II. Demonstration of the Malice of Pollution

323. - The grave question concerning the malice of voluntary or admitted pollution must now be undertaken. This question contains three parts. For these three things are asked concerning voluntary pollution: is its malice intrinsic; is it grave; is it specifically distinct from the malice of a lustful touch?

I. Opinions. That the malice of the sin of pollution, at least in the man, was not unknown to the pagans is already demonstrated by Martial in these verses:

"Do you think this is nothing? It is a crime, believe me, and a great one, Such as you yourself can scarcely conceive in your mind....

Believe me, the very nature of things says: That which you waste with your fingers, Ponticus, is a man ¹."

¹ Epigram 42, book 9, Against Ponticus.

But Caramuel ² again denied that this uncleanness is condemned by nature itself; and from two of his assertions was taken proposition 49, which Innocent XI condemned as at least scandalous and dangerous in practice: "Effeminacy is not prohibited by the law of nature. Wherefore, if God had not forbidden it, it would often be good and sometimes obligatory under mortal sin."

² Cf. Theologia intentionalis, book 4, nos. 1960 and 1965.

Therefore, the common doctrine of Catholics affirms that it is intrinsically and gravely evil. Yet in the accurate demonstration of the doctrine they again experience no slight difficulty and have attempted various ways.

II. Various arguments. Several indicate this rationale, that pollution signifies a futile emission of semen, the exclusive destination of which is the good of the human species. Ballerini ³ still adduces this rationale; and Lehmkuhl himself ⁴ seems to us to have attended excessively to this effusion. You would indeed say that St. Thomas himself ⁵ used an argument from the pouring forth of semen. But in this way he responds rather ad hominem. To one objecting that semen is a superfluity of nourishment, the Holy Doctor replies that "it is a superfluity which is needed." But in the direct demonstration in the body of the article, he places the formal malice of lust in the vicious use of venereal things.

³ Opus theologicum morale, vol. 2, treatise 6, no. 1026.

⁴ Theologia moralis, I, 1036 and 1039.

⁵ II-II, question 153, article 3, reply to objection 1.

Moreover, the rationale deduced from the prodigal effusion of semen is subject to a twofold difficulty. Nature itself, even against the will of the man, lavishes this semen. Why would the same not be lawful for me for a just cause, for example for the sake of health ⁶? Especially since the quantity of this liquid is so great that it can never be said: "this portion of the semen poured forth is necessary for generation." Indeed, a useless outpouring is permitted even to men themselves. For no less than in pollution, in the copulations of sterile persons the semen is lavished.

⁶ Thus already Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 17, no. 16.

Again, the end for which nature prepares semen is not the generation of offspring alone.

For it destines semen for an operation, copulation, which has other immediate utilities; but nature impels to so many copulations that several must necessarily be futile.

And so you will never establish from the outpouring as such why it is not lawful to lavish by pollution this semen which can be lavished in other ways, but rather from another rationale which, if found, will manifest to us the formal malice of pollution.

b) Wherefore others have placed the malice of pollution not in the loss of semen, but in perfect venereal pleasure; and at least principally in it, as they say; indeed exclusively in it, if they wish to speak consistently. Thus Rev. Fr. Eschbach, Disputationes, disputation 4, chapter 4, or the Nouvelle Revue Theologique, vols. 3 and 5, which Palmieri favors, Opus theologicum, note to II, no. 1028.

But they incur this grave criticism, that pleasure follows the nature of the conjoined operation, so that it cannot be the first rationale of dishonesty. Nor can the force of this principle be evaded by a certain arbitrary distinction between venereal pleasure and other pleasures ⁷. At most this can be conceded: that, if it is connected with an operation evil of itself, the pleasure can create such allurements and such a danger of delusion that the disorder must consequently be judged grave and every accidental exception must be rejected. Wherefore Sanchez and other scholastic doctors gathered merely from the pleasure the necessity of a perpetual and grave prohibition ⁸.

⁷ Cf. Eschbach, Disputationes physiologico-theologicae, disputation 4, chapter 4, p. 483.

⁸ Cf. Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 17, no. 16; and Lessius, book 4, chapter 3, nos. 108, 119, 122.

And furthermore, if the disorder is present in the pleasure itself, since the pleasure of the consummated act and that of the non-consummated act seem to differ only in intensity ⁹, one could scarcely distinguish imperfect lust specifically from perfect lust, so that in matrimony you would be compelled to confess either that all solitary lust is gravely evil or that none is gravely evil ¹⁰.

⁹ Cf. II-II, question 154, article 4.

¹⁰ Cf. those things which the Most Illustrious Dr. Waffelaert most excellently objects, no. 63, De virtutibus cardinalibus.

Yet we do not therefore hold as improbable the opinion of those who, once the intrinsic malice of the action is admitted, contend that, because of carnal pleasure wrongly sought, it is opposed to temperance, so that unless this pleasure were joined to it, a diverse species of malice would have to be sought. Cf. the appendix at the end of the book.

c) But if, with not a few, you appeal to the disadvantages of pollution once permitted, and affirm that if the licitness of pollution were conceded in some case, men, content with this pleasure, would no longer be sufficiently solicitous about entering matrimony, there will be those, such as Lecomte ¹¹, and after him Berardi ¹², who altogether deny the truth of this effect. But it is already evident that this rationale is sought extrinsically.

¹¹ De l'ovulation spontanée, part 2, section 1, chapter 3, § 2.

¹² Praxis confessariorum, no. 849.

d) There are not lacking those who think that the malice of pollution must be derived from the fact that it is an act against nature, but its gravity from the conjoined vehement pleasure and the consequent danger of frequent abuse which would be gravely opposed to the good of the species. Thus, for example, Rev. Dr. Van Roey. This opinion seems to approach the truth more closely. Yet it has this inconvenience: that pleasure follows the nature of the operation, which here would not in itself be gravely evil; and that the vehement pleasure and the very danger of abuse can be absent in various cases in which at least grave guilt would logically have to be denied. Rev. Dr. Van Roey solves this latter difficulty thus, in the cited place: "From the common danger such a law is made, and reasonably must be made, which permits no exception. Otherwise, with the psychological constitution of men again considered, the law would be weakened in itself and the intended end would not be obtained" ¹³. By these words he transfers to the natural law those things which are customarily said of positive law. To the first difficulty he responds that pleasure belongs essentially to the work of pollution itself. (Quaestio specialis, p. 28.)

¹³ Quaestio specialis, pp. 23-24.

Hence Palmieri ¹⁴ again: "It must be confessed that there are certain practical truths necessary for human society, which men perceive and sense by a certain rational instinct, but the altogether demonstrative rationale of which those same men, when they seek it analytically, find only with difficulty.... Among truths of this kind is perhaps also found this one with which we are dealing."

¹⁴ Opus theologicum, vol. 2, no. 1036.

Nevertheless, after those things which we discussed in no. 305 concerning the formal cause of grave sin, when we spoke of fornication, the proof does not seem so difficult; and the difficulty is seen to arise from the manner in which they wished to derive the gravity of the disorder directly from the gravity of the harm.

The question concerning the intrinsic malice of pollution and its gravity is followed by the question concerning its specific distinction from imperfect acts. All Catholic authors affirm this distinction, if you except a few who, after the true organic rationale of female pollution was discovered, began to doubt whether or not there existed in women a true distinction between the perfect and imperfect solitary act. With this distinction destroyed, the burden of sacramental accusation would be lightened. Indeed, there was even one among them who inclined to this consequence ¹⁵: that the rationale of mortal sin seemed consequently to be absent from the solitary acts of a married woman.

¹⁵ Observe that this was in no way defended or admitted by Ballerini, but rather by Lecomte, De l'ovulation spontanée. Cf. Van Roey, Quaestio specialis, who on p. 6 and in note 6 explicitly averts a suspicion of this kind from Ballerini.

324. - III. Therefore, we comprehend both the gravity of pollution in either sex and its distinction from the imperfect act in a conclusion which we can state briefly thus:

Every voluntary pollution, indeed every full consent to casual pollution, whether of the man or of the woman, is infected with intrinsic and grave malice and is specifically distinguished from imperfect lust.

To explain some words: we here call pollution voluntary when it is sought directly or by intention.

Consent to pollution signifies the deliberate enjoyment of the pleasure which accompanies even casual pollution, or, as Lehmkuhl says ¹⁶, the accepted pleasure of a pollution which has arisen.

¹⁶ Theologia moralis, I, 1039.

But casual is any pollution which occurs apart from intention, whether some action of ours or no action has given occasion to it.

With these things posited, we establish the first assertion by this brief argument: Every voluntary pollution is infected with intrinsic and grave malice.

Both the man and the woman who pollute themselves exercise individually an act which was to be exercised by common operation as an act of the species. Therefore, by violating its essential subordination to the species, for the sake of their individual pleasure, they deprive the act of its essential relation to the species. Thus there recurs again, but with greater force, since the very order of animal nature is overthrown here, that twofold grave malice which was demonstrated in fornication, no. 306.

The second assertion, Every full consent to casual pollution is infected with intrinsic and grave malice, is proved briefly thus.

Consent of this kind is not a mere intellectual approval of a physiological fact, but introduces the participation of the mind and furnishes a concurrence which, by increasing it, influences the pleasurable commotion itself and physically changes it, so that in place of corporeal or partial pollution you now have complete pollution. By this active participation, reason is again carried away by sense toward enjoying individually an operation which can be loved only as pertaining to the species. Wherefore this active participation contains a malice of the will lesser indeed in degree, but similar in kind to the production itself. Therefore, the same malice by which the will to pollution is vitiated generically infects consent to casual pollution. Since this malice signifies an inversion of the essential order, it necessarily remains grave.

The third assertion, concerning the specific distinction of pollution from imperfect lust, is established by this rationale:

The non-consummated acts of lust, as is easily evident from the anthropological part, express in themselves a prepara- tion for the consummated act, and immediately derive their morality from the order toward the consummated act, so that they are good or evil according to the act to which they are referred; while the consummated act is judged good or evil immediately from the order toward generation which it possesses or of which it is deprived. And this is common to either sex.

Therefore, although we concede that these acts are referred to the same complete species, nevertheless, specifically, just as the begun and the completed, the beginning and the terminus, the means and the end - yet of the same generic rationale - differ from one another in species.

We rely upon the doctrine which St. Thomas ¹⁷ renders in these words: "Certain things are found to differ in species in two ways: in one way, from the fact that each has a complete species ¹⁸, as a horse and an ox differ in species; in another way, insofar as, according to diverse degrees in some generation or motion, diverse species are taken, as the building is the complete generation of a house, while the placing of the foundation and the erection of the wall are incomplete species, as is evident through the Philosopher (Ethics, book 10, chapter 4)." And below: "The sin of the heart and of the mouth are not distinguished from the sin of deed when they are joined with it at the same time, but insofar as any one of these is found by itself; just as a part of a motion is not distinguished from the whole motion when the motion is continuous, but only when the motion stops in the middle."

¹⁷ I-II, question 72, article 7, body and reply to objection 3.

¹⁸ That is, one individual being which is distinguished from many of the same species by individual notes alone.

325. - We can now confirm by several considerations the argument which we made concerning the intrinsic and grave guilt of pollution.

1. Let these various things which nature has disposed be considered. It did not will that offspring be generated outside matrimony; therefore, it is also opposed to that vice which, increasing lust, would indeed favor copulations, but fornicatory ones. It imposed grave burdens upon matrimony and at the same time imparted to it the greatest utility for the common good. Wherefore, not without a grave cause did it join so vehement a pleasure with the active generation of man. But the more it willed this intense plea- sure to be present, the more strongly it resists lest the benefits on account of which it was granted be suppressed or diminished.

2. Let this logical inference be considered. Unless individual perfect solitary acts were gravely prohibited, not even individual onanistic copulations could be charged with grave guilt. For what do those exercised outside matrimony contain, except two perfect solitary acts with the complicity of one toward the pollution of the other? Within matrimony, the special malice which pollution then has against justice can be removed by the consent of the injured party. But the grave malice against matrimony is founded upon the very grave disorder against the natural end of the act. If you deny this, you will be compelled logically to absolve from grave guilt onanistic copulation performed by mutual consent.

3. Let these moral effects be considered.

a) Once fornication has been excluded, if the solitary pursuit of the extreme of venereal pleasure is gravely prohibited:

That pleasure is attached by an indivisible bond to conjugal copulation, by which provision is made for the desirable propagation of the human race; it fosters mutual love between the spouses, since each then brings to the other a delight which he or she cannot expect from others; it is reserved to a more mature age, in which it is exercised without bodily harm. And meanwhile victorious abstinence wonderfully increases the moral dominion of the will; and the soul, in order to withdraw itself from the baser appetite, is almost compelled to turn itself earnestly toward nobler pursuits.

Furthermore, in the matrimonial state, mutual love itself and the other circumstances lead the spouses to a salutary and wise moderation of lust, so that a person is not wholly immersed in those things, is not withdrawn from higher cares, is taught to carry off at least a partial victory over the strongest appetite, and the vigor of the soul does not cease to receive joyful increases.

The appetite for this pleasure allures one to enter conjugal society, which profits the common good so greatly.

Abstinence, even temporary, in this matter triumphs over the lowest desires, which adds strength to the soul and disposes a person to accomplish great things. But perfect or perpetual continence is not morally obtained except from higher pursuits which furnish society and the human race with services more excellent than the utilities furnished by matrimony itself.

Therefore, the natural order when preserved profits the person and human society in every way.

b) But suppose that this uncleanness is not prohibited or is not gravely prohibited, which amounts to the same thing in this matter of allurements:

Nuptials become less desirable of themselves, since an almost equivalent satisfaction is available with which many would be content. Therefore, the vehemence of concupiscence is deprived of its utility by a concession which subjects a person to abject desires.

Within matrimony itself, the spouses are allured to a less perfect use of matrimony.

But it is sufficient to recall mentally those things which are commonly said concerning conjugal onanism, and from how many children solitary lust cuts off life as it were in the root. Those who charged similar attempts with anticipated homicide seem to have sensed this. Indeed, is not Martial himself proved to have recognized it, when, wishing to demonstrate the enormity of this crime, he recalls that triplets were born to Horatius from one intercourse, and twins to Mars, and thus pronounces:

"Each would have lost all if, having masturbated, He had entrusted foul pleasures to his own hands ¹⁹."

¹⁹ From the cited Epigram 42, Against Ponticus, book 9.

Finally, by the very vehemence of concupiscence, a person rushes headlong toward the lowest things, so that he not rarely lavishes even the strength and health of the body, becomes unequal to higher pursuits with his mind darkened and enervated ²⁰, and is reduced into the base slavery of the foulest depravity.

²⁰ There are those who attempt to explain by an invasion of impure fantasy the remarkable incapacity for acquiring further knowledge which many African Negroes experience from puberty, even if they previously seemed to be of lively intelligence.

With these things presupposed, we can now reason thus in order to confirm our demonstration.

Nature cannot permit the very operation which is of such great importance to the good of society and of the human species to turn to the harm of the human race, of human society, and of the agent himself. Nature cannot permit it; neither can nature prohibit it only ineffectively.

Now it is evident from the considerations already made that, if you were to grant license to solitary lust, it would of itself be exercised in such a manner that fewer conjugal covenants would be joined; that in them a less intimate union would join the spouses; that the multiplication of men, especially through legitimate copulation, would be diminished; that adult men who propagate the species would be weaker in strength; and that many would give themselves wholly to these shameful things. And all these things would occur while nature connived!

But the vehemence of concupiscence brings it about that a prohibition under light obligation is practically no prohibition. And the matter is manifestly notable. For it is grave that the human race should be deprived of many legitimate children. Indeed, the loss or suppression of one life is something momentous, as St. Thomas bears witness, reasoning thus: "From one intercourse one man can be generated. And therefore the disorder of intercourse which impedes the good of the offspring to be born is, from the very genus of the act, a mortal sin." II-II, question 154, article 2, reply to objection 6.

Moreover, as Sporer observes ²¹, consideration must be given not to what harm pollution would cause if done once, but to what it would cause if once permitted.

²¹ Theologia sacramentalis, part 4, chapter 3, section 5, no. 640.

Nor would even the grave prohibition be sufficiently efficacious if it were not perpetual. For if, after a certain time and in a certain state, this operation were excused, men, from the very hope of such circumstances, would meanwhile draw motives for abstaining from matrimony or the conjugal act, or for obtaining, even through a crime committed once ²², that state in which an onanistic use would be permitted without grave sin; or for not correcting themselves from a sin whose act would afterward become lawful; just as we now see men who, in the hope of a subsequently possible dispensation, contract invalid nuptial covenants, for example with a party who, after obtaining a civil divorce, has abandoned a legitimate spouse.

²² For example, through excised ovaries or obstructed oviducts.

The sum of these things is this: If we consider the good to be protected,

these words of St. Thomas apply: "The more necessary something is, the more it is necessary that the order of reason be preserved concerning it; whence, consequently, it is more vicious if the order of reason is passed over. But the use of venereal things, as has been said, is very necessary for the common good, which is the preservation of the human race; and therefore the order of reason must be observed most of all concerning this." (II-II, question 153, article 3.)

But if you consider the danger of abuse: because of the greatest inclination toward that lust and the nature of this concupiscence, which is sharpened by use, any license conceded in this matter outside matrimony introduces of itself an unbridled lust.

Therefore, from either part, a grave prohibition of nature is demanded. But here there is question of lust which departs from order more than fornication, which is gravely unlawful. Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, question 154, article 4.

326. - IV. As regards the difficulties, our very form of demonstrating has cut away those which are sought either from copulation certainly sterile or from permitted celibacy, or which attack the arguments less happily drawn from the frustration of human semen, from the attached pleasure, or from the consequences concerning matrimony and the multiplication of men.

Nor are these two more valid against our position:

1. That which nature effects cannot be intrinsically evil. But after fixed intervals nature itself effects pollutions. Therefore, pollution is not always or intrinsically evil.

Response. Distinguish the major. That which nature effects cannot be evil insofar as it is done by nature, I concede. Insofar as it is done voluntarily by man, I deny. Thus by the law of nature we die; yet suicide is intrinsically unlawful. What of the fact that the physical rationale of pollution effected by nature differs from that which is effected by the will? For nature effects the pollution which we call incomplete; but pollution in the full psychological sense is effected by the will. Cf. no. 322.

2. At least consent to that pollution is not evil, since the thing is not evil.

Response. Distinguish. Consent, that is, an approval which is speculative and in no respect lustful, is not evil, I concede, or let it pass. Consent, that is, active participation or acceptance of the pleasure, is not evil, I deny.

It is urged. The very acceptance of the pleasure is not evil, for it is the pleasure of a good work.

Response. I deny the assertion; as to its proof: It is the pleasure of a work physically good, let this pass; of a work morally good, I deny the supposition, for natural pollution lies outside the moral order. But a good pleasure is that which accompanies a morally good operation.

Otherwise, joy over the death of any man, even of one's father, would be good.