Cursing and imprecations

208. To curse properly is to imprecate evil upon another. Therefore curses uttered against creatures are blasphemies when the curses redound upon God. But curses uttered against creatures redound upon God when they are cursed insofar as they have a relation to God, that is, insofar as they are the work of God or insofar as they are sent by God. Therefore:

1. To curse saints or sacred things, for example the sacraments of the Church, or to speak malevolently about some saint, ordinarily is blasphemy, because in these there is ordinarily had and apprehended a relation to God.

2. To curse creatures lacking reason, for example winds, rain, hail, animals, ordinarily is not blasphemy, because their relation to God is not apprehended; ordinarily therefore it is a light sin of anger and impatience. And if there is an honorable end of cursing creatures, there is no sin, as David cursed the mountains of Gilboa, Job and Jeremiah the hour of birth, and the psalmist cursed sinners in the imprecatory psalms.

Yet if the relation of irrational creatures, for example animals, to men is regarded, a sin against charity is committed, because the evil which is wished to them is in reality wished to the man to whom they are useful.

3. To curse rational creatures ordinarily is opposed only to charity, because their relation to God is ordinarily not apprehended. This sin rather often is venial, either because of smallness of matter or because of defect of serious will, for example in him who in great anger curses his neighbor.

These curses: May God damn me; may the devil take you, are blasphemies if they are uttered against the creature insofar as it has been made by God or bears before itself the likeness of God; but ordinarily he who utters an imprecation of this kind does not attend to the respect which the creature has to God.

4. To curse the devil, with anger, impatience, or another defect excluded, is not a sin: for he is not customarily cursed insofar as he is a creature of God, but insofar as he is the hostile enemy of God and of men and the author of so many and so great evils.

To utter imprecations or to speak injuriously against creatures which have a special relation to God is blasphemy. Thus it is grievously sinful to call down maledictions on one’s fellow-men, wishing that they may perish eternally. Such acts are seriously against charity as well as religion. To utter imprecations against brute beasts or other creatures which have no special relation to almighty God is not blasphemy, and will not ordinarily exceed a venial sin. Profane words and vulgar expressions like “‘ damn,” “ bloody,” and so forth, are commonly used without definite meaning, and at most are venial sins, because they are unbecoming, shock others, or are manifestations of anger and impatience. It is sometimes said that blasphemy is most common where faith is strong, and this may be a reason why real blasphemy is not so common perhaps with us in ordinary conversation as with some nations.

AN oath is the calling on God to witness to the truth of what we say. This calling on God may be express or tacit; it is express when God is mentioned, as, ‘‘ I swear by God ”’; it is tacit when we swear by some creature which in a special way shows forth the Divinity or has some special relation to him, as, ‘‘ I swear by the Christian Faith,” “‘ by the Gospel,” “by Heaven.”

In an assertory oath we call God to witness to the truth of a present or past event; in a promissory oath we call him to witness to some future event.

A solemn oath is clothed with the ceremonies prescribed by law, such as holding up the right hand or kissing the Bible; a simple oath is devoid of such ceremonies.

An imprecation is sometimes added to an oath by such words as, ‘‘ so help me God ”’; in this case we have an imprecatory oath; otherwise it is an invocatory oath.

Cursing.—Cursing in general is the speaking of evil for some person or thing, that is, in order that the evil spoken may befall him or it. Thus, it differs from contumely and derision, which are the speaking of evil to another, and from defamation and whispering, which are the speaking of evil against another. Cursing is also different from prediction of evil, and some passages in the Imprecatory Psalms, though couched in terms of malediction, are prophecies of the future, rather than curses. An example is Psalm cviii, which foretells the fate of the traitor Judas. Cursing is expressed in two ways:

(a) imperatively, when one pronounces with authority that punishment is to be inflicted or evil visited upon some person or object. In this way God decrees eternal or temporal penalties against sinners, judges sentence criminals, and the Church anathematize the contumacious;

(b) optatively, when one who has not the power or authority to command punishment, expresses the wish that misfortune or evil of some kind may overtake a person or thing. Examples are: “Bad luck to you,” “May you break your leg,” “The devil take you,” “God damn you.” A curse made in the form of a prayer is called an imprecation.

When Cursing Is Not Sinful.—Cursing a person is not sinful when the evil which is ordered or wished is not intended as to the evil that is in it, but as to some good; for so the intention is directed to good, not to evil.

(a) Thus, evil may be ordered on account of the good of justice that is in it, as when a judge decrees capital punishment, which in its physical being is an evil, but morally is the vindication of justice and therefore a good. Some of the curses made by holy men in the Bible are of this character: they proclaim the just sentence of God, as when Elias called down fire from heaven upon his persecutors (IV Kings, i), and Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked him (IV Kings, ii. 24); or they express the submission of the human will to the just decree of God: “And the Levites shall pronounce with a loud voice, ‘Cursed be he that abideth not in the words of this law,’ and all the people shall say, ‘Amen’” (Deut., xxvii. 14, 26).

(b) Evil may be desired, if the intention takes in only the good of public or of private utility that is contained in it, as when one hopes a jury will find a dangerous criminal guilty, if one has in view, not the sufferings or death of the criminal, but the safety of the community. It is right, therefore, to wish confusion and defeat to the enemies of religion, of the Church, or of one’s country; it is lawful to pray God to visit a sinner with sickness that he may thereby be reformed or prevented from harming others. But in wishing evils one must remember that it is not always lawful to do what one wishes may happen in some lawful manner, nor is it lawful to wish a greater evil as a means of escape from a lesser evil (see 1308 sqq.).

Sinfulness of Cursing.—Cursing a person is sinful when the evil ordered or wished is intended precisely as it is the hurt or loss of this person.

(a) From its nature this sin is mortal, since it shuts out the curser from heaven (“Neither cursers nor extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God,” I Cor., vi. 10), and it is essentially opposed to charity, being the natural expression of hatred (see 1296). But, other things being equal, optative cursing is less serious than defamation, for it is less harm to another to wish him evil (e.g., that he be defamed) than to inflict that evil on him.

(b) From the imperfection of the act or the lightness of the matter, cursing becomes at times a venial sin. The act is imperfectly deliberate when one curses in a sudden fit of temper; it is imperfectly intentional, when one curses in fun or from habit and does not really wish that the evils pronounced should be fulfilled. The curses, “Go to hell,” “God damn you,” are usually not meant or understood to express a wish that the person addressed be consigned to eternal punishment. Hence, they are generally in themselves venial sins only. But it should be remembered that venial curses of this kind may become mortal by reason of scandal (e.g., when parents habitually address such curses to their children, or other superiors to their subordinates), or by reason of irreverence (e.g., when children curse their parents). The matter of a curse is light when the evil spoken is harmful only in a small degree (e.g., to wish that a person may lose a small sum of money).

Rules for Deciding as to Gravity of the Sin.—Persons who have expressed a grave curse against a neighbor are sometimes in doubt whether there was enough ill-will in the curse to make it a mortal sin. For such doubts theologians give the following rules:

(a) if the reason for doubting is that after the curse one cooled off and hoped that no evil would happen to one’s neighbor, mortal sin was committed during the curse, but the bad disposition quickly passed away;

(b) if the reason for doubting is that one is not sure about the state of mind one was in during the curse, a good index of that state of mind will be the feeling one has towards the person who was cursed. Thus, if one is well disposed towards that person, the presumption is that the curse was not meant except as an expression of anger; but if one is hostile to that person, the presumption is rather that the evil in the curse was really intended. If one is indifferent as regards the person whom one cursed, the presumption will follow what one is accustomed to desire in one’s curses, whether that be to give forceful expression to displeasure or to manifest a malevolent hatred.

Circumstances Which Change the Moral Species of Cursing.—There are certain circumstances of person and objects which change the moral species of cursing, and which must therefore be mentioned in confession.

(a) Thus, by reason of difference in the persons cursed the species is changed, for where special love or reverence is owed a special sin is committed by hatred or irreverence. The gravest curse is that against God, which is the sin of blasphemy (see 887 sqq.). Next in wickedness is the curse against one’s parents, which is a sin of impiety.

(b) By reason of difference in the evils that are desired, the species is also changed, since the essential malices of the will and of the deed are the same (see 90, 242). In this respect cursing differs from contumely and detraction, for in these sins the evils spoken are not pleasing, but rather displeasing to the speaker (see 2103). Hence, he who wishes death to his neighbor commits murder in his heart, he who wishes loss of property is a thief at heart, etc. But if one curses a neighbor in a general way, without mentioning any particular evil, one sins by hatred.

Numerical Multiplication in Sins of Cursing.—(a) By reason of the specific difference in the evils wished (e.g., death, disgrace, poverty), one is guilty of several sins by one and the same act; for, though the act is physically one, it is morally many, as was said in the previous paragraph. But some authors add that only one sin is committed if all the evils wished are united in the mind as expressions of the one sin of hate or as means of the one purpose of injury (see 217).

(b) By reason of the different persons cursed, one is also guilty of several sins by one and the same act, or at least is guilty of one sin that is equivalent to many; for he who curses a whole family or group, formally and expressly intends evil to each member, and thus he differs from a thief who steals from many persons, but does not will individual injuries (see 218).

The Cursing of Evil.—(a) It is not sinful to curse evil as such, that is, to wish that sin or wrong may be defeated. Hence, it is lawful to pray against the evil spirits, the enemies of God and man. But it is sinful to curse any creature of God, even though he is among the lost, for the nature of every creature is good, since it comes from God.

(b) It is not sinful to curse evil tropologically, that is, to curse a creature of God that is taken to represent evil, as being its cause (e.g., Job cursed the day of his birth, the beginning of many evils), or location (e.g., David cursed Mount Gelboe, the spot where Saul and Jonathan were slain), etc. But it would be a sin to curse these creatures of God in themselves.

It is not sinful to curse an irrational creature on account of its relation to man, if there is a sufficient reason to curse man himself (see 2112), either on account of the good of justice (e.g., when God cursed the earth as a punishment on Adam, when Christ cursed the fig-tree as a sign of the curse on Judea), or on account of the good of utility (e.g., when one wishes that the liquor ordered by a drunkard may be lost).

Unlawful Cursing of an Irrational Creature.—(a) It is unlawful to curse an irrational creature, considered precisely as a creature of God, for in so doing one reflects on God Himself, and incurs the guilt of blasphemy.

(b) It is unlawful to curse an irrational creature, considered precisely in relation to man, if there is no just cause to curse man. Thus, if one wishes that a neighbor’s cattle may die, intending only the harm that will be done the neighbor, one is guilty of sinful cursing (see 2113).

(c) It is unlawful to curse an irrational creature, considered precisely in itself, for such an act is vain and useless. Those who curse the inclemency of the weather, the infertility of the soil, the stubbornness of mules or other animals, the uselessness of a tool, etc., do not generally speaking commit a grave sin, since they intend only to voice their impatience with conditions that are displeasing.

Is it blasphemy to curse creatures? - It is blasphemy to curse creatures with relation to God, for example, rains or winds as commanded by God, or with the word of God added; likewise to curse a creature which of itself has a special relation to God, for example, our soul, the Catholic faith, heaven, and similar things. But otherwise, as generally happens, if indignation is borne toward creatures without relation to God. "To curse irrational things insofar as they are creatures of God is the sin of blasphemy; but to curse them, considered according to themselves, is idle and vain," namely it is venial. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 76, a. 2. But per se there is no sin if irrational creatures are cursed because of harm brought, for example, a storm, because it devastated vineyards. Thus David without sin cursed the mountains of Gilboa, namely on account of the slaughter of the people which had happened on them. To curse rational creatures, to whom from charity we ought to wish good, is against the same charity.

L. 128; S. Th. l. c., a. 4 ad 1.

You will resolve: It is not grave simply to curse an hour, day, or year, unless the word holy is added; or unless the day of itself bears before itself something special of sanctity, such as Easter day, etc. The reason is that whatever imports sanctity is per se referred to God, who is the author of all sanctity; and the utterance of words by which a certain special sanctity is explained, at least indirectly, speaking per se, is referred to God.

To curse beasts, winds, etc., is regularly a light fault; nor regularly, in anger, is the mind present that the curse be carried into execution; and it is an act of impatience. Likewise "in anger to imprecate upon others a demon, hail, thunderbolts, etc...., for the most part, at least when it is said against those who are loved by the angry person, on account of sudden commotion and inadvertence and defect of serious will, is only venial.... But it is grave if subjects thus curse superiors, children parents, even only materially, especially to their face; because it is grave against due reverence." L. 130. Cf. ibid., n. 126 seqq., Epist. Resp. and n. 134; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 76, a. 3.

542.bis Note: To curse is the same as to speak evil. And this is done either by way of simple enunciation, by reporting the evil of another, which pertains to detraction; or by way of cause, either by effecting something or by moving others through command to do something; or by way of the expression of a certain desiring affection. "In those two modes in which evil is spoken by way of commanding or by way of wishing, by the same reason something is licit or illicit. For if someone commands or wishes the evil of another insofar as it is evil, as though intending the evil itself, thus to curse in either mode will be illicit; and this is to curse, speaking per se. But if someone commands or wishes the evil of another under the aspect of good, thus it is licit, nor will it be cursing, speaking per se, but per accidens, because the principal intention of the speaker is not borne toward evil, but toward good. But it happens that some evil is spoken by commanding or wishing under the aspect of a twofold good: sometimes indeed under the aspect of the just, and thus a judge licitly curses him upon whom he commands a just punishment to be inflicted; and thus also the Church curses by anathematizing, just as the Prophets in the Scriptures sometimes imprecate evils upon sinners, as though conforming their will to divine justice, although imprecations of this sort can also be understood by way of foretelling. But sometimes some evil is spoken under the aspect of the useful, as when someone wishes some sinner to suffer some sickness or some impediment, either that he himself may be made better, or at least that he may cease from harming others." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 76, a. 1. "Blessing or cursing properly pertains to that thing to which something good or evil can happen, namely to a rational creature. But good or evil is said to happen to irrational creatures in order to the rational creature, on account of whom they are. But they are ordered to him in many ways. In one way indeed by way of assistance, insofar as human necessity is assisted from irrational creatures. And in this way the Lord said to man, Gen. 3:17, Cursed is the earth in your work, namely so that man might be punished through its sterility. And thus also is understood what is had in Deut. 28:5, Blessed are your barns, and below, v. 17, Cursed is your barn... In another way an irrational creature is ordered to the rational by way of signification; and thus the Lord cursed the fig tree in signification of Judea. In a third way an irrational creature is ordered to the rational by way of containing, namely of time or place; and thus Job cursed the day of his birth, on account of original guilt which he contracted by being born, and on account of the punishments following; and on account of this also David can be understood to have cursed the mountains of Gilboa, 2 Kings 1, namely on account of the slaughter of the people which had happened on them." S. Th. l. c., a. 2.

A licit curse, and one conformed to the divine will, as being just, does not lack its effect. Hence "the curse of a mother uproots the foundations." Ecclus. 3:11, namely, "it uproots houses down to the foundations, that is, it plainly destroys and extinguishes his offspring and family and its riches and honors... An example of a curse is in Ham... St. Augustine relates a similar example, lib. 22, de Civit., c. 8, and more fully in Serm. 34, concerning a mother who, cursing ten sons, made them all trembling, miserable, and wandering. Thus today we see sons and illustrious families, which seemed likely to endure for ages, fall and be extinguished." Cornelius a Lapide on the same place. Likewise, "the prayer of him who curses you in the bitterness of his soul will be heard," namely of the poor man. "But he who made him will hear him." Ecclus. 4:6; "that is to say, God the Creator will hear him as his afflicted creature, despised by you and abandoned to you. Therefore he himself, as advocate and father of the poor and orphans, will take up his just complaint and cause against you, and will condemn and punish you." Cornelius a Lapide on the same place. But anyone can pray away from himself the evils of a curse both by penance and by prayer, conciliating God's blessing to himself.

Is it blasphemy to curse the whole world? - St. Liguori, n. 129, affirms, because just as to swear by creatures in which the divine attributes shine forth more is a true oath, so to curse them is true blasphemy, because God is indirectly contemned in them. "Yet in reality such a sense is scarcely accustomed to occur to the mind of the one uttering these things." Thus Gury 304. But the same St. Alphonsus, l. c., thinks the opposite: "Ordinarily speaking, I judge that country people who curse the world for the most part sin gravely, while they accuse themselves of such a curse with grave horror." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 76, a. 4 ad 1.

Is it blasphemy to curse the dead and the devil? - R. To the first. Negative, yet in that case in which the mind of those cursing is not borne to this, that he curse them insofar as they are creatures of God. Indeed for the most part this is not even mortal, because through this no grave injury is inflicted upon them, either in themselves or from the mind of those uttering it: not in itself, because the word dead is more to be referred to the body which dies than to the soul which always lives; or at most it signifies men who have finished life, who can be either saved or damned. Not from the mind of those uttering it, because those cursing the dead in no way intend to pray evils upon the souls of the dead, but rather to reproach the living, to whom they are accustomed to refer their curses as an injury. L. 130. R. To the second. Tamburini rightly thinks that to curse the devil is rarely mortal sin, because he is always accustomed to be cursed as the author of evils or as the enemy of God; in this manner, abstracting from the act of impatience, he says that it is not even venial. L. 120; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 76, a. 1 ad 4.

Are these French expressions blasphemous: "Nom de Dieu! Noms de Noms! Mille Noms! Sacré Nom!" without an addition, etc.? - R. Negative per se, even if they are uttered in anger, unless the anger is borne against God himself, or unless there is present a blasphemous intention, which is generally absent. For these words contain no blasphemy in themselves. Therefore they will be only venial on account of the vain usurpation of the name of God; but if the name of God is employed in these formulas neither explicitly nor implicitly, they will per se be free from all fault.

Is the French expression "S. Nom de D." blasphemy? - Some answer: affirmative per se, because those words, by reason of the common acceptance of the faithful, are insulting to God. Others answer: negative per se, unless a blasphemous intention explicitly, or at least implicitly, intervenes, because those words in their obvious sense contain no insult of God in themselves; for in reality they signify the blessed name of God. Therefore in practice all those who utter words of this sort are not easily to be accused of mortal sin. For it is certain, experience being witness, that not a few, especially the uneducated, do not apprehend grave malice in them. Therefore the confessor should attend first to the varied common usage of places, which could well have determined the meaning of the word sacred to signify cursed. Likewise he should attend to the various circumstances of penitents. "Sins of words are especially to be judged from the intention of the speaker." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 73, a. 2.

Note: In doubt whether some expression is or is not blasphemy, it is by no means to be taken as blasphemy. L. 129, 130. If the words according to themselves express no diminution of divine honor, it is not to be judged blasphemy, nor mortal sin. L. 130. If the meaning is doubtful, then attention must be given to the intention and affection of the one uttering the words. L. 130. The uneducated often confuse with blasphemy any less becoming words and curses against beasts and men. Therefore they are to be taught, "lest so many souls perish miserably from ignorance on account of an erroneous conscience of mortal sin." L. 131.

304. • Q. 3. Whether it is blasphemy to curse creatures?

Resp. Distinguish. It is blasphemy to curse creatures with relation to God, for example the rains, the winds, as commanded by God, or with the word of God added; likewise to curse a creature which of itself has a special relation to God, for example our soul, the Catholic Faith, heaven, and the like. But it is otherwise, as nearly always happens, if indignation is directed against creatures without relation to God. - So commonly. - St. Lig., n. 128.

Q. 4. Whether it is blasphemy to curse the whole world?

Resp. St. Lig. affirms it, because just as to swear by creatures, in which the divine attributes shine forth more, is a true oath, so to curse these very things is true blasphemy, because in them God is indirectly contemned. - St. Alphonsus, n. 129. - In reality, however, such a meaning scarcely tends to occur to the mind of the one uttering these things.

534. A curse is to invoke evil upon another. One can invoke evil a) upon God or sacred things and persons, b) upon rational creatures, c) upon irrational creatures, d) upon the devil.

a) To curse God or sacred things and persons is blasphemy, as was explained above.

b) To curse rational creatures ordinarily is opposed only to charity or justice, and therefore St. Thomas treats cursing among the sins opposed to justice.⁸¹⁸ Curses of this kind are often poured forth from sudden anger without serious intention, and then they are only venial sins; for example, if an angry person exclaims: May the devil seize you! May lightning strike you! May you break your neck! etc. Such curses are especially to be avoided by parents and other superiors, both because scandal is accustomed to arise from them and because sometimes, beyond expectation, they are efficacious. For it happens that the evil which parents invoke upon their children from anger afterward truly occurs. Hence it is said: "The blessing of the father establisheth the houses of the children, but the curse of the mother rooteth up the foundation."⁸¹⁹ Curses seriously uttered against one's neighbor proceed from hatred and are gravely or lightly sinful according to the gravity of the hatred and of the evil wished.

c) To curse irrational creatures, for example, winds, horses, rains, etc., is not blasphemy, because then some relation to God is by no means customarily attended to and intended. Commonly it is nothing other than a light sin of impatience. Indeed, if there is an honorable end, such curses are no sin, as happens in exorcism. Thus David also cursed the mountains of Gilboa, Job and Jeremiah cursed the day of their birth, and indeed Christ Himself cursed the fig tree.⁸²⁰

d) To curse the devil as the enemy of God and of the human race is lawful.⁸²¹

Note. Exclamations such as: devil, heaven, lightning (Donnerwetter! [thunderstorm!]), etc., are not blasphemies; they are customarily nothing other than sudden eruptions of a vivid affection. In themselves they are not sinful, but per accidens they become unlawful if scandal arises from them, as if priests, parents, or teachers often use them. The faithful are especially to be admonished not to utter frequently the name of the devil, the most bitter enemy of our salvation; but they are also to be openly instructed that exclamations of this kind are not true blasphemies.

⁸¹⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 76.

⁸¹⁹ Ecclus. 3:11.

⁸²⁰ Cf. S. theol., l.c., a. 2.

⁸²¹ Cf. ibid., a. 1 ad 4.

VI. Notions and principles concerning imprecations. - An imprecation or curse is an act by which someone calls down evil upon another under the aspect of evil. This sin is not always opposed to divine reverence, religion, and the second precept of the Decalogue, but only when it imports a dishonoring of God; otherwise it will be against charity or also justice, and thus against the precepts of the second table, for example against the fifth or eighth. Hence in particular:

A. Against religion and the second precept of the Decalogue are, and are grave sin:

1. imprecations directed immediately against God, because they are great imprecatory blasphemy;

2. likewise imprecations against creatures, but considered in relation to God, because then the curse redounds upon God: this easily happens concerning wind, rain, heaven, thunder, the whole world, etc., for example, cursed be the rain of God; and almost always concerning sacred things or persons; if nevertheless holy persons are considered in themselves, the sin will not be against religion but against dulia;

3. likewise curses against creatures considered in themselves, but by something divine or holy which exists not for cursing but for blessing, for example: may God's blood, death, head, wounds, passion, etc., destroy you.

B. They are not against religion, but against charity of neighbor and justice:

1. to curse rational creatures or any neighbors whatever considered without relation to God, which is mortal sin from its genus, if it is done from the heart; otherwise it will be venial, as for the most part happens: thus, for example, may the devil carry you off, may God damn you;

2. likewise to curse irrational creatures insofar as they serve the utility of men, for example cattle, because in fact this is to curse men;

3. much more to curse parents, which is not only mortal if a grave evil is wished seriously, but sometimes if a light evil is wished, because it is also great irreverence against piety; likewise to curse children or before children, which in parents is also a sin against piety, because they easily provide scandal and are the cause that children thereafter have no reverence and obedience toward them; likewise to curse superiors, especially when present, which also easily is grave and against observance.

C. To imprecate evil upon oneself is against charity toward oneself, which is mortal from its genus if it is done seriously; otherwise it is venial: thus, for example, may God damn me.

D. It is not a sin of itself, on account of an honorable end:

1. to curse the devil as author of evils, unless sometimes by reason of immoderate anger or scandal;

2. to curse irrational creatures insofar as they are the cause of evil, unless by reason of impatience or anger.

E. Of itself it is vain and idle, and by this reason venial: to curse irrational creatures considered according to themselves.

Observation. - The custom of imprecating is to be extirpated: under mortal sin if the imprecations are against God; under venial sin if imprecations against men are pronounced without intention.

VII. Practical notes concerning sins against honor and reputation. - Concerning sins of the tongue, or injuries of words, and other things which can harm honor and reputation, just as they can dissolve friendship and peace, and which frequently arise from hatred, it is useful to observe a few things.

A. Imprecations against one's own offenders:

1. are not grave if they are uttered by mouth alone without full advertence, or, as among the rude, are understood as uttered without mind; unless nevertheless they cause grave scandal, as could happen in parents imprecating before children, who would be moved from this to sin gravely;

2. on the contrary, they are mortal sin if they are pronounced from the heart, from hatred or excessive vengeance.

S. Th. II-II, q. 72; q. 73, a. 1; q. 75 and 76; q. 103, a. 1.

435. Notions. - Just as reputation is injured by detraction, so honor is injured by contumely (beleediging). Honor is the external testimony of another's excellence, made by words or equivalent signs. It can be done by laudatory words which pronounce another's excellence, by calling him, for example, lord, eminent, most wise, - by deeds or actions such as inclination, going to meet him, yielding place, - or by exterior things, such as gifts, the erection of a statue, the setting up of an image, etc.; all these are employed from the intention of the one honoring, to signify another's excellence or his superiority in regard to oneself, under some respect, or in regard to others.

The foundation of honor is qualities or gifts, of whatever kind, internal and external, natural or supernatural, by which someone excels, especially virtue, which is the true excellence of man.

Honor proceeds as from its first motive from reverence, insofar as someone, from the reverence which he has toward another, honors him; and at the same time it tends to reverence as to an end, insofar as he honors him so that he may be held in reverence by others. But its effect is glory, which is clear knowledge of excellence among others. It differs from good reputation: a) reputation chiefly consists in the internal opinion of many, honor in external testimony; b) reputation is borne concerning one absent, honor is shown to one present, either through himself, or through another which represents him, such as an ambassador or image; c) reputation concerns a certain perfection simply, but honor concerns excellence or superiority in perfection.

436. Definition of contumely. - Contumely is directly opposed to honor; whence it is the unjust dishonoring of a present person. It is said:

1° dishonoring, i.e., not only the negative absence of honor even when due, but a positive contrary act which expresses contempt, which is chiefly done by words uttered or written, also by deeds insofar as they are equivalent signs which have the force of words, for example, by a contemptuous look or gesture, by an infamous picture, by a slap inflicted, by the breaking of an image or defacing of a door. Whence the privative omission of due honor is not contumely, unless because of special circumstances it is equivalent to a positive act of contempt, as if, all being greeted, one is deliberately neglected;

2° unjust, because it could also be a just punishment of a delict;

3° of a present person, at least in some way, whether through himself, or in an ambassador or in an image, or in such a way that the injury is made known to him through a messenger or through letters. For "he who utters words against someone in secret, seems to fear him rather than to despise him, whence he does not directly bring detriment to honor" q. 73, a. 1. Hence for contumely it is not necessary that it be done before others; for "if someone says his defect to someone... to him alone, it can be contumely insofar as he who speaks acts unjustly against the reverence of the hearer" q. 72, a. 1, ad 1.

437. Contumely is made from the intention of dishonoring and by this differs from other sins. - Its end is externally to manifest contempt toward the man to be dishonored; therefore:

1. It differs really from detraction a) by reason of the object or end, because it directly injures honor, not reputation; b) by reason of the mode, because it is done to one present, while detraction of itself is done concerning one absent. But if contumely is done before others in such a way that a delict, whether false or unknown, is imputed to another while he himself is present, then it is joined with detraction but formally is contumely.

Let St. Thomas be heard, q. 73, a. 1: "Just as by deed someone harms another in two ways: openly indeed as in robbery,... but secretly as in theft...; so also by word someone injures another in two ways: in one way openly, and this is done by contumely,... in another way secretly, and this is done by detraction. But from this, that someone openly utters words against another, he seems to despise him; whence from this very fact he is dishonored, and therefore contumely brings detriment to the honor of him against whom it is uttered. But he who utters words against someone in secret seems to fear him rather than to despise him; whence he does not directly bring detriment to honor, but to reputation, insofar as one uttering such words secretly, as far as in him lies, makes those who hear have an evil opinion of him against whom he speaks: for the detractor seems to intend this, and strives for this, that credence be given to his words. Whence it is clear that detraction differs from contumely in two ways: in one way as to the mode of proposing words, because namely the contumelious man speaks openly against someone (i.e., to his face), but the detractor secretly; in another way as to the end, or as to the harm inflicted, because namely the contumelious man derogates from honor, the detractor from reputation."

2. It also differs really from mockery or jeering, by which the defects of one's neighbor are turned into laughter, whether by words, or by gestures such as with wrinkled nose, or by deeds, to his illegitimate blushing, disturbance, and confusion. Therefore mockery has an end diverse from contumely: to procure blushing, which is not dishonoring but fear of dishonoring (q. 75, a. 1).

3. It differs also under some respect from abusive speech and reproach (versmading), by which generally any vice whatsoever, or defect of fault or penalty or merely natural defect, is disgracefully objected to someone to the detriment of honor, or a lessening or need, while contumely strictly so called objects fault (q. 72, a. 1, ad 3).

438. Principle. Contumely is a sin against justice, grave from its genus. - For it takes away from one's neighbor a notable good which is usually esteemed more than riches, indeed in external goods it holds the first place, "both because it is very near to virtue, as being a certain testimony existing concerning someone's virtue; and also because it is shown to God and to the best; and also because men set aside all things for obtaining honor and avoiding blame" (q. 129, a. 1). But to take away such a good is against justice, because it is done while one's neighbor is unwilling, who has a right to it because of natural or supernatural qualities and gifts, especially because of honesty and virtue.

Whence Christ, Mt. V, 22: "But he who shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be liable to the council: but he who shall say, Thou fool (i.e., madman), shall be liable to the hell of fire." And the Apostle admonishes Christians that they be "anticipating one another with honor" (Rom. XII, 10), and "in humility judging one another superior to themselves" (Phil. II, 3).

Nevertheless it can be venial a) on the part of the agent, if it is done from inadvertence, lack of deliberation, sudden anger, or from an intention of not gravely injuring honor, as if someone speaks in jest or not so seriously;

b) on the part of the matter, if there is no grave injury of honor. Whence contumelious words which are uttered by parents against children, and abusive speeches by which men of the lowest condition or quarrelling women attack one another and vomit forth whatever occurs, are easily excused from grave sin, because they are usually considered as of lesser moment or are even not seriously uttered.

439. The gravity of the sin of contumely is to be weighed not only absolutely from the thing itself or the contumely uttered according to itself, but also respectively

1° to the dignity of the person offended: for injury is measured from the dignity of the person offended to whom it is terminated; whence the same contumely brought upon a father, bishop, or king is much graver than if it is brought upon an equal;

2° also to the offending person and his dispositions: thus an offense which arises from hatred, envy, or contempt is graver than that which arises from anger or lightness; greater if it is uttered by a person of great authority than by a man of lower condition;

3° to the effects to follow from it: the sin is greater if it is done before several persons or before those who from this receive scandal, or if quarrels, contentions, enmities are foreseen.

440. Mockery (beschimping, bespotting) agrees with contumely in matter; but it differs in mode and end, and consequently is of a diverse species; for it is had when someone objects to another a defect or fault in a joking manner, so that the other blushes or is ashamed (Mt. XXVII, 41-44; Lk. XXIII, 36). It is called jeering when someone is exposed to ridicule not by words but by gestures or movements of the body (Mt. XXVII, 40). It is called derision when the same is done by means of some deception (Mt. XXVI, 68; XXVII, 29; Lk. XXII, 63). Cf. St. Thomas, q. 75.

The gravest sin is mockery of God and of those things which are of God (Is. XXXVII, 23), because it is also blasphemy against religion; the second place is held by mockery of parents because it is also against piety (Prov. XXX, 17); in the third place derision of the just is grave insofar as the virtue and simplicity of the just man is derided (Job XII, 4), which derision is very harmful because through this men are impeded from acting well. Besides, derision will be a grave sin against justice if it notably offends and shames one's neighbor, or causes grave damages and sins (Prov. XXII, 10).

But derision concerning a light evil or defect, or one not sufficiently deliberate, is a venial sin, indeed none, if it is done moderately and with a just cause, for example, so that the one derided may abstain from a defect or sin, or that honest recreation may be fostered. Nevertheless, even friends should deride soberly, prudently, and not too long, especially if the neighbor is foreseen to be not lightly moved by this; wherefore St. Thomas wisely admonishes (q. 72, a. 2, ad 1): "It pertains to eutrapelia to say some light abusive speech, not for the dishonoring or saddening of him against whom it is said, but rather for the sake of delight and jest; this can be without sin, if due circumstances are observed. But if someone does not fear to sadden him against whom a joking abusive speech of this kind is uttered, provided he excites laughter in others, this is vicious."

441. Cursing, concerning which St. Thomas treats after derision (q. 76), can be understood in three ways:

1° one is merely enunciative, by which someone reports the evil of another, and this is nothing but detraction;

2° another is causative or imperative, by which someone moves others by command to bringing evil upon another; and this is the first of the nine modes of cooperation, concerning which we spoke above (n. 309);

3° another is optative, by which someone expresses an evil affection or desire and wishes evil to another (verwensching). This can be defined: a dishonoring by which someone imprecates evil upon someone insofar as it is evil, and thus it is against justice; besides, it contains the sin of hatred against charity, if evil is wished from the heart.

Optative cursing, just like imperative cursing, is a sin if someone intends the evil of another insofar as it is evil; but it is not a sin if someone intends the evil of another under the aspect of good, because then the intention of the one speaking is not referred to evil but to good, whether because it is just (for example, to desire just punishment), or because it is useful (for example, for correction). This however is to be understood, provided it is done according to the order of charity: thus he would sin who wished the death of his father because of the inheritance.

Cursing is a mortal sin from its genus, because it is against charity; nevertheless it can be venial either because of the smallness of the evil which one wishes to another, or because of the imperfection of the affection, because it is not done from the heart but from lack of deliberation or without the mind of one desiring, for example, from a sudden movement of anger or from custom. And nevertheless curses even light of themselves can from circumstances be mortal, whether by reason of the person against whom they are made, for example, if they are made against God, against parents, against superiors especially present, or by reason of scandal.

It is a sin so much graver according as we ought more to love and reverence the person whom we curse and according as we wish graver evils. Whence

1. it is gravest to curse God, which is also blasphemy against religion;

2. then to curse parents, which is also against piety;

3. then to curse superiors, which is also against observance;

4. then against other neighbors according to the gravity of the evil wished; but if by a simple evil affection diverse things are also wished under the general aspect of evil, because they are evil, the sin is against charity insofar as evil is desired, and against justice insofar as, by uttering it, one's neighbor is dishonored; but if by an efficacious desire someone desires to inflict diverse evils upon another, the sins are diverse in species against justice according to the diverse evils wished;

5. to curse irrational creatures: a) if they are regarded according to themselves, it is not a mortal sin, because they are not a subject of right and injury, but it is idle and vain, and therefore venial; b) insofar as they have a relation to evil, there is no sin because it is to curse evil itself; c) insofar as they are creatures of God, it is blasphemy against God; d) insofar as they are useful to man, it is the same as to curse man.

Concerning the comparative gravity of detraction and cursing, St. Thomas teaches, q. 76, a. 4 [Original misprint: q. 77]: "The enunciation of fault is a sin, insofar as some harm is thereby brought upon one's neighbor; but to bring harm is graver than to desire harm, other things being equal. Whence detraction according to the common account is a graver sin than cursing expressing simple desire. - But cursing which is done by way of command, since it has the account of a cause, can be graver than detraction, if it brings greater harm than the denigration of reputation; or lighter, if less."

442. Remark: On patience in tolerating contumelies. - From patience we are bound to endure contumelies in preparation of soul, but not always to do this in act. As St. Thomas clearly explains, q. 72, a. 3: "It is the precept of the Lord: if someone has struck you on one cheek, offer him also the other, namely, so that a man be prepared to do this if there is need; nevertheless he is not always bound to do this in act, because neither did the Lord himself do this, but when he had received a slap, he said: Why do you strike me?... Sometimes it is necessary that we repel an inflicted contumely, especially for two reasons: 1) because of the good of him who brings the contumely, so that his audacity may be repressed, and he may not attempt such things thereafter; 2) in another way because of the good of many, whose progress is impeded because of contumelies inflicted upon us. Whence Gregory says: those whose life has been placed as an example for imitation ought, if they can, to restrain the words of those detracting from them."

Question 2. Is it blasphemy to curse creatures?

Response. It is certainly blasphemy to curse creatures with relation to God, for example, rain or winds, as commanded by God, or with the word God added; likewise to curse a creature which of itself has a special relation to God, for example, our soul, the Catholic faith, heaven, and similar things. But one must speak otherwise if indignation is directed toward creatures without relation to God. Wherefore that formula accustomed to be employed by our people, "God damn your soul," whether "to hell" is added or not, of itself is blasphemous. Indeed, besides the malice of blasphemy it also contains another specific malice against charity. I said of itself, for often each malice is lacking, because the soul is not usurped as a creature in which divine goodness shines forth in a special way, and because there is not an affection or desire of harming one's neighbor. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 128. - Kenrick, n. 44.

You Will Resolve. It is greatly to be commended to the faithful that they associate themselves with those Sodalities which in a special way turn members away from blasphemy and other sinful modes of speaking of this kind, such as, for example, is the Society named from the Most Holy Name.

MALEDICTION is defined by St. Bonaventure in the Declaratory Dictionary of Theological Terms: To curse is for anyone to wish that blows or punishments be impressed upon someone by word. So also St. Thomas.

St. Thomas, art. 1. Filliuc, Tract. 40, cap. 5, num. 146. Fagundez, l. 8, cap. 12, num. 18, and others cited by him, define cursing as: An imprecation of evil, under the aspect of evil, and they add that a curse can be made either imperatively or optatively; but I do not see that they can exercise a proper command unless they order someone killed or struck, which is not to curse.

THEY SAY, further, that "an imprecation of evil, under the aspect of evil," is added to the definition because someone can imprecate evil under the aspect of good, as when someone is justly punished for a fault.

THEY ADD that to curse with the mouth only is only a material cursing, such as certain Fathers usually commit, and who therefore do not sin gravely. So in Bassaeus, v. maledictio.

I ASSUME here that if we imprecate evil out of justice, it is not a sin. Thus Noah in Genesis 9 cursed his grandson; Genesis 27, Isaac: Let him that curseth thee be cursed. Genesis 49, Jacob against Simeon and Levi: Cursed be their fury. In Deuteronomy 27 Moses heaps up many curses against sinners. Joshua imprecated a curse on those who would rebuild Jericho, cap. 6; 4 Kings 2, Eliseus cursed the mocking boys.

THIS IS PROVED from St. Bonaventure, loc. cit. of the Pharetra, from the Fathers, from St. Gregory, l. 4, Moral., cap. 6: A curse is uttered one way under the pretext of justice, another through the rancor of vengeance: when holy men pronounce a sentence of cursing, it bursts from them not from a desire of revenge, but from the justice of judgment. Therefore Gregory of Valencia, in the place cited, warns sons to fear the curses of their parents when they are just; but those who curse without cause sin most grievously.

MOREOVER, cursing is of itself a mortal sin.

THIS IS PROVED first from St. Bonaventure, in the Mirror of the Soul, cap. 1, §. Item solium discordiae, and l. 3 of the Pharetra, cap. 3, §. 1, according to the exposition of Sts. Augustine, de conflictu vitiorum, cap. 9, and Gregory, l. 3, Dial. cap. 15, from that first verse to the Corinthians 6: Nor shall cursers possess the kingdom of God.

IT IS PROVED secondly from St. Bonaventure in the Pharetra, from the Fathers, from St. Gregory, l. 22, Mor. cap. 6: They who assail an enemy with curses, what else do they wish God to do to him than what they themselves either cannot do, or blush to do? And in the Register, book 2, index 10, cap. 34, to a certain Archbishop: You show nothing of thinking on heavenly things, but you signify that you have an earthly thought: while for your own vengeance for an injury — which the sacred rules forbid — you have invaded with the curse of anathema. And lib. 3, Dial. cap. 15, on the Apostle's words: Nor shall cursers possess the kingdom of God. Consider how great is the guilt that separates from the kingdom of heavenly life.

ST. AUGUSTINE, lib. de conflictu vitiorum et virtutum, cap. 9: What is to be said of those who, in the fury of blindness, burst forth even into words of cursing, except what the Apostle says: Nor shall cursers possess the kingdom of God?

And in Proverbs 26: A curse uttered in vain against anyone shall come upon the one who utters it, where the Interlinear gloss has: Upon the one who utters it.

NEVERTHELESS (as the Holy Doctor says above) the word of a curse can be venial, either because of the smallness of the evil desired, or because the words are spoken in jest, or by surprise, or out of zeal for justice, or without a wicked affection. And in this way St. Augustine, sermon 41 on the Saints, indicates it is venial.

SOME DOUBT: whether it is lawful to imprecate an evil upon someone for a right end, that is, sickness upon a sinner, so that he may repent.

SOME DENY it, because what is not lawful to do is not lawful to desire.

THE TRUER opinion is affirmative. So St. Thomas, quaest. 76, art. 7; Sotus, l. 5, quaest. 12, art. 1; Filliuc, tomo 2, tract. 40, cap. 5, numer. 149; Fagundez, lib. 8, cap. 22, num. 21. The reason is that the end is more important, and therefore a good is wished to him when some penalty, ordered to a good end, is wished. And what is lawful to desire is lawful to pray for, as Bass. 4 and Sanci. sel. disp. 2 and 6 say.

FINALLY THEY ASK: whether it is lawful to curse irrational creatures.

ST. BONAVENTURE ANSWERS, in his commentary on Psalm 39, universally that it is not lawful to curse these. He proves it from Romans 12: Bless, and curse not: and from that passage of 1 Corinthians 6 cited above.

THEY OBJECT that David cursed the mountains of Gelboe, 2 Kings 1.

IT IS ANSWERED with St. Bonaventure, de gradibus virtutum, cap. 16, that David was lamenting the ruin of Israel, and rather cursed the misfortune of the men. So also St. Thomas, quaest. 76, article two.

THEY OBJECT secondly that Job cursed the day of his birth and the night of his conception.

ST. BONAVENTURE ANSWERS, in the Mirror of the Blessed Virgin, lecture eleven, that Job cursed the night of his conception not as it was a day or night, but as it was stained in it by original sin. So Fagundez also answers, lib. 8, cap. 13, number 24.

GREGORY OF VALENCIA ANSWERS, quaest. 19, p. 2, that the curses of things read in Scripture cannot be referred to things that are not capable of evil in order to the free attainment of the supernatural end, but only to the men themselves, as at Job 3 and 2 Kings 1 cited above; Matthew 21: Never shall fruit come forth from thee henceforward; Genesis 3: Cursed is the earth in thy work.

THEREFORE, says Tannetus, number 157, curses upon irrational creatures, as rustics do, are idle words; but to curse them as they are creatures of God is blasphemy, just as it is to curse the Saints insofar as God dwells in them. But to curse them as they are someone's goods is the same sin as cursing the Lords themselves: so also Bassaeus, num. 5.

AGAIN, to curse creatures as they are related to human goods — for example, to curse the day on which one was born, because you wish he had never been born, as if he had been born unto evil — is a mortal sin; but to curse them as they are referred to evils, for example the day of one's birth because of the evils that followed from it, provided that this does not contradict the ordination of the absolute will of God, is not a sin, says Tanner, number 158; and thus Job cursed his day, cap. 3, and David the mountains of Gelboe, 2 Kings 1, as St. Thomas also teaches, quaestion 76, artic. 2, and Cajetan, on the word maledictum.

FURTHER, a curse does not belong to one single genus of sin; for if anyone wishes an evil to be inflicted on another not by an unjust way but through God, or the elements, or other creatures, without injustice, it will belong to the order of charity and will be opposed to charity, as St. Thomas indicates, quaest. 76, art. 3. But if he wishes evils of this kind to be inflicted unjustly, for instance by homicide, etc., then it is opposed to justice. See Tanner, number 159.

SOME TREAT here of Suspicion and Rash Judgment, of which we treated in disput. 23, quaest. 7; therefore nothing now occurs to be said of these, except what the Doctors assign as the rule for discerning one from the other, namely when you judge an evil of your neighbor with near certainty and the firmness of a judgment upon slight conjectures, so that if someone publicly questioned you about it, you would affirm the same.

OTHERS ADD that you would not fear to confirm it even by oath; and then indeed the sin is grave, against love of neighbor, who always stands in possession of his good character until he loses it by so open a prostitution that he cannot sustain it by any evasion. Understand this, however, of that neighbor who is of so entire a good reputation as to be commonly so regarded. For to judge of a soldier who is used to spending his time over cups that he is drunk, when he leaves the tavern with a flushed face, will not be a sin so grave, even if in fact he is not tipsy.

IF, HOWEVER, the Judgment falls away from this firmness of asserting; then it will be only suspicion, which is for the most part venial, unless it happens concerning a very honorable person; as if you suspected theft or adultery of a man of noted sanctity because you saw him leaving the house where these were committed; for then upon a slight conjecture you inflict a grave injury on him. The Doctors are accustomed to interpose always: Upon slight conjectures; for if you formed a judgment of anyone with such evidence of reason that no defense to the contrary could be offered, then he is not judged rashly, nor consequently is there sin. Yet since judgments of this kind are accustomed to burst forth from some depraved affection or passion, one must strenuously guard lest anyone indulge himself too much while judging.