Article — Vermeersch, On Chastity
Article I. The Rational Estimation of Chastity
Chastity is shown to be a special virtue, and its notion is handed down.
91. - Demonstration of the virtue of chastity. Thus, in this article, we treat the nature and office of chastity as they are perceived by the eyes of reason in the present condition of the human race.
Reason, then, teaches us that there is a virtue of chastity which can be defined: A moral virtue, a species of temperance, and a perfection of the concupiscible appetite, which inclines toward honesty in moderating the appetite for venereal pleasures.
For, as reason teaches and St. Thomas confirms for us, wherever a special rationale for moderating pleasure is found, a moderating virtue is proved to be fitting and necessary; and this virtue will be subject to temperance, since the province of moderating concupiscences has fallen to the cardinal virtue of temperance.
Now pleasure, and indeed the most vehement pleasure, of itself accompanies the use of venereal things.
The pleasure is special. For it is already established by direct observation, as we saw in no. 22, that this pleasure differs even from the sense of touch, to which it is more akin, and pertains to a less exterior sensibility. Moreover, since pleasures are the perfections of operations 1, venereal pleasure is proved to be special from the peculiar operation itself to which it is joined.
1 St. Thomas, I-II, q. 4, art. 2.
Its vehemence, moreover, surpasses the other sensible pleasures, and it alone seems to promise a certain satiating happiness.
And because the venereal appetite is not directed toward an arduous thing, it is referred to the concupiscible, not to the irascible appetite. Wherefore the moderating virtue, or chastity, has its seat in the same appetite, so that it may perfect it; and it must be placed under temperance.
What chastity governs.
92. - The scope of chastity. Chastity governs the venereal appetite immediately and of itself. Nevertheless, because, as we saw in no. 17, the other senses (except taste) concur in exciting venereal pleasure, chastity, under its proper aspect, also governs the use of the eyes, ears, smell, and touch. Indeed, because the quality and quantity of food or drink influence sexual libido not a little, chastity, from its own motive, will command certain abstinences from food or drink, or even a certain use of them 2.
2 For an excessive weakening of the body can provoke sources of temptations.
The notion of continence.
93. - Chastity and continence. Acquired virtue, by its very definition 3, confers facility in acting well. Nevertheless, many, even of those who are endowed with upright morals, must struggle with a natural propensity toward lust. Wherefore, strictly speaking, while the difficulty persists, they have not obtained the acquired virtue of chastity. But if they preserve in the will a habitual, firm disposition to resist the movements of concupiscence, they are said to possess continence.
3 Habitus signifies an inclination.
Twofold continence.
Continence, therefore, is the interior will of chastity persevering in difficulty. This disposition is referred to chastity as a certain beginning and preparation for it. By the Philosopher 4, because of deficient command over the senses, it is called a mixed virtue.
4 Ethics, book 4, at the end.
By the special name of continence, however, is designated the pursuit of perfect chastity, or that which attains fuller praise for resistance, since it bids farewell to every carnal pleasure, even that which is rendered honorable by matrimony.
The beauty of chastity.
94. - The beauty of chastity. Both the order which the virtue of chastity, thus understood, establishes in a man, and the nobility of command by which reason so masters a most vehement passion that it never, at least against reason, submits itself to venereal pleasure, already adorn this chastity with a twofold beauty. For since it is perceived by us through the natural light itself that it pertains to our dignity that we should be led and governed by reason and not by passion, we cannot judge any rebellion of the flesh to be morally indifferent, but must acknowledge in it a defect of moral order, although one without fault, and must fight against it. And there appear beautiful to us in the moral order the purpose and the effort by which the free will endeavors to correct this defect.
Wherefore, even by those who, although estranged from the faith, nevertheless preserve a sense of honesty, dominion of this kind is celebrated as a fruit of human culture. "Civilization," says Féré 5, "has the general effect of subjecting the instincts to the will."
5 L'instinct sexuel, p. 24.