The Positions Compared: Justice and the Vices Against It

Drawn from the authors' own words; every quotation links to its place.

The virtues: Faith · Hope · Charity · Prudence · Justice · Fortitude · Temperance

Every point on which our authors part ways about justice and the vices against it, as the comparison notes of the Virtues and Vices pages set them out, each set out here as its sides, with each author of this library who answers it placed on his side in his own words. St. Alphonsus has a column of his own: his Theologia moralis is not yet in this library, so his opinion is given as our authors report it, and where two of them report it differently, both reports are shown. The counts are of the authors in this library, whose shelf is not evenly balanced: it holds more Jesuits than any other school.

In the table, a letter is the side an author takes; ± means he sets out both without choosing; a blank means the fuller entry does not place him. Each point opens below, with every author quoted and linked.

Point	St. Thomas	St. Alphonsus	Thomist					Franciscan	Alphonsian		Jesuit			Catechetical
Point	St. Thomas	St. Alphonsus	Billuart	Concina	Prümmer	Merkelbach	McHugh-Callan	Bontempi	Marc	Wouters	Noldin	Sabetti-Barrett	Vermeersch	Roman Catechism	Spirago
How Grave It Is
How it is weighed	A				A	A			B	B	B	±	B
Mortal or venial					B	B	C		A	B	B	B	C
The gravity of suspicion	A		B		±	A				A
Thefts by religious						A		D	B				C
Restitution for small thefts that coalesced								B		A
Grave damage from light fault			D		A	B	±					C
Wishing for death to escape a grave evil					B	A					A
Telling one prudent person					±	B	A	A	B	B	B	B	B
Defaming oneself						A		B	A
Contumely graver than detraction?	A							A			B	A	A
A light jest taken very hard							±	A			B
Grave matter in judgment and in detraction			A							A	B		C
A preacher's invented story				B	A	A			B		A		A
Authors of superfluous worship													B
Idolatry the gravest of all sins?	A			B		A	A				B
Perfect or imperfect idolatry graver				B	A	A	A		A		A	A	B
Consulting a fortune-teller in jest				A		A		A	A	B	A	B	A
Looking on at a séance					A	A			B	B	A	B	B
Tempting God from curiosity: never light, or light in a small matter				A	A			B	B		A	B
Swearing to commit a light sin: grave or light		A			A	A	±	A	A	A	B	±	B
Breaking a sworn promise in a light matter: light or mortal					A	A	A	B			A
Oaths slipping out from an unretracted habit: light or mortal						A		B			A
Swearing without due cause: grave or venial					B			B						A
“God damn” and like formulas: venial or blasphemous							A				A	A
Worn vestments put to common use: unlawful or lawful once changed		A			A	B					B	A	B
Sacred functions done chiefly for money: venial or possibly mortal	B			B	A		A		A	A	A
Married persons in a church: sacrilege, venial, or lawful for a cause					C			B	A	A	A		A
Formal disobedience in light matter: always grave, or venial with imperfect contempt	A				B	B	B				A
Formal ingratitude: ordinarily mortal, or only sometimes	B				B	A	A	B
Lying to save chastity: never, or the lesser evil for the weak	A							B							A
Boasting of a sin never committed: grave, or venial of itself						B							A
Whom the prodigal wrongs: only himself, or others too	B				B	A	A
A promissory oath in small matter				B	A	A			A	±	A		A
What a Thing Is or Requires
Vindicative justice	A			A	C	B	A		A	B	B	±
Whether only commutative justice is justice strictly			B	B		B	A		A	±	B	A
What social justice is					A	A				A	±
Whether hypnotism is lawful					B	B			B	A	A		B
Whether the accused must tell the truth	A				B	B				B	B		B	A
Killing one who consents					A		B		A	A	B		B
The worthy or the worthier	A		A			A		A		B			A
Restitution to the worthier passed over			A			A	A			A			A
Taking in grave necessity					A	A		C	A			B	B
Things of great value in extreme necessity					C	A			A	B		A
Whether extreme necessity gives ownership					A	B		A			A
Damaging the wrong owner by mistake		B			A	A	A		B		A	B
Repairing personal harm with money	A	B		A		A
The confessor who does not warn of restitution					A	A	B	A	A		B
Servants and goods in their care				C	A	A						B
When the soul is infused					A		B		A	C			B
A doubtful or ectopic pregnancy							A			B	A	A
A condemned man ordered to kill himself	A					B	±					B
Mutilating oneself to escape a tyrant								B	A
Self-killing at God's inspiration						A	B		A
Intending the aggressor's death	A					A	A			B
Striking first against a planned attack		A				A	A		B		A
Killing to defend lesser goods					A	B	±		A	A	A	A
Fighting when refusal means death							A	B				A
Why moderate interest is now lawful				D	A	A			A		B	C	A
Prices of necessities in scarcity							A						A
A judge privately certain of innocence	A	B			±	A	A	B			C
The price of an unjust sentence	A				A	A	A	B		A	A	A
A silent witness and restitution						A	A	B		A	A	A
A guilty man fleeing a prison of punishment	A	B			A	A	±	A	B	B	B	B
Bribing or drugging the guards						A	B	B	B		A
Damage done in breaking prison					A		B	B	B		A
A sentence told in another region						B	A		A	A	A		A
A crime public in one place, told elsewhere		B			C	A	C		B	A	B	B	B
Recalling a forgotten crime					B	A			B	A	A
Taking back a true detraction		A				B	C		A		A	A	C
Money for a lost good name						B	B	A	A	A	A
Retracting on oath						A	A	B	A	A	A
Using knowledge unjustly gained		A			±	A	A		A
Must a superior ask pardon					A	A	A	B		A	A
A private insult, repaired in justice?						A	±		A				A
Whether asking pardon always suffices		B				A	A		B		A
Cursing things without reason	A						A	B			A
Restitution for a rash judgment						B			B	B	A
An entrusted secret and the innocent condemned					A	B	±		B	B	B	B	B
Reading torn-up letters		A			A	A	A		A	A	B		B
A secret promised at the cost of life					A				A	±	B
How far a dream may be believed				B				A	B	A	A		B
Fearful avoidances: superstition at all?	A			A			B		A		B		B
A turning table and its answers					B	B	±		A	A	A	B
Preaching unprepared: tempting God, presumption, or neither						B	A	B	C		A		B
An oath confirming grave detraction: venial as an oath, or a second mortal sin					C	B		C	B	B	A	B	B
Stealing a purse in a church: sacrilege, or only if the church held it		A		A	A	B	B	A	A	B	B	B	B
Breaking a private vow of chastity: sacrilege or not		B			A		A		B	±	A	A	A
Breaking the vows of poverty and obedience: sacrilege or not		A				A	B	A		B
What profanes a church: only the acts the Code names, or more						B	B		B	B			A
Tithes and dues withheld: sacrilege or not					±		B	A		B	B		B
A price for the labor of the sacred act itself: simony or not					B	B	B	A	B		B		B
Paying a priest who will not give a sacrament free: never, or for grave cause	A			A			B		B	B	B
A gift binding a youth to the sacraments: simony or not		A			A		B			A	±		B
Touches, looks and obscene talk in a church: sacrilege or not		A			A	B	A	C	A	A	C	C	C
Secret pollution in a church since the Code: sacrilege or not					A		A		A	A	A	A	B
A sin of lust soon after Communion: sacrilege or doubtful					B		A		A	A	A		A
A vowed person leading another into sin without lust of his own						A			B	A			A
Cemeteries and semi-public oratories: sacred places for carnal sacrilege or not						A	A			C	A		B
The superior's wish without a command: matter of obedience or not	A	A			B	B	±		A	B	±
What makes disobedience a special sin: contempt, a true precept, or the precept's motive	A				A	A	A	A	B	C	A
A private man punishing lightly: lawful or not					A	B	A	B		B
The intention to deceive: of the essence of a lie, implicit, or only its perfection	A				B	B		C	C	A	B	A	D
Saying the truth one thinks false: a lie, or lying only in a qualified sense	A				A			B
A false statement to guard a secret against aggression: lawful defense or a lie				C	B	B			B	B	B	B	A
The accused who denies his crime: a lie, or a stratagem of defense					B	C			C	B			A	D
A restriction used without just cause: a lie, or only a sin against trust					B	A					B	B	B
Mixed speeches before Innocent XI: lawful equivocation or lies				C	B			A			B
Telling the customs officer one carries nothing: lawful, or not for clerics					B	A			A		B
The adulterous wife denying to her husband: lawful, or only probably		A		B		A			A	A	A
Integral parts of justice: two acts, or two justices	A				A	A
Legal justice: a special virtue, or general	A				A		A	A			A		B
What right is, and its first sense	A		A			A					B		C
Justice or mercy: which is the greater	A					B	A	B
Whether commutative justice ever measures by proportion								A
Restitution in money for a harm of another order	A	B		A	A	A			B		B	B	B
Returning a stolen thing to the thief for the price		B	A	A	±	B	B		B			B	B
Restitution lost in the confessor's hands		B			A	A	A		B	B	A
A debtor entering religion	A				C			A				A	B
Prayer: whether inward attention is of its essence		A		A	A	B	±	A			B		B
The souls in purgatory: praying for us, and invoked	B				A	C	A	A		C	A
Prayer for another: whether infallibly heard	A				A	±				±
Fear and the validity of a vow				B	B					C	A
A husband annulling his wife's vows	A			B	B	A	±		A		B
Obedience: whether it needs a true precept	A				±				B
The cross and images: relative latria or a lesser worship	A			A	A	A			A
Where It Belongs
Which virtue the lesser degrees offend			C							B	A
Truthfulness, justice or charity					A	C				B	B
Unequal burdens: distributive or commutative			A			B	C				A		A
Denying due honor: distributive justice or observance								A
A common thing stolen in a church: sacrilege?						A		B
Whispering: charity or justice		A				A	B	C		A
Cursing: charity or justice	A				C	B	A	C			A
Superstition or a sin against oneself						B		A
A stipend above the rate: simony, or only injustice					A	B	±			A	A	A	A
A rich monastery asking support at profession: simony of divine law or of the Church's law				C					C	B	A		B
Selling indulgenced rosaries: simony of the Church's law, or none					A	B			A	B	A		B
Thanks owed to God: gratitude, or religion	A				A	A	A	B							B
Flattery: a sin against truth (eighth commandment), or against affability	B				B	B		A						A	A
The ruler's lawmaking: legal or commutative justice	A				A	A					A		B
Judgment: an act of justice, distributive justice or prudence	A		A			B	A	C
How Many
Daughters of covetousness	A	C			A	A			C	B	C		C
Annexed virtues					C	A				B	D
How small thefts coalesce					A	B			C		B		D
Ways of cooperating in injustice	A													B
Calumny and detraction: one species or two					B	B	±		A	B	B		B
Derision: its own species?	A				B	A	A		B	A	B
Several evils in one curse						B	A						B
Rash judgment and detraction: one species or two						A				±
Divination and vain observance: one species or two	A			B	B	A	B		B	B	B	B
Sacrilege: three species or two	A					A	A			±	A		B
How often the precept of prayer binds		B		C	A	A			A
Neglecting to pray in temptation: a second sin?	B			B
One Word, Two Senses
Duel					A	A		B
Material idolatry					A						A	B
Material ingratitude: a venial omission, or no special sin at all					A	B	B
Liberality: giving to the needy for God, or the right measure with money					B	B	B	A							A
Breaking a vow: sacrilege or not					±	B	B						B
Equity and epikeia	A				B	A	A		C				A

How Grave It Is

How it is weighed

A. Covetousness against justice mortal in its genus; against liberality alone, venial

St. Thomas
Prümmer — named on this side in the fuller entry
Merkelbach — named on this side in the fuller entry

B. Venial in itself (against liberality), mortal when justice or charity is injured

Noldin — named on this side in the fuller entry
Wouters — named on this side in the fuller entry
Marc (n. 363)
Vermeersch (n. 491)

Setting out both: Sabetti-Barrett (n. 141).

Held by most of our authors: B (B 4, A 2). The fuller entry.

Mortal or venial

A. Mortal from its whole genus

Marc: “a mortal sin from its whole genus” (n. 568)

B. Grave of itself, often excused by the imperfection of the act

Prümmer (II, n. 516)
Noldin (n. 160)
Merkelbach (II, n. 787)
Wouters (n. 597)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 206)

C. Of a non-religious kind, regularly only venial

McHugh-Callan: “regularly only a venial sin” (n. 2295)
Vermeersch: “hold it for merely venial” (n. 242)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 5, C 2, A 1). The fuller entry.

The gravity of suspicion

A. Suspicion is of its genus light

St. Thomas: “a venial and a light sin” (II-II, q. 60, a. 3)
Merkelbach: “doubt or suspicion from its genus is not a grave sin but a light one” (II, n. 420)
Wouters: “ordinarily are only slight sins” (n. 1077)

B. Rash suspicion, fully deliberate about a grave evil, is of its genus mortal

Billuart: “It is more probable that rash suspicion concerning the evil of one's neighbor, insofar as it comprehends doubt and opinion, is of its genus mortal sin” (On suspicion and rash judgment, n. 9)

Setting out both: Prümmer, “dispute greatly” (II, n. 200).

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1). The fuller entry.

Thefts by religious

A. Not treated as sons: a greater quantity than for others, but not double

Merkelbach: “too lax” (II, n. 406)

B. The rule for sons cannot be applied

Marc (n. 907)

C. The matter increased by at least half

Vermeersch: “at least by half” (n. 660)

D. As sons of moderately rich parents

Bontempi (On the thefts of religious, n. 3)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1, C 1, D 1). The fuller entry.

Restitution for small thefts that coalesced

A. Bound gravely only until no grave matter remains to be restored

Wouters: “that there no longer remains grave matter to be restored” (n. 1031)

B. The whole is grave: the injury is grave by reason of the whole

Bontempi (Whether theft is mortal when, afte, n. 24)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1). The fuller entry.

Grave damage from light fault

A. A light obligation to repair the whole

Prümmer (II, n. 97)

B. A light obligation to partial repair, in proportion to the fault

Merkelbach (II, n. 294)

C. Held to nothing

Sabetti-Barrett: “More probably he is held to nothing” (n. 425)

Also named on this side: Lessius, as Billuart reports (Whether vehement theological fault…, n. 2).

D. Held to some restitution, and in practice the fault is to be held mortal

Billuart: “It is more probable that he who gravely damaged his neighbor through venial fault is held to some restitution” (Whether vehement theological fault…, n. 2)

Setting out both: McHugh-Callan (n. 1765).

Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1, C 1, D 1). The fuller entry.

Wishing for death to escape a grave evil

A. Licit, of itself not sinful (though imperfect)

Noldin (n. 329)
Merkelbach: “of itself it is not sinful” (II, n. 354)

B. Imperfect and a venial sin

Prümmer: “and a venial sin” (II, n. 117)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1). The fuller entry.

Telling one prudent person

A. Grave (or the grave opinion more common)

Bontempi: “reputation is often more harmed if it is said to one weighty person than if to many of the common people” (Whether, and how, restitution of f, n. 16)
McHugh-Callan: “more common and more likely” (n. 2065)

B. Not grave: reputation is the estimation of many

Noldin (n. 647)
Wouters (n. 1069)
Marc (n. 1200)
Vermeersch (n. 600)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 316)
Merkelbach (II, n. 427)

Setting out both: Prümmer, “uncertain” (II, n. 191).

St. Thomas: such a man's good name is destroyed “not altogether but partly”; Prümmer reads him for the grave opinion, Noldin cites him for the other.

Held by most of our authors: B (B 6, A 2). The fuller entry.

Defaming oneself

A. Of itself prodigality and a defect of charity toward oneself; not regularly mortal

Merkelbach: “only a sin of prodigality and of defect of charity toward oneself” (II, n. 432)
Marc (n. 1200)

B. Mortal

Bontempi: “precepts for guarding against grave evils” (Whether anyone can defame himself, n. 3)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1). The fuller entry.

Contumely graver than detraction?

A. Contumely is graver

St. Thomas: “in as much as it implies greater contempt of one's neighbor” (II-II, q. 73, a. 3, ad 2)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 318)
Bontempi (What contumely is, and whence it a, n. 15)
Vermeersch (n. 599)

B. Graver only when reputation is injured with it

Noldin: “But if honor alone is injured, it is a lighter sin than detraction” (n. 662)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 1). The fuller entry.

A light jest taken very hard

A. Mortal, if he will be most gravely moved

Bontempi: “IF, however, you judge that he will be most gravely moved, it will be mortal” (On the malice of mockery, n. 4)

B. Not grave: the cause is the other's foolishness

Noldin: “does not sin gravely, even if he knows that the other takes a light joke gravely” (n. 664)

Setting out both: McHugh-Callan (n. 2109).

Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1). The fuller entry.

Grave matter in judgment and in detraction

A. The same matter as for grave detraction

Wouters: “if it were revealed, would contain grave detraction” (n. 1077)
Billuart: “grave evil in this matter, as in the matter of detraction” (On suspicion and rash judgment, n. 26)

B. Graver matter is required for grave judgment

Noldin: “graver matter is required to constitute grave judgment than grave detraction” (n. 661)

C. Grave even where telling one man would not be

Vermeersch: “as if falsely” (n. 600)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

A preacher's invented story

A. Only venial, even an invented story (not miraculous)

Prümmer: “who invents an entire story” (II, n. 501)
Noldin (n. 149)
Merkelbach: “(not miraculous)” (II, n. 772)
Vermeersch: “as if, in confirming a true doctrine, some circumstance not explored is exhibited as certain” (n. 231)

B. Grave to narrate false miracles to increase devotion

Marc (n. 554)
Concina: “All affirm that this is a most grave crime of superstition” (Theol. III, diss. II, ch. I, n. VII)

Vermeersch excuses only a lesser thing: some unexplored circumstance exhibited as certain.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4, B 2). The fuller entry.

Authors of superfluous worship

A. Superfluous worship is venial

B. Its conscious authors are not excused from grave sin

Vermeersch: “Yet conscious authors of such superstitions cannot be excused from grave sin” (n. 233)

All the authors hold superfluous worship itself venial.

One author of this library answers it (B 1). The fuller entry.

Idolatry the gravest of all sins?

A. The gravest of sins on the part of the sin itself

St. Thomas: “idolatry is the most grievous sin” (II-II, q. 94, a. 3)
Merkelbach: “the greatest idolatry viewed objectively is graver than the greatest infidelity and the greatest hatred of God” (II, n. 775)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2279)

B. The gravest after the sins against the theological virtues

Noldin: “the gravest after sins which are opposed to the theological virtues” (n. 152)
Concina: “the gravest of all the crimes opposed to religion” (Theol. III, diss. II, ch. III, n. V)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 2, B 2). The fuller entry.

Perfect or imperfect idolatry graver

A. Imperfect idolatry is graver, proceeding from malice

Prümmer (II, n. 503)
Noldin (n. 152)
Marc (n. 556)
Merkelbach (II, n. 775)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2280)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 204)

B. Perfect idolatry is objectively graver

Vermeersch: “perfect idolatry is objectively graver than imperfect” (n. 237)
Concina: “involves the highest degree of malice” (Theol. III, diss. II, ch. III, n. V)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 6, B 2). The fuller entry.

Consulting a fortune-teller in jest

A. Venial or no sin from curiosity without faith

Noldin (n. 155)
Marc (n. 563)
Merkelbach: “no sin per se is present” (II, n. 784)
Vermeersch (n. 244)
Bontempi (On divination by the elements, and, n. 5)
Concina: “I myself would not dare to condemn them of mortal fault” (Theol. III, diss. II, ch. IV, n. XIII)

B. Grave if done seriously, or if the diviner acts seriously (cooperation)

Wouters: “even if only externally” (n. 600)
Sabetti-Barrett: “with difficulty be excused from gravely culpable cooperation” (n. 209)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 6, B 2). The fuller entry.

Looking on at a séance

A. Watching from curiosity once or twice is not grave

Prümmer: “unlawful, but does not seem to be a grave sin” (II, n. 525)
Noldin: “he does not sin gravely” (n. 170)
Merkelbach: “otherwise it is probably only venial” (II, n. 780)

B. Gravely unlawful to attend

Wouters: “It is gravely unlawful to attend spiritistic gatherings” (n. 605)
Marc (n. 566)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 209)
Vermeersch (n. 248)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 4, A 3). The fuller entry.

Tempting God from curiosity: never light, or light in a small matter

A. Formal tempting of God admits no light matter

Noldin: “does not admit smallness of matter” (n. 173)
Prümmer (II, n. 528)
Concina: “But the more probable opinion is that this is always a grave fault” (Theol. III, diss. III, ch. I, n. IV)

B. In a light matter from mere curiosity, only venial

Marc (n. 576)
Sabetti-Barrett — named on this side in the fuller entry
Bontempi (What temptation is, and of how man, n. 4)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 3, B 3). The fuller entry.

Swearing to commit a light sin: grave or light

A. Grave

St. Alphonsus, as Wouters reports him (n. 685)
Prümmer (II, n. 459) — “more probable”
Merkelbach (II, n. 798)
Wouters (n. 685)
Marc (n. 610)
Bontempi: “sins mortally” (Whether an oath made without justi, n. 3)

B. Light (the benign opinion probable)

Noldin (n. 255)
Vermeersch (n. 193)

Also named on this side: Lessius, Sanchez and Suarez, as Vermeersch reports (n. 193).

Setting out both: Sabetti-Barrett (n. 224); McHugh-Callan (n. 2250).

Held by most of our authors: A (A 5, B 2). The fuller entry.

Breaking a sworn promise in a light matter: light or mortal

A. Venial (a sin of inconstancy, breach of oath, or omission)

McHugh-Callan: “is commonly denied” (n. 2261)
Prümmer (II, n. 456)
Noldin (n. 254)
Merkelbach: “rather a sin of omission” (II, n. 795)

Also named on this side: Sanchez, as Bontempi reports (Whether, and how, it is a sin to s, n. 19).

B. Mortal

Bontempi (Whether, and how, it is a sin to s, n. 19)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4, B 1). The fuller entry.

Oaths slipping out from an unretracted habit: light or mortal

A. Of itself light (grave by danger, or by the disposition)

Noldin (n. 255)
Merkelbach (II, n. 799)

B. Mortal

Bontempi (When one who swears incautiously f, n. 7)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1). The fuller entry.

Swearing without due cause: grave or venial

A. A grave sin

Roman Catechism: “he who swears rashly and without deliberation commits a grave sin” (The Second Commandment)

B. Of itself venial

Prümmer (II, n. 458)
Bontempi (Whether an oath lacking judgment i, n. 2)

The manuals (Prümmer, Merkelbach, Noldin, Wouters, Marc, McHugh-Callan, Vermeersch, Sabetti-Barrett) make it of itself venial; Bontempi too, unless due inquiry is gravely omitted.

Held by most of our authors: B (B 2, A 1). The fuller entry.

“God damn” and like formulas: venial or blasphemous

A. Of themselves venial, vain use of the Name

Sabetti-Barrett: “by God” (n. 220)
Noldin (n. 208)
McHugh-Callan: “usually not meant or understood” (n. 2113)

B. Blasphemous

Sabetti-Barrett: "God damn your soul" is of itself blasphemous.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3). The fuller entry.

Worn vestments put to common use: unlawful or lawful once changed

A. Unlawful (light sacrilege)

St. Alphonsus, as Vermeersch reports him (n. 272)
Prümmer (II, n. 553)
Sabetti-Barrett: “it is not licit to mend profane garments from an old chasuble” (n. 215)

B. Lawful once the form is changed, not for sordid uses

Vermeersch (n. 272)
Noldin (n. 179)
Merkelbach (II, n. 807)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 3, A 2). The fuller entry.

Sacred functions done chiefly for money: venial or possibly mortal

A. Not simony: an inverted order, venial (or even mortal indevotion)

Prümmer: “acts badly” (II, n. 563)
Noldin (n. 198)
Wouters (n. 623)
Marc (n. 588)
McHugh-Callan: “may even be mortal” (n. 2333)

B. Simony

Concina: “Guilty of simony are Canons who principally assist at choir on account of the distributions” (XII, diss. II, ch. II, n. XXXII) — with St. Thomas
St. Thomas

Held by most of our authors: A (A 5, B 1). The fuller entry.

Married persons in a church: sacrilege, venial, or lawful for a cause

A. Sacrilege unless moral necessity excuses

Noldin (n. 26)
Marc: “the more probable and more common opinion” (n. 788)
Wouters: “Many teach the same” (n. 42)
Vermeersch: “are excused by necessity itself” (n. 59)

Also named on this side: Navarre, Henriquez, Cajetan, Sylvius (always sacrilege), as Bontempi reports (On sacrilege, n. 3).

B. For a just cause and in secret, no fault

Bontempi (On sacrilege, n. 9)

C. The question scarcely occurs today

Prümmer: “can scarcely occur in our times” (II, n. 547)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

Formal disobedience in light matter: always grave, or venial with imperfect contempt

A. Formal disobedience is always grave

St. Thomas: “is a mortal sin” (II-II, q. 105, a. 1, ad 1)
Noldin: “is always a grave sin” (n. 280)

B. Venial in light matter from imperfection of contempt

Prümmer: “admits slightness of matter” (II, n. 579)
Merkelbach: “from imperfection of contempt” (II, n. 844)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2369)

Prümmer: contempt of the person is mortal even in light matter; contempt of one command admits slight matter.

Held by most of our authors: B (B 3, A 1). The fuller entry.

Formal ingratitude: ordinarily mortal, or only sometimes

A. Of itself and ordinarily mortal

Merkelbach: “of itself and ordinarily mortal” (II, n. 878)
McHugh-Callan: “from its nature seems to be a mortal sin” (n. 2379)

B. Sometimes mortal, sometimes venial

Prümmer: “can be a mortal sin if this contempt gravely offends the benefactor” (II, n. 609)
Bontempi: “sometimes mortal; sometimes venial” (On ingratitude, n. 1)
St. Thomas (II-II, q. 107, a. 3)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 2, B 2). The fuller entry.

Lying to save chastity: never, or the lesser evil for the weak

A. Never lawful

St. Thomas: “to deliver another from any danger whatever” (II-II, q. 110, a. 3, ad 4)
Spirago (What are the Reasons that should make us Ref)

B. The weak who fear to yield may choose the lesser evil

Bontempi: “the lesser evil, that of lying” (Whether among the degrees of lying, n. 17)

Elsewhere Bontempi, with St. Bonaventure, answers that charity does not move to a lie.

Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1). The fuller entry.

Boasting of a sin never committed: grave, or venial of itself

A. Besides the lie, of itself grave in grave matter

Vermeersch: “besides a lie, contains malice of itself grave” (n. 464)

B. Of itself not beyond venial

Merkelbach: “which often happens if the matter concerns a fictitious work, of itself it does not exceed venial sin” (II, n. 867)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1). The fuller entry.

Whom the prodigal wrongs: only himself, or others too

A. Only himself: not grave of its nature

McHugh-Callan: “since it does not injure others” (n. 2428)
Merkelbach: “only an excessive use of one's own goods” (II, n. 887)

B. Others too, by spending what should help them

St. Thomas: “against others by spending the wherewithal to help others” (II-II, q. 119, a. 3, ad 1)
Prümmer: “not the absolute master of his goods” (II, n. 616)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1). The fuller entry.

A promissory oath in small matter

A. It admits small matter

Prümmer: “far more common and more probable opinion” (II, n. 450)
Merkelbach: “probably admits lightness of matter, just as a vow does” (II, n. 755)
Noldin (n. 250)
Marc (n. 614)
Vermeersch: “practically, in no light matter will the obligation of a sworn promise have to be urged under grave sin” (n. 204)

Also named on this side: Soto, Suarez, Sanchez, Tamburini, Azor, the Salmanticenses, as Concina reports (Theol. V, diss. II, ch. I, n. X).

B. Every breach of a valid oath is grave perjury

Concina: “the oath takes its species from truth” (Theol. V, diss. II, ch. I, n. X)

Also named on this side: Cajetan, Lessius, Valentia, as Prümmer reports (II, n. 450).

Setting out both: Wouters, “it is disputed whether the obligation is grave or light” (n. 689).

Held by most of our authors: A (A 5, B 1). The fuller entry.

What a Thing Is or Requires

Vindicative justice

A. A species of justice: commutative (or legal) justice in the judge

St. Thomas (II-II, q. 80)
McHugh-Callan: “elicited by commutative justice” (n. 1707)
Marc: “primarily pertains to legal justice” (n. 400)
Concina: “is an act of true commutative justice; but in the persons injured it is not true justice, but a potential part of the same” (IX, diss. I, ch. III, n. V)

B. Not a fourth species: reduced to the three, or a potential part

Noldin: “in no way” (n. 272)
Merkelbach: “Some among more recent authors, after Schmalzgrueber” (II, n. 256)
Wouters: “unless, which seems not altogether improbable, it must be held as a special virtue and a potential part of justice” (n. 382)

C. Let each abound in his own sense

Prümmer: “let each one abound in his own sense” (II, n. 71)

Setting out both: Sabetti-Barrett, “many do not hold vindicative justice as a peculiar species of justice distinct from the others” (n. 346).

Our authors are evenly divided (A 3, B 3, C 1). The fuller entry.

Whether only commutative justice is justice strictly

A. Only commutative justice is justice strictly

Marc: “imperfect justice, because it is not founded upon strict right, but upon a debt of fittingness” (n. 400)
Sabetti-Barrett: “which alone is such strictly” (n. 346)
McHugh-Callan: “Particular justice partakes more of the nature of justice” (n. 1703)

B. Legal and distributive justice are true justice too

Merkelbach: “only commutative justice” (II, n. 256)
Noldin: “although both are true right, properly so called and perfect” (n. 270)
Concina: “is not justice in the whole rigour of the term the Salmanticenses and others contend; but the opposite opinion is to me the more probable” (IX, diss. I, ch. III, n. III)
Billuart: “as into essentially distinct species” (On the division of justice, n. 2)

Setting out both: Wouters (n. 382).

Held by most of our authors: B (B 4, A 3). The fuller entry.

What social justice is

A. Social justice is legal justice

Merkelbach: “nothing other than legal justice” (II, n. 256)
Prümmer (II, n. 71)
Wouters (n. 382)

B. Legal and distributive together

Setting out both: Noldin, “either legal justice” (n. 272).

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3). The fuller entry.

Whether hypnotism is lawful

A. Of itself illicit, lawful with conditions (or with a grave cause)

Noldin: “Hypnotism of itself is illicit” (n. 749)
Wouters: “although free from superstition, is nevertheless unlawful without a grave cause” (n. 603)

B. Not unlawful in itself; often unlawful by abuse

Prümmer: “Hypnotism is not unlawful in itself; often, however, it becomes unlawful because of abuse” (II, n. 523)
Marc: “the more common opinion” (n. 570)
Merkelbach (II, n. 789)
Vermeersch (n. 251)

Noldin counts Marc among those who forbid it absolutely. All call spiritism superstitious.

Held by most of our authors: B (B 4, A 2). The fuller entry.

Whether the accused must tell the truth

A. He must tell the truth the judge exacts according to law

St. Thomas: “the accused is in duty bound to tell the judge the truth which the latter exacts from him according to the form of law” (II-II, q. 69, a. 1)
Roman Catechism: “God commands him to confess the truth, if he is interrogated judicially” (The Eighth Commandment)

B. By present law he is not held to confess his crime

Merkelbach: “by present-day law he is not held to confess a crime committed by himself” (II, n. 641)
Prümmer: “are not always applicable today” (II, n. 163)
Noldin (n. 732)
Wouters (n. 1142)
Vermeersch: “by no civil law is the accused held to confess the delict” (n. 695)

Bontempi, against the Thomists, denies that a half-proof suffices for questioning the accused.

Held by most of our authors: B (B 5, A 1). The fuller entry.

Killing one who consents

A. Injustice is done to the one consenting

Wouters: “against many” (n. 976)
Prümmer (II, n. 76)
Marc: “without injury to others” (n. 723)

B. Unjust to God (and the State), not to him who consents

Noldin: “is unjust against God, but cannot be unjust against him who consents” (n. 411)
McHugh-Callan: “to God and to the State” (n. 1725)
Vermeersch: “suffers no exception” (n. 575)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 3, B 3). The fuller entry.

The worthy or the worthier

A. The worthier is owed

St. Thomas: “one who is better” (II-II, q. 63, a. 2, ad 3)
Merkelbach: “not conformable to the mind of St. Thomas” (II, n. 622)
Bontempi: “for any Ecclesiastical benefice whatever” (Whether, and how, it is a sin of a, n. 12)
Vermeersch: “extrinsic probability” (n. 571)
Billuart: “regularly speaking, is illicit, but valid” (On respect of persons in the…, n. 4)

B. A worthy man suffices

Wouters (n. 1048)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4, B 1). The fuller entry.

Restitution to the worthier passed over

A. None owed unless a competition gave a strict right

Vermeersch (n. 571)
Merkelbach — named on this side in the fuller entry
McHugh-Callan — named on this side in the fuller entry
Wouters — named on this side in the fuller entry
Billuart: “not strict right to the benefice, but only a right of aptitude and proportion” (On respect of persons in the…, n. 19)

B. Distributive injustice itself binds to restitution

Also named on this side: Molina, Salon and Bannes, as Bontempi reports (Whether, and how, it is a sin of a, n. 43).

Held by most of our authors: A (A 5). The fuller entry.

Taking in grave necessity

A. Not lawful in grave necessity (Innocent XI, prop. 36)

Prümmer (II, n. 86)
Merkelbach (II, n. 411)
Marc (n. 913)

B. A modest thing, or in quasi-extreme necessity, may be taken

Sabetti-Barrett (n. 407)
Vermeersch: “some modest thing” (n. 660)

C. In urgent necessity it is lawful to take what is necessary

Bontempi: “in urgent necessity it is lawful to take what is necessary” (Whether in extreme, or urgent, nec, n. 11)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 2, C 1). The fuller entry.

Things of great value in extreme necessity

A. Even a thing of the greatest value

Merkelbach (II, n. 411)
Marc (n. 914)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 407)

B. Not in quasi-extreme necessity

Wouters (n. 1032)

C. Probably not a great sum in a more remote extreme necessity

Prümmer (II, n. 87)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

Whether extreme necessity gives ownership

A. He makes it his own

Prümmer (II, n. 86)
Noldin (n. 425)
Bontempi (Whether in extreme, or urgent, nec, n. 1)

B. Only a right to take it, not ownership

Merkelbach: “does not make the poor man the owner of another's thing” (II, n. 412)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 1). The fuller entry.

Damaging the wrong owner by mistake

A. Bound to restitution

Merkelbach: “a mere subtlety” (II, n. 296)
Prümmer: “conflicts too much with men's moral sense” (II, n. 99)
Noldin (n. 463)
McHugh-Callan: “probably does not excuse” (n. 1764)

B. Probably no obligation before a sentence

St. Alphonsus, as Marc reports him (n. 950)
Marc (n. 950)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 425)

Noldin: one who follows St. Alphonsus cannot in practice be obliged.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4, B 2). The fuller entry.

Repairing personal harm with money

A. Compensation in money is owed

St. Thomas: “as far as possible” (II-II, q. 62, a. 2, ad 1)
Merkelbach (II, n. 297) — “more probable in speculation”
Concina: “The other opinion, which is the more probable, affirms it” (IX, diss. II, ch. V, n. II)

B. Not owed

St. Alphonsus, as Merkelbach reports him (II, n. 297)

Merkelbach judges the other opinion usable in practice.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2). The fuller entry.

The confessor who does not warn of restitution

A. Mere omission does not bind him

Prümmer (II, n. 110)
Merkelbach (II, n. 316)
Marc (n. 989)
Bontempi (On the indirect causes of loss, n. 10)

B. Bound (if he culpably neglects, or frees one who must restore)

Noldin (n. 497)
McHugh-Callan: “confessors who culpably neglect to give penitents needed spiritual advice” (n. 1780)

Also named on this side: Navarrus and others, as Bontempi reports (On the indirect causes of loss, n. 8).

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4, B 2). The fuller entry.

Servants and goods in their care

A. Bound for goods specially in their care

Merkelbach (II, n. 316)
Prümmer (II, n. 110)

B. Probably not bound, except those set over a thing

Sabetti-Barrett (n. 441)

C. Bound against strangers for any goods; against fellow servants only for goods in their custody

Concina: “strangers filching their master's goods” (IX, diss. II, ch. II, n. XX)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

When the soul is infused

A. At or soon after conception (now commonly admitted)

Prümmer (II, n. 138)
Marc (n. 740)

B. Later animation still probable, though in practice life is held to begin at conception

McHugh-Callan: “still has great probability physically” (n. 1848)
Vermeersch (n. 622)

C. Freely disputed

Wouters: “freely disputed” (n. 732)

All forbid the direct abortion of a fetus not yet animated.

Our authors are evenly divided (A 2, B 2, C 1). The fuller entry.

A doubtful or ectopic pregnancy

A. Removal allowed when the mother is in danger

Noldin (n. 341)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 273)
McHugh-Callan (n. 1848)

B. The same rules as for a certain fetus

Wouters (n. 738)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 1). The fuller entry.

A condemned man ordered to kill himself

A. Not lawful: no man is judge of himself

St. Thomas: “no man is judge of himself” (II-II, q. 64, a. 5, ad 2)

B. Not certainly illicit (probable) at public command

Merkelbach: “not dare to condemn as certainly illicit” (II, n. 350)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 264)

Setting out both: McHugh-Callan (n. 1856).

Held by most of our authors: B (B 2). The fuller entry.

Mutilating oneself to escape a tyrant

A. Lawful

Marc (n. 756)

Also named on this side: Bassaeus, as Bontempi reports (Whether the mutilation of a limb i, n. 4).

B. No one is bound or able to do it

Bontempi (Whether the mutilation of a limb i, n. 4)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1). The fuller entry.

Self-killing at God's inspiration

A. Certainly lawful

Merkelbach: “certainly is licit” (II, n. 350)
Marc (n. 753)

B. Whether God ever did so is uncertain

McHugh-Callan: “whether God has ever done this is uncertain” (n. 1856)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1). The fuller entry.

Intending the aggressor's death

A. Only indirect killing: the death may not be intended

St. Thomas: “it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense” (II-II, q. 64, a. 7)
Merkelbach: “nothing except indirect killing” (II, n. 361)
McHugh-Callan (n. 1834)

Also named on this side: Cajetan and Billuart, as Wouters reports (n. 746).

B. The killing may be taken as a means

Wouters (n. 746)

Also named on this side: Lugo and Waffelaert, as Merkelbach reports (II, n. 361).

On the reason: Sabetti-Barrett, the aggressor cannot keep the right to his life against the innocent; Vermeersch rests it on the double effect.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1). The fuller entry.

Striking first against a planned attack

A. Not lawful before the aggression

St. Alphonsus, as Marc reports him (n. 734)
Noldin (n. 332)
Merkelbach (II, n. 361)
McHugh-Callan (n. 1830)

B. The contrary is more probable (though scarcely to be held in practice)

Marc (n. 734) — “more probable”

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 1). The fuller entry.

Killing to defend lesser goods

A. Lawful for goods of great value and for chastity

Prümmer (II, n. 122)
Noldin — named on this side in the fuller entry
Wouters — named on this side in the fuller entry
Marc — named on this side in the fuller entry
Sabetti-Barrett — named on this side in the fuller entry

B. Only probable for goods; very doubtful for chastity

Merkelbach: “very doubtful” (II, n. 362)

Setting out both: McHugh-Callan (n. 1840).

Held by most of our authors: A (A 5, B 1). The fuller entry.

Fighting when refusal means death

A. He may fight for mere defense

Sabetti-Barrett: “to fight for mere defense, even by accepting weapons from the adversary” (n. 275)
McHugh-Callan (n. 1436)

Also named on this side: Sanchez, Bannes and Cajetan, as Bontempi reports (Whether, and how, the duel is unla, n. 23).

B. Altogether false

Bontempi: “altogether false” (Whether, and how, the duel is unla, n. 19)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1). The fuller entry.

Why moderate interest is now lawful

A. Extrinsic titles, ordinarily present, or the title of civil law

Merkelbach: “ordinarily” (II, n. 579)
Prümmer (II, n. 288)
Marc: “until the Holy See has issued a definitive decision” (n. 1112)
Vermeersch: “while the present condition of society perseveres” (n. 450)

B. Permitted by the Church even without another title

Noldin: “even if another title making the gain honorable does not exist” (n. 586)

C. The fruitfulness of money itself

Sabetti-Barrett (n. 528)

D. The "trading" loan is a fiction the Scriptures and Fathers explode

Concina: “These crafty and inept fictions both the divine Scriptures and the Fathers explode” (IX, diss. IV, ch. II, n. II)

Concina wrote before the Holy See's responses.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4, B 1, C 1, D 1). The fuller entry.

Prices of necessities in scarcity

A. Justice itself sets a maximum price on necessities

Vermeersch (n. 464)
McHugh-Callan: “profiteering” (n. 2128)

B. The price is the common estimate

The others measure the price by the common estimate.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2). The fuller entry.

A judge privately certain of innocence

A. He must follow the evidence (with the lightest penalty, if no legal way out)

St. Thomas: “he is unable to reject that evidence juridically, he must, as stated above, follow it in pronouncing sentence” (II-II, q. 67, a. 2)
Merkelbach: “not logically founded” (II, n. 637)
McHugh-Callan: “the lightest penalty allowed by the law” (n. 1951)

B. He may by no means condemn the innocent

St. Alphonsus, as Marc reports him (n. 2302)
Bontempi: “a judge can by no means condemn an innocent man to any punishment, and especially to death” (Whether a judge can condemn to dea, n. 12)

C. At his pleasure: the matter is controverted

Noldin: “at his pleasure,” (n. 723)

Setting out both: Prümmer (II, n. 158).

St. Alphonsus sides with St. Bonaventure in capital cases, as Marc and Sabetti-Barrett report.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

The price of an unjust sentence

A. He may keep it, as for a base contract

St. Thomas: “she may keep” (II-II, q. 62, a. 5, ad 2)
Prümmer: “can retain the gift accepted, just as a prostitute can retain the price” (II, n. 157)
Merkelbach: “the principles concerning a base contract” (II, n. 636)
Noldin (n. 721)
Wouters (n. 1136)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 559)
McHugh-Callan: “no natural obligation” (n. 1946)

B. It is owed back by natural law

Bontempi: “liable to restitution by the law of nature, and therefore before every sentence” (On the injustice of false witnesse, n. 22)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 6, B 1). The fuller entry.

A silent witness and restitution

A. Not held: he did not positively inflict the damage

Merkelbach: “held himself negatively, is not held,” (II, n. 642)
Noldin: “does not positively inflict damage, but only does not impede it” (n. 741)
Wouters (n. 1146)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 564)
McHugh-Callan (n. 1993)

B. He sins against justice and must restore

Bontempi: “sins against Justice” (Whether anyone is sometimes bound, n. 6)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 5, B 1). The fuller entry.

A guilty man fleeing a prison of punishment

A. He may flee (commonly taught)

St. Thomas: “is not bound to do anything from which death would result” (II-II, q. 69, a. 4, ad 2)
Bontempi (Whether the accused can flee, and, n. 6)
Prümmer: “theologians commonly teach that even one justly condemned can flee from prison,” (II, n. 164)
Merkelbach: “at least in order to evade death or harsh prison” (II, n. 641)

B. Not unless the prison is excessively harsh or the penalty atrocious

St. Alphonsus, as Wouters reports him (n. 1144)
Wouters (n. 1144)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 562)
Marc: “not very hard” (n. 2311)
Noldin (n. 733)

Setting out both: McHugh-Callan (n. 1982).

Prümmer adds that flight today is often illicit, against right and the love of oneself.

Held by most of our authors: B (B 4, A 3). The fuller entry.

Bribing or drugging the guards

A. He may bribe the guards (if unjustly condemned)

Merkelbach: “can, by giving money, induce guards not to obstruct his flight” (II, n. 641)
Noldin: “who has been forewarned” (n. 733)

B. Never: it is intrinsically evil, the guards bound by justice

Marc: “since this is intrinsically evil” (n. 2311)
Bontempi: “because the guards are bound by justice and a just oath to keep guard” (Whether the accused can flee, and, n. 13)
McHugh-Callan (n. 1977)

Prümmer and Wouters allow making the guards drunk; Bontempi forbids a sleeping potion as mortal. Wouters forbids bribery to one justly condemned.

Held by most of our authors: B (B 3, A 2). The fuller entry.

Damage done in breaking prison

A. He must repair notable damage (or the broken prison)

Prümmer: “seems truer,” (II, n. 164)
Noldin: “according to the common opinion” (n. 733)

B. Not: he uses his own right

McHugh-Callan: “a hole cut in a wall” (n. 1983)
Marc: “for he uses his own right” (n. 2311)
Bontempi (Whether the accused can flee, and, n. 12)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 3, A 2). The fuller entry.

A sentence told in another region

A. Lawful anywhere: the sentence took away the right in that matter

Noldin (n. 651)
Wouters (n. 1069)
Marc (n. 1200)
Vermeersch (n. 600)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2054)

B. Against justice where the accused has not been deprived of it

Merkelbach: “because there the accused has not been deprived of the right to reputation” (II, n. 430)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 5, B 1). The fuller entry.

A crime public in one place, told elsewhere

A. Unjust, except for crimes that make a man dangerous

Merkelbach (II, n. 430)
Wouters (n. 1069)

B. Lawful, or probably not mortal

St. Alphonsus, as Sabetti-Barrett reports him (n. 316)
Noldin (n. 651)
Marc: “very probable” (n. 1200)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 316)
Vermeersch (n. 600)

C. Against charity, not justice

Prümmer (II, n. 194)
McHugh-Callan: “if not against justice” (n. 2056)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 4, A 2, C 2). The fuller entry.

Recalling a forgotten crime

A. Against justice (the right to reputation revived)

Noldin (n. 651)
Merkelbach (II, n. 430)
Wouters: “as it seems” (n. 1069)

B. No violation of justice; against charity

Prümmer (II, n. 194)
Marc: “at least against charity” (n. 1200)

The sides answer a crime public only in fact. Where it was public by sentence: Noldin, Merkelbach and McHugh-Callan find no injustice, Wouters allows it, Vermeersch judges today's law against it.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 2). The fuller entry.

Taking back a true detraction

A. Equivocal words are allowed ("I was deceived")

St. Alphonsus, as Marc reports him (n. 1206)
Noldin: “that he erred, that he was deceived” (n. 656)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 315)
Marc: “I drew this out of my head” (n. 1206)

B. Amphibology allowed, but praise preferred

Merkelbach: “smells of mental restriction” (II, n. 445)

C. No mental restrictions: say his words were unjust

Vermeersch: “The use of mental restrictions, which others concede and even command, cannot be approved by us” (n. 603)
McHugh-Callan: “were unjust” (n. 2093)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, C 2, B 1). The fuller entry.

Money for a lost good name

A. Not bound: reputation and money are not goods of one order

Noldin: “because reputation and money are not goods of the same order” (n. 655)
Marc: “because reputation and money are not goods of the same order” (n. 1205)
Wouters: “because reputation and money are not goods of the same order” (n. 1074)
Bontempi: “cannot be made” (Whether, and how, restitution of f, n. 11)

B. Counselled or owed as a benefit, money if he is satisfied

Merkelbach: “can be counseled” (II, n. 445)
McHugh-Callan: “should make a profitable compensation by the bestowal of a benefit” (n. 2094)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4, B 2). The fuller entry.

Retracting on oath

A. Required if the retraction would not otherwise work

Noldin: “because they are not considered very difficult” (n. 656)
Merkelbach (II, n. 445)
Wouters (n. 1073)
Marc (n. 1206)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2093)

B. Only a simple retraction

Bontempi: “require only a simple retraction” (Whether, and how, restitution of f, n. 6)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 5, B 1). The fuller entry.

Using knowledge unjustly gained

A. Unlawful (the knowledge must not be unjustly gained)

St. Alphonsus, as Prümmer reports him (II, n. 192)
Merkelbach (II, n. 429)
Marc (n. 1198)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2070)

Also named on this side: Lugo, as Prümmer reports (II, n. 192).

B. Lawful: to use it once acquired breaks no law

Also named on this side: Lessius and Concina, as Prümmer reports (II, n. 192).

Setting out both: Prümmer (II, n. 192).

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3). The fuller entry.

Must a superior ask pardon

A. Never (or rarely) obliged

Noldin: “are never obliged” (n. 665)
McHugh-Callan: “an apology is never necessary” (n. 2025)
Prümmer (II, n. 185)
Wouters (n. 1083)
Merkelbach (II, n. 447)

B. Restitution must equal the injury, superiors too

Bontempi: “what turns my stomach is that some of the authorities cited compel subjects to ask pardon, but never superiors” (Whether, and how, restitution of f, n. 40)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 5, B 1). The fuller entry.

A private insult, repaired in justice?

A. Repaired in justice

Vermeersch: “because dishonoring, as such, is damnose” (n. 596)
Marc: “according to the common and true opinion” (n. 1215)
Merkelbach (II, n. 447)

B. Only charity binds

Also named on this side: Molina, as Vermeersch reports (n. 596).

Setting out both: McHugh-Callan (n. 2022).

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3). The fuller entry.

Whether asking pardon always suffices

A. Asking pardon suffices for any injury

Noldin (n. 665)
Merkelbach (II, n. 447)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2022)

B. For a very grave injury to a superior, on bent knees

St. Alphonsus, as Marc reports him (n. 1215)
Marc: “more probable” (n. 1215)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 1). The fuller entry.

Cursing things without reason

A. Lawful in their relation to man, for an honorable end

St. Thomas (II-II, q. 76, a. 2)
Noldin: “if there is an honorable end of cursing creatures, there is no sin” (n. 208)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2117)

B. Never lawful to curse them

Bontempi: “universally that it is not lawful to curse these” (On curses, n. 17)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1). The fuller entry.

Restitution for a rash judgment

A. No restitution arises from it as such

Noldin: “the obligation of restitution does not arise from rash judgment as such” (n. 659)

B. Bound to lay the judgment aside, a kind of restitution in justice

Wouters: “to a certain species of restitution, namely that one lay aside the aforesaid judgment” (n. 1077)
Marc: “held from justice to reform his suspicion and his judgment” (n. 1194)
Merkelbach (II, n. 444)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 3, A 1). The fuller entry.

An entrusted secret and the innocent condemned

A. It may be revealed to save the innocent

Prümmer: “I ought rather to save the life of the innocent man than the life of the guilty man” (II, n. 180)

B. The secret still binds, even then

Noldin: “even if by manifestation the damage of the innocent person could be averted” (n. 670)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 325)
Vermeersch: “even the damage of an innocent person must be put after it” (n. 699)
Wouters (n. 1089)
Merkelbach (II, n. 855)
Marc: “unless the guilty person unjustly strives to accuse the innocent” (n. 1187)

Setting out both: McHugh-Callan (n. 2418).

Held by most of our authors: B (B 6, A 1). The fuller entry.

Reading torn-up letters

A. Against justice

St. Alphonsus, as Prümmer reports him (II, n. 181)
Prümmer (II, n. 181)
Merkelbach: “as it were destruction” (II, n. 856)
Wouters (n. 1090)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2411)
Marc (n. 1188)

B. Probably not against justice; venial curiosity

Noldin: “is probably not against justice” (n. 671)
Vermeersch: “only to venial curiosity” (n. 700)

Also named on this side: Lugo, as Prümmer reports (II, n. 181).

Held by most of our authors: A (A 5, B 2). The fuller entry.

A secret promised at the cost of life

A. The promise is to be kept

Prümmer: “the truer opinion” (II, n. 180)
Marc: “very probably” (n. 1186)

B. It does not bind with grave inconvenience, unless expressly

Noldin: “unless someone expressly obligated himself otherwise” (n. 668)

Setting out both: Wouters (n. 1089).

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1). The fuller entry.

How far a dream may be believed

A. If it is probably from God, it may be believed

Noldin: “we can believe it and direct our actions according to it” (n. 156)
Wouters: “at least permissible to suspect” (n. 600)
Bontempi: “if there is not probability that those dreams are from God, it will not be permitted to give faith to them” (On divination from dreams, n. 3)

B. In doubt not to be believed; almost certainty is wanted

Marc: “faith is not to be applied to them” (n. 565)
Vermeersch: “almost certain” (n. 244)
Concina: “If, after sufficient diligence, they remain doubtful, they are to be disregarded — this being the safer course” (Theol. III, diss. II, ch. VI, n. IV)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 3, B 3). The fuller entry.

Fearful avoidances: superstition at all?

A. Superstition

St. Thomas: “superstitious and unlawful” (II-II, q. 96, a. 3)
Marc (n. 568)
Concina: “are guilty of superstition” (Theol. III, diss. II, ch. II, n. IX)

B. Not properly superstition: foolish, a venial defect of trust

Noldin: “properly speaking, a sin of superstition is not committed by these” (n. 160)
Vermeersch: “a fearful rather than strictly superstitious mind” (n. 242)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2295)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 3, A 2). The fuller entry.

A turning table and its answers

A. The simple rotation is lawful (with a protest), or not evidently illicit

Noldin: “with a protestation against the influence of the demon premised” (n. 167)
Wouters: “of itself lawful” (n. 601)
Marc: “not evidently illicit” (n. 566)

B. Not to be permitted; the faithful kept from it

Prümmer (II, n. 521)
Merkelbach (II, n. 780)
Sabetti-Barrett: “certainly it is not to be permitted” (n. 209)

Setting out both: McHugh-Callan (n. 2297).

On its answers: Prümmer and Merkelbach find some explicable naturally; Noldin and Sabetti-Barrett hold any consultation illicit.

Our authors are evenly divided (A 3, B 3). The fuller entry.

Preaching unprepared: tempting God, presumption, or neither

A. Tempting God (grave in an untaught cleric who expects God to suggest it)

Noldin (n. 173)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2302)

Also named on this side: Navarrus, as Bontempi reports (What temptation is, and of how man, n. 7).

B. Not tempting God unless special aid is expected; another sin

Merkelbach (II, n. 793)
Vermeersch: “rather presumption” (n. 255)
Bontempi (What temptation is, and of how man, n. 7)

C. Venial

Marc (n. 577)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 3, A 2, C 1). The fuller entry.

An oath confirming grave detraction: venial as an oath, or a second mortal sin

A. As an oath, venial

Noldin: “even if the sin against charity or justice is grave” (n. 255)

B. The oath is grave as the instrument of the detraction

Merkelbach (II, n. 798)
Marc (n. 609)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 224)
Vermeersch (n. 193)
Wouters (n. 685)

C. Two mortal sins

Prümmer (II, n. 459)
Bontempi (Whether an oath made without justi, n. 12)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 5, C 2, A 1). The fuller entry.

Stealing a purse in a church: sacrilege, or only if the church held it

A. Every grave theft in a sacred place is sacrilege

St. Alphonsus, as Prümmer reports him (II, n. 548)
Prümmer (II, n. 548)
Marc (n. 582)
Bontempi (Sole Question: What sacrilege is, n. 10)
Concina: “If someone steals in a Church a sacred thing from a sacred place, or a non-sacred thing from a sacred place, or a sacred thing from a non-sacred place” (III, diss. VIII, ch. III, n. VII)

B. Only if the thing belongs to the church or is in its keeping

Noldin (n. 178)
Merkelbach (II, n. 805)
Wouters (n. 616)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2312)
Vermeersch (n. 269)
Sabetti-Barrett: “certainly probable” (n. 215)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 6, A 4). The fuller entry.

Breaking a private vow of chastity: sacrilege or not

A. Not sacrilege properly so called

Prümmer (II, n. 544)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2313)
Vermeersch (n. 267)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 215) — “probably”
Noldin (n. 177)

B. Sacrilege (more probably, or probable in practice)

St. Alphonsus, as Noldin reports him (n. 177)
Marc: “others, perhaps more probably, affirm” (n. 581)

Setting out both: Wouters (n. 614).

Noldin, with St. Alphonsus, allows the affirming opinion as probable in practice. All agree it sins against religion as well as chastity.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 5, B 1). The fuller entry.

Breaking the vows of poverty and obedience: sacrilege or not

A. Personal sacrilege

St. Alphonsus: “a sacrilegious theft” (True Spouse, ch. IX)
Merkelbach (II, n. 804)
Bontempi (Sole Question: What sacrilege is, n. 7)

Also named on this side: the Salmanticenses, as Marc reports (n. 581).

B. Not sacrilege

McHugh-Callan (n. 2313)
Wouters: “does not involve sacrilege” (n. 614)

Also named on this side: Suarez, as Marc reports (n. 581).

St. Alphonsus speaks to religious, in The True Spouse of Jesus Christ.

Our authors are evenly divided (A 2, B 2). The fuller entry.

What profanes a church: only the acts the Code names, or more

A. Only the acts the Code names

Vermeersch (n. 268)

B. Also other sins against the sanctity of the place

Merkelbach (II, n. 805)
Marc (n. 582)
Wouters (n. 616)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2312)

Also named on this side: de Lugo, as Noldin reports (n. 178).

Held by most of our authors: B (B 4, A 1). The fuller entry.

Tithes and dues withheld: sacrilege or not

A. Personal sacrilege

Bontempi (Sole Question: What sacrilege is, n. 6)

B. Not sacrilege: the Church does not yet possess them

Vermeersch: “is not sacrilege,” (n. 270)
Noldin (n. 179)
Wouters (n. 618)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2313)

Setting out both: Prümmer (II, n. 554).

Held by most of our authors: B (B 4, A 1). The fuller entry.

A price for the labor of the sacred act itself: simony or not

A. A price may be received even for the ordinary labor

Bontempi: “Woe to innumerable priests” (How simony is known on the part of, n. 18)

B. Simony of divine law: such labor is valued only from the spiritual work

Prümmer: “the most common opinion” (II, n. 562)
Merkelbach (II, n. 812)
Noldin (n. 185)
Marc (n. 589)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2328)
Vermeersch (n. 276)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 6, A 1). The fuller entry.

Paying a priest who will not give a sacrament free: never, or for grave cause

A. Never: rather die unbaptized (baptism of desire supplies)

St. Thomas: “must by no means pay a price for Baptism, and should rather die without being baptized” (II-II, q. 100, a. 2, ad 1)
Concina: “Whence is rejected the opinion of those who teach that money can be given for the bending of the will of an avaricious priest” (XII, diss. II, ch. II, n. XIV)

B. For a grave cause, not as a price

Noldin (n. 200)
Wouters (n. 624)
Marc (n. 588)
McHugh-Callan: “it would not be simony to pay the money” (n. 2334)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 4, A 1). The fuller entry.

A gift binding a youth to the sacraments: simony or not

A. Simony, if the giver means to bind strictly

St. Alphonsus, as Wouters reports him (n. 623)
Wouters (n. 623)
Prümmer (II, n. 563)

B. No simony

Vermeersch (n. 285)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2334)

Setting out both: Noldin (n. 194).

Our authors are evenly divided (A 2, B 2). The fuller entry.

Touches, looks and obscene talk in a church: sacrilege or not

A. Sacrilege, even in secret (more probably)

St. Alphonsus, as Prümmer reports him (II, n. 547)
Wouters (n. 42)
Marc (n. 788)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2312) — “probably”
Prümmer (II, n. 547)

B. Only acts disposing proximately to the complete act

Merkelbach: “disposing altogether proximately to the complete act” (II, n. 1013)

C. Probably not sacrilege

Noldin: “this must probably be denied” (n. 26)
Sabetti-Barrett: “the negative opinion seems probable” (n. 215)
Bontempi (On sacrilege, n. 12)
Vermeersch: “and much more from imperfect acts” (De castitate, n. 339)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 4, C 4, B 1). The fuller entry.

Secret pollution in a church since the Code: sacrilege or not

A. Still sacrilege, the place to be confessed

Prümmer: “since the Code of Canon Law has changed nothing in this matter” (II, n. 547)
Noldin (n. 26)
Marc: “although the crime is hidden” (n. 788)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 215)
Wouters (n. 42)
McHugh-Callan: “though under the Code it does not seem to be a desecration” (n. 2312)

B. Not grave local sacrilege

Vermeersch: “Yet its truth escapes us” (De castitate, n. 339)

Vermeersch holds fornication in a church grave local sacrilege.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 6, B 1). The fuller entry.

A sin of lust soon after Communion: sacrilege or doubtful

A. Sacrilege while the species remain

Noldin (n. 26)
Marc: “as long as the sacred species remain” (n. 789)
Wouters (n. 42)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2533)
Vermeersch: “according to the common estimation” (n. 269)

B. Doubtful and not solidly proved

Prümmer: “seems doubtful and not solidly proved” (II, n. 702)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 5, B 1). The fuller entry.

A vowed person leading another into sin without lust of his own

A. Not sacrilegious without his own lust

Vermeersch: “is not sacrilegious” (n. 267)
Merkelbach (Pastoral, Ar. V)
Wouters: “quite probably” (n. 42)

B. Sacrilege where he leads from an affection toward lust, or with his hands

Marc: “pollutes him with his hands, although without his own pleasure” (n. 787)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 1). The fuller entry.

Cemeteries and semi-public oratories: sacred places for carnal sacrilege or not

A. Blessed cemeteries (and semi-public oratories) too

Noldin (n. 26)
Merkelbach: “churches and cemeteries consecrated or blessed” (II, n. 1013)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2311)

B. Only a church or public oratory

Vermeersch (De castitate, n. 314)

C. Doubtful of both

Wouters (n. 42)

Merkelbach's Pastoral names only a church or public oratory.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

The superior's wish without a command: matter of obedience or not

A. It belongs to obedience: a tacit precept

St. Alphonsus: “a truly obedient man never waits for a command” (True Spouse, ch. VII)
St. Thomas: “the superior's will, however it become known, is a tacit precept” (II-II, q. 104, a. 2)
Marc: “a little more broadly” (n. 690)

Also named on this side: Cajetan and Lehmkuhl, as Prümmer reports (II, n. 575).

B. Not obedience strictly; leaving it undone is no disobedience

Prümmer: “does not commit a sin of disobedience” (II, n. 575)
Merkelbach: “does not pertain to obedience strictly so called” (II, n. 839)
Wouters (n. 400)

Also named on this side: Lessius and Billuart, as Prümmer reports (II, n. 575).

Setting out both: Noldin (n. 280); McHugh-Callan (n. 2355).

St. Alphonsus writes for religious, in The True Spouse of Jesus Christ.

Held by most of our authors: B (B 3, A 1). The fuller entry.

What makes disobedience a special sin: contempt, a true precept, or the precept's motive

A. Contempt: the command broken in order not to submit

St. Thomas (II-II, q. 105, a. 1, ad 1)
Prümmer — named on this side in the fuller entry
Merkelbach — named on this side in the fuller entry
Noldin — named on this side in the fuller entry
McHugh-Callan (n. 2367)
Bontempi — named on this side in the fuller entry

B. The breaking of a true precept

Marc (n. 690)

C. Only when the precept was given from the motive of obedience

Wouters: “which often does not occur” (n. 400)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 5, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

A private man punishing lightly: lawful or not

A. Light punishments by private persons are not unlawful

Prümmer: “it does not appear unlawful to give a light slap to a boy who has inflicted some injury” (II, n. 610)
McHugh-Callan: “such punishments as are not forbidden to private persons” (n. 2381)

B. Private persons cannot exercise vengeance

Wouters: “is dishonorable for a private man” (n. 408)
Merkelbach: “cannot exercise vengeance by themselves” (II, n. 882)
Bontempi: “which only a superior is” (On vindication, n. 4)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 3, A 2). The fuller entry.

The intention to deceive: of the essence of a lie, implicit, or only its perfection

A. Not of its species, but its perfection

St. Thomas: “does not belong to the species of lying, but to perfection” (II-II, q. 110, a. 1)
Wouters (n. 1062)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 310)

B. Implicitly of its essence

Prümmer (II, n. 166)
Merkelbach: “implicitly included” (II, n. 857)
Noldin: “virtually and implicitly” (n. 636)

C. Its formal part, in the definition

Marc (n. 1177)
Bontempi (What a lie is, n. 4)

D. What is required is formal speech

Vermeersch: “reasonably be judged to will to communicate” (n. 703)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 3, A 2, C 2, D 1). The fuller entry.

Saying the truth one thinks false: a lie, or lying only in a qualified sense

A. It is a lie

St. Thomas (II-II, q. 110, a. 1)
Prümmer (II, n. 166)

B. A lie only in a qualified sense: falsity is also required

Bontempi: “holds that falsity is also required for a lie” (What a lie is, n. 5)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1). The fuller entry.

A false statement to guard a secret against aggression: lawful defense or a lie

A. A false statement may defend a secret against unjust aggression

Vermeersch: “defend your silence or secret by a false statement” (n. 705)

B. A lie is never lawful; the obligation of secrecy ceases instead

Merkelbach: “even for just defense” (II, n. 862)
Wouters: “the obligation of hiding ceases” (n. 1064)
Prümmer (II, n. 169)
Noldin (n. 638)
Marc: “stand apart from the common opinion” (n. 1177)
Sabetti-Barrett: “They certainly err who place the malice of a lie” (n. 313)

C. Only silence or an open refusal

Concina: “No other way of concealing truth did Augustine recognize — not internal restrictions, not material locutions, not amphibologies of words, not other inventions of more recent authors” (Theol. V, diss. III, ch. V, n. III)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 6, A 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

The accused who denies his crime: a lie, or a stratagem of defense

A. A stratagem of defense, not a lie

Vermeersch: “as it were, a military stratagem” (n. 705)

B. He lies if he denies without restriction

Prümmer: “lies if without mental restriction he denies the crime committed” (II, n. 166)
Wouters (n. 1062)

C. A restricted denial only when not bound to confess

Merkelbach (II, n. 871)
Marc (n. 1183)

D. He must confess the truth

Roman Catechism (The Eighth Commandment)

Our authors are evenly divided (B 2, C 2, A 1, D 1). The fuller entry.

A restriction used without just cause: a lie, or only a sin against trust

A. A restriction without cause makes a lie

Merkelbach: “makes a lie” (II, n. 861)

B. A sin, the needless occasion of deception, but not a lie

Noldin (n. 640)
Prümmer (II, n. 172)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 313)
Vermeersch (n. 705)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 4, A 1). The fuller entry.

Mixed speeches before Innocent XI: lawful equivocation or lies

A. Mixed speeches are admitted when one is asked unlawfully

Bontempi: “The TRUE opinion” (On the other things that are reduc, n. 17)

Also named on this side: Cattaneo, as Concina reports (Theol. V, diss. III, ch. VII, n. IX).

B. Not admitted (the purely mental restriction condemned)

Noldin (n. 640)
Prümmer: “by certain older authors were held lawful” (II, n. 173)

Also named on this side: Soto, Cajetan and Azor, as Bontempi reports (On the other things that are reduc, n. 15).

C. No device beyond silence and open refusal

Concina: “not internal restrictions, not material locutions, not amphibologies of words” (Theol. V, diss. III, ch. V, n. III)

Bontempi wrote in 1676, before Innocent XI condemned the strict restriction in 1679.

Held by most of our authors: B (B 2, A 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

Telling the customs officer one carries nothing: lawful, or not for clerics

A. Lawful

Merkelbach: “can deny that he has merchandise liable” (II, n. 870)
Marc (n. 1183)

B. For a cleric today illicit: officers expect an answer without restriction

Noldin: “deservedly expect a response without restriction” (n. 641)
Prümmer: “in our times it seems illicit” (II, n. 173)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 2, B 2). The fuller entry.

The adulterous wife denying to her husband: lawful, or only probably

A. She may deny it

St. Alphonsus, as Wouters reports him (n. 1065)
Wouters: “in such a way that she must manifest it” (n. 1065)
Marc: “I am innocent of this crime” (n. 1183)
Merkelbach: “probably” (II, n. 871)
Noldin (n. 641)

Also named on this side: Sanchez, Castropalao and Bonacina (even on oath), as Concina reports (Theol. V, diss. III, ch. VIII, n. VII).

B. Not: contrary to St. Augustine

Concina: “Is such a doctrine consonant with Augustine's mind, and teaching, who, in express words, teaches the opposite of the adulteress!” (Theol. V, diss. III, ch. VIII, n. VII)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4, B 1). The fuller entry.

Integral parts of justice: two acts, or two justices

A. Doing good and declining from evil

St. Thomas: “quasi-integral parts” (II-II, q. 79, a. 1)
Merkelbach: “proper to justice itself” (II, n. 250)
Prümmer (II, n. 72)

B. Constitutive and restitutive justice

Prümmer reports "some modern authors" for the other division.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2). The fuller entry.

Legal justice: a special virtue, or general

A. A special virtue in essence, general in virtue

St. Thomas: “is a special virtue in respect of its essence” (II-II, q. 58, a. 6)
Prümmer: “better and more rightly” (II, n. 71)
Noldin: “not because it has no special object” (n. 272)
McHugh-Callan: “Essentially, it is a distinct virtue” (n. 1702)
Bontempi: “is not a general virtue” (Whether justice is a special virtu, n. 15)

B. A general virtue, without special matter

Vermeersch: “a general virtue, lacking special matter and commanding in the matter of all virtues” (n. 349)

Also named on this side: Buridan, as Bontempi reports (Whether justice is a special virtu, n. 13).

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4, B 1). The fuller entry.

What right is, and its first sense

A. First the just thing itself

St. Thomas: “the just thing itself” (II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 1)
Merkelbach: “Properly, and indeed in its primary signification, that which is just” (II, n. 149)
Billuart: “right taken in this second way is the foundation of right taken in the first way” (What is right, and of how many kinds, n. 1)

B. First the moral power (faculty)

Noldin: “Right, in its proper and primary sense, signifies the inviolable moral power” (n. 266)

C. The inviolable autonomy of the person

Vermeersch: “the inviolable autonomy of the person” (n. 346)

On what right essentially is: Merkelbach, with Lugo, a moral preference; Bontempi rejects this as circular.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

Justice or mercy: which is the greater

A. Justice is the greater

St. Thomas: “foremost among all the moral virtues” (II-II, q. 58, a. 12)
McHugh-Callan: “The superiority of justice to fortitude, temperance, and the annexed virtues, such as mercy” (n. 1715)

B. Mercy (and piety, religion) more perfect

Bontempi: “particular Justice is not simply more perfect than all the other virtues which are toward another; for Mercy seems more perfect” (Whether justice is the most excell, n. 3)
Merkelbach (II, n. 148)

St. Thomas also calls mercy “the greatest” of the virtues toward our neighbor.

Held by most of our authors: B (B 2, A 1). The fuller entry.

Whether commutative justice ever measures by proportion

A. Distributive justice compares several persons in every act

Bontempi: “this reason is frivolous” (Whether distributive justice diffe, n. 16)

Also named on this side: Lugo, as Bontempi reports (Whether distributive justice diffe, n. 14).

B. Not in every act

Also named on this side: Suarez, Poncius and Mastrius, as Bontempi reports (Whether distributive justice diffe, n. 15).

St. Thomas: distributive justice measures by geometrical proportion, commutative by the arithmetical mean; Bontempi reports writers divided on whether commutative justice ever measures by proportion.

One author of this library answers it (A 1). The fuller entry.

Restitution in money for a harm of another order

A. Compensation in money is owed (more probable speculatively)

St. Thomas: “compensation should be made as far as possible” (II-II, q. 62, a. 2, ad 1)
Prümmer: “does not seem convincing” (II, n. 204)
Merkelbach: “speaking speculatively, the opinion of St. Thomas seems more probable” (II, n. 297)
Concina: “The other opinion, which is the more probable, affirms it” (IX, diss. II, ch. V, n. II)

B. Not owed before a sentence

St. Alphonsus, as Prümmer reports him (II, n. 204)
Marc: “is also probable” (n. 928)
Noldin: “of counsel, not of precept” (n. 433)
Vermeersch: “This reason seems to be preferred” (n. 587)
Sabetti-Barrett: “neither can compensation be made” (n. 413)

All grant that money is owed once a judge has imposed it.

Held by most of our authors: B (B 4, A 3). The fuller entry.

Returning a stolen thing to the thief for the price

A. Bound to the owner even at the loss of his price

Concina: “The opinion true to me is that the buyer in the case proposed is bound to restore the thing to the lord, as St. Thomas teaches” (IX, diss. II, ch. I, n. XXV)
Billuart: “It is more probable that he who buys a stolen thing in good faith, when he knows it is stolen, is held to render it immediately to the true owner, and not to the thief, even though he would not recover his price from the thief” (Whether one who in good faith bought…, n. 2)

Also named on this side: Cajetan, Soto, as Prümmer reports (II, n. 214).

B. He may return it to the thief

St. Alphonsus, as Prümmer reports him (II, n. 214); Prümmer: “St. Alphonsus favors this opinion”
Merkelbach: “it can probably be returned to the thief” (II, n. 301)
Marc: “very probably, and perhaps more probably” (n. 939)
Sabetti-Barrett: “more probably the buyer can send the thing back to the thief” (n. 418)
Vermeersch: “Many permit him to do this” (n. 651)
McHugh-Callan: “it is held by some” (n. 1774)

Also named on this side: St. Antoninus, Báñez, Lugo and Lessius, as Prümmer reports (II, n. 214).

Setting out both: Prümmer (II, n. 214).

Held by most of our authors: B (B 5, A 2). The fuller entry.

Restitution lost in the confessor's hands

A. He is freed (probable)

Prümmer: “immune from a new restitution” (II, n. 239)
Merkelbach: “perhaps not improbably” (II, n. 331)
Noldin: “truly probable” (n. 511)
McHugh-Callan: “It is held as probable” (n. 1792)

B. He is not freed

St. Alphonsus, as Wouters reports him (n. 1015); Wouters: “deservedly prefers the contrary opinion”
Marc: “neither do I dare” (n. 1013)
Wouters: “deservedly prefers the contrary opinion” (n. 1015)

Noldin: St. Alphonsus “does not judge probable, but does not dare to condemn” it.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4, B 2). The fuller entry.

A debtor entering religion

A. He may enter, after surrendering his property

St. Thomas: “he may lawfully enter religion, nor is he bound to remain in the world in order to earn the means of paying the debt” (II-II, q. 189, a. 6, ad 3)
Bontempi (Whether entrance into religion exc, n. 17)
Sabetti-Barrett: “more probably in itself, if he must wait through a notable time” (n. 463)

B. He must wait if he hopes to pay within a year or two

Vermeersch: “say after one or two years” (n. 681)

Also named on this side: Sanchez, Navarre and Lessius, as Bontempi reports (Whether entrance into religion exc, n. 6).

C. Not while the creditor is known

Prümmer (II, n. 243)

Also named on this side: Gerson and many Parisian doctors, as Bontempi reports (Whether entrance into religion exc, n. 4).

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

Prayer: whether inward attention is of its essence

A. Internal attention is of its essence (for private prayer, or the Office)

St. Alphonsus, quoted by Wouters: “I have never been able to understand how attention can virtually remain in one who is distracted” (n. 583)
Prümmer: “the essence of private prayer cannot subsist with external attention alone” (II, n. 357)
Bontempi (Whether attention is necessary in, n. 3)
Concina: “there is a precept of reciting the Canonical Hours with internal attention” (III, diss. VI, ch. VIII, n. V)

Also named on this side: Cajetan, Soto, Concina, Billuart, as Prümmer reports (II, n. 355).

B. External attention suffices, the first intention unrevoked

Noldin: “Internal attention is not required for the essence of prayer” (n. 139)
Vermeersch: “does not take away the substance of prayer, at least of vocal prayer” (n. 189)
Merkelbach: “as long as the first intention of praying and attending is not revoked” (II, n. 672)

Also named on this side: Durandus, Lugo and many moderns, as Prümmer reports (II, n. 355).

Setting out both: McHugh-Callan, “According to the opinion of many modern authors, external attention suffices” (n. 2174).

St. Thomas: attention is absolutely necessary for the refreshment of the mind; for merit and impetration the first intention suffices.

Our authors are evenly divided (A 3, B 3). The fuller entry.

The souls in purgatory: praying for us, and invoked

A. They pray for us and may be invoked (more probably)

Prümmer: “can more probably pray both for themselves and for those living on this earth” (II, n. 334)
Noldin: “It is very probable” (n. 141)
Bontempi: “it is probable that the souls of Purgatory pray for us” (Who ought to pray, n. 9)
McHugh-Callan: “privately to invoke” (n. 2159)

B. They are not in a condition to pray

St. Thomas: “are not in a condition to pray” (II-II, q. 83, a. 11, ad 3)

C. Disputed

Merkelbach: “disputed” (II, n. 665)
Wouters: “There is no obligation of invoking souls detained in purgatory” (n. 585)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4, C 2). The fuller entry.

Prayer for another: whether infallibly heard

A. Not always heard (an obstacle in the other)

St. Thomas: “we are not always heard when we pray for others” (II-II, q. 83, a. 15, ad 2)
Prümmer: “it sometimes happens that prayer made for another does not impetrate” (II, n. 352)

B. Of itself infallible

Also named on this side: Suarez and others, as Noldin reports (n. 145).

Setting out both: Merkelbach, “who is well disposed is infallible is disputed” (II, n. 679); Wouters (n. 586).

One author of this library answers it (A 1). The fuller entry.

Fear and the validity of a vow

A. Grave unjust fear voids it by natural law too

Noldin: “but also by the law of nature” (n. 214)

B. Only by ecclesiastical law; valid by natural law

Prümmer: “Thus from positive ecclesiastical law” (II, n. 397)
Concina: “the common opinion of the Theologians” (III, diss. IX, ch. IV, n. XV)

C. Disputed

Wouters: “It is disputed whether such fear also by natural law impedes the validity of a vow” (n. 642)

Of light fear: Prümmer and Concina, it does not void a vow; Noldin and Merkelbach, probably it does when it was the sole cause.

Held by most of our authors: B (B 2, A 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

A husband annulling his wife's vows

A. He can annul all her vows made in marriage

St. Thomas: “of a wife, without the consent of her husband” (II-II, q. 88, a. 8, ad 3)
Marc: “a husband can directly irritate the vows of his wife emitted during the time of marriage” (n. 638)
Merkelbach: “The husband, probably, can annul the vows of his wife, because he is the head of the woman” (II, n. 735)

B. Only vows that touch his rights

Prümmer: “seems to be truer and more common” (II, n. 418)
Noldin: “seems to be preferred” (n. 231)
Concina: “marriage, the governance of the family, the administration of goods, and the education of children” (III, diss. IX, ch. V, n. XVI)

Setting out both: McHugh-Callan (n. 2228).

Held by most of our authors: B (B 3, A 2). The fuller entry.

Obedience: whether it needs a true precept

A. A known wish suffices

St. Thomas: “a command tacit or express, because the superior's will, however it become known, is a tacit precept” (II-II, q. 104, a. 2)

Also named on this side: Lehmkuhl, as Noldin reports (n. 280).

B. A true precept is required

Marc: “only when a true precept issued by a Superior is transgressed” (n. 690)

Also named on this side: Lessius, as Noldin reports (n. 280).

Setting out both: Prümmer, “Theologians dispute whether formal obedience demands a true command of the superior” (II, n. 575).

One author of this library answers it (B 1). The fuller entry.

The cross and images: relative latria or a lesser worship

A. Relative latria

Prümmer: “The other part of this thesis is disputed” (II, n. 386)
Merkelbach: “the name and images of God, the cross of Christ, the instruments of the Passion, and relics are worshiped” (II, n. 653)
Marc (n. 536)
Concina: “since the Cross of Christ is his image. Now the image of Christ is adored with the same worship as Christ himself” (III, diss. VII, ch. I, n. VI)
St. Thomas

B. A lesser worship

Also named on this side: Bellarmine, as Prümmer reports (II, n. 386).

Held by most of our authors: A (A 4). The fuller entry.

Where It Belongs

Which virtue the lesser degrees offend

A. Against charity

Noldin: “Suspicion and doubt, if they are voluntary, are sins against charity” (n. 659)

B. Against justice

Wouters: “Judgment, opinion, and doubt, rashly conceived, are sins, and indeed against justice” (n. 1077)

C. Against both

Billuart: “Therefore against justice. Also against charity” (On suspicion and rash judgment, n. 10)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

Truthfulness, justice or charity

A. Against truthfulness

Prümmer: “violation of a secret violates it by excess” (II, Section 4)

B. Against justice or charity, by the harm done

Noldin (n. 667)
Wouters (n. 1089)

C. Against charity and fidelity together

Merkelbach: “against charity and at the same time against fidelity or justice” (II, n. 855)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 2, A 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

Unequal burdens: distributive or commutative

A. An inequitable distribution of burdens violates commutative justice

Vermeersch (n. 572)
Noldin (n. 274)
Billuart: “there is found a violation of commutative justice even toward private persons” (What is respect of persons, n. 4)

B. Distributive justice regards the goods, not the burdens, of the community

Merkelbach: “first and directly” (II, n. 618)

C. Favoritism

McHugh-Callan (n. 1809)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

Denying due honor: distributive justice or observance

A. Against distributive justice

Bontempi (Whether acceptance of persons has, n. 6)

B. Against observance only

Also named on this side: Cajetan and Lessius, as Bontempi reports (Whether acceptance of persons has, n. 5).

One author of this library answers it (A 1). The fuller entry.

A common thing stolen in a church: sacrilege?

A. Sacrilege only if handed over to the custody of the place

Merkelbach (II, n. 403)

B. Any non-sacred thing taken from a sacred place is sacrilege

Bontempi (What quantity is required for mort, n. 25)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1). The fuller entry.

Whispering: charity or justice

A. Always against justice: a strict right to friendship once possessed

St. Alphonsus, as Wouters reports him (n. 1079)
Merkelbach: “because it takes away from another the good of friendship, for preserving which, once friendship has been entered, he has a strict right by reason of possession” (II, n. 434)
Wouters (n. 1079)

B. Of its nature only against charity

McHugh-Callan: “only a sin against charity, for the injured party has no strict right to friendship” (n. 2104)

C. Against justice when done by deceit, fraud, lies

Bontempi (On the malice of whispering, n. 9)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

Cursing: charity or justice

A. Against charity (ordinarily only)

St. Thomas: “of its very nature, contrary to charity” (II-II, q. 76, a. 3)
Noldin: “ordinarily is opposed only to charity” (n. 208)
McHugh-Callan: “essentially opposed to charity” (n. 2113)

B. Also against justice, as a dishonoring

Merkelbach: “a dishonoring” (II, n. 441)

C. Charity or justice, by how the evil is wished

Prümmer: “only to charity or justice” (II, n. 534)
Bontempi (On curses, n. 25)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 2, C 2, B 1). The fuller entry.

Superstition or a sin against oneself

A. A sin against charity toward oneself, not superstition

Bontempi: “seems a sin against charity toward oneself” (On superstitious observances for w, n. 2)

Also named on this side: Valencia, as Bontempi reports (On superstitious observances for w, n. 2).

B. Tacit invocation wherever the means lack power

Merkelbach (II, n. 786)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1). The fuller entry.

A stipend above the rate: simony, or only injustice

A. Not simony: unjust rather than simoniacal

Noldin (n. 198)
Prümmer (II, n. 563)
Wouters (n. 626)
Vermeersch: “unjust rather than simoniacal” (n. 277)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 218)

B. Simony of the Church's law

Merkelbach (II, n. 813)

Setting out both: McHugh-Callan (n. 2330).

Vermeersch judges a stipend for a forbidden second Mass of the day simony of divine law.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 5, B 1). The fuller entry.

A rich monastery asking support at profession: simony of divine law or of the Church's law

A. Not simony of divine law if asked for support

Noldin (n. 199)

B. Of the Church's law (at least)

Wouters: “certainly” (n. 626)
Vermeersch (n. 282)

C. Unlawful: nothing beyond food and clothing in probation

Marc (n. 589)
Concina: “UNDER WHATSOEVER PRETEXT” (XII, diss. II, ch. II, n. XVII)

Our authors are evenly divided (B 2, C 2, A 1). The fuller entry.

Selling indulgenced rosaries: simony of the Church's law, or none

A. Simony of the Church's law

Prümmer (II, n. 564)
Noldin (n. 186)
Marc (n. 590)

B. Not simony if nothing is asked for the blessing

Merkelbach: “not simony” (II, n. 813)
Vermeersch (n. 277)
Wouters: “is not proved” (n. 626)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 3, B 3). The fuller entry.

Thanks owed to God: gratitude, or religion

A. Religion

Prümmer (II, n. 605)
St. Thomas
Merkelbach: “eminent gratitude” (II, n. 875)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2374)

B. Gratitude (religion commands its acts)

Bontempi: “Religion is not formally gratitude” (On gratitude, n. 3)
Spirago (XII. THE DUTY OF GRATITUDE)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 2). The fuller entry.

Flattery: a sin against truth (eighth commandment), or against affability

A. Against truth (the eighth commandment)

Roman Catechism (The Eighth Commandment)
Spirago: “against one’s own conviction” (THE COMMAND AGAINST UNTRUTHFULNESS)
Bontempi (On friendship, n. 5)

B. Against affability, an excess in pleasing

St. Thomas (II-II, q. 115, a. 1)
Prümmer (II, n. 612)
Merkelbach (II, n. 889)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 2). The fuller entry.

The ruler's lawmaking: legal or commutative justice

A. Legal justice, in the prince architectonically

St. Thomas: “in the sovereign principally and by way of a mastercraft” (II-II, q. 58, a. 6)
Merkelbach: “principally and, as it were, architectonically” (II, n. 260)
Noldin: “by prescribing those things which are necessary for procuring the common good” (n. 272)
Prümmer: “the prince establishes good laws” (II, n. 71)

B. Commutative justice: it is the ruler's office

Vermeersch: “to establish good laws, to administer well the republic or the Church is for rulers an office of commutative justice” (n. 347)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 1). The fuller entry.

Judgment: an act of justice, distributive justice or prudence

A. An act of justice (properly)

St. Thomas: “belongs properly to justice” (II-II, q. 60, a. 1)
McHugh-Callan: “the proper act of the virtue of justice” (n. 1727)
Billuart: “is an act of justice, because it belongs to justice to define and determine what is just” (Whether judgment is lawful, n. 1)

B. Primarily an act of distributive justice

Merkelbach: “which primarily and formally is an act of distributive justice” (II, n. 132)

C. Private judgment of a neighbor belongs to prudence

Bontempi: “pertains to Prudence, not to Justice” (Whether judgment is an act of just, n. 10)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.

How Many

Daughters of covetousness

A. Seven

St. Thomas
Prümmer — named on this side in the fuller entry
Merkelbach — named on this side in the fuller entry

B. Six

Wouters (n. 307)

C. Five

St. Alphonsus, as Marc reports him (n. 363)
Noldin: “chiefly five” (n. 337)
Marc (n. 363)
Vermeersch (n. 471)

Held by most of our authors: C (C 3, A 2, B 1). The fuller entry.

Annexed virtues

A. Eight principal

Merkelbach: “eight” (II, n. 258)

B. Nine

Wouters: “nine” (n. 384)

C. Three and six

Prümmer (II, n. 73)

D. Obedience apart from observance

Noldin (n. 273)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 1, B 1, C 1, D 1). The fuller entry.

How small thefts coalesce

A. Two ways

Prümmer (II, n. 82)

B. Three

Merkelbach (II, n. 407)
Noldin (n. 419)

C. Four

Marc (n. 908)

D. Five

Vermeersch (n. 660)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 2, A 1, C 1, D 1). The fuller entry.

Ways of cooperating in injustice

A. St. Thomas's nine

St. Thomas (II-II, q. 62, a. 7)

B. Seven classes bound to restitution

Roman Catechism (The Seventh Commandment)

All the manuals repeat St. Thomas's nine in his verse.

One author of this library answers it (B 1). The fuller entry.

Calumny and detraction: one species or two

A. Calumny differs in species

Marc: “differs in species from simple detraction” (n. 1195)

B. One species of injury, calumny adding a lie

Merkelbach (II, n. 428)
Prümmer (II, n. 190)
Wouters (n. 1068)
Vermeersch (n. 599)
Noldin (n. 648)

Setting out both: McHugh-Callan (n. 2039).

Noldin and Sabetti-Barrett reject St. Alphonsus's view that detractions about crimes of different kinds differ in species.

Held by most of our authors: B (B 5, A 1). The fuller entry.

Derision: its own species?

A. A special kind of sin

St. Thomas: “derision is a special kind of sin” (II-II, q. 75, a. 1, ad 3)
Merkelbach: “of a diverse species” (II, n. 440)
Wouters (n. 1084)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2106)

B. The same moral species as contumely

Prümmer: “to the same moral species of contumely” (II, n. 183)
Marc (n. 1211)
Noldin (n. 662)

Our authors are evenly divided (A 3, B 3). The fuller entry.

Several evils in one curse

A. Several sins, by the evils wished

McHugh-Callan (n. 2116)

B. One sin, under the general aspect of evil

Merkelbach (II, n. 441)
Vermeersch (n. 90)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 2, A 1). The fuller entry.

Rash judgment and detraction: one species or two

A. A different species from detraction

Merkelbach: “And thus it differs in species from detraction” (II, n. 420)

Also named on this side: Lugo, as Merkelbach reports (II, n. 420).

B. The difference merely material

Setting out both: Wouters (n. 1077).

One author of this library answers it (A 1). The fuller entry.

Divination and vain observance: one species or two

A. Two species, by their ends

St. Thomas (II-II, q. 92, a. 2)
Merkelbach: “by intrinsic end” (II, n. 785)

B. One moral species

Prümmer (II, n. 516)
Noldin (n. 160)
Wouters (n. 599)
Marc (n. 567)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2295)
Sabetti-Barrett (n. 211)
Concina: “The more common opinion teaches that these divinations do not differ in moral species” (Theol. III, diss. II, ch. IV, n. XI)

Concina: an express pact must still be disclosed in confession. Vermeersch rearranges the matter by formal differences.

Held by most of our authors: B (B 7, A 1). The fuller entry.

Sacrilege: three species or two

A. Three species

Merkelbach (II, n. 802)
Noldin (n. 176)
McHugh-Callan (n. 2315)
St. Thomas

B. Two: local and real reduced to one

Vermeersch: “seems capable of being safely denied,” (n. 265)

Setting out both: Wouters (n. 612).

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 1). The fuller entry.

How often the precept of prayer binds

A. Several times a year (or in life); no fixed rule provable

Prümmer: “All these opinions cannot be strictly proved” (II, n. 347)
Merkelbach: “others more probably: at least several times in a year” (II, n. 677)
Marc: “more often in the year, indeed frequently” (n. 549)

B. Every month

St. Alphonsus, as Prümmer reports him (II, n. 347)

C. Every Sunday

Concina: “That the precept of praying presses on every Lord's day is certain to me” (III, diss. V, ch. II, n. VIII)

Concina rejects once a year “as evidently false”.

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, C 1). The fuller entry.

Neglecting to pray in temptation: a second sin?

A. No second sin

Also named on this side: Lessius, Villalobos, Prado, the Salmanticenses, as Concina reports (III, diss. V, ch. II, n. XIII).

B. A second sin, against religion

Concina: “Lessius, Villalobos, Prado, the Salmanticenses, and others deny it. Graver Theologians, with St. Thomas, affirm it. This opinion is more probable to me, and true” (III, diss. V, ch. II, n. XIII)
St. Thomas

One author of this library answers it (B 1). The fuller entry.

One Word, Two Senses

Duel

A. Defined without regard to its end

Prümmer (II, n. 124)
Merkelbach (II, n. 365)

B. Defined by its end: the judicial duel

Bontempi: “to redeem the truth of some matter, or to purge a crime” (Whether, and how, the duel is unla, n. 2)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1). The fuller entry.

Material idolatry

A. Idolatry feigned outwardly from fear

Prümmer (II, n. 503)
Noldin (n. 151)

B. Inculpable idolatry

Sabetti-Barrett: “inculpable” (n. 204)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 2, B 1). The fuller entry.

Material ingratitude: a venial omission, or no special sin at all

A. The omission of gratitude without contempt, ordinarily venial

Prümmer (II, n. 609)

B. Not a special sin, a circumstance of another

Merkelbach: “not a special sin” (II, n. 878)
McHugh-Callan: “any injury done a benefactor without contempt” (n. 2377)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 2, A 1). The fuller entry.

Liberality: giving to the needy for God, or the right measure with money

A. Giving to the needy for God

Spirago: “has no claim to the virtue of liberality” (LIBERALITY)
Bontempi: “the virtue dispensing benefits” (On liberality, n. 1)

B. The right measure in using money

Prümmer (II, n. 615)
McHugh-Callan: “may be without charity” (n. 2424)
Merkelbach: “it gives even to the unknown, not only to friends” (II, n. 884)

Held by most of our authors: B (B 3, A 2). The fuller entry.

Breaking a vow: sacrilege or not

A. Breaking any true vow is sacrilege

Also named on this side: Cajetan, as Prümmer reports (II, n. 403).

B. Not of itself sacrilege (only certain vows)

Merkelbach: “of itself it is not sacrilege, because it is not the violation of a sacred thing” (II, n. 722)
McHugh-Callan: “is committed only by sins against certain vows” (n. 2209)
Vermeersch: “differs specifically from sacrilege” (n. 221)

Setting out both: Prümmer, “This controversy is a dispute about a name” (II, n. 403).

Held by most of our authors: B (B 3). The fuller entry.

Equity and epikeia

A. Epikeia a subjective part of (legal) justice; equity an annexed virtue

St. Thomas: “a subjective part of justice” (II-II, q. 120, a. 2)
Merkelbach: “pertains to legal justice, of which it is a subjective part or species” (II, n. 891)
McHugh-Callan: “the rank of a subjective part” (n. 2430)
Vermeersch (n. 685)

B. One twofold epikeia

Prümmer: “Epikeia can be taken in a twofold sense” (II, n. 617)

C. Equity an annexed virtue

Marc: “although this is rather referred to legal justice” (n. 403)

Held by most of our authors: A (A 3, B 1, C 1). The fuller entry.