Moral Theology: Its Method and Masters
The Positions Compared: Prudence and the Vices Against It
Drawn from the authors' own words; every quotation links to its place.
The virtues: Faith · Hope · Charity · Prudence · Justice · Fortitude · Temperance
Every point on which our authors part ways about prudence and the vices against it, as the comparison notes of the Virtues and Vices pages set them out, each set out here as its sides, with each author of this library who answers it placed on his side in his own words. St. Alphonsus has a column of his own: his Theologia moralis is not yet in this library, so his opinion is given as our authors report it, and where two of them report it differently, both reports are shown. The counts are of the authors in this library, whose shelf is not evenly balanced: it holds more Jesuits than any other school.
In the table, a letter is the side an author takes; ± means he sets out both without choosing; a blank means the fuller entry does not place him. Each point opens below, with every author quoted and linked.
How Grave It Is
Whether venial from their kind
A. Venial from their kind
- Prümmer: “venial from their kind” (n. 634)
Also named on this side: Lessius and the Jesuits who follow him, as Merkelbach reports (II, n. 36).
B. Mortal per se and from their genus
- Merkelbach: “not mortal per accidens, but per se and from its genus” (II, n. 36)
Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1). The fuller entry.
Mortal negligence: per se or per accidens
A. Mortal only per accidens, by the work omitted
B. Mortal per se, being always considered with the work omitted
- St. Thomas (II-II, q. 54, a. 3)
- Merkelbach: “negligence is always considered with the omitted work, and thus it is considered according to itself” (II, n. 36)
One author of this library answers it (B 1). The fuller entry.
Whether prudence of the flesh is mortal of itself
A. Of itself mortal
- Marc: “This prudence is of itself mortal” (n. 397)
B. Mortal only when the evil end is the last end of life; venial with a particular end
- St. Thomas (II-II, q. 55, a. 2)
- Merkelbach — named on this side in the fuller entry
- McHugh-Callan: “is not sinful, but virtuous” (n. 1676)
Held by most of our authors: B (B 2, A 1). The fuller entry.
What a Thing Is or Requires
What foresight regards
A. The foreseeing of future contingents
- Wouters: “future contingents” (n. 375)
B. The ordering of means to the end (St. Thomas)
- Merkelbach: “Several understand foresight to be mere cognition of future events, but this is not according to the mind of St. Thomas” (II, n. 25)
C. Either sense
- Prümmer: “either for the ordering of means to an end” (n. 631)
Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.
What makes care for the future excessive
A. Untimeliness: care before the opportune time
- Wouters: “before the opportune time” (n. 376)
B. Excessive occupation of the mind, with anxiety and little trust in providence
- Merkelbach: “with anxiety and little confidence in divine providence” (II, n. 44)
- Noldin — named on this side in the fuller entry
C. Both
- St. Thomas (II-II, q. 55, a. 7)
Held by most of our authors: B (B 2, A 1). The fuller entry.
What shrewdness regards
A. Quick finding of the means (the middle term)
- St. Thomas (II-II, q. 48)
- Wouters: “finding a suitable means” (n. 375)
B. Shrewdness in considering future events
- Noldin: “shrewdness in considering future events” (n. 265)
Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1). The fuller entry.
Prudence: its formal object
A. The practical truth of the act
B. Natural honesty
- Noldin: “natural honesty” (n. 263)
C. Conformity with the moral order or the supernatural end
- Wouters: “the conformity of practical judgment with the moral order, or with the supernatural end” (n. 372)
D. The mean of reason
Our authors are evenly divided (A 2, D 2, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.
Whether prudence sets the ends of the moral virtues
A. No: synderesis sets the ends; prudence regulates the means
- St. Thomas: “it does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means” (II-II, q. 47, a. 6)
- Merkelbach (II, n. 12)
- McHugh-Callan (n. 1631)
- Bontempi (What the offices of prudence are, n. 1)
B. Prudence sets the ends before the moral virtues
Also named on this side: Scotus, as Bontempi reports (What the offices of prudence are, n. 1).
Held by most of our authors: A (A 3). The fuller entry.
Prudence in sinners: false, or true but imperfect
A. Sinners can have a true but imperfect prudence
- St. Thomas: “cannot be in sinners” (II-II, q. 47, a. 13)
- Merkelbach: “in sinners there can be imperfect prudence” (II, n. 19)
- Marc: “only imperfect prudence can exist” (n. 392)
- McHugh-Callan: “are of course found in sinners” (n. 1651)
B. In those sinning mortally prudence is false
- Bontempi: “in sinners prudence is false; I speak of those sinning mortally” (Who share in prudence, n. 3)
Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 1). The fuller entry.
Where It Belongs
Whether negligence comes from lust
A. Lust is the source of precipitation, inconsideration and inconstancy, not of negligence
- St. Thomas (II-II, q. 53, a. 6)
- Prümmer — named on this side in the fuller entry
- Merkelbach (II, n. 38)
- McHugh-Callan — named on this side in the fuller entry
B. Lust is the source of all four
- Bontempi: “although they arise also from other sins, especially Sloth” (On negligence, n. 3)
Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 1). The fuller entry.
Negligence: a failure to command, or to execute
A. Reason's failure to command
- St. Thomas: “a lack of solicitude on the part of the reason in commanding what it should command” (II-II, q. 54, a. 3)
- Prümmer: “pertain to execution” (n. 634)
B. Failure to execute at the opportune time
- Noldin: “a matter deliberated and determined is not committed to execution at the opportune time” (n. 264)
Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1). The fuller entry.
Prudence: whether command is of reason or of the will
A. Command is the chief act of the practical reason, and so of prudence
- St. Thomas: “the chief act of the practical reason, and consequently of prudence” (II-II, q. 47, a. 8)
- Prümmer: “The act of commanding is the principal and proper act of prudence” (n. 630)
- Merkelbach — named on this side in the fuller entry
- Wouters — named on this side in the fuller entry
B. Its proper act is preceptive election, of intellect and will together
- Vermeersch: “The preceptive election of an action indicated as honorable” (n. 157)
C. Command belongs to the will; prudence directs, not commands
- Bontempi: “imperium is nowhere conceded to the intellect, against the Thomists” (Whether prudence is a virtue, n. 26)
Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.
How Many
Prudence: one virtue, or one for each moral virtue
A. One special virtue (species only by what it governs)
- St. Thomas (II-II, q. 47, a. 5)
- Merkelbach: “this seems to be contrary to St. Thomas and Cajetan” (II, n. 27)
B. One generic prudence with many species, as many as the moral virtues
- Bontempi: “There is therefore ONE generic Prudence, and many species” (Whether there is one prudence for, n. 12)
Also named on this side: Scotus, with the Nominalists and the Scotists, as Bontempi reports (Whether there is one prudence for, n. 1).
Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1). The fuller entry.
Prudence: two potential parts or three, and whether distinct
A. Three potential parts, true virtues annexed
- St. Thomas: “a distinct virtue from prudence” (II-II, q. 51, a. 2)
- Prümmer: “eubulia, synesis, gnome” (n. 633)
- Noldin — named on this side in the fuller entry
- Wouters — named on this side in the fuller entry
- Marc — named on this side in the fuller entry
- Merkelbach: “Potential parts are true virtues, but annexed” (II, n. 30)
- Bontempi — named on this side in the fuller entry
B. Two
- McHugh-Callan: “The principal act of prudence is direction, its secondary acts are deliberation and decision” (n. 1646)
C. Not really distinguished from prudence
Also named on this side: Lessius, as Merkelbach reports (II, n. 30).
Held by most of our authors: A (A 6, B 1). The fuller entry.
One Word, Two Senses
Political prudence: the ruler's or the subject's
A. Regnative prudence is the ruler's; political prudence the subject's
- St. Thomas
- Merkelbach: “Nevertheless these things are not conformed to the interpretation of St. Thomas” (II, n. 27)
- Prümmer — named on this side in the fuller entry
- Wouters — named on this side in the fuller entry
B. Political prudence is that by which society is ruled; no regnative
- Noldin: “by which a society of men living under the same laws is ruled” (n. 265)
C. Civil prudence is the magistrates'; none peculiar to the citizen
Also named on this side: Lessius, as Merkelbach reports (II, n. 27).
Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 1). The fuller entry.
Solicitude: of command only, or of all three acts
A. Solicitude belongs to command: quickness in carrying out
- St. Thomas: “chief act is a command about what has been already counselled and judged” (II-II, q. 47, a. 9)
- Merkelbach: “quickness in commanding and pursuing those things which are to be done” (II, n. 13)
B. All three acts must be done with solicitude
- Prümmer: “These three acts, that they may be done well, must be exercised with solicitude and diligence” (n. 630)
- Marc: “must be exercised with solicitude and fitting diligence” (n. 392)
Also named on this side: Lessius and Billuart, as Merkelbach reports (II, n. 14).
Merkelbach grants the second view, but with solicitude “taken in another and diverse, broader sense”.
Held by most of our authors: B (B 2, A 1). The fuller entry.
Docility and caution in St. Bonaventure's sense
A. Docility is readiness to be taught; caution guards against hindrances to virtue
- St. Thomas: “especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding of the ends in practical matters” (II-II, q. 49, a. 3)
- Prümmer: “an affection and promptitude for learning” (n. 631)
B. St. Bonaventure's: docility the power of teaching; caution the discerning of vices that look like virtues
- Bontempi: “Docility is the power of teaching, in this order, that you first instruct yourself, and afterward others” (What prudence is, n. 8)
Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1). The fuller entry.
Prudence “simply”: the personal or the regnative
A. Regnative prudence is prudence in its most perfect sense
- St. Thomas: “in its special and most perfect sense” (II-II, q. 50, a. 1)
B. Personal prudence is prudence simply; regnative the most perfect
- Merkelbach: “prudence absolutely and simply so called” (II, n. 28)
C. Prudence ruling others is not prudence simply
- Marc: “It is not simply prudence, because it does not always render him who has it better” (n. 394)
Vermeersch notes a lower sense: a prudence “in a certain respect” which even saints can lack.
Our authors are evenly divided (B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.