries.

358.

Must there be solicitude concerning "distillation"?

Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

358. - 1. So-called distillation or urethrorrhea from lust (cf. no. 13) obtains a place or special mention in moral theology rather fruitlessly. For it is a certain rationale of imperfect lust which introduces no new species because of the liquid distilled or emitted drop by drop.

¶1890.
Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

It escapes us how Rev. Father Noldin, after he wrote: "Distillation... differs from pollution," could have added concerning distillation which is joined with pleasure: "This distillation is a sin of the same gravity and species as pollution itself, since it introduces the danger of it and is joined with venereal pleasure." Cf. De sexto, etc., no. 40.

359.

Specification of touches,

Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

359. - 2. Lustful touches, embraces, and kisses performed with other persons, because they begin a definite perfect act, participate in the circumstances of the agent and the patient. Wherefore it will have to be indicated whether either or both were unmarried or married, or in sacred orders.

360.

Of looks,

Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

360. - 3. But in looks, unless there were at the same time desires for or pleasures concerning sin with the person seen, it seems to suffice of itself that, the other qualities being kept silent, the penitent declare complicity. For looks do not of themselves tend toward the consummated act: St. Alphonsus 2 judges this the more probable opinion.

2 Book 3, no. 421.

¶1891.
Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

Nevertheless, one who participates in another's sin will not be able to omit the circumstance of a vow. But if there was no complicity of the person seen, that person's vow need not be declared.

361.

Of evil counsels,

Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

361. - 4. One who through an invitation or counsel induces another to sin participates in the foreseen malices of the work which he counseled.

362.

Of true or fictitious approvals,

Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

362. - 5. One who seriously approves in words a lustful work perpetrated by himself or by another manifests a depraved affection which is infected by the malice of that work.

¶1892.
Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

One who approves only fictitiously, besides the lie, is guilty of a sin against chastity insofar as he detracts from the honor due to virtue, but is ashamed of it. Yet because he does not deny its goodness, we do not judge this sin to be grave of itself.

¶1893.
Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

The scandal arising therefrom must be judged according to the circumstances.

¶1894.
Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

The same must be said of one who takes vain glory from fictitious sins. Observe that vain glory is often sought, rather than from the malice of the sin, from the circumstance by which the sinner proves himself bold, cunning, or strong in powers. Cf. also no. 394, 6.

363.

Of conversations.

Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

363. - 6. a) Conversations held from lust concerning base matters are not the beginning of a complete sin with those with whom the conversations are conducted. Therefore, the fact that those conversing are unmarried or married, or joined to one another by relationship, does not of itself change the species of the sin against chastity.

¶1895.
Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

Nevertheless, if you have thus induced a sacred person to violate his vow, this circumstance must certainly be indicated.

¶1896.
Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

Furthermore, if because of your words you have failed in the positive duty of piety to care for the morals, for example, of a young person, you also contract the malice of a sin against piety.

¶1897.
Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

Therefore, complicity with a sacred person or with a person committed to your care being excluded, base conversations, unless they contain a desire for or approvals of an object, are sufficiently accused by saying: "I spoke basely with one or several persons," adding, where necessary, consent to depraved pleasure.

¶1898.
Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

b) Indeed, since each one takes his own part in conversations, unless there was some cause of the base words spoken by the other, one who engages in depraved conversations is not even formally an accomplice but is merely scandalous. But scandal of itself, or not intended, is opposed to charity alone.

¶1899.
Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

N.B. Observe that conversations can be base in two ways: either because, in the manner of a base narration, they excite lust in the present, and these are called obscene more strictly; or because they approve or prepare base deeds, as if you were to conduct a discussion concerning a dishonorable action to be perpetrated afterward.

364.

Touches of an unwilling person.

Show the text of this paragraphHide it again

364. - 7. Lustful touches upon an unwilling person contain a grave malice against justice which is similar to that of stuprum; and the quality of a married person or of one joined to you by relationship will have to be indicated.