The Positions Compared: Faith and the Vices Against It

A. Unbelief is the greatest of sins

• Bontempi: “the greatest sin among sins” (What unbelief is, and what kind of, n. 3)

B. Hatred of God is graver

• St. Thomas
• Merkelbach (I, n. 737)
• Prümmer — named on this side in the fuller entry
• McHugh-Callan — named on this side in the fuller entry

A. A grave sin of omission

• Noldin: “a grave sin of omission” (n. 27)
• Marc — named on this side in the fuller entry
• Sabetti-Barrett — named on this side in the fuller entry

B. By accident more easily venial, or no sin

• Wouters: “can more easily be venial or even no sin” (n. 491)

C. Not unbelief at all, but a sin of ignorance

• Merkelbach (I, n. 736)

D. A refusal to believe, a sin of commission

• McHugh-Callan (n. 818)
• Concina — named on this side in the fuller entry
• Billuart: “Privative and contrary unbelief is a sin” (On unbelief in general, n. 6)

A. Shame of the faith is not grave in its whole genus, as denial is

• Vermeersch: “Denial is grave in its whole genus; not so shame” (n. 42)

B. It is always illicit to be ashamed of the faith

• Wouters: “always illicit to be ashamed of the faith” (n. 497)

A. It seems to be blasphemy

• Prümmer: “for it seems to be blasphemy” (II, n. 532)

B. Of itself only venial, a vain use of the Name

• Sabetti-Barrett: “of themselves contain only venial malice” (n. 220)

C. Such swearers are blasphemers, whatever their indignation is against

• Billuart: “are contumelious to God, though uttered on occasion of another” (On blasphemy, n. 4)
• Concina: “it seems to me, however, more certain that such swearers are, absolutely speaking, to be reckoned as blasphemers” (Theol. III, diss. III, ch. V, n. I)

A. Remissible, yet in fact never remitted

• Noldin: “indeed is remissible, yet in fact is never remitted” (n. 352)

B. Remitted with the greatest difficulty, rarely

• Merkelbach: “with greatest difficulty, more rarely, and only as it were miraculously” (I, n. 476)

C. No sin repented of is unforgivable in this life

• McHugh-Callan: “if repented of, cannot be forgiven in this life” (n. 900)

A. They must be repeated

• St. Alphonsus, as Marc reports him (n. 427)

  Marc reports that St. Alphonsus reformed his former opinion on this point.

• Prümmer: “must repeat confessions so made” (n. 499)
• Marc: “is bound, after having been taught those mysteries, to repeat the confession” (n. 427)
• Concina: “must repeat their Confessions, as being null” (III, diss. I, ch. IV, n. VIII) — “is common, and the contrary utterly false”

B. More safely repeated, but not strictly required

• Merkelbach: “the faithful cannot be strictly obliged to this” (I, n. 708)

C. They need not be repeated

• Noldin: “need not necessarily repeat the confessions made in this state of ignorance” (n. 10)
• McHugh-Callan: “is not obliged to repeat his confessions” (n. 792)

A. Pilate and the third day bind under light obligation

• Merkelbach: “circumstances of time: under Pontius Pilate, the third day” (I, n. 709)

B. They need not be known under any obligation

• Noldin: “need not be known even under light obligation” (n. 12)
• Vermeersch: “may be unknown without punishment” (n. 11)
• McHugh-Callan: “do not oblige to explicit faith under any sin” (n. 928)
• Concina: “nor is explicit faith in the passion under Pontius Pilate required” (III, diss. I, ch. IV, n. X)

A. By accident a grave obligation (at least the Our Father)

• Prümmer: “By accident there is a grave obligation of learning the Lord's Prayer by memory” (n. 501)
• McHugh-Callan: “it seems that there is a serious obligation of memorizing at least the Our Father” (n. 923)

Also named on this side: Fagundez, Sanchez and Suarez, as Bontempi reports (What things are to be believed by, n. 26).

B. The neglect is a venial sin

• Noldin (n. 12)
• Marc: “sins venially” (n. 427)
• Vermeersch: “at least venial fault” (n. 13)
• Merkelbach (I, n. 709)

C. An ecclesiastical precept, binding as to the substance

• Concina: “confirmed by long custom” (III, diss. I, ch. V, n. XI)

A. Illicit to wear them

• Prümmer: “it is not licit to wear the distinctive signs of Freemasons” (n. 507)
• Noldin: “is illicit” (n. 20)
• Merkelbach — named on this side in the fuller entry
• McHugh-Callan — named on this side in the fuller entry

B. Illicit when they certainly show adherence; perhaps tolerable for a proportionate cause where their meaning is uncertain

• Vermeersch: “when they certainly show adherence to a condemned sect” (n. 24)

A. Blasphemy is of its kind graver than heresy

• Merkelbach: “the greatest blasphemy is graver than the greatest infidelity or the greatest hatred of God” (I, n. 785)
• Concina: “blasphemy, by its very kind, is graver than heresy itself” (Theol. III, diss. III, ch. IV, n. III) — with St. Antoninus, Navarrus

B. Lighter than heresy, hatred of God and despair

Also named on this side: the Salmanticenses, as Concina reports (Theol. III, diss. III, ch. IV, n. III).

A. Mortal if the jest leaves the insult, not if it takes it away

Also named on this side: Leander, with Castropalao, Tamburini and Sanchez, as Concina reports (Theol. III, diss. III, ch. IV, n. X).

B. The distinction is empty: jest increases the wickedness

• Concina: “This distinction seems to me empty and worthless” (Theol. III, diss. III, ch. IV, n. X)

A. Denying a single article makes a true apostate

• Prümmer: “becomes a true apostate” (n. 512)

B. Apostasy is total defection; denying a part is heresy

• Noldin (n. 28)
• Wouters (n. 492)
• Concina: “bids farewell to Christ and to his whole Religion” (III, diss. I, ch. IX, n. IV)
• Billuart: “is distinguished from heresy, which is a desertion of the faith as to a part only” (On apostasy, n. 2)

A. No gravely culpable ignorance excuses from heresy

• Bontempi: “that no gravely culpable ignorance excuses from heresy” (Whether ignorance excuses from her, n. 2) — “probable”

B. Only affected ignorance makes formal heresy

• Billuart: “through ignorance, even culpable, crass, and supine, yet not affected” (On heresy, n. 7)
• Concina: “for the end of speaking and living more freely, or of contradicting the authority of the Church: for then it is formal heresy” (III, diss. I, ch. IX, n. II)

A. A positive, deliberate doubter is a heretic

• Concina: “in practice they are commonly heretics who with pertinacious mind doubt about the things of faith” (III, diss. I, ch. IX, n. III)
• Billuart: “some hold, not improbably, that the malice of heresy is included therein” (On heresy, n. 12)

B. Not properly a heretic, but an unbeliever privatively

• Bontempi: “one doubting concerning matters of faith is not properly a heretic” (Whether one who doubts about the a, n. 6)

A. Better to profess the faith candidly; concealment not advisable

• Merkelbach: “much better to profess faith candidly” (I, n. 715)
• Prümmer — named on this side in the fuller entry
• McHugh-Callan: “is not advisable” (n. 1008)

B. Concealment lawful, and often better

• St. Alphonsus, as Marc reports him (n. 431)
• Marc: “often it is better” (n. 431)
• Vermeersch: “per se lawful, and sometimes expedient” (n. 23)
• Billuart: “although it has never been licit to deny the faith, it is nevertheless licit sometimes to hide and dissemble it” (On the external act of faith, n. 13)

A. One must confess, even at the risk of life

• Prümmer: “Theologians commonly teach” (n. 505)
• Concina: “It is agreed among all” (III, diss. I, ch. VI, n. III)

B. Not generally bound to profess positively, unless silence would look like denial

• St. Alphonsus, as Marc reports him (n. 430)
• Marc: “generally it is not true” (n. 430)

Also named on this side: one of four opinions, as Bontempi reports (Whether we are bound to confess fa, n. 10).

A. It is the sin of blasphemy

• Merkelbach: “commits the sin of blasphemy” (I, n. 783)

B. Formal blasphemy seems to be lacking; the scandal remains

• Vermeersch: “formal blasphemy seems to be denied” (n. 260)

Also named on this side: Tamburini and Leander, as Concina reports (Theol. III, diss. III, ch. IV, n. V).

C. Mortal while the habit is not fought; light in one who labors to root it out

• Concina: “sins, then, a mortal sin, as often as he blasphemes” (Theol. III, diss. III, ch. IV, n. V)
• Billuart: “does not care to eradicate as far as he can” (On blasphemy, n. 12)

A. God's authority is believed in the same act (one simple assent)

• Prümmer: “the authority of God revealing, not known but believed” (n. 486)
• McHugh-Callan: “at the same time the authority of the Revealer and the truth of His revelation” (n. 799)
• Billuart: “by the same act we assent to the thing revealed and to the revelation” (On the habit of faith, n. 18)

Also named on this side: Suarez, as Merkelbach reports (I, n. 694).

B. It is known beforehand, the motive only, not believed in the act

• Merkelbach: “in this act we do not believe nor in any way affirm the very authority of God revealing” (I, n. 694)

C. The act is a kind of reasoning from God's veracity

• Bontempi: “the Truth of revelation is the conclusion deduced, as Lugo shows” (What the object of faith is, n. 34)

Also named on this side: Lugo, as Merkelbach reports (I, n. 694).

A. Not at the same moment

• St. Thomas: “it is equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of science and of belief for the same person” (II-II, q. 1, a. 5)
• Merkelbach: “cannot at that moment accept the same truth on account of testimony, even divine testimony” (I, n. 680)
• McHugh-Callan (n. 784)

B. The same truth can be known and believed

• Wouters: “according to the more probable opinion even truths evidently known to reason, or admitted on account of their intrinsic evidence, can be believed by divine faith” (n. 358)
• Bontempi: “acts of faith and of science concerning the same object can exist” (Whether the object of faith can be, n. 12)

A. After definition it is believed by divine faith

• Prümmer: “then certainly that is to be believed by divine faith” (n. 484)

B. It is ecclesiastical faith (or theological assent)

• Merkelbach: “are the object, not of divine faith, but of theological assent or even of ecclesiastical faith” (I, n. 675)
• Wouters: “More probably it must be held to be an assent of ecclesiastical faith” (n. 356)

A. Faith rests on God's wisdom and veracity together

• Noldin: “rests on first truth, or on two divine perfections” (n. 4)

B. On veracity, supposing (connoting) His knowledge or wisdom

• Merkelbach: “insofar as it supposes first truth in knowing” (I, n. 667)
• Billuart: “the divine veracity revealing, connoting first truth in knowing, or the infinite wisdom of God” (What is the object of faith, n. 5)

C. On veracity alone; wisdom is a condition only

• Wouters: “wisdom does not essentially constitute the formal object of theological faith, but nevertheless concurs toward it as a condition without which not” (n. 356)

A. He will be saved without an act of faith

• Merkelbach: “he will be saved without an act of faith” (I, n. 707)
• Noldin: “and therefore can be saved even without an act of faith” (n. 8)

Also named on this side: Lugo and Elbel, as Prümmer reports (n. 497).

B. No adult with the use of reason is saved without actual faith

• Prümmer: “We deny that this can be admitted” (n. 497)
• Concina: “adults having the use of reason, though baptized in infancy, cannot attain eternal salvation without actual faith” (III, diss. I, ch. IV, n. III)

A. Necessary as a means (or to be followed in practice)

• St. Thomas (II-II, q. 2, a. 8)
• Bontempi: “THE TRUE teaching” (What must be believed by the neces, n. 18)
• Merkelbach: “is more probable” (I, n. 707)
• McHugh-Callan: “A majority of theologians hold, and with greater probability it seems” (n. 787)
• Prümmer: “This affirmative opinion must be followed in practice” (n. 499)
• Concina: “The contrary opinion, which Fr. Sporer defends — who cites for it Laymann, Tanner, and other more recent writers — is false, and adverse to the luminous testimonies of God” (III, diss. I, ch. IV, n. VI)
• Billuart: “This opinion is more probable and more common” (Whether it is of the necessity of…, n. 5)

B. The denial is probable, even more probable in theory

• Wouters: “the contrary opinion also is probable” (n. 488)
• Marc: “sufficiently probable” (n. 427)
• Sabetti-Barrett: “the negative opinion is certainly probable” (n. 157)
• Noldin: “theoretically more probable” (n. 10)

Also named on this side: Sporer, Laymann, Tanner, as Concina reports (III, diss. I, ch. IV, n. VI).

C. Necessary like baptism, in reality or in desire

• Vermeersch: “like baptism itself, in reality, or in desire” (n. 10)

A. They must be believed

• Noldin: “The precepts of the decalogue must not only be known, but also believed” (n. 12)
• Bontempi: “faith in the Decalogue is also necessary for its observance” (What things are to be believed by, n. 18)
• Wouters: “by explicit faith there must be believed” (n. 489)
• Merkelbach: “at least implicitly must be believed” (I, n. 709)
• Billuart: “to believe explicitly” (The remaining difficulties concerning…, n. 2)

B. They must be known, not necessarily believed

• Sabetti-Barrett: “Many affirm this, because the precepts of the Decalogue were revealed that they might be observed by all; but several rightly contradict it” (n. 157)

A. It binds of itself at death

• Merkelbach (I, n. 790)
• Prümmer: “More probably” (n. 502)
• Marc: “as is more commonly taught” (n. 426)
• Wouters: “Thus many” (n. 489)
• Concina: “At the time of death the precept urges of itself” (III, diss. I, ch. V, n. XIII)
• Billuart: “binds per se in danger of death” (The remaining difficulties concerning…, n. 12)

B. Not proved, unless a temptation urges

• Noldin: “it cannot be proved with certainty that faith is necessary at that time, unless a vehement temptation against faith urges” (n. 14)

Also named on this side: Leander, as Concina reports (III, diss. I, ch. II, n. VI).

C. Resolved in practice by the sacraments; not named

• Sabetti-Barrett: “has been resolved, at least practically” (n. 153)
• Vermeersch (n. 19)

A. Questioned by public authority in a cause of faith, one must confess

• Prümmer: “if he is questioned by public authority in a cause of faith” (n. 505)
• Noldin: “whether this happens publicly or privately” (n. 16)
• Merkelbach (I, n. 712)
• Concina: “It is agreed among all” (III, diss. I, ch. VI, n. III)

B. Only when questioned in the order of law (before the law, by one with the right)

• Vermeersch: “at least if the legal order is observed by the one questioning” (n. 20)
• Wouters: “when someone is summoned before the law” (n. 490)
• Marc: “outside the order of law” (n. 430)
• Sabetti-Barrett: “reject the interrogation as out of order” (n. 153)
• McHugh-Callan: “out of hatred of the faith” (n. 995)

A. Pastors may not flee (when the flock is in danger)

• Noldin: “pastors of souls, bishops, and parish priests, cannot licitly flee” (n. 23)
• Prümmer: “if their flight would expose the people committed to them to grave danger of apostasy” (n. 505)
• Merkelbach — named on this side in the fuller entry
• Marc — named on this side in the fuller entry

B. Left to judgment; flight may be lawful or even a duty when others can supply

• Vermeersch: “to withdraw himself for a time so that from a safe place he may administer the territory and reserve himself for the good of more persons” (n. 23)
• McHugh-Callan (n. 1005)
• Spirago: “they may fly if their presence is not required, or if it seems likely to give rise to fresh persecutions” (VIII. ON THE DUTY OF CONFESSING OUR FAITH)

A. Long concealment is illicit

• Noldin: “concealment for a long time is illicit” (n. 16)
• McHugh-Callan: “it cannot be permitted permanently” (n. 992)

B. Where profession would bring excessive evil, one may stay hidden till a posthumous revelation

• Vermeersch: “it will be lawful to be a hidden Christian and to satisfy the debt of Christian profession through a posthumous revelation” (n. 26)

A. Make an act of faith

• Spirago: “we should not argue with them, but should make an act of faith and pray for more faith” (VII. ON THE ABSENCE AND LOSS OF FAITH)
• Vermeersch: “will for the most part help in the temptation itself” (n. 17)
• Concina: “He who feels himself agitated by these straits should elicit acts of faith, and desist from the conflict” (III, diss. I, ch. IX, n. III)

B. Turn away without positive effort; no new acts

• Merkelbach: “fled and contemned without positive effort” (Pastoral, Q. I)
• McHugh-Callan: “as prolonging or intensifying the temptation (a thing that is not infrequent)” (n. 934)

A. For others it probably suffices not to contemn it

• Merkelbach: “for others it probably suffices that they do not contemn them” (I, n. 674)

B. Probably others too owe it the assent of divine faith

• McHugh-Callan: “This applies to those to whom and for whom they were given, and probably to others also” (n. 758)

A. Lawful for a grave cause when they mark only a nation; never what professes a false sect

• Noldin (n. 22)
• Billuart: “the same of their standards in war, that thus they may be deceived and conquered” (On the external act of faith, n. 13)
• Concina: “whatever Azor, with certain others, asserts to the contrary” (III, diss. I, ch. VI, n. VIII)

B. Lawful for a great cause even what is sacred to the sect

Also named on this side: Azor, as Concina reports (III, diss. I, ch. VI, n. VIII); Antonio of the Holy Spirit, as Concina reports (III, diss. I, ch. II, n. VII).

A. Under faith, as opposed to its confession

• St. Thomas (II-II, q. 13, a. 1)
• Merkelbach (I, n. 733)

B. Among the vices against religion (the second precept)

• Prümmer — named on this side in the fuller entry
• Noldin — named on this side in the fuller entry
• Wouters — named on this side in the fuller entry
• Concina: “is opposed to the confession of faith, not to faith by its very nature” (Theol. III, diss. III, ch. III, n. II)

C. Under both

• Billuart: “insofar as it contains implicitly or explicitly something false concerning God, it is opposed to the confession of faith; insofar as it is a dishonoring of God, it is opposed to religion” (On blasphemy, n. 14)

A. Against prudence

• McHugh-Callan: “is opposed rather to prudence” (n. 847)

B. Against faith, by excess

• Prümmer (n. 509)
• Noldin — named on this side in the fuller entry
• Marc — named on this side in the fuller entry

A. A special infused habit in the will

• Prümmer: “an infused habit is required in the will for eliciting the act of pious credulity” (n. 491)
• Noldin (n. 3)

B. Charity; no special habit

• Merkelbach: “it cannot be concluded that there exists in the will a certain special habit” (I, n. 716)
• Marc (n. 423)

C. Faith itself gives the will its virtue

• Bontempi: “the habit of faith gives the will its virtue, that it may command its acts to the intellect” (Whether faith resides in the intel, n. 39)

A. Two kinds

• St. Thomas (II-II, q. 10, a. 1)
• Prümmer (n. 510)

B. Three, privative unbelief lying between

• Noldin (n. 26)
• Wouters (n. 491)

C. Three, the privative being a refusal

• Concina: “positively resists the preaching of the faith, and refuses to receive the faith” (III, diss. I, ch. VII, n. I)
• Billuart: “does not will to assent to it, without however asserting the contrary” (On unbelief in general, n. 1)

A. Paganism, Judaism and heresy are morally distinct species

• Merkelbach: “three morally distinct species” (I, n. 739)

B. They do not differ in species

• Wouters: “do not differ in species from positive infidelity” (n. 492)
• Vermeersch — named on this side in the fuller entry

A. Four

• Prümmer: “supernaturalness, freedom, infallibility, firmness or constancy” (n. 486)

B. Five

• Wouters: “truth, certitude, obscurity, liberty, and necessity” (n. 358)
• McHugh-Callan (n. 799)

C. Seven

• Merkelbach: “on the part of the subject, irrevocability belongs to faith” (I, n. 728)

A. At least every five years; the other reckonings are arbitrary

• Prümmer: “the precept of faith also obliges at least in any five-year period” (n. 502)

B. Three or four times a year

• Merkelbach: “more probably, three or four times a year” (I, n. 790)

C. At least once a year

• Marc: “at least once in the year, as Doctors admit with sufficient probability” (n. 426)
• Sabetti-Barrett (n. 153)

D. Indeterminate

• Noldin: “altogether indeterminate” (n. 14)
• Vermeersch (n. 17)
• McHugh-Callan: “There is no solid support for any of these opinions” (n. 933)

E. Many times; the Casuists' reckonings are vain

• Concina: “I should scarcely count him a Christian who within a year elicited an act of faith only once. This frequency of acts I dare not define” (III, diss. I, ch. V, n. XIII)
• Billuart: “cannot be determined with certainty. Marvelously on this point authors vary” (The remaining difficulties concerning…, n. 13)

A. Another species

• Concina (Theol. III, diss. III, ch. III, n. V) — “more probable”

B. The same species, since religion is one virtue

Also named on this side: the Salmanticenses, Azor, Bonacina, as Concina reports (Theol. III, diss. III, ch. III, n. V).

A. God is the formal object which; the authority revealing, the formal object by which

• Prümmer: “the formal object which” (n. 482)
• Billuart: “or, as others call it, the object of attribution of faith, is first truth in being, or God himself as God” (What is the object of faith, n. 3)
• Concina: “is also called the formal object which” (III, diss. I, ch. III, n. III)

B. "Formal object" is the authority revealing alone; God is the principal material object

• Merkelbach: “the primary or principal material object” (I, n. 672)
• Wouters (n. 356)
• McHugh-Callan (n. 754)
• Marc — named on this side in the fuller entry
• Bontempi: “the principal object, and the object of attribution” (What the object of faith is, n. 7)

A. An extrinsic, accidental form

• St. Thomas: “charity is called the form of faith in so far as the act of faith is perfected and formed by charity” (II-II, q. 4, a. 3)
• Merkelbach: “the form (extrinsic, directive, and accidental) of faith” (I, n. 717)

B. Called its form only metaphorically

• Wouters: “cannot be called its substantial or accidental form” (n. 355)
• Bontempi: “charity is called the form of faith only metaphorically” (Whether faith is perfected by char, n. 1)

A. Lifeless faith is not a virtue (simply so called)

• St. Thomas: “lifeless faith is not a virtue” (II-II, q. 4, a. 5)
• Merkelbach: “it is not a virtue simply so called” (I, n. 717)

B. It is a true virtue, though imperfect

• Bontempi: “is most properly a virtue” (Whether, and how, faith is a virtu, n. 2)
• Noldin: “a true virtue and true faith” (n. 6)
• McHugh-Callan: “an imperfect virtue” (n. 800)

A. Never licit, directly or indirectly

• Prümmer: “It is never licit to deny faith, neither directly nor indirectly” (n. 504)
• Merkelbach: “which is held by others as a denial of faith” (I, n. 712)

B. Indirectly permitted for a just cause

• Noldin: “From a just cause it is permitted indirectly to deny faith” (n. 24)