II. On Blasphemy

What is blasphemy? - Blasphemy is defined: speech of malediction against God. By speech are comprehended not only words, but also thoughts and deeds which inflict insult upon God; as if someone tramples a Crucifix underfoot, or emits spittle toward heaven as toward the seat of God. Hence blasphemy is opposed to the virtue of religion, since it is directly contrary to God's honor and worship. Malediction here is not restricted to the imprecation of some evil, but is extended generally to speech of any evil whatever, so that there are comprehended insult, railing, reproach, opprobrium, mockery, derision, jeering, illusion, irony, imprecation, any derogation from the excellent divine goodness and divine honor, whether by denying something of God which belongs to him, or by asserting of him what does not belong to him. Against God, namely considered either in himself or in his Saints and creatures in order to God himself, insofar as in them some divine perfection shines forth, for example sanctity, goodness, wisdom. L. 121, 122, 125; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 13, a. 1; q. 14, a. 1.

Note: If the discussion is of reservation or of other penalties inflicted upon blasphemy, only oral blasphemy is properly understood. For the word blasphemy then is to be used strictly. Moreover, in the common usage of men, blasphemy signifies a vice of the tongue, and it is opposed to the praise of God, which is exhibited by words alone. Therefore blasphemy of deed, by which rather the honor of God is injured, is not properly blasphemy, but is reduced to blasphemy as to the character of the injury against God. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 13, a. 2 ad 2; q. 103, a. 3; Struggl 34; Ithur., Cas. 30; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 3, l. 1, c. 4, n. 1.

You will resolve: If someone from anger against a man, or by exclaiming to exaggerate the truth, names the Saints, the Blessed Virgin, the death of God, the Body of Christ, the Blood of Christ, the Head of Christ, and other honorable members of Christ, per se he does not commit blasphemy, but only an unworthy usurpation of the divine name. Per se; for otherwise it is if these are uttered from anger or indignation against God by way of contempt, or if among the hearers God and his sacred things are judged to be dishonored. Nor is it blasphemy to say: I deny God, if I do not strike you; for he who speaks thus wishes only to signify that he certainly will strike. Nor to say: this is true as God; for created truth is not equated with uncreated truth, but only a certain hyperbolic likeness is implied. But it would be blasphemy if it were in fact intended to signify that the truth is as great according to equality as it is in the truth of faith.

On the contrary, it is blasphemy to say: may the death of Christ or the blood of God destroy you; may the sacraments destroy you; because injury is inflicted upon the death, blood, and sacraments of Christ, which are ordered not to the ruin but to the salvation of men. Consequently it is blasphemy to say: may God damn you. Likewise it is blasphemy to say that one wishes to act with God unwilling, and similar things. It is blasphemy to say: God has entirely forgotten me; why did God create me? Except, however, if these are uttered in a human manner of speaking, from lightness, or to show the gravity of grief or weariness, as is often accustomed to happen. But those are never to be excused from sin who advertently and seriously say: God is unjust; God unjustly burdens me with tribulations; he unjustly permits the evil to be happy in the world. Voit 519; L. 123-126, 128; Aertnys, ed. 2, n. 67, q. 6; Lehmkuhl, Cas., ed. 3, n. 218, 336, note.

Of how many kinds is blasphemy? - Blasphemy is first distinguished: 1. into direct or indirect, according as the dishonoring of God is intended directly and formally by the blasphemer, or, although it is not intended in itself, is nevertheless contained in deeds or sayings injurious to God, which are uttered by him with the intention, for example, of joking, of manifesting anger, with advertence to the sense which the words contain. 2. Into immediate or mediate, according as it immediately affects God himself, or only mediately, namely by dishonoring the Saints or sacred things by words. 3. Into heretical, which is also against faith; imprecative or execrative, which is also against the charity of God; and merely reproachful, according as it contains heresy, or imprecation, or mere contempt of God, although it pronounces true things, but from anger and an evil mind against God. L. 122, 123, 126; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 13, a. 1 ad 2.

What kind of sin is blasphemy? - Any formal and deliberate blasphemy, whether direct or indirect, whether immediate or mediate, is a mortal sin from its whole genus. The reason is that any derogation from divine goodness is a grave injury inflicted upon the divine Majesty. Hence Lev. 24:16: The man who has cursed his God shall bear his sin; and he who has blasphemed the name of the Lord shall die the death. Insofar as it derogates from divine goodness by denying something of God which belongs to him, or by asserting of him what does not belong to him, it is opposed to confession of faith, and pertains to infidelity, or to sin against faith. Insofar as it again derogates from divine goodness by wishing evil to God, it is against charity toward God. Insofar as it is opposed to divine praise and divine honor, it is against religion and is a sin of irreligiosity. St. Pius V, Const. Cum primum, 6 Kal. Apr. 1566, sec. 10; Struggl 36; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 13, aa. 2-4; E. M.

Note: Blasphemy, as any other sin, can become venial from imperfection of the act, namely from defect of advertence or of perfect consent. To the point is S. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 13, a. 2 ad 3: "Blasphemy can proceed without deliberation from surreption in two ways: in one way because someone does not advert that what he says is blasphemy, which can happen when someone suddenly from some passion breaks out into imagined words, whose meaning he does not consider; and then it is a venial sin, and does not properly have the notion of blasphemy." Direct blasphemy brings a merely aggravating circumstance over indirect blasphemy, and therefore it is not necessarily to be expressed in confession. For that circumstance of direct voluntary, as merely subjective, indeed makes the act more voluntary with respect to the evil object, but does not tend toward a new objective malice.

You will resolve: He does not sin gravely who pronounces words which are indeed blasphemous in themselves, but so halved or corrupted that he does not attend to their true sense; for example, he who says: I deny Di! I deny Diana! For these no longer have the character of blasphemy. L. 123.

Is the intention of dishonoring God altogether necessary for blasphemy? - For perfect blasphemy, by reason of the act, an express and explicit intention of dishonoring God is not necessary, but an implicit intention suffices, which is present in indirect blasphemy. The reason is that the indirectly voluntary suffices for sin. Therefore he who advertently pronounces blasphemous words, whence in reality there is dishonoring of God, for whatever cause he does this, voluntarily admits the sin of blasphemy and becomes guilty of it. Therefore he who knowingly and willingly pronounces blasphemous words is not excused by the fact that he did not have the intention of contemning God, but did it moved by anger or despair, for the sake of frightening, or for the sake of empty solace. Reuter 442; L. 124, 127.

Do blasphemies uttered against God and against the Saints differ in species? - Busembaum with others probably affirms, because the persons are distinct to whom their own honor is owed. Bonacina, Sanchez, and others probably deny, because the Saints are intimately connected with God, whence injury inflicted upon them is referred to God himself. Finally the Salmanticenses and others hold that besides proper malice against latria, it contains another malice distinct in species against dulia.

But since those who blaspheme the Saints, more truly, commonly speaking, intend to affect them with injury not precisely on account of their own excellence, but insofar as they are referred to God; therefore they sin not against dulia but against latria, and therefore they are not bound to explain whether they blasphemed God or the Saints. But if something is uttered against the Saints, but only as men once dwelling on earth, it will be only against dulia. Indeed it will even be only venial if it is done from jest, for example, if someone calls Saints Crispin and Crispinian cobblers; but, on the contrary, it will be mortal if it is done from contempt, from hatred, or from indignation against the Saints. Struggl 37; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 277 seqq.; L. 124, 125, 132; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 13, a. 1 ad 2.

Is blasphemy uttered in jest grave? - These words are from Reuter, n. 442: "Blasphemy is grave... if someone in jest says blasphemous words, where among the hearers dishonoring of God is joined to them." Therefore grave fault will be absent where among the hearers that dishonoring is absent. L. 124.

Is it blasphemy to curse creatures? - It is blasphemy to curse creatures with relation to God, for example, rains or winds as commanded by God, or with the word of God added; likewise to curse a creature which of itself has a special relation to God, for example, our soul, the Catholic faith, heaven, and similar things. But otherwise, as generally happens, if indignation is borne toward creatures without relation to God. "To curse irrational things insofar as they are creatures of God is the sin of blasphemy; but to curse them, considered according to themselves, is idle and vain," namely it is venial. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 76, a. 2. But per se there is no sin if irrational creatures are cursed because of harm brought, for example, a storm, because it devastated vineyards. Thus David without sin cursed the mountains of Gilboa, namely on account of the slaughter of the people which had happened on them. To curse rational creatures, to whom from charity we ought to wish good, is against the same charity.

L. 128; S. Th. l. c., a. 4 ad 1.

You will resolve: It is not grave simply to curse an hour, day, or year, unless the word holy is added; or unless the day of itself bears before itself something special of sanctity, such as Easter day, etc. The reason is that whatever imports sanctity is per se referred to God, who is the author of all sanctity; and the utterance of words by which a certain special sanctity is explained, at least indirectly, speaking per se, is referred to God.

To curse beasts, winds, etc., is regularly a light fault; nor regularly, in anger, is the mind present that the curse be carried into execution; and it is an act of impatience. Likewise "in anger to imprecate upon others a demon, hail, thunderbolts, etc...., for the most part, at least when it is said against those who are loved by the angry person, on account of sudden commotion and inadvertence and defect of serious will, is only venial.... But it is grave if subjects thus curse superiors, children parents, even only materially, especially to their face; because it is grave against due reverence." L. 130. Cf. ibid., n. 126 seqq., Epist. Resp. and n. 134; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 76, a. 3.

542.bis Note: To curse is the same as to speak evil. And this is done either by way of simple enunciation, by reporting the evil of another, which pertains to detraction; or by way of cause, either by effecting something or by moving others through command to do something; or by way of the expression of a certain desiring affection. "In those two modes in which evil is spoken by way of commanding or by way of wishing, by the same reason something is licit or illicit. For if someone commands or wishes the evil of another insofar as it is evil, as though intending the evil itself, thus to curse in either mode will be illicit; and this is to curse, speaking per se. But if someone commands or wishes the evil of another under the aspect of good, thus it is licit, nor will it be cursing, speaking per se, but per accidens, because the principal intention of the speaker is not borne toward evil, but toward good. But it happens that some evil is spoken by commanding or wishing under the aspect of a twofold good: sometimes indeed under the aspect of the just, and thus a judge licitly curses him upon whom he commands a just punishment to be inflicted; and thus also the Church curses by anathematizing, just as the Prophets in the Scriptures sometimes imprecate evils upon sinners, as though conforming their will to divine justice, although imprecations of this sort can also be understood by way of foretelling. But sometimes some evil is spoken under the aspect of the useful, as when someone wishes some sinner to suffer some sickness or some impediment, either that he himself may be made better, or at least that he may cease from harming others." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 76, a. 1. "Blessing or cursing properly pertains to that thing to which something good or evil can happen, namely to a rational creature. But good or evil is said to happen to irrational creatures in order to the rational creature, on account of whom they are. But they are ordered to him in many ways. In one way indeed by way of assistance, insofar as human necessity is assisted from irrational creatures. And in this way the Lord said to man, Gen. 3:17, Cursed is the earth in your work, namely so that man might be punished through its sterility. And thus also is understood what is had in Deut. 28:5, Blessed are your barns, and below, v. 17, Cursed is your barn... In another way an irrational creature is ordered to the rational by way of signification; and thus the Lord cursed the fig tree in signification of Judea. In a third way an irrational creature is ordered to the rational by way of containing, namely of time or place; and thus Job cursed the day of his birth, on account of original guilt which he contracted by being born, and on account of the punishments following; and on account of this also David can be understood to have cursed the mountains of Gilboa, 2 Kings 1, namely on account of the slaughter of the people which had happened on them." S. Th. l. c., a. 2.

A licit curse, and one conformed to the divine will, as being just, does not lack its effect. Hence "the curse of a mother uproots the foundations." Ecclus. 3:11, namely, "it uproots houses down to the foundations, that is, it plainly destroys and extinguishes his offspring and family and its riches and honors... An example of a curse is in Ham... St. Augustine relates a similar example, lib. 22, de Civit., c. 8, and more fully in Serm. 34, concerning a mother who, cursing ten sons, made them all trembling, miserable, and wandering. Thus today we see sons and illustrious families, which seemed likely to endure for ages, fall and be extinguished." Cornelius a Lapide on the same place. Likewise, "the prayer of him who curses you in the bitterness of his soul will be heard," namely of the poor man. "But he who made him will hear him." Ecclus. 4:6; "that is to say, God the Creator will hear him as his afflicted creature, despised by you and abandoned to you. Therefore he himself, as advocate and father of the poor and orphans, will take up his just complaint and cause against you, and will condemn and punish you." Cornelius a Lapide on the same place. But anyone can pray away from himself the evils of a curse both by penance and by prayer, conciliating God's blessing to himself.

Is it blasphemy to curse the whole world? - St. Liguori, n. 129, affirms, because just as to swear by creatures in which the divine attributes shine forth more is a true oath, so to curse them is true blasphemy, because God is indirectly contemned in them. "Yet in reality such a sense is scarcely accustomed to occur to the mind of the one uttering these things." Thus Gury 304. But the same St. Alphonsus, l. c., thinks the opposite: "Ordinarily speaking, I judge that country people who curse the world for the most part sin gravely, while they accuse themselves of such a curse with grave horror." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 76, a. 4 ad 1.

Is it blasphemy to curse the dead and the devil? - R. To the first. Negative, yet in that case in which the mind of those cursing is not borne to this, that he curse them insofar as they are creatures of God. Indeed for the most part this is not even mortal, because through this no grave injury is inflicted upon them, either in themselves or from the mind of those uttering it: not in itself, because the word dead is more to be referred to the body which dies than to the soul which always lives; or at most it signifies men who have finished life, who can be either saved or damned. Not from the mind of those uttering it, because those cursing the dead in no way intend to pray evils upon the souls of the dead, but rather to reproach the living, to whom they are accustomed to refer their curses as an injury. L. 130. R. To the second. Tamburini rightly thinks that to curse the devil is rarely mortal sin, because he is always accustomed to be cursed as the author of evils or as the enemy of God; in this manner, abstracting from the act of impatience, he says that it is not even venial. L. 120; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 76, a. 1 ad 4.

Are these French expressions blasphemous: "Nom de Dieu! Noms de Noms! Mille Noms! Sacré Nom!" without an addition, etc.? - R. Negative per se, even if they are uttered in anger, unless the anger is borne against God himself, or unless there is present a blasphemous intention, which is generally absent. For these words contain no blasphemy in themselves. Therefore they will be only venial on account of the vain usurpation of the name of God; but if the name of God is employed in these formulas neither explicitly nor implicitly, they will per se be free from all fault.

Is the French expression "S. Nom de D." blasphemy? - Some answer: affirmative per se, because those words, by reason of the common acceptance of the faithful, are insulting to God. Others answer: negative per se, unless a blasphemous intention explicitly, or at least implicitly, intervenes, because those words in their obvious sense contain no insult of God in themselves; for in reality they signify the blessed name of God. Therefore in practice all those who utter words of this sort are not easily to be accused of mortal sin. For it is certain, experience being witness, that not a few, especially the uneducated, do not apprehend grave malice in them. Therefore the confessor should attend first to the varied common usage of places, which could well have determined the meaning of the word sacred to signify cursed. Likewise he should attend to the various circumstances of penitents. "Sins of words are especially to be judged from the intention of the speaker." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 73, a. 2.

Note: In doubt whether some expression is or is not blasphemy, it is by no means to be taken as blasphemy. L. 129, 130. If the words according to themselves express no diminution of divine honor, it is not to be judged blasphemy, nor mortal sin. L. 130. If the meaning is doubtful, then attention must be given to the intention and affection of the one uttering the words. L. 130. The uneducated often confuse with blasphemy any less becoming words and curses against beasts and men. Therefore they are to be taught, "lest so many souls perish miserably from ignorance on account of an erroneous conscience of mortal sin." L. 131.