Detraction, calumny and tale-bearing

644. Declaration. 1. The reputation of another can be unjustly violated in a twofold mode, either by detraction or by calumny. Detraction is the unjust and hidden lesion of another's reputation which is done by revelation of a true crime, or of one which in good faith is believed to be true; but calumny is the unjust and hidden lesion of another's reputation which is done by narration of a false crime.

Some in the definition of detraction and calumny add with St. Thomas the word hidden;¹ others omit it. Those who add it call only a lesion of reputation brought forth while the one defamed is absent detraction, and they call a lesion of reputation brought forth before the one defamed mere insult; those who omit it call a lesion of reputation brought forth before the one defamed insult joined with detraction.

2. A distinction is made between direct detraction and calumny, which are done from the intention of injuring reputation; and indirect, which is done from lightness and talkativeness without the intention of defaming.

According to others, detraction and calumny are done directly when another's vices are narrated, which obtains in four modes: if a false crime is imposed, if a true crime is amplified, if a hidden one is manifested, if a good work is taken sinisterly. The same are done indirectly when another's gifts are diminished, which again can happen in four modes: by denying the good works of one's neighbor, by lessening them, by being silent when others praise, by praising coldly.

¹ Summa II-II, q. 73, a. 1.

645. Moral malice of detraction and calumny. Detraction and calumny are sins mortal from their kind against justice: for they injure the strict right which another has to his own reputation; but a sin against commutative justice is mortal from its kind. Moreover theft is a sin grave from its kind against justice; therefore a fortiori detraction and calumny, because reputation is a greater good than riches.¹ Therefore each can be a light sin from smallness of matter. But sins of detraction will more often be light from imperfection of the act, especially because of inadvertence to the damage of one's neighbor.

a. To this is referred whispering (Ohrenblaserei), which is detraction or calumny by which discords are sown among friends. Therefore whispering differs from detraction and calumny by reason of the end, because it is committed in order secretly to dissolve friendship and to sow discord. Hence, other things being equal, it is a graver sin than simple detraction, because it moreover deprives another of the good of peace and friendship with his neighbor.

b. To commit the sin of detraction it is not necessary that the detractor have the intention of detracting from his neighbor and of harming him in reputation, but it suffices that he advert that from those things which he narrates the blackening of reputation follows.

¹ Prov. 22:1; Ecclus. 41:15.

646. Norm for judging gravity. The gravity of detraction and calumny is taken from the gravity of the damage which another suffers in reputation; but the gravity of the damage depends not only on the gravity of the crime which is manifested, but also on the circumstances both of the detractor and of the person from whom one detracts. Hence for judging the gravity of these sins one must attend:

a. To the defect which is narrated: manifestation of a grave defect ordinarily injures reputation notably, and manifestation of a light defect ordinarily injures it lightly;

b. To the condition of the detractor: a grave and prudent man harms more than a light and talkative one;

c. To the condition of the injured person, namely to the reputation which he enjoys among men and to the dignity by which he stands out among others: for he who is of intact reputation and great dignity experiences much greater detriment from detraction or calumny.

Hence it can happen that grave damage is inflicted if a light sin or even an inculpable defect is narrated about someone, as if someone says of a bishop that he is a liar or of illegitimate origin. On the contrary, to narrate a grave sin about someone can be only light detraction, as if someone says of a soldier or of a young man of lighter disposition that he is a lover of girls or has been drunk: for certain vices occur so frequently in persons of a determined condition that in them they are almost already supposed, and therefore do not gravely harm their reputation; but to narrate the same vices about a priest is mortal because of the condition of the person.

647. Applications. 1. To manifest natural defects, for example, to say that someone is ignorant, unlearned, imprudent, illegitimate, etc., ordinarily is not a grave sin, because all know that defects of this kind are not imputed and therefore do not notably diminish reputation. Moreover these things are usually publicly known. Yet if an inculpable defect is truly disgraceful, and if moreover men are gravely saddened by its revelation, and especially if they suffer damage, its revelation would be a grave sin, whether against justice or against charity.

2. To call someone in general proud, avaricious, angry, lazy, etc., ordinarily is not a grave sin, because defects of this kind signify rather a natural inclination than personal fault, or only venial defects, but not mortal sins; but to reveal inculpable defects or only venial ones ordinarily does not gravely harm.

3. To narrate a single grave sin to several will ordinarily be grave detraction, because grave damage in reputation is inflicted on one's neighbor, for example, to narrate that someone is a concubinary, unjust, or a robber.

4. To manifest a grave defect to one prudent man who is not going to divulge the matter certainly is not mortal if it is done from a reasonable cause, as if someone narrates an injury accepted to his friend in order to take consolation from it, although some defaming of the author follows from it. But if it is done without reasonable cause, there exists a twofold opinion: of those who judge that grave damage is inflicted even in this case, and of those who judge that damage to reputation in this case is not notable. Since the opinion which denies grave damage is truly probable, in practice it is permitted to follow it. Therefore a wife does not commit grave sin who communicates to her husband even gravely defaming things which she has discovered about her neighbor, provided the husband is prudent and silent. But if there is present a just reason for communicating these things, she is immune from sin.

Those who affirm that it is grave, such as Molina, Lessius, Lugo, the Salmanticenses, and others, commonly argue in this way: insult gravely injures honor even if it is done by only one person; moreover rash judgment in a grave matter is a grave sin; therefore, by parity, lesion of reputation before one grave man must be judged grave. But those who with St. Thomas, Navarrus, Bonacina, and Tamburini deny that it is grave bring this reason: reputation consists in the estimation of many; therefore he who has lost reputation before one or another prudent man is not considered to have undergone grave damage of reputation. But to the arguments of the former opinion these authors deny the parity. And indeed insult is made to one present; but rash judgment must be compared more to calumny than to detraction; but to impose a grave crime on someone is mortal. But all except the case in which a crime is manifested to him to whom the delinquent would especially wish to conceal it before all others.

5. To say nothing special, but only general things about someone, of itself is not a mortal sin; yet if general things are brought forth in that mode that hearers must suspect something grave, it can be mortal; for example, if you say that you know certain things which, if they were revealed, would affect another with great disgrace, or that you know certain things about that person which charity forbids revealing.

6. To narrate a grave matter about someone as heard from others:

a. is grave against justice if the narrator foresees that the hearers are going to believe because of motives brought by him, as if he says that he accepted the matter from a trustworthy person: for in this case he is the efficacious cause of the damage;

b. is grave against charity if he foresees that the hearers are going to believe not because of motives brought by him, but because of their own lightness or malice: for although the damage of the defamed person must be attributed not to the narrator but to the lightness of the hearers, nevertheless each one is bound to impede the grave damage of his neighbor which he can conveniently impede by being silent;

c. is a light or no sin if he foresees that the hearers are not going to believe, because light or no damage is inflicted on one's neighbor.

7. He who narrates a hidden crime committed, without naming the person, for example, "it happened in this place," does not sin if the hearers cannot come to knowledge of the person; but he sins gravely if he either describes the matter in such a way that the person can easily be known, or if grave infamy redounds upon the family or monastery or religious order of that person from the narration. This can happen if someone, while keeping silent about the person, says that a member of this family or order committed such a crime.

8. About one who is already defamed in some crime, to narrate a defect commonly connected with that crime, for example, to narrate perjury about a robber, or about a drunken husband that he quarreled with his wife, is not grave, because the infamy is not notably increased from it. But to narrate about him an altogether disparate defect is ordinarily grave defamation: for he who has lost reputation in one matter, for example, in chastity, has not therefore lost reputation in another quality also, for example, in learning; but he can have good reputation in one matter and bad reputation in another.

9. To say that in such a city all or most are unjust is considered grave defamation, because the reputation of individuals is gravely injured. But to say that in such a city many are unjust is not grave, unless it can be referred to determined persons, because no determined person is injured. Hence if someone by enormous exaggeration says that in such a city all merchants are defrauders, all virgins are corrupt, and the hearers judge that many are of this sort, and yet do not refer the vice to determined persons, he does not seem to sin gravely.

10. To say about some religious order or some monastery that religious in it live badly or do not observe regular discipline is grave detraction, unless the matter is plainly notorious: for both the whole religion or house and its individual members suffer grave damage by this defamation, because suspicion is induced about individuals.

11. It is not permitted to reveal another's hidden crime while at the same time adding the penance performed for it: for there always remains in others a certain sinister opinion, since the blackening of reputation from the manifestation of the fault is not wholly taken away by knowledge of the penance.

12. To refer in general the vice of a people or of a whole nation, for example, that it is proud, generally is not a sin, or is only venial, because either the matter treated is known, or concerns a natural disposition, not personal sins, or many indeterminate persons are understood.¹

¹ Cf. Titus 1:12.

648. Specific and numerical malice. 1. Detraction and calumny are sins specifically diverse, not insofar as they injure reputation, but insofar as calumny adds to detraction the malice of lying; yet this malice, since it is against veracity, is not mortal.

Therefore of itself it is not necessary that it be declared in confession whether the reputation of one's neighbor was injured by detraction or calumny. Yet generally it is fitting that the confessor know this, both so that the gravity of the sin and so that the mode of restitution can be determined.

2. Detractions in matters diverse in species, for example, to say that someone is a robber and an adulterer, are not sins diverse in species: for reputation morally is of the same nature, whatever the prerogative may be in which it is founded; therefore also lesions of reputation are of the same species, just as all lesions in goods of fortune are of the same species.

The opposite opinion, which seems more probable to St. Alphonsus (n. 48), uses this argument: as many diverse sins are committed as there are diverse reputations and therefore diverse rights injured; but as many diverse reputations and diverse rights in reputation are injured as specifically diverse crimes of one's neighbor are revealed: for one is the reputation which someone has, for example, concerning justice, and another which he has concerning chastity, and to each there corresponds its own right. But although it must be conceded that one reputation is that which someone has concerning justice, and another that which he has concerning chastity, nevertheless each is not specifically diverse, but is of the same species. In like manner one property is that which someone has of money, and another which he has of a house and a forest; yet each is of the same species. Since St. Alphonsus also holds the former opinion as probable, the confessor would imprudently require the matter of detraction from the penitent where this is not necessary from another reason. Therefore it suffices to say: I gravely injured another's reputation.

3. He who detracts from someone before several commits only one sin, because he injures only one right to reputation: for reputation by its nature consists in the estimation of several; yet the sin is extensively so much graver as there are more who hear the detraction.¹

¹ Lugo, De poenit., disp. 16, n. 112. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 5, n. 49.

DETRACTION, slander, or backbiting is committed by unjustly depriving another of his good name in his absence. If this is done by falsely imputing to him something which injures his reputation it is called calumny. Tale-bearing is a similar sin, and consists in making mischief between friends by telling tales to the disadvantage of one of them. All these are sins against justice and charity, for they tend to deprive our neighbour of his good name, “ which is better than great riches,” and to which he has a strict right until he forfeits it by his public conduct. Even if what is said to the disadvantage of our neighbour be true, we have no right to make it known to his discredit, as long as it is not public, for he still retains his reputation, he still has a right to it, and he must not be deprived of it without just cause. Even the dead retain their right to their good name, for death does not make them non-existent, and men are prepared to do and suffer much for the sake of leaving a reputation behind them. Besides, speaking ill of the dead frequently besmirches the living. Not only individuals but corporate bodies have each their reputation, and detraction may be committed against a Religious Order, for example, or a diocese, as well as. against individuals.

Inasmuch as detraction is contrary to justice and charity, which, as we have seen, bind under a grave obligation, it will of itself be a serious sin, though frequently only venial on account of levity of matter. The measure of the gravity of the sin will be the harm which it causes to the person whose reputation suffers. The making known of the grave but secret sin of another with malicious intent or to his serious injury will certainly be a mortal sin. The disclosure of a venial sin of another, or even of some hidden defect for which he is not responsible, as, for example, illegitimacy, may cause him serious damage and constitute a grievous sin. However, the making known of even a grievous sin of another is not always mortally sinful, for sometimes no serious harm follows from it. A notorious drunkard will not be injured appreciably if a secret sin of drunkenness is made public, nor a woman of doubtful reputation if some specific fall is mentioned. On the other hand, although a man has lost his reputation in one particular matter, he may still have one to lose in other matters, and if his secret sins in these matters be made known, a more or less grievous sin of detraction will be committed. A man may be of notoriously loose morals but with a character still to lose for honesty and uprightness.

I. Notion. Detraction is the unjust denigration of another's reputation. If it is done before the defamed person, there is added insult or injury of honor (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 966).

II. Division. Detraction is distinguished into simple detraction and calumny, according as it is committed by revealing what is true, or by imputing what is false.

III. Morality. 1. Detraction, both simple detraction and calumny, is opposed to justice and is grave from its kind. It is opposed to justice because it deprives a man of a good justly possessed. It is grave from its kind, which is clear from Sacred Scripture,¹ and likewise from reason; for "to take away someone's reputation is very grave, because among temporal things reputation seems to be more precious, through the lack of which a man is impeded from doing many good things; on account of which it is said in Ecclesiasticus 41: Have care for a good name, for this will remain to you more than a thousand great and precious treasures; and therefore detraction, speaking per se, is a mortal sin" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 2). Yet they can become venial because of slightness of matter. Finally, that the aforesaid sins are opposed to justice is sufficiently elicited from what has been said (St. Alphonsus, III, 966). Besides, note:

a) The malice of calumny is graver than the malice of simple detraction; for the former injures an absolute right to reputation, the latter a limited right. For everyone has the right that what is false never be imputed to him; but with respect to revealing what is true, he has only the right that it not be revealed without a relatively grave cause.

b) The gravity of matter, if there is question of injury of reputation, depends: 1° on the gravity of the thing revealed; 2° on the judgment which the hearers make, considering their region and condition; 3° on the greater or lesser authority of the detractor; 4° on the condition of the person against whom detraction is made (St. Alphonsus, III, 967).

Objection. A bad man does not have the right of retaining the reputation of goodness.

Response. I deny the assertion, since on the one hand no one is certainly held to deprive himself of reputation; and on the other hand, per se it belongs to no private person to deprive another of a good which the latter has and possesses without injury to another; nor can public authority do this unless public order demands it.

2. Simple detraction and calumny, insofar as they are opposed to justice, do not differ in species, because they injure the same good or right. But to calumny there is added the species of lying. Furthermore, detractions in different matters seem to be of the same species, because, insofar as they are injurious to reputation, they are not morally diverse, but differ only according to more and less (St. Alphonsus, III, 978).

Objection. Reputation consists of parts distinct in species; for one reputation is that which someone possesses concerning chastity, another concerning justice, and therefore injuries of reputation ought to differ in species according as they violate parts of a different species.

Response. The parts of which reputation consists are indeed diverse in species in themselves, but insofar as they constitute reputation, they differ only according to more and less.

Corollary I. Ordinarily it is venial to reveal: 1° natural defects of mind or body; 2° venial faults; 3° a defect which is indeed grave, but which is sufficiently common in men of such a condition (St. Alphonsus, III, 967).

Corollary II. Generally, unless the matter is known, it is mortal to say of a superior that he is a liar; of a religious or priest, that he has been drunk, or that he is a lover of girls; likewise to use words which provide occasion for suspecting something grave, as if "you should say nothing in particular, but only in general, for example, that you know something about him, which, if you should say it, would affect him with great shame" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Corollary III. He who narrates the hidden crime of someone who has already been defamed in other matters sins gravely if the new revelation notably increases the prior infamy, or brings a new grave infamy, for example if about one infamous in one species a crime of another species is narrated, not very connected with the prior one (St. Alphonsus, III, 976).

Corollary IV. He who, in reporting someone's hidden crime, at the same time reports his repentance, is guilty of grave detraction, unless the repentance is so great that it entirely destroys the infamy.

Corollary V. Several slight detractions can coalesce into grave matter, because taken together they can contain a grave injury of reputation.

Corollary VI. What has been said about injury of reputation should also be applied to defamation of the dead, although it is less grave to detract from the dead than from the living, and the detraction is the less, the longer the person has been dead. But what is lawful for historians, see n. 1070.

3. Detraction from some person also contains a graver sin if the infamy of the defamed person redounds to the community, or to the family, to which he belongs; and the sin is graver in proportion as a greater and more common good is injured. Yet note that the defamation of a member commonly redounds into the community the more, the smaller it is in number, and therefore redounds more into a family, which of itself is smaller in number (St. Alphonsus, III, 978; Homo Apostolicus, tract 11, n. 16).

¹ Prov. XXIV, 9; Rom. I, 30, 32; 1 Cor. VI, 10; Jas. III.

I. Subject of restitution. 1. He who unjustly and with grave theological fault has injured the reputation of the neighbor is held under grave obligation to restitution "just as to restitution of any thing taken away" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 991).

2. He who with slight fault or inculpably has injured the reputation of the neighbor is held to remove the cause of damage placed by him and morally persevering, i.e. to revoke the detraction or deprive it of force, if he conveniently can.

3. What has been said about the detractor should also be applied: 1° to him who positively influenced an unjust detraction, for example by asking, applauding, etc. (n. 1075); 2° to a Superior, in the case in which from justice he is held to provide for reputation to be restored, according to what is to be said in n. 1075.

I. He who positively influences detraction, for example by asking, laughing, or applauding, sins against justice. Yet sufficiently probably he sins only slightly who fishes out the crime of the neighbor without the intention of divulging it (n. 1069; St. Alphonsus, III, 979).

II. He who only internally rejoices over detraction sins against charity with respect to the defamed person; likewise with respect to the defamer, insofar as he omits fraternal correction in a case in which he is held to it (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

III. He who does not rejoice over detraction as such, but over the hearing of a new thing, or over curious knowledge of the crimes of others, or over the witty manner of narrating, or over the thing narrated as amusing, is excused at least from mortal sin (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

IV. He who does not impede detraction which he can easily impede sins against charity. But practically the obligation at least grave of positively impeding often is absent, "because in this matter of detraction it can be most difficult to establish that correction would be profitable, and from another source detractors corrected before others are very easily offended; indeed there is danger that they would rather increase or confirm the detraction. ... But according to all, those are excused even from venial sin who, noticing the detraction, either depart, or divert the conversation, or turn away the face or show it sad" (St. Alphonsus, III, 981). The contrary must be said about a Superior who does not impede detraction, namely:

1. The Superior of the defamer per se is held from charity, even more than others, to correct the subject; indeed even from justice, if he is the pastor, although he is not the Superior, or the Bishop of the defamer. But with respect to a defamer who is not a subject he is held no otherwise than others are.

2. The Superior of the defamed person likewise per se is held, even more than others, from charity to impede the evil of the subject; not, however, from justice, even if he is his pastor or Bishop, because from that virtue he is not held to attend to the temporal good of the subject (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

But what if the Superior has not impeded the detraction?

Response 1. The Superior of the defamer is held from charity to compel the subject to restore reputation; indeed from justice, if he is pastor or Bishop.

Response 2. The Superior of the defamed person likewise per se is held from charity to provide for the restitution of reputation; not, however, from justice, even if he is pastor or Bishop, because from that virtue he is not held to provide for the temporal good of the subject.

Response 3. If there is question of the Superior of both, and the defamed person implores the authority of the Superior, more probably he is held from justice to take care of the restitution of reputation, because in the case he seems to act as a judge, who from justice speaks the law (St. Alphonsus, III, 980).

Various Forms of Injury to Good Name.—(a) By reason of the intention, the injury is either defamatory (as when derogatory things are said about another behind his back) or contumelious (as when derogatory things are insultingly said to him in his presence). Hence, there can be injury to reputation that is not contumelious (e.g., the secret spreading of a rumor that Balbus is a drunkard); there can be contumely that is not injurious to fame (e.g., the addressing of Balbus as a drunkard when no else is by, or when those present know already that he is a drunkard), and contumely that is injurious to reputation (e.g., when one calls Balbus a drunkard before others who thought he was a sober man).

(b) By reason of the purpose, defamation is willed either explicitly or implicitly. In the former case the defamer expressly intends the blackening of his neighbor’s reputation; in the latter case he intends something unnecessary, such as mere indulgence of levity or talkativeness, though the blackening of his neighbor is foreseen. Explicit defamation is regularly a mortal offense, implicit defamation a venial one; but the degrees of sinfulness may be changed, if the former sin causes slight, or the latter sin serious damage.

(c) By reason of the injury done defamation is either detraction or calumny. Detraction blackens a reputation by revealing faults or defects that are real; calumny (slander) injures reputation by stories that are untrue. A common form of calumny is a mixture of truth and falsehood (e.g., when a historian ascribes to a villain, in addition to real crimes, faults of which the latter was innocent), or of half-truths that convey the impression of what is untrue (e.g., when a historian narrates that a certain character killed a man and does not give the background or causes of the killing, such as provocation, challenge, mistake; or when a biographer tells of the crimes of his subject and glosses over the virtues, or makes no mention of his amendment).

(d) By reason of the means used defamation is either direct or indirect. Direct defamation is more open and positive; indirect defamation is rather concealed or negative. There is also the distinction of slander (which is oral) and libel (which is written or printed). Libel is more grievous, since it has a permanence that is not found in spoken words.

Examples of Direct Defamation.—The following are examples of direct defamation:

(a) sinister interpretation, as when one states that words or acts of a neighbor that were good or at least open to a good interpretation, were dictated by greed, ambition, pride, etc.;

(b) unjust revelation (detraction), as when one reveals secret faults or crimes;

(c) exaggeration, as when one magnifies a venial into a mortal sin, an exceptional or indeliberate fault into an habitual or deliberate sin; or when one distorts a sin of one species into a sin of another and far more heinous species, or accuses a whole class or body of men because one of their number has fallen. Those who add their own little detail or circumstance to a defamatory tale as they pass it along are proverbial examples of exaggeration: “Fama crescit eundo”;

(d) false accusation (calumny) is the worst kind of defamation. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that one may probably use calumny without serious sin as a defense of one’s own justice and honor (see Denzinger, n. 1194).

Whispering or Tale-Bearing.—Whispering (susurratio), also called mischief-making and tale-bearing, is a speech unfavorable to another person secretly made with the purpose of breaking up a virtuous friendship.

(a) It is unfavorable speech, that is, the whisperer says something to his listener that will turn the latter against the person spoken about. The thing attributed to the absent person may be either something evil or something that is only seemingly evil, but in either case it will be something displeasing to the listener. Whispering, therefore, does not necessarily include defamation.

(b) It is secret, that is, the whisperer speaks privately, and usually in the way of confidence to the person whose mind he wishes to impress. Often, however, he goes now to one of the friends, now to another, speaking in different senses to each, to make his work doubly effective. This kind of whisperer is known as double-tongued: “The whisperer and the double-tongued is accursed” (Ecclus., xxviii. 15).

(c) It is aimed at the breaking up of a friendship, that is, the whisperer intends to destroy the feeling of respect and affection which his listener has for the absent person, or even to instill into the listener’s mind a feeling of disrespect and dislike for the absent person. Whispering, therefore, is incomplete when it ends a friendship, and complete when it makes enemies of those who had been friends and sows discords and quarrels: “A passionate man kindleth strife, and a sinful man will trouble his friends, and bring in debate in the midst of them that are at peace” (Ecclus., xxviii. 11); “When the tale-bearer is taken away, contentions shall cease” (Prov., xxvi. 20). Whispering, then, differs from simple defamation, whose purpose is to steal away fame, for the mischief-maker intends to steal away friendship.

(d) It is directed against a virtuous friendship, for there is no sin but rather an act of charity in the effort to end a sinful or harmful friendship, as when a parent tries to keep his daughter away from a wicked man with whom she is infatuated, or his son away from a disorderly set whose companionship appeals to the youth (see 1353).

The Sinfulness of Whispering.—(a) Theological Species.—Whispering is from its nature a mortal sin, since it is hateful to God (the soul of the Lord detesteth “him that soweth discord among brethren,” Prov., vi. 19), and deprives man of the boon of a virtuous friendship, the greatest of external goods. “A faithful friend is a strong defence, and he that hath found him hath found a treasure. Nothing can be compared to a faithful friend, and no weight of gold and silver is able to countervail the goodness of his fidelity. A faithful friend is the medicine of life and immortality” (Ecclus., vi. 14-16). Whispering is a greater sin than contumely or defamation, since honor is less esteemed than friendship, and reputation is only a means to friendship.

(b) Moral Species.—Generally, whispering is a sin against justice on account of the unjust means (e.g., force, fraud, lies, detractions) to which it resorts; but from its nature it is only a sin against charity, for the injured party has no strict right to friendship, which is a free relationship that may be terminated at will by either of the parties.

Circumstances Which Affect the Species of Whispering.—Is the species of whispering changed by circumstances?

(a) The theological species is changed when the sinful act is imperfect in malice (e.g., when the whisperer had not reflected well on the evil that would be caused by him), or when the harm done is slight (e.g., when no enmity was caused and the friendship broken up was not strong or important to the friends). It is not a small matter, however, to destroy friendships that are very necessary, such as the friendship between husband and wife, between parent and child.

(b) The moral species is not subdivided, for, though there are different kinds of friendships (see 1111), whispering is not directed against the special features, but against the general character common to all of them, namely, unity of soul and mutual affection. Hence, the whisperer is not obliged to mention in confession whether the friendship he broke up was based on utility, or pleasure, or virtue. It is clear, however, that a new species may be added to whispering. Thus, he who separates husband and wife, intending to secure the wife for himself, is guilty also of adultery; he who separates a business man and his patrons, intending to attract the trade to himself, is guilty also of theft; he who separates ruler and subjects by his whispering, is also guilty of sedition, etc.

What is detraction; what is calumny? - Detraction is: the hidden and unjust violation of another's reputation. Hidden, i.e., in the absence of the other from whom reputation is taken. Hidden; for if it is manifest, it is contumely. Of another's, for he who injures his own ordinarily is not unjust, since he is its owner. But reputation is the public opinion about the excellence of another.

Violation of reputation can be done in various ways: 1. Positively, if a false crime is imposed, if a true crime is amplified, if a hidden one is manifested, if a good work is taken in a sinister way. 2. Negatively, namely by denying the good works of neighbor, or by diminishing them, or even sometimes by being silent when others are praising, or by praising coldly. If reputation is taken from someone by opening a true crime, it is called simple detraction; if by imputing a false one, it is called calumny, which is graver and differs in species from simple detraction, because it adds to detraction a lie damaging to neighbor. Yet this diverse species, "precisely insofar as it is against truthfulness, is not mortal malice, and therefore does not bring a diverse mortal species necessarily to be explained in Confession." Lugo d. 14, n. 36. Detraction differs from whispering, which is a word sowing discord among friends. Yet whispering agrees with detraction on the part of the matter, because each says evil about neighbor; but it differs in species on the part of the end, because whispering moreover intends the dissolution of friendship. And therefore it is from its genus mortal, of a species diverse from and graver than detraction; hence it is to be expressed in Confession. Prov. 6:16, 19.; Eccli. 28:15.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 74, a. 2.; L. 966.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 73, a. 1.; E. M.

Whether calumny or detraction is ever licit? - It is never licit to place a false crime upon another, as is clear from propositions 44 and 45 condemned by Innocent XI. Yet for a just cause it is licit to manifest another's hidden crime, even with loss of his reputation; because sometimes the public or private good requires this, and then the right of neighbor to preserving reputation is overcome by a stronger right. L. 972.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 69, a. 2.; E. M.

How is reputation to be restored? Restitution of reputation is to be made in one way by a calumniator, and in another by a simple detractor. Hence 1. the calumniator is held to retract what was said, and indeed of itself even with loss of his own reputation, if reparation cannot be made otherwise; the reason is that the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty, and he ought to impute to his own malice whatever he is going to suffer on that account. 2. A simple detractor cannot retract what was said, because thus he would lie; but in another way, as much as is in him, he ought to restore reputation, by saying, e.g., that he spoke badly, that he erred, or something similar; for not only those err who depart from truth, but also those who depart from rectitude, according to that saying of Prov. 14:22: They err who work evil. But often that mode does not suffice among intelligent and crafty persons, who rather gather from these formulas that the crime is true which is not openly asserted to be false. Therefore then the detractor, by being silent about what was said, ought, when the occasion is given, with dexterity and truth, to praise and honor him from whom he took reputation. L. 992.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 2 ad 2, q. 73, a. 2.

The sins against the honor we owe our fellowmen are partly internal and partly external. They differ in degree according to the nature of the attack and the relation existing between the offender and the offended.

The legal axiom that every man must be considered honorable until the contrary has been proved, embodies a truly Christian principle, for the essence of Christianity is charity, which “thinketh no evil.”¹ Whoever disregards this maxim, has either lost charity, or is about to lose it. Merely to entertain unfounded suspicion internally is an injustice to others and an act of infidelity to God.²

¹ 1 Cor. XIII, 5.

² Matth. VII, 1; Luke VI, 37; John VII, 24; 1 Cor. IV, 5; Jas. IV, 13.—St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 60, art. 4: “By the very fact that someone holds a bad opinion of another without sufficient cause, he injures and despises him. But no one ought to despise another or inflict any harm whatever without compelling cause. And therefore, where manifest indications of someone’s malice do not appear, we ought to regard him as good by interpreting what is doubtful in the better part.”—Ibid., ad 2: “It is one thing to judge things and another to judge men. For in a judgment in which we judge things, . . . each person ought to strive to judge things according as they are. But in the judg- ment in which we judge men, . . . we ought rather to tend toward judging a man good, unless a manifest reason to the contrary appears.”—Hence the moral and legal axiom: “Nemo praesumitur malus, nisi probetur.”

1. The internal acts by which we violate the duty of honoring our neighbor, in so far as they influence our conduct towards him and thus cause him injury, are: groundless suspicion and rash judgment.

a) We are guilty of groundless suspicion against our fellowman if we doubt his virtue for altogether insufficient reasons (levia indicia). This sin usually begins with an unfounded doubt (dubitatio temeraria), which, if it is not promptly suppressed, engenders rash suspicion (suspicio temeraria).³

³ St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 60, art. 3: “There are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a man begins to doubt another’s goodness from slight indications; and this is a venial and slight sin, for it belongs to human temptation, without which this life is not lived. The second degree is when someone holds another’s malice as certain from slight indications; and this, if it concerns some grave matter, is a mortal sin, inasmuch as it is not without contempt of one’s neighbor. The third degree is when a judge proceeds from suspicion to condemn someone; and this pertains directly to injustice, whence it is a mortal sin.”—St. Augustine, Tract. in Ioa., 26, n. 2: “Noli velle iudicare, si non vis errare.” (Migne, P. L., XXXV, 1607).

Unfounded suspicion of others usually comes from corruption in one’s own heart. If we were better men ourselves, says a modern writer, we should not consider others capable of so much evil. “He who is himself wicked,” says St. Ignatius of Loyola, “easily suspects others, just as he who suffers from vertigo, imagines that everything about him is moving round and round.”

b) Rash judgment (iudicium temerarium) consists in thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant. It differs from groundless suspicion only in degree: the former implies hesitation, whereas the latter does not.⁴ Holy Scripture tells us, and experience confirms it, that unfounded suspicion and rash judgment both originate as a rule either in malice, which sees nothing but wickedness in others, or in envy or hatred, which inspire ill will towards others. In some men these vices result from the bitter disappointments of a life-time. When they spring from malice, envy, or hatred, unfounded suspicion and rash judgment are invariably sinful, because they involve a lack of charity. The gravity of this sin may be gauged by the importance of its object and the degree of pleasure which the sinner takes in his uncharitable act.

⁴ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 481: “1. A rash judgment is a true assent, conceived from slight indications, concerning some sin or defect of one’s neighbor; 2. rash suspicion is a weak assent concerning one’s neighbor’s evil, or an assent concerning another’s stain conceived with fear of the opposite; 3. doubt is a suspension of the mind determining itself toward neither side.”

Merely to harbor a momentary and spontaneous (or involuntary) doubt regarding the virtue of another is, of course, no sin at all. Such judgments frequently flash through the mind—we are so quick and prone to judge ill of others without sufficient reason. All this is merely a temptation. But from the temptation we pass on to sin if, knowing the insufficiency of our reasons, we nevertheless deliberately form an unfavorable judgment regarding another’s virtue. “Suspicion,” says the Angelic Doctor, “denotes evil thinking based on slight indications, and this may arise from three causes. First, from a man’s being evil in himself, and from this very fact, as though conscious of his own wickedness, a wicked man is prone to think evil of others. . . . Secondly, it is owing to a man’s being ill-disposed towards another; for when a man hates or despises another, or is angry with or envious of him, he is led by slight indications to think evil of him, because everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, it may arise from long experience, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii) that old people are very suspicious, for they have often experienced the faults of others. The first two causes of suspicion evidently connote perversity of the affections, whilst the third diminishes the nature of suspicion, in as much as experience leads to certainty, which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently, suspicion denotes a certain amount of vice, and the further it goes, the more vicious it is.”⁵

⁵ St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 60, art. 3: “Suspicion denotes an opinion of evil when it proceeds from slight indications, and this happens in three ways: first, from the fact that someone is evil in himself and, from this very fact, as though conscious of his own malice, readily thinks evil of others. Secondly, it arises from the fact that someone is ill-disposed toward another; for when someone despises or hates another, or is angry with or envious of him, he thinks evil of him from slight signs, because everyone readily believes what he desires. Thirdly, it arises from long experience. The first two causes of suspicion manifestly pertain to perversity of affection; but the third cause diminishes the nature of suspicion, inasmuch as experience advances toward certainty, which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. And therefore suspicion denotes a certain vice, and the farther suspicion proceeds, the more vicious it is.” (Vide supra, n. 3).—Gury, Comp. Theol. Moral., I, n. 482: “A rash judgment concerning a neighbor’s fault is by its kind a mortal sin against justice; for each person has a right to his good reputation in the judgment of individuals. . . . Often, however, it is venial because of the slightness of the matter or the imperfection of the act. Rash suspicion and doubt concerning a neighbor’s stain are only venial by their kind. The reason is that, because of their weak and readily changeable adherence, they ordinarily inflict only slight harm on one’s neighbor, since they do not destroy his reputation but only diminish it and render it doubtful.”

To entertain a sort of general distrust towards strangers or to reserve one’s judgment regarding their honesty or disinterestedness, in consequence of having had one’s goodness repeatedly imposed upon, is no sin, because there is some reason for such a general distrust. Still, we must always remember that Christian charity commands us to think good rather than evil of our neighbor.⁶ The Talmud lays down a prudent rule of conduct when it says: “Judge no one unless you have been in his place.”

⁶ Cfr. Is. XI, 3; Luke VI, 37; John VIII, 15 sq.; 1 Cor. IV, 5.—St. Augustine, De Agone Christ., c. 27, n. 29: “In that passage [Mt. vii, 1], where [the Lord] forbids judging, He admonishes us not to condemn anyone whose thought is not open to us, or of whom we do not know what sort of person he may afterwards become.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 395).

“Frequently there is a greater sin involved in judging rashly of another than in the act that is so judged. The wise men of the world (sapientes mundi) warn us not to outdo the sins of others by passing rash judgment upon them; how much more carefully ought we to consider our own conduct, lest we condemn petty faults in others and at the same time incur grievous sins ourselves.”⁷

⁷ Pseudo-Ambrose, Apol. II David, c. 2, n. 5 (Migne, P. L., XIV, 889).

“To have a low opinion of oneself and always to think well and commendably of others,” says Thomas à Kempis, “is great wisdom and perfection. If thou shouldst see another openly sin, or commit heinous crimes, yet thou oughtest not to esteem thyself better, because thou knowest not how long thou mayest remain in a good state. We are all frail; but do thou think no one more frail than thyself.”⁸

⁸ De Imitatione Christi, l. I, c. 2 (ed. Pohl, II, 8).

2. The chief external sins against the honor of our fellowman are contumely, calumny, and slander.

a) Contumely (contumelia) means casting a man's faults in his face to detract from his dignity. This may be done either in his physical or in his moral presence. Moral presence is assumed when the insult is uttered before those who know the victim and to whose respect he attaches weight.⁹ This includes publication in the press.

⁹ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 478: "A person can be present either personally or physically, or morally through an image or through something else in which he is represented to some extent."

Contumely implies insult. An insult is any remark or expression by which another is denied the dignity of a human being, or accused of a moral defect, or charged with a crime or an offense. It is not necessary that the utterance in question actually contain an expression of contempt or disrespect, but the intention of injuring the other (animus iniuriandi) suffices.

The seriousness of the sin of contumely is measured by the intention of the offender, the importance of the matter involved, and the dignity of the person injured. No contumely is committed by parents and superiors when they censure the sins and faults of their children or subjects, even if this is done in a humiliating way, though they should, of course, always remember that even just reproaches must be kept within proper limits and that brutality and unnecessary harshness often produce a contrary effect.

The ancients took cognizance of real contumely, but not of verbal, and the Roman law did not punish the latter, probably for the reason that in former times men were less sensitive in regard to verbal insults than they are now, but especially because the spoken word did not then enjoy the publicity now given to it through the press.¹⁰ St. John the Baptist and Jesus Christ Himself severely censured the Scribes, Pharisees, and Sadducees.¹¹ St. Polycarp, when asked by the heretic Marcion whether he knew him, answered: "Certainly I know the first-born of Satan!"¹²

¹⁰ Homer (Ilias, I, 210 sqq.) describes Athene as intervening between Achilles and Agamemnon with the words: "Do not engage in combat nor draw the sword, for you can insult him in words as much as you please."—Linsenmann, Moraltheol., p. 457; W. S. Lilly, On Right and Wrong, London, 1892, Ch. VII, "The Ethics of Journalism," pp. 150–173.

¹¹ Matth. III, 7; XII, 34, 39; XVI, 4; XXIII, 13–33; Mark VIII, 38; Luke III, 7; XI, 42–45; cfr. Matth. XV, 26; XVI, 23; Mark VII, 27; Luke XIII, 32; Acts XIII, 10; XXIII, 3; Gal. III, 1, 3; Phil. III, 2; Tit. I, 12 sq.

¹² Irenaeus, Adv. Haer., III, 3–4; cfr. Polycarp, Epist. ad Philipp., c. 7; Funk, Patres Apost., Vol. I, 2nd ed., p. 304; Kirsopp Lake, The Apostolic Fathers (Loeb Classical Library), Vol. I, p. 293.

Contumely, says Fr. Slater,¹³ is of itself a grave sin against justice and charity, for it injures a man in what he values more than wealth, and as a rule an insult wounds the reputation as well as the feelings of him who is insulted. Christ shows how grievous a sin is committed by contumely when He says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council. And whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire."¹⁴ Like most sins against justice and charity, contumely may be a venial sin only, if the matter involved is slight. Chaff or banter, which is not intended to wound or irritate others is, of course, harmless, so long as it keeps within due bounds.¹⁵

¹³ Slater, Mor. Theol., I, 462.

¹⁴ Matth. V, 22.

¹⁵ Slater, ibid.

We insult a neighbor not only in words, but also by sending him abusive, immoral, or frivolous cards, a custom which exists in some countries and constitutes a serious abuse of the practice, in itself unobjectionable, of sending tokens of congratulation or remembrance at certain seasons of the year. The exhibition and circulation of offensive cards seriously menaces the morals of the young and promotes the world-wide movement against sound ethics.

b) Calumny (calumnia) or slander is committed by falsely imputing to another something which injures or destroys his reputation. This usually consists in accusing him falsely or exaggerating his faults or denying his good qualities or wilfully misinterpreting his intentions,¹⁶ and may be done in speech or in writing; in the latter case is called libel or pasquil.

¹⁶ Deut. I, 27; Mark VII, 22. On Matth. XII, 36 ῥῆμα ἀργόν, verbum otiosum, cfr. E. Nestle, Philologica Sacra, Berlin, 1896, pp. 58 sq.

Calumny involves three distinct acts; namely, first, a wilful lie, which is aggravated by the fact that it is told in secret and the injured person cannot defend himself against it; secondly, a sin against charity, and thirdly, a violation of justice (iustitia commutativa), because the injured person frequently suffers damage in his social position or good name.

If calumny is committed in general terms, i. e., if we declare our neighbor to be entirely bad without a redeeming trait, it is a mortal sin. If we impute to him only one fault, or several faults, the gravity of the sin committed varies according to the seriousness of the faults imputed, the consequences of the imputation, and the malice with which the calumniator strives to effect the moral or social ruin of his victim. The lighter the unjust accusation and the less intentional the imputation of evil, the smaller will be the guilt incurred.

In its worst form calumny is little less than spiritual murder and must be reckoned among the sins that cry to Heaven for vengeance.¹⁷

¹⁷ Cfr. Ps. C, 5; Jas. IV, 11; 1 Pet. II, 1.—St. Jerome, Epist. 54 (al. 10), n. 13: "It is impossible for anyone to pass through the course of this life without being bitten by men, and it is the consolation of the wicked to carp at the good, while they think the guilt of sins is diminished by the multitude of sinners. Yet the fire of stubble soon subsides, and the overflowing flame gradually dies when nourishment fails."—Epist., 108 (al. 27), n. 19: "A slanderous tongue is accustomed to carp at saints as a consolation for the offender."—Epist., 148 (al. 14), n. 16: "Never detract from anyone at all, nor wish to appear praiseworthy by censuring others; learn rather to adorn your own life than to carp at another's. There are very few who renounce this vice, and rarely will you find those who wish to present their own life as blameless without willingly censuring another's. So great a lust for this evil has invaded men's minds that even those who have withdrawn far from other vices nevertheless fall into this one as though into the devil's final snare. But do you so flee this evil that not only do you yourself not detract, but you do not even at any time believe another who detracts. Nor by agreeing give authority to detractors, lest by nodding assent you nourish their vice. . . . Indeed, this vice is such that it should be extinguished among the first, and should be wholly excluded by those who wish to train themselves in holiness. For nothing so disturbs the mind; there is nothing that makes the mind so changeable and frivolous as readily to believe everything and to follow the words of detractors with the mind's rash assent. Hence frequent dissensions arise, hence unjust hatreds. This it is that often makes enemies even of the closest friends, when a malicious tongue separates souls that are indeed harmonious but credulous. On the other hand, it is great tranquility of mind and great steadiness of character not rashly to hear anything adverse about anyone. Blessed is he who has so armed himself against this vice that no one dares detract in his presence. But if there were in us this diligence not to believe detractors indiscriminately, everyone would now fear to detract, lest in detracting they make not others so much as themselves contemptible. But this evil is notorious for this reason, and this vice flourishes in many for this reason: because it is willingly heard by almost everyone." (Migne, P. L., XXII, 557, 896, 1211).

The varieties of this sin are described in the old memorial verse:

"Imponens, augens, manifestans, in mala vertens, Qui negat aut minuit, reticet laudatque remisse."

If one is calumniated, he should recall that it is not the worst fruit that is attacked by the wasps, as the German poet Bürger says, or, as an Arabian proverb puts it: "People do not throw stones at a tree unless it bears fruit."

Some men resemble bees, not by their diligence, but by their sting.

c) Detraction, or backbiting (diffamatio, detractio)¹⁸ is committed when one unjustly deprives another of his good name by revealing his real but secret faults in his absence. This is a sin against justice as well as charity, because every man has a strict right to his good name. The more uncharitable the disposition of the detractor or slanderer, the more unfavorable the light in which he places his neighbor, the more widely the detraction circulates, the more the victim's position or activity depends on his good name, and the worse the results of the detraction, the more serious is the sin committed. Another factor to be taken into consideration here, as in all sins of defamation, are the consequences resulting from detraction in the case of those who hear of it.

¹⁸ The older Scholastics designated both calumny and detraction with one word: detractio.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 73, art. 1.—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 459, says: "Detraction is a secret and unjust violation of another's reputation, or the unjust blackening of the reputation of an absent neighbor. Reputation is the good estimation that others have of someone's life and morals. Detraction is called simply such if the neighbor's reputation is violated by reporting a true crime; it is called calumny if the violation follows from imputing a false crime."

Unsophisticated persons are apt to lose their good opinion of others generally (odium generis humani) and their reverence for virtue. Hence a sin of this kind, aside from the malice it involves, is more grievous when committed by persons in whose veracity and judgment one has great confidence.¹⁹

¹⁹ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 460: "The gravity of detraction is to be taken chiefly from the gravity of the harm that one's neighbor is foreseen to suffer from it, and not precisely from the gravity of the defect or crime related about him. Hence, to determine the gravity of detraction in a particular case, attention must be paid to the character: 1. of the detractor—whether he is serious and discreet, or talkative and frivolous; 2. of the injured person—whether he enjoys a good or bad reputation, etc. The reason is that greater or lesser credence will be given according as the speaker is worthy of greater or lesser trust; likewise, greater or lesser injury to reputation will follow in proportion to the greater or lesser esteem enjoyed by the injured person."

Like calumny, detraction can be committed against an entire community or class, and not only by word of mouth, but also in writing. To defame others in writing is a more grievous sin than to do so by word of mouth. Writings enjoy a certain permanency and therefore are able to exercise their influence not merely in the present, but likewise in the future.²⁰

²⁰ Cfr. St. Paul's judgment of the Cretans (Tit. I, 12), and the sayings: "Litera scripta manet" and "Literae non erubescunt"; i. e., one writes more boldly than one speaks.

Mendacity and detraction are the primary vices of the modern newspaper press. "Journalism is conducted under conditions which tend to nourish this vice. The newspaper is, by its very nature, an ephemeral production, read for an hour and then cast aside, and probably never looked at again. Its assertions have done their work before an opportunity of correcting them is presented. Besides, it rests with editors whether contradictions of false and misleading allegations, which their journals may contain, shall appear in them or not. And it is manifest to all men that the considerations by which this question is determined are, in a vast majority of instances, wholly unethical. Again, the conditions under which the newspaper publicist works are extremely unfavorable to the cultivation of the virtue of veracity. He is called upon suddenly to expound views which shall strike his readers as profound, well-considered, or original, about subjects of which, very likely, he knows nothing truly or exactly. Or he is summoned to essay the defense of 'principles' to which he is wholly indifferent. Or he is bidden to attack some institution, some interest, some work, which whatever there may be of good left to him confesses to be worthy of respect and support. A very few years' practice in a calling of this kind is apt to render him as indifferent to the goal whither his pen conducts him, as is a cab-horse to the destination whither the driver's 'fare' is conveyed. And the worst of it is that, in time, he comes to glory in his shame. Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, distinguishes between two kinds of liars; there is 'the liar who loves a lie for its own sake,' and 'the liar who lies to win reputation or to make money.' But many a journalist who, at first, belongs to the latter of these classes, and is perhaps a little ashamed, for a while, at finding himself there, passes pretty swiftly into the former. Thus does he anticipate in this life, the doom which Dante ascribed to the damned; he is in the miserable estate of those 'genti dolorose' who have lost 'il ben del intelletto.' And then, by a fatal and necessary law, his chief object, next to the provision of the means of 'agreeable feeling' for himself, is to bring down as many as possible to his own level. Nor does he find any surer way of effecting this, than by the persistent denial of those moral excellences which he has ceased to strive after, or even to venerate. Is a man the object of reverence and admiration, for patriotism, philanthropy, piety? Your newspaper censors, with due protestations of hatred of hypocrisy, will strip off the veneer which imposes on the unsuspicious; will show their readers that these pretended virtues are a mere cloak for some base or sordid end; will demonstrate conclusively that 'old Cato is as great a rogue as you.' And their efforts are only too successful. I think I may truly say that the newspaper press, during the last quarter of a century, has done more than anything else to de-ethicize public life; to lay the axe to the root of duty, self-devotion, self-sacrifice, the elements of the moral greatness of a nation, which is its true greatness."²¹

²¹ W. S. Lilly, On Right and Wrong, pp. 171 sqq.

Formal detraction differs from material in that it is intentional. Formal detraction, or, a fortiori, slander, be- ing contrary to justice and charity, which bind under a grave obligation, is of itself a grievous sin, though frequently only venial on account of the smallness of the matter involved. Material detraction usually proceeds from carelessness, lack of caution, love of gossip, or a desire to be entertaining and, therefore, as a rule, is a venial sin only, unless indeed it seriously injures the good name of others.²²

²² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 73, art. 2: "Verbal sins are to be judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Detraction by its nature is ordered to blackening someone's reputation. Hence, strictly speaking, he detracts who speaks ill of someone in his absence for the purpose of blackening his reputation. Now, to take away someone's reputation is very serious, because among temporal goods reputation seems to be more precious, through the loss of which a man is hindered from doing many good things (Eccli. 41, 15). And therefore detraction, strictly speaking, is a mortal sin. Yet it sometimes happens that someone says certain words by which another's reputation is diminished, intending not this but something else. This, however, is not detraction strictly and formally speaking, but only materially and, as it were, accidentally. And if someone utters words by which another's reputation is diminished for the sake of some necessary good, with the due circumstances observed, it is not a sin and cannot be called detraction. But if he utters them from levity of mind or for some unnecessary cause, it is not a mortal sin, unless perhaps the word spoken is so grave that it notably injures someone's reputation, especially in matters pertaining to uprightness of life, because from the very kind of words it has the character of a mortal sin."

Note that the guilt of detraction, aside from the underlying intention, is measured by the amount of injury done (gravitas damni), and that, consequently, attacks upon the good name of others are grievously sinful in proportion to the dignity or social position of the persons attacked. To attack the good name of a priest or superior, therefore, is more grievous than to attack the reputation of an ordinary citizen.

While it is never permissible falsely to impute a crime to another,²³ it may be licit, nay a strict duty, to reveal his true faults for a higher purpose. This is the case, for instance, when it becomes necessary to inform legitimate superiors, to warn inferiors, children, etc., or to protect oneself or others against serious injury, or if the faults revealed are already known in consequence of a public trial or the culprit's own admission (notorietate iuris) through the confession of confederates (notorietate facti) or through rumor (notorietate famae). Whenever the revelation of the sins or faults of another seems necessary as a means of reforming him or of averting a greater evil, it is morally licit, nay a duty, for the reason that the sinner has lost the right to his good name because he can not preserve it except to the detriment of others and to his own injury.²⁴ But even though his faults and crimes are notorious, charity commands us not to reveal them to persons to whom they would otherwise probably remain unknown. Besides rumors must never be represented as facts.

²³ Prop. damn. sub Innoc. XI, n. 44: "It is probable that one who imputes a false crime to someone in order to defend his own justice and honor does not sin mortally. And if this is not probable, scarcely any opinion in theology will be probable." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1194).

²⁴ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 461: "It is never permissible to impute a false crime to another. . . . It is permissible, however, for a just cause to reveal a hidden crime even with the loss of his reputation, because sometimes the public or a private good requires this, and then the neighbor's right to the preservation of his reputation ceases. The causes for which another's crime may lawfully be revealed are the following: 1. A notable advantage to the revealer himself, e. g., to seek advice or assistance in a grave matter, provided, however, that every disposition to detraction is excluded; 2. The advantage of the offender, namely, for his instruction or correction, etc.; 3. The public advantage, as for preventing evils threatening the state, religion, or some community; 4. A grave private advantage, either of the hearers or of others, e. g., that they may guard against evils, losses, or inconveniences that otherwise will certainly or probably befall them. The reason for these cases is that one who then reveals another's sin injures neither justice nor charity. 1. He does not injure justice, because the neighbor does not have so strict a right to his reputation that others are bound to conceal the truth when its disclosure is necessary to avoid grave harm, whether to oneself or to others. 2. He does not injure charity, because charity does not bind at so great a loss. For if you are not bound to prevent harm to your neighbor, even greater harm, at grave loss to yourself, neither are you bound in that case to conceal your neighbor's hidden crime." Cfr. ibid., n. 465–466.

Detraction comprises all evil speaking and criticizing of others through the spreading of tales to the disadvantage of their good name. This applies especially to suspicions cast upon the internal motives of our fellowmen.

A special kind of detraction is known as tale-bearing (susurratio), and consists in mischief-making between friends by telling tales to the disadvantage of one of them, with the object of sowing or promoting discord.²⁵ This sin is particularly detestable if it is directed to the destruction of mutual confidence between husband and wife.

²⁵ Prov. VI, 16 sqq.; XXVI, 20, 22; Ecclus. V, 16 sq.; XXVIII, 15.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 74, art. 2: "A sin against one's neighbor is graver in proportion as greater harm is inflicted on the neighbor through it. Harm, however, is greater in proportion as the good taken away is greater. Among the remaining external goods, however, a friend is preeminent (Ecclus. vi, 15). Reputation itself, which is taken away by detraction, is especially necessary for this, that a man be held fit for friendship. Therefore tale-bearing is a greater sin than detraction and even than contumely, because a friend is better than honor and to be loved than to be honored."

By listening wilfully or with pleasure to a detractor, or encouraging him by asking questions or applauding his tales, or not hindering them if we are able, we formally coöperate in his sin.²⁶

²⁶ Prov. XXV, 23.—Cfr. St. Bernard, De Consid., l. II, c. 13: "Whether to detract or to listen to a detractor—which of these is more damnable I would not easily say." (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, 756).

Mockery or derision (derisio, irrisio, illusio, subsannatio) makes sport of another's honor. It sometimes runs counter to charity also by employing the faults or infirmities of others in order to make them a butt of laughter or contempt. The most grievous sin of this kind is the mockery of God and sacred things; next in order come mockery of parents, superiors, and virtuous persons.²⁷

²⁷ Is. XXXVII, 23; Prov. XXX, 17; Job XII, 4.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 75, art. 2.—Possidius, Vita Sti. Augustini, c. 22 (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 52): "Whoever loves to gnaw at the life of the absent with words, let him know that this table is unworthy of him."

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 60, art. 3–4; qu. 73 (Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus, II, 18 sqq., 82 sqq.).—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 962–977 (ed. Gaudé, II, 355 sqq.).—Jocham, Moraltheologie, Vol. III, pp. 400 sqq.—Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, pp. 77 sqq.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 110 sqq.—A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor. et Pastor., Vol. III, pp. 156 sqq.—J. E. Ross, Christian Ethics, pp. 259 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 659 sqq., 678 sq.

S. Th., II-II, q. 73 and 74.

423. Detraction or defamation (diffamation, medisance; achterklap, kwaadsprekerij) is the unjust denigration of another's reputation by hidden words. It is said:

1° unjust: for it is not detraction if reputation is injured from a just and reasonable cause;

2° denigration: for just as a man is bright with good reputation, so by defamation he is blackened and obscured, although good reputation is not always totally taken away;

3° of reputation: thus detraction is distinguished from contumely and theft, which deprive one of honor or riches;

4° another's: for no one can commit injustice against himself in his own reputation;

5° by hidden words, i.e., while the one who is defamed is absent: for if it were done while he himself is present, it would now be Contumely, because first, of itself, and formally it would deprive him of honor, but of reputation only materially and consequently.

424. Detraction is divided in various ways:

A. On the part of the matter, one detraction is simple, another calumny (laster), according as it manifests a hidden vice of one's neighbor without just cause, or imputes to him a false crime or vice; therefore calumny adds to simple detraction a lie, and indeed a pernicious one, as bringing unjust damage.

B. On the part of the mode or efficacy of the exterior act, one is direct if a vice is clearly narrated, another indirect if a vice is insinuated by silence or a good quality is denied or diminished. Detraction happens in eight diverse ways: "directly indeed in four ways," says St. Thomas, q. 73, a. 1, ad 3: "1° in one way, when he imposes a falsehood on another; 2° when by his words he increases a sin; 3° when he reveals something hidden; 4° when he says that what is good was done from an evil intention. Indirectly, however, either 5° by denying the good of another; or 6° by maliciously keeping silence"; or, others add, 7° by diminishing; or 8° by praising remissly; yet these two are easily reduced to the fifth and sixth.

Indirect modes of speaking or keeping silence are sometimes more malicious than direct modes, as for example: I do not say all things. There are other deeds of his concerning which it is enough to keep silence! If I could say all the things I know. These are certainly splendid things; would that he had always shown himself such; but what does it help to recall the past! This person is pious, but!... I could provoke his blushing. I know certain things which no one would suspect about him, etc. Sometimes it suffices to keep silence deliberately, and a fortiori to smile or to make a gesture.

C. On the part of intention or the interior act of the will, one is formal, which is done from the explicit intention of injuring reputation; another material, which is done from another motive not necessarily evil, of lightness, lack of reflection, loquacity, utility, without the intention of defamation but with foresight of it.

425. Thesis I. Detraction, whether simple or calumnious, is a sin against justice, mortal from its genus, less grave than homicide and adultery, graver than theft.

The thesis is to be understood not only concerning formal detraction, uttered from the intention of injuring the reputation of one's neighbor, but also concerning material detraction done with full or sufficient advertence to this. It is proved:

1° It is against commutative justice: To take from an unwilling neighbor a notable good to which he has a strict right is a grave sin against justice. But by detraction there is taken from an unwilling neighbor a notable good, to which he has a strict right, namely, reputation, which is a greater good than riches. Therefore. The minor is proved: a) it is evident when calumny is in question, which deprives an innocent man of due reputation, to which he has a right by reason of virtue; b) it also holds concerning simple detraction, which deprives a hidden delinquent of reputation to which he has a right by reason of possession: he possesses a very useful good which he needs and of which therefore he ought not to be despoiled, until it becomes harmful, and meanwhile he keeps the right not to be reputed evil in society as long as he has done nothing evil openly. - Nor should you say: because of sins he deserves justly to be despoiled of reputation. For to judge concerning delicts and penalties pertains to God or to a judge constituted in the name of God; but he who by private authority, without sufficient reason, takes away reputation unduly usurps to himself the rights of God and of judicial authority.

2° It is against legal justice and greatly harms the good of society: for the public good demands that the evils of others not be revealed without sufficient motive; for if it were lawful for all to manifest the hidden sins of one's neighbor, contentions, quarrels, envies, and hatreds would arise on every side, and the peace and tranquility of families and of the whole society would be disturbed.

3° It is also against charity, for as St. Thomas says, q. 74, a. 2, ad 2: "reputation is a disposition to friendship and infamy to enmity," and "he who detracts from his brother seems to detract from the law insofar as he contemns the precept concerning love of neighbor" (ibid. ad 3).

Hence a) Scripture holds detractors and evil-speakers to be hateful to God and men and assimilates them to those who are excluded from the kingdom of heaven;¹ this holds at least concerning calumniators; and b) the Fathers hold that vice as an abomination and a diabolical work. It is useful to remember that St. Bernard said of the detractor that with one breath he infects three souls lethally: he kills himself, the hearer, and him from whom he detracts.²

¹ Cf. Prov. XXIV, 9; Rom. I, 29-30; I Cor. VI, 10.

² Serm. XVII, De Diversis, n. 4-5.

Moreover, "among the sins which are committed against one's neighbor, homicide is graver, by which the life of one's neighbor already actually existing is taken away; consequently adultery, which is against the due order of human generation, through which there is entrance to life. Consequently there are exterior goods, among which reputation excels riches, because it is nearer to spiritual goods, whence it is said, Prov. XXII, 1: A good name is better than many riches. And therefore detraction according to its genus is a greater sin than theft; nevertheless less than homicide and adultery. Yet there can be another order because of aggravating or diminishing circumstances" (a. 3).

426. How great the right to reputation is. - So that both the right to reputation, and the malice of detraction, and the reasons excusing from it may be better understood, the following are to be noted:

A. To each one there belongs a right to ordinary good estimation or good name; although no one of himself has a right to the estimation by which special virtues are attributed to him, nevertheless each one has the right of demanding that in human intercourse he be treated as someone to whom the virtues common among upright men belong: each one, from the fact that he seems to act rightly, and as long as he has done nothing evil publicly, is to be held good until he is proved evil.

Moreover there is a right to this reputation not only true, which is founded in true goodness and excellence, but also to false reputation, which rests only upon apparent and estimated goodness:

1. One can have a right in true reputation directly and of itself: for this reputation is a good positively acquired by one's own acts, in which therefore he exercises full right and dominion; whence this right also is absolute and universal, which demands that each good man be held by all to be such as he truly is.

There exists, namely, a bond between the person and true reputation, which bond can justly be violated by no one except by permission of the owner himself. Therefore this reputation is never lawfully taken away and calumny is always an injury; - nor is public calumny lawfully repeated, because it is cooperation in evil: it confirms a false opinion.

2. The right in false reputation does not arise positively and directly from the internal probity and excellence itself of the man, but negatively from acts, insofar as nothing evil appears publicly in them, and indirectly from the inconveniences which would arise against the private and common good if the hidden defects of others could everywhere be published.

Therefore it is founded positively in public and private necessity:

a) in public necessity, for from the revelation of crimes one's neighbor could not usefully perform his office, he would lose all authority, would lack the good of conversation, and those closely joined would be affected with ignominy, and thus contentions, quarrels, envies, and hatreds would arise on every side by which peace and tranquility in society would be disturbed. And this is still more established because

b) it is also founded in private necessity: for he who lacks reputation is deprived of a great protection against greater vices; on the contrary, fear of losing reputation often restrains the evil themselves, while he who has lost reputation can be restrained by no bridle; besides, as long as the crime is not public, conversion is easier, since human fear is less to be feared. Whence, says St. Thomas, q. 73, a. 2: "to take away someone's reputation is very grave, because among temporal things reputation seems to be more precious, by the lack of which a man is impeded from doing many good things; on account of which Ecclus. XLI, 15 says: Have care for a good name: for this will remain to you more than a thousand great and precious treasures. And therefore detraction, speaking of itself, is a mortal sin."

That right is not absolute, but conditioned by the private and public good, and limited by it; and consequently it ceases when a notable good either of the revealer, or of the delinquent himself, or of others, or of society rather demands that hidden defects be revealed. And therefore no one can be deprived of this false reputation of his unless, from the reputation not taken away, proportionate damage would follow to a private man or to the community, whether in a right already possessed or in a right to be possessed.

B. No one of himself has a right to extraordinary reputation, which is founded in singular gifts and talents, for example, of an outstanding theologian, orator, physician, saint: he does not have a right to such reputation if he does not really possess these things. Wherefore manifestation of the error on which extraordinary reputation rests is not against justice; - nor against charity, provided there is a reasonable motive for manifesting it.

C. The preceding things hold not only concerning private persons, but also concerning moral persons because of similar reasons. Indeed also concerning the dead, in whom the subject of the right to reputation perseveres, namely, the immortal soul, which is not verified for goods of fortune, whose right rests upon the necessities of bodily life; moreover the reputation by which they live among men is a great good which they therefore esteem and desire to retain.

Nevertheless this holds concerning the dead in a lesser degree, because they need reputation less than the living, and therefore are less unwilling in the violation of the right, whence calumny is so much less a sin; and as to detraction, the common right to knowing historical truth is accustomed to prevail, provided notable damage is not at the same time brought upon persons still living or institutions still existing.

427. The gravity of detraction is taken not so much from the gravity of the crime divulged as from the gravity of the harm of infamy, or of the damage which the injured person suffers in reputation. This damage must be considered not only in itself, but also as to the injured person, and as to the efficacy of the detraction.

Therefore one must attend:

1° To the imputed defect in itself: if the defect is grave, ordinarily it notably injures reputation; if light, ordinarily lightly.

Hence a) detraction regarding honesty of life is much graver than that which regards natural defects of body or soul (for example, that someone is imprudent or unlearned), because these are not accustomed notably to lessen reputation, and easily become of public right; - b) if however a natural defect is very disgraceful and brings great sadness to the injured person, it can be a grave sin, for example, if it is said of an eminent man that he is a natural son, of someone that he is the son of a priest; - c) in general to call someone proud, angry, lazy, etc., is not as grave as to narrate particular facts from which those defects are actually manifested: such a general manner of speaking, rather than grave personal fault, denotes natural propensities or venial defects, which by their nature are accustomed to be public; on the contrary, to say that someone is lustful or unjust, because it indicates a habit; - d) it is not grave to report concerning one who is already defamed by sin something connected with that delict, for example, concerning a known adulterer to say that he sent love letters, concerning a husband who is known to be drunk, that he quarreled with his wife; otherwise if the fact is altogether dissimilar, for example, if it is said that he who has lost reputation in doctrine or faith is ruined in morals, or vice versa: for he who has lost reputation in one thing has not therefore lost it in a wholly diverse thing. But there is no sin of defamation if you say of a prostitute that she laid snares for a youth, because she suffers no detriment in reputation, since this is included in prostitution.

2° To the person injured and his condition and dignity. For the gravity of the defect which is manifested depends much upon the condition of the person, and he who enjoys an integral reputation and needs it for exercising an office or business suffers graver damage than he who neither enjoys nor needs it.

Hence a) an accusation of great ambition, hypocrisy, or lust harms a priest or pious monk more and gravely than a layman; likewise an accusation of immodesty harms a girl more than a soldier; on the contrary, an accusation of sloth brings greater detriment to a soldier than to a girl. Regularly it is not grave to say of a light and worldly youth that he is a lover of girls; on the contrary, to say that a bishop is lying, a merchant dishonest, a physician ignorant, is apt to harm gravely in reputation or also in temporal goods;³ - b) to detract from a family or community is unlawful, because the disgrace redounds to the whole community, for example, that in such a monastery certain religious indulge in such a vice, or that regular discipline is not observed, or that such a crime, for example, of fornication, was committed; in such a city nearly all are infected, all the girls corrupted, all the merchants plunderers; - otherwise if in a general way it were said that in monasteries there are not lacking some who sin gravely, in a great city there are many unjust persons, many corrupted girls.

³ It can happen that the injury of reputation is slight in itself, but apt for bringing grave damage in goods of another genus, as if someone narrated that the man whom a hearer wished to take on for the office of secretary was talkative. Then to the light sin of detraction there would be added a grave injury of charity or justice in temporal goods.

3° To the efficacy of detraction, which depends both upon the quality of the detractor, and upon the number, disposition, and quality of the hearers.

a) Upon the quality of the detractor: a man who is held to be grave, prudent, and truthful harms more than one light, talkative, and lying; and he who reports something as seen harms more than if he reports it as heard from persons of uncertain authority; if however he narrates a grave thing as heard from a trustworthy person, or if from the circumstances he foresees that the hearers will believe it, or if he reports a thing so enormous that the mere suspicion of it gravely defames, such as sodomy committed by a priest, he sins gravely.

The FIRST opinion is that material detraction, which bursts forth from lightness in speaking, or from indiscreet zeal, is not mortal. So D. Bonaventure reports it, nor did he wholly reject it, saying that it would be a rash judgment to pronounce this mortal. So in the Book of the Mirror of the Soul, chapter 1, about the middle: but I shall explain it below.

The SECOND opinion is that, if the loss is grave and foreseen, or inflicted through grave blameable ignorance, it is mortal. So D. Bonaventure there, who says it is common to most; D. Thomas, question 73, article 2; Salonius; Cajetan; Aragon there; Soto book 5 on Justice, question 10, article 2; Valentia disputation 5, question 17, point 2; Nauarre in the Manual, chapter 18, number 23, and on the decretal Inter verba, 11. question 3, coml. 6. coroll. 33. number 119; Sayrus in the Clavis Regia, book 12, chapter 6, number 9; Toletus book 5 of the Summa, chapter 63; Sylvester, s.v. detractio; Lessius book 2, chapter 11, on detraction, doubt 3, number 11; Fagundez book 8, chapter 2, number three; Bassaeus, s.v. Detractio, 1. number 4; Diana p. 5, tract 5, resolution 69; Sylvius 2. 2. question 63, article 2.

But it WILL be venial, if he speaks from venial lightness in speaking, without advertence, or from a good and reasonable end of correcting his morals. This the second teaches, as Valentia, Salon. loc. cit., Nauarre number 30, and S. Antoninus p. 2, title 8, chapter 4; Astian. in 4. on fraternal correction; Sayrus number 9, even if something of zeal exceeds bounds.

I ASSERT first, that material detraction is venial, if it lightly blackens reputation. It is plain, because light loss is against Justice.

I ASSERT secondly, that it is mortal, if grave loss is inflicted.

It is PROVED first by D. Bonaventure, from the precept of the order of fraternal correction.

It is PROVED secondly, because if grave ignorance also follows, since you are bound not to inflict grave loss, by no means do you remove the voluntary act, whence sin results. Yet if there be some venial lightness as the cause in speaking, the effect also will already be light.

It is EXPLAINED further: for it can arise from some impulse or inadvertence, and so be venial.