Question XXI: Whether, and how, faith is a virtue

The MASTER sent. 3. dist. 23., D. Thom. here, Albertus in 3. dist. 23. art. 5., Richard. art. 4. quaest. 1., and almost all the other Theologians, with whom D. Bonav. also is commonly cited, say that faith formed by charity is a true virtue, because it renders its acts perfect toward God: but that unformed faith is not simply a virtue, because it does not render its act perfect — with which D. August. lib. 4. cont. Iulianum cap. 3. seems to smile. See Pasqualigum disp. 36. sect. 2., Lugum disp. 15. sect. 2., Merac. disp. 22. sect. 1., Morandum tract. un. quaest. 12.

I ASSERT first; that Faith not formed by charity is most properly a virtue.

It is PROVED by D. Bonav. first from D. Augustine de vera innocentia, asserting it so.

SECONDLY, because about difficult things an art, or virtue, is necessary to the rational mind, from 2. Ethic. cap. 3.; but the articles of faith are difficult to believe, and are believed by sinners; therefore for this the art, or virtue, that is necessary is conferred on them. Not art: Therefore the virtue of faith.

THIRDLY. It is more difficult to believe the articles than to be held back from lust, but for this a virtue is necessary. Therefore also for that; and sinful man believes through unformed faith: therefore this is a virtue.

FOURTHLY. What is essentially opposed to vice and sin is a virtue; but the act of unformed faith is directly and essentially opposed to the vice of heresy and of infidelity: Therefore.

FIFTHLY. To what the specific ratio belongs, the generic belongs too; but to unformed faith belongs the specific ratio of faith, which is to captivate the intellect into the obedience of Christ: therefore also the generic ratio of virtue. Hence therefore S. Doct. deduces, and with him the rest, that unformed faith is a virtue essentially, though imperfect, because it has not the perfect operation through the defect of the extrinsic, that is, of charity, which makes one for merit — one, I say, physically accidental, but morally essential. And in this way also Cajetan and Aragon. speak, ad art. 4. D. Thomae.

I ASSERT secondly, in this sense, that unformed faith is not a perfect virtue.

It is PROVED by D. Bonav. first, because it is called dead in Iacobi primo, in the sense given in quaest. 20.

SECONDLY, because the perfect virtue is that which operates well and perfectly, from D. August. in the Master dist. 23.

Yet S. Doct. NOTES ad 4. that the ratio of unformed faith in a faithful sinner is not the same as that of partial faith in a heretic, who believes only some articles; for the latter falls short of the essence, since it has not the formal ratio, that is, the assent rendered to the articles under the ratio of the first truth speaking; for by denying even one attribute of God, it already denies God to be truthful.

S. Doct. SOLVES some arguments in quaest. 1. The first is: the extremes and the mean are in the same genus; for the mean shares the nature of the extremes. But faith is a mean between opinion and science, as Hugh says: therefore it is in the same genus with the extremes: but science and opinion are not virtues: Therefore neither is faith.

S. Doct. RESPONDS first, that faith is a mean between these as to certitude, but it is not on that account necessary that it be in the same proximate genus with the extremes.

He RESPONDS secondly, that the MAJOR is false in morals, for the mean is often a virtue, and the extremes are vices.

You OBJECT secondly. Habits are distinguished by acts, and acts by objects. Now virtue and science are distinguished in this, from Aristotle 6. Metaph. t. 8., that virtue is about the good, and science about the true. But faith is about the true under the ratio of the true: Therefore it is not a virtue. The MINOR is proved, because the act of faith is to assent to the first truth.

S. Doct. RESPONDS that the true is the object of faith as salutary unto eternal life; for since it is obscure truth, it demands another habit diverse from science; and because it is health-giving, it therefore orders directly to salvation, and so has the ratio of virtue, because it regards obscure truth, captivating the intellect, and orders it freely to salvation; therefore it is a virtue.

You OBJECT thirdly. It is blameworthy in a rational man to will anything without reason; but faith does not require reason: Therefore.

S. Doct. responds that the MAJOR is false, where authority supplies the reason; now faith believes God revealing, even if the object be obscure, and this indeed is praiseworthy and reasonable.

You OBJECT fourthly. The nobler the ratio an act has, the nearer it is to virtue: Therefore to believe by compelling reason looks more to virtue than to believe without reason; but necessary assent is not a virtue: Therefore much less will faith, which assents supported by no reason, be a virtue.

S. Doct. RESPONDS by denying the MAJOR, if we speak of credulity resting on natural reason, which often deceives; and so it is more to the purpose to believe without reason the first truth revealing, even if those things seem irrational. For many things have been revealed that are contrary to philosophy, as altogether to live continent, to beg, etc. Likewise to believe one essence in three Persons: two natures with one subsistence, etc.