IV. Concerning the Circumstance: In what Manner

240. - 1. The natural manner, which is to be observed per se, is that the man, lying above, know the wife lying beneath and turned toward him.

¹ On the title above. Cf. also no. 166.

But there can be a just cause for changing this position. Changed without a cause, because of a less ordered rationale of appetite, the manner contains venial guilt.

Nor will the change be mortal, as long as the manner permits sufficient seminal emission within the vessel, so that the intercourse of itself (that is, considered precisely in itself, with other circumstances which can exclude that hope omitted) affords a truly probable hope of fertilization. It matters sufficiently little that part of the semen be lost whenever the intercourse seriously cooperates per se with the primary end of nature ².

² Alberti, no. 123, following Berardi, warns that penitents speak ambiguously when they declare that "they had intercourse from behind." For by these words both unnatural intercourse and lawful intercourse performed in the manner of beasts can be signified. By asking whether or not the act was nevertheless sufficiently perfect, the ambiguity will be dispelled.

But if, the natural position having been changed, it is established that all the semen is lost, for example, because of the laxity of the vessel, authors agree that such a position cannot be chosen without mortal sin. For then this manner becomes of itself improper for generation and is not natural. Cf. Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 16, no. 5; St. Alphonsus, book 6, no. 917; Aertnys, II, 492.

2. A spouse who, while exercising the conjugal work, delights in a fictitious intercourse with another person, sins gravely with an adulterous affection.

Nevertheless, a husband is not guilty of this sin if, in order that he may obtain the desired heat more easily, he imaginatively adorns his own wife, as it were, with the beauty of another person (living or depicted), and thus increases his affection toward his own spouse. But if it is a question of the appearance of another living person, let him take care lest he be held or captivated by desire for her.

3. It is consonant with nature and to be commended for the sake of health itself that both spouses experience the heat of pleasure at the same time. And wives who deliberately restrain their commotion are to be reproved, especially if by this means they wished to manifest a less benevolent disposition toward the husband. Yet this frigidity, since it does not impede generation, cannot of itself be accused of grave sin. Men likewise are to be reproved who, solicitous only concerning their own satisfaction, take no care for the wife's participation in pleasure.

Nevertheless, it seems to suffice for the law of union that the heat of each be morally joined. Wherefore, whether when intercourse is imminent or immediately after intercourse, if the wife is brought by her own touch or the touch of her husband to enjoy perfect pleasure, this is not grave, and, if some cause is added, it will be free from every fault. For through a moral union the heat preserves the utility which it ought to have, from God's providence, for human generation itself. There will be a just cause if, because of lesser heat, the wife could not be moved in the intercourse itself, or if the man himself is scarcely aroused otherwise than by seeing the arousal of the wife and can thereby complete intercourse.

But take care that you do not permit the same thing to the man after the wife has withdrawn herself. For on the part of the man nothing but a useless pollution would take place. Cf. Noldin, De sexto, etc., no. 70, c.

4. It is by no means lawful for one who is impeded neither by the avoidance of the contagion of disease nor by physical impotence from penetrating the vagina to place semen only at the opening of the vagina. And this would be grave. For this manner renders fertilization not probable but merely possible.

Wherefore, there is no approved author who permits this manner with the intention that offspring be avoided or that, with the hope of fertilization diminished, dangerous or fatal childbirth for the wife be forestalled. Let Bal- lerini be heard: "It must not be judged lawful for spouses to use matrimonial rights in a most imperfect manner for this reason, whenever they are able to come together in a more suitable manner. For although in general they are not bound to employ the greatest diligence so that the effect intended by nature may follow more certainly, they are nevertheless obliged, insofar as it is within their power, to avoid that manner of the work by virtue of which generation could not only be impeded but even could not be obtained except with the greatest difficulty ³." Let Noldin be heard: "If a more perfect manner is possible, it is not lawful to exercise the conjugal act in this imperfect manner, because this would be the same as morally impeding generation ⁴." Wherefore, it is also manifest that the words of Lehmkuhl ⁵, by which he tolerates this intercourse "in the case of a certainly validly contracted marriage, when it is impossible, or gravely harmful to the woman, to come together more perfectly," are to be understood of harm which would arise from the intercourse itself, as such, and not from the consequent conception or childbirth, lest, contrary to the most manifest mind of the celebrated theologian, he seem to connive at neo-Malthusianism.

³ Opus theologicum morale, vol. 6, treatise 10, no. 874.

⁴ Noldin, De sexto, etc., no. 68.

⁵ Theologia moralis, II, 1065.

For what if, through an impediment of a physical kind, for example, the excessive heat of the man, who immediately experiences pollution, or a nervous incapacity for erection, or vaginismus which does not tolerate contact, or the avoidance of contagion (if this case is granted), the spouses are prohibited from using marriage otherwise?

That we may speak first from our own persuasion, the placing of semen at the opening of the vagina does not seem to us to have the character of true intercourse: rather than intercourse, we would say that two simultaneous pollutions are exercised by the spouses. We do not deny that the end of nature can be obtained even in this way; but this does not suffice for acting honorably if you rupture the order of nature through the separate complete use of the genitals.

Yet not a few approved authors judge that this manner is lawful for spouses to whom another is inaccessible: thus Ballerini-Palmieri ⁶; Cardinal d'Annibale ⁷; Lehmkuhl ⁸; Cardinal Gasparri, in the first edition ⁹; Noldin ¹⁰; Alberti ¹¹. Some of these, excessively solicitous concerning the end of nature alone, formerly thought that even artificial fertilization, condemned by the Holy Of- fice, was permitted from necessity. We therefore fear lest they be deceived by an error of the same kind. Nevertheless, because, while the semen is placed at the vessel, both spouses operate together in the emission and reception of the semen, and this sufficiently immediately, the matter is not openly unlawful, and the probability of the opinion of weighty authors can be conceded until the Holy See decrees otherwise.

⁶ Loc. cit., no. 873.

⁷ Summula, vol. 3, no. 431, note 10.

⁸ Loc. cit.

⁹ De matrimonio, no. 1061. But in the third edition, nos. 575, 576, he adheres to the different opinion, with reasons added, although he says that the Holy Office is to be consulted.

¹⁰ Loc. cit.

¹¹ De sexto, etc., no. 122.

But even according to this opinion, since such a manner is not indulged to spouses except because they are unable to use a better one, they must then, by ordinary means, assist the introduction of semen into the vagina, so that they may truly come together in the best manner they can, and may endeavor to render fertilization probable rather than merely possible.

From the same opinion this follows, that "the case in which, by reason of impotence, intercourse ought to be forbidden to spouses as unlawful will be very rare" (Ballerini-Palmieri, vol. 6, treatise 10, no. 873).

The same writers will permit this use of marriage to those who are otherwise unable, not only for having offspring but also for the other ends of marriage. Wherefore, an old man who, having become incapable of penetration, uses his marriage by this means is not to be strictly reproved. Cf. Ballerini, vol. 6, treatise 10, nos. 873, 874.

N.B. Several things must be accurately distinguished here.

1. It is one thing to deposit semen at the opening; another, to penetrate the vagina a little. One who, being capable of another manner, chooses the former manner will sin gravely; but one who chooses the latter will be guilty of venial fault. (Aertnys, II, 497, 1; Alberti, De sexto, etc., no. 122.)

2. Even in our opinion, it will be lawful to attempt intercourse for old men who preserve hope of some penetration; it will likewise be lawful for a husband whose wife perhaps will be able to admit penetration, although she suffers from vaginismus, and this even if emission very often occurs outside the vessel. Cf. what was said in nos. 229, 230, and Aertnys, II, 497; Ballerini, vol. 6, treatise 10, nos. 873, 874.

3. Cardinal Gasparri, loc. cit., resolves the questions concerning impotence, the lawful use of marriage, and the consummation of marriage by one and the same rationale. Although we think this opinion reasonable, we distinguish these matters rather with others. For the respects seem to us to be diverse, and we think the conclusions must be drawn from somewhat diverse rationales. The immediate object of the contract is one thing: from this potency or capacity for marriage must be evaluated. But after marriage has been validly contracted, the very difficulty of continence between the spouses counsels that we easily concede to them the use of marriage which alone remains possible; finally, we shall call a marriage consummated where the rationale of the greater firmness of a consummated marriage is found. Wherefore, we hold certainly impotent one who cannot do anything except deposit semen at the opening of the vagina (cf. no. 72), since such a use of marriage is too distant from the intercourse intended; but with less certainty do we prohibit that use to spouses in the necessity explained above, because it seems to preserve something of intercourse; we judge marriage to be consummated by every introduction of semen, lest, in some case, we be compelled to admit the conception of offspring without the consummation of marriage, since offspring is the greatest argument why marriage, even in the natural order, cannot be dissolved. Cf. nos. 80, 87.