The Positions Compared: Hope and the Vices Against It

Drawn from the authors' own words; every quotation links to its place.

The virtues: Faith · Hope · Charity · Prudence · Justice · Fortitude · Temperance

Every point on which our authors part ways about hope and the vices against it, as the comparison notes of the Virtues and Vices pages set them out, each set out here as its sides, with each author of this library who answers it placed on his side in his own words. St. Alphonsus has a column of his own: his Theologia moralis is not yet in this library, so his opinion is given as our authors report it, and where two of them report it differently, both reports are shown. The counts are of the authors in this library, whose shelf is not evenly balanced: it holds more Jesuits than any other school.

In the table, a letter is the side an author takes; ± means he sets out both without choosing; a blank means the fuller entry does not place him. Each point opens below, with every author quoted and linked.

Point	St. Thomas	St. Alphonsus	Thomist					Franciscan	Alphonsian		Jesuit			Catechetical
Point	St. Thomas	St. Alphonsus	Billuart	Concina	Prümmer	Merkelbach	McHugh-Callan	Bontempi	Marc	Wouters	Noldin	Sabetti-Barrett	Vermeersch	Spirago
How Grave It Is
Whether despair is ever forgiven							A	B						C
Whether presumption admits light matter						B	B			B	B	A
How often presumption is committed				A		B	B		A		B		B
What a Thing Is or Requires
The motive of hope	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	D	C	C	B	B	C
The division of servile fear				C	A	B		A	A		A
Whether the vision of God is the object of hope	A		A		A	A	C	B		A			B
Whether hope requires God's promise		A			B	B		A	A	A	A
Whether the arduous belongs to hope's formal object						A		B		A
Where hope's certainty comes from	A					A		B
Whether Christ hoped for the glory of His body	A					A		B
Which presumption destroys the habit of hope					A	A	A			C	B		A
Whether the sinner keeps hope	A		A		A			A						B
Whether hope is due at once with the use of reason				A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A		B
Whether an act of hope is due of itself at death				A	A	A	B		A	A	C		C
Whether acts of fear are commanded of themselves	A			A		A	A		B	A
Initial fear: imperfect filial fear, or its own kind	A			A	A	A	A	B
Whether filial fear grows with charity	A				A	A	A	B
Whether our own merits are a ground of hope	B				A	B	A	A					A
Where It Belongs
Hatred of God: under hope too											A		B
Wishing for death: against hope or not									B		A
Hoping for help in sin: presumption or blasphemy					A	B	B			A	A		B
Putting off repentance: against hope or charity				B		A							B
Hoping for another's salvation: hope, or charity	A				A	A	A	B
How Many
Ways of presuming					C	A				B	B
Causes of despair	A				B	A		C	B	B		B
How often an act of hope is due				E	C	A		D	B		C		C
One Word, Two Senses
Excess of hope	A			B	B	B

How Grave It Is

Whether despair is ever forgiven

A. It can be forgiven

McHugh-Callan: “it is not unpardonable” (n. 1070)

B. It can scarcely be remitted

Bontempi: “can scarcely be remitted” (Sole Question: Of what power despa, n. 17)

C. As a sin against the Holy Ghost it is never forgiven

Spirago: “is never forgiven” (THE OBJECT OF CHRISTIAN HOPE)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

Whether presumption admits light matter

A. Mortal from its genus, but not from its whole genus: light matter possible

Sabetti-Barrett: “mortal from its genus, but not from its whole genus” (n. 164)

B. Presumption properly so called is mortal from its whole genus

Merkelbach — named on this side in the fuller entry
Noldin — named on this side in the fuller entry
Wouters — named on this side in the fuller entry
McHugh-Callan (n. 1090)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 4, A 1). The fuller entry.

How often presumption is committed

A. More frequent than despair

Marc: “more frequent than desperation” (n. 463)
Concina: “more frequently than into desperation, fall those sinners who trust that they will attain eternal glory without fasting, without the buffeting of the flesh, and without laborious works” (III, diss. I, ch. XI, n. VIII)

B. Rarely committed, properly so called

Merkelbach: “rarely fully deliberate” (I, n. 835)
McHugh-Callan — named on this side in the fuller entry
Vermeersch — named on this side in the fuller entry
Noldin — named on this side in the fuller entry

Held by most of our authors: B (B 4, A 2). The fuller entry.

What a Thing Is or Requires

The motive of hope

A. God's aiding omnipotence alone

St. Thomas (II-II, q. 17, a. 1)
Prümmer: “omnipotence assisting” (n. 536)
Merkelbach: “the ultimate and immediate motive of hope is only aiding omnipotence” (I, n. 799)
McHugh-Callan: “proximately on God’s almighty power and radically on His goodness” (n. 1026)
Concina: “God himself as omnipotent — that is, the aiding omnipotence” (III, diss. I, ch. XI, n. II)
Billuart: “assisting omnipotence, that is, affording or offering helps” (On hope in itself and on its object, n. 17)

B. God's fidelity in His promises

Noldin: “the supreme fidelity of God promising” (n. 43)
Sabetti-Barrett: “from the promise of God” (n. 162)

C. Omnipotence, goodness and fidelity together

St. Alphonsus, as Wouters reports him (n. 360)
Vermeersch: “the Omnipotence of God, His Supreme relative Goodness, and His fidelity in promises” (n. 57)
Wouters: “that this fidelity is also a constitutive part of the formal object” (n. 360)
Marc: “the BENEVOLENCE OF GOD, considered as presupposing omnipotence” (n. 456)

D. God as an arduous good, attained by His liberality, truth and omnipotence

Bontempi: “yet to be attained by divine liberality, truth, and omnipotence upheld” (What the formal object of hope is, n. 7)

Merkelbach and Bontempi both reject Scotus and Suarez, who make the motive God as our supreme good.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 5, C 3, B 2, D 1). The fuller entry.

The division of servile fear

A. Servile fear is divided into simply servile (good) and servilely servile (evil)

Prümmer: “into simply servile fear and servilely servile fear” (n. 542)
Noldin (n. 46)
Bontempi (What the object of fear is, n. 3)
Marc: “Servile fear of God (formally, called by others servilely servile)” (n. 457)

B. Servilely servile fear is not servile fear at all, but worldly

Merkelbach: “has nothing in common with servile fear except the name” (I, n. 824)

C. Servile fear is good, and no such line is drawn

Concina: “Servile fear is good; God urges it” (III, diss. I, ch. XI, n. V)

Marc keeps other names: his servile fear is the others' servilely servile, his initial fear their simply servile.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

Whether the vision of God is the object of hope

A. God Himself; the vision is only a condition

St. Thomas: “we should hope from Him for nothing less than Himself” (II-II, q. 17, a. 2)
Merkelbach: “is only the condition required so that God may be attained and possessed” (I, n. 805)
Wouters: “seems to be admitted as more probable” (n. 360)
Prümmer: “not formal beatitude, which is a created act” (n. 535)
Billuart: “not formal but objective beatitude” (On hope in itself and on its object, n. 11)

B. God, and in oblique the happiness of possessing Him

Vermeersch: “in oblique, the subjective happiness of His possession” (n. 57)
Bontempi: “not the vision itself alone, but God also, is the material object of Hope” (What the material object of hope i, n. 7)

C. The vision itself is in the primary object

McHugh-Callan: “essential beatitude, that is, the beatific vision” (n. 1019)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4, B 2, C 1). The fuller entry.

Whether hope requires God's promise

A. Hope supposes God's promise as a necessary condition

St. Alphonsus, quoted by Marc: “without this promise, we would not be able to hope for salvation with certain confidence” (n. 456)
Noldin: “as faith supposes revelation, so hope supposes the divine promise of those things which we hope for as a necessary condition” (n. 43)
Wouters: “a condition without which there is no eliciting of an act of hope” (n. 360)
Marc: “without this promise, we would not be able to hope for salvation with certain confidence” (n. 456)
Bontempi: “the primary foundation of hope, which is the promise of God” (Whether a certain object is set fo, n. 8)

B. Hope is possible without the promise, though not certain

Prümmer: “theological hope is at least possible without this promise” (n. 536)
Merkelbach: “even if God had promised nothing or were not faithful in promises” (I, n. 800)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4, B 2). The fuller entry.

Whether the arduous belongs to hope's formal object

A. The arduous is a condition of the object, not the motive

Merkelbach: “These indeed are not the motive of hope, but are conditions required for the material object” (I, n. 807)
Wouters: “the opinions of the few who assign as the formal object of the virtue of hope either the arduousness of the good to be obtained” (n. 360)

B. The arduous enters into the formal object

Bontempi: “the aspect of the Arduous enters into the notion of the object” (What the formal object of hope is, n. 14)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1). The fuller entry.

Where hope's certainty comes from

A. Its certainty is borrowed from the certainty of faith

St. Thomas: “as though sharing in the certainty of faith” (II-II, q. 18, a. 4)
Merkelbach: “the act of hope is certain with a certitude derived from the certitude of faith” (I, n. 819)

B. Hope has its own certainty, and charity adds one to the just

Bontempi: “Hope has its own certainty” (Whether a certain object is set fo, n. 7)

Marc adds how the uncertainty on our part, of justification and of perseverance, is in great part taken away.

Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1). The fuller entry.

Whether Christ hoped for the glory of His body

A. Christ could hope for the glory of His body, though He had not the virtue of hope

St. Thomas: “hope for the glory of impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to the virtue of hope” (II-II, q. 18, a. 2, ad 1)
Merkelbach: “he could hope for the glory of the body, which was arduous for him, as to be merited by the Passion” (I, n. 817)

Also named on this side: Coninck, as Bontempi reports (Whether hope remains in the blesse, n. 26).

B. Christ had hope only in His members; His body's glory was not arduous to Him

Bontempi: “Christ had hope not in himself, but in his members” (Whether hope remains in the blesse, n. 26)

Prümmer denies Him the virtue of hope, as all do.

Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1). The fuller entry.

Which presumption destroys the habit of hope

A. Presumption properly so called, opposed to the motive, destroys the habit

Merkelbach: “that presumption which removes the motive of hope” (I, n. 818)
Vermeersch: “by the two reasons of presumption properly so called” (n. 66)
McHugh-Callan: “takes away the virtue of hope” (n. 1085)
Prümmer: “Through presumption and gravely culpable desperation, as directly contrary to the virtue of hope” (n. 538)

B. Only Pelagian presumption is named

Noldin: “through Pelagian presumption, the habit of hope is lost” (n. 52)

C. The heretical presumptions destroy it only indirectly, by destroying its foundation

Wouters: “it indirectly destroys the formal object of hope by destroying its foundation” (n. 515)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

Whether the sinner keeps hope

A. Hope remains in the sinner who keeps the faith and has not despaired or presumed

Prümmer: “the Council manifestly supposes that hope can remain in a sinner” (n. 538)
Bontempi: “Hope remains even when Charity is destroyed” (Whether hope is at times formless, n. 10)
Billuart: “Hope remains in all faithful wayfarers, even in sinners who do not despair or presume” (In whom hope is found, n. 1)
St. Thomas: “the movement of living hope” (II-II, q. 17, a. 8, ad 2)

B. The sinner can hope only when he repents

Spirago: “the sinner can hope in God only when he really repents and is willing to reform his life” (THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIAN HOPE)

St. Thomas distinguishes hope in general, which the sinner can keep, from living hope, which proceeds from charity; Spirago does not draw the line.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 1). The fuller entry.

Whether hope is due at once with the use of reason

A. At once with the use of reason (when beatitude is first proposed)

Prümmer (n. 545)
Merkelbach (I, n. 839)
Noldin (n. 45)
Wouters (n. 513)
McHugh-Callan (n. 1096)
Marc (n. 460)
Concina: “This precept obliges as soon as the light of reason shines forth” (III, diss. I, ch. XI, n. IV)

B. Controverted

Vermeersch: “the obligation of an act of hope immediately from the use of reason is controverted” (n. 60)

C. After the use of reason, not immediately, but not long after

Bontempi: “after the use of reason, not immediately, but not after much time” (Whether there is a precept of hopi, n. 13)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 7, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

Whether an act of hope is due of itself at death

A. Due of itself at the article of death

Prümmer (n. 545)
Merkelbach (I, n. 839)
Wouters (n. 513)
Marc: “in danger of death” (n. 460)
Concina: “when one must depart from this world” (III, diss. I, ch. XI, n. IV)

B. Not of itself when the sacraments are received without temptation

McHugh-Callan: “there is no manifest need of making an express act of hope” (n. 1096)

C. Only as many wish; not named among the times it binds

Vermeersch: “As many wish, around the end of life” (n. 58)
Noldin (n. 45)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 5, C 2, B 1). The fuller entry.

Whether acts of fear are commanded of themselves

A. There is a precept of fear, binding of itself

St. Thomas: “precepts of filial fear are given in the Law, even as precepts of love” (II-II, q. 22, a. 2)
Merkelbach (I, n. 840)
Wouters: “To the act of hoping there corresponds the act of fearing eternal damnation, which likewise obliges” (n. 513)
McHugh-Callan: “the principles and conclusions given above for hope can be applied also to fear” (n. 1104)
Concina: “This precept is a peculiar one” (III, diss. I, ch. XI, n. VI)

B. No special precept of explicit acts of fear

Marc: “Nor are we bound directly, from a special precept, to exercising explicit acts of fear” (n. 461) — with Valentia, Sanchez

Also named on this side: Caspensis, as Bontempi reports (On the effects, and the precept, o, n. 4).

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4, B 1). The fuller entry.

Initial fear: imperfect filial fear, or its own kind

A. Initial fear is imperfect filial fear, not another kind

St. Thomas (II-II, q. 19, a. 8)
Prümmer: “It does not differ essentially from filial fear” (n. 542)
Merkelbach: “is not a new species of fear, but is filial fear” (I, n. 825)
McHugh-Callan: “two degrees of filial fear” (n. 1055)
Concina: “is not distinguished from the first except as the imperfect from the perfect” (III, diss. I, ch. XI, n. V)

B. They differ by their principal motive

Bontempi: “they do not differ only as the less perfect from the more perfect; but by the principal motive” (Whether initial and filial fear di, n. 10)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4, B 1). The fuller entry.

Whether filial fear grows with charity

A. Filial fear grows as charity grows

St. Thomas: “filial fear must needs increase when charity increases” (II-II, q. 19, a. 10)
Prümmer (n. 542)
Merkelbach (I, n. 825)
McHugh-Callan (n. 1056)

B. As charity grows, fear diminishes as to anxiety; only reverential fear grows

Bontempi: “that as charity grows, Fear diminishes with respect to anxiety” (Whether, as charity grows, fear di, n. 6)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 1). The fuller entry.

Whether our own merits are a ground of hope

A. Our merits are a ground of hope

McHugh-Callan: “since they are instruments used by God” (n. 1023)
Prümmer: “our merits acquired under the influence of grace found in us hope of eternal life” (n. 537)
Bontempi: “the confidence of the Saints is born also from good merits” (Whether hope arises from merits, n. 4)
Vermeersch: “he hopes more perfectly who, in the state of grace, actually has merits” (n. 57)

B. They are dispositions required, not the motive

Merkelbach: “not indeed because in this way they are the motive of hoping, but because they are dispositions required” (I, n. 802)
St. Thomas: “does not flow from our merits, but from grace alone” (II-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad 2)

McHugh-Callan also says of grace and merits already had: “It is not in this sense that divine help is called the motive of hope.”

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4, B 1). The fuller entry.

Where It Belongs

Hatred of God: under hope too

A. Hatred of God (of abomination) is also a sin against hope

Noldin: “directly opposed to hope” (n. 48)

B. It is opposed rather to the imperfect charity hope presupposes

Vermeersch: “rather is opposed to imperfect charity which is presupposed to hope itself” (n. 68)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1). The fuller entry.

Wishing for death: against hope or not

A. Wishing for death from weariness of life is not against hope

Noldin: “it is not a sin against hope” (n. 47)

B. It is a sin against hope's desire (venial unless rebellious)

Marc: “the inordinate affection of heavenly happiness, by which beatitude is sought from weariness of life” (n. 462)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1). The fuller entry.

Hoping for help in sin: presumption or blasphemy

A. A way of presumption

Prümmer: “tempting God” (n. 549)
Noldin — named on this side in the fuller entry
Wouters — named on this side in the fuller entry

B. Not presumption: blasphemy, or a sin against religion

Merkelbach (I, n. 834)
McHugh-Callan: “blasphemous hope” (n. 1081)
Vermeersch: “not against hope but against religion” (n. 67)

Our authors are evenly divided (B 3, A 3). The fuller entry.

Putting off repentance: against hope or charity

A. Hoping for time to repent at the end is presumption

Merkelbach: “time for penance precisely at the end of life” (I, n. 834)

B. Sinning in hope of later repentance is against charity toward oneself

Vermeersch (n. 63)
Concina: “This crass negligence alone, this stupid torpor and indolence in the gravest business of eternal salvation, is a grave sin” (III, diss. I, ch. XI, n. VIII)

Concina: not presumption properly so called, but a continual sin of carelessness of one's own salvation, grave.

Held by most of our authors: B (B 2, A 1). The fuller entry.

Hoping for another's salvation: hope, or charity

A. The same virtue of hope, given the union of love

St. Thomas: “it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes for himself and for another” (II-II, q. 17, a. 3)
Merkelbach (I, n. 807)
McHugh-Callan (n. 1022)
Prümmer: “does this because the neighbor is another self, and his beatitude increases his own beatitude” (n. 539)

B. An act of charity, not of hope

Bontempi: “to desire beatitude for another, as it is a good, is not an act of Hope; but of Charity” (Whether hope remains in the blesse, n. 11)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 1). The fuller entry.

How Many

Ways of presuming

A. Against hope, or beside hope

Merkelbach (I, n. 834)

B. Five ways

Noldin (n. 51)
Wouters (n. 515)

C. Four ways

Prümmer (n. 549)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 2, A 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

Causes of despair

A. Lust and sloth

St. Thomas: “in a more special way” (II-II, q. 20, a. 4)
Merkelbach (I, n. 832)

B. Also defect of faith (or melancholy)

Prümmer — named on this side in the fuller entry
Wouters — named on this side in the fuller entry
Marc — named on this side in the fuller entry
Sabetti-Barrett — named on this side in the fuller entry

C. Pride

Bontempi — named on this side in the fuller entry

Held by most of our authors: B (B 4, A 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

How often an act of hope is due

A. Several times, at least three or four times a year

Merkelbach: “more probably: several times, at least three or four times a year” (I, n. 839)

B. At least once a year

Marc: “at least once in any year” (n. 460)

C. It cannot be determined; often

Noldin: “cannot be determined. Yet it must be elicited frequently” (n. 45)
Vermeersch: “This cannot be defined.” (n. 58)
Prümmer: “authors do not agree” (n. 545)

D. Often enough not to be without it for many years

Bontempi: “that one is not without an act of hope for many years” (Whether there is a precept of hopi, n. 13)

E. The question of an indeterminate time is a paradox: the precept presses of itself to frequent acts

Concina: “By what reason so great a paradox can be asserted by Christian men, I truly do not perceive” (III, diss. I, ch. XI, n. IV)

McHugh-Callan: “But, practically, there is agreement among theologians” that those who pray and keep the duties of a Christian life fulfil it.

Held by most of our authors: C (C 3, A 1, B 1, D 1, E 1). The fuller entry.

One Word, Two Senses

Excess of hope

A. Presumption is not hoping too much, but hoping for what is unbecoming to God

St. Thomas: “does not denote excessive hope, as though man hoped too much in God” (II-II, q. 21, a. 2, ad 2)

B. Presumption is excessive hope

Merkelbach: “any immoderate or excessive hope” (I, n. 833)
Prümmer: “hopes too much from God” (n. 549)
Concina: “persevere in sins from an excessive confidence in the divine mercy” (III, diss. I, ch. XI, n. VIII)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 3). The fuller entry.