Article — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Article Second. On Detraction and Calumny
644. Declaration. 1. The reputation of another can be unjustly violated in a twofold mode, either by detraction or by calumny. Detraction is the unjust and hidden lesion of another's reputation which is done by revelation of a true crime, or of one which in good faith is believed to be true; but calumny is the unjust and hidden lesion of another's reputation which is done by narration of a false crime.
Some in the definition of detraction and calumny add with St. Thomas the word hidden;1 others omit it. Those who add it call only a lesion of reputation brought forth while the one defamed is absent detraction, and they call a lesion of reputation brought forth before the one defamed mere insult; those who omit it call a lesion of reputation brought forth before the one defamed insult joined with detraction.
- A distinction is made between direct detraction and calumny, which are done from the intention of injuring reputation; and indirect, which is done from lightness and talkativeness without the intention of defaming.
According to others, detraction and calumny are done directly when another's vices are narrated, which obtains in four modes: if a false crime is imposed, if a true crime is amplified, if a hidden one is manifested, if a good work is taken sinisterly. The same are done indirectly when another's gifts are diminished, which again can happen in four modes: by denying the good works of one's neighbor, by lessening them, by being silent when others praise, by praising coldly.
1 Summa II-II, q. 73, a. 1.
645. Moral malice of detraction and calumny. Detraction and calumny are sins mortal from their kind against justice: for they injure the strict right which another has to his own reputation; but a sin against commutative justice is mortal from its kind. Moreover theft is a sin grave from its kind against justice; therefore a fortiori detraction and calumny, because reputation is a greater good than riches.1 Therefore each can be a light sin from smallness of matter. But sins of detraction will more often be light from imperfection of the act, especially because of inadvertence to the damage of one's neighbor.
a. To this is referred whispering (Ohrenblaserei), which is detraction or calumny by which discords are sown among friends. Therefore whispering differs from detraction and calumny by reason of the end, because it is committed in order secretly to dissolve friendship and to sow discord. Hence, other things being equal, it is a graver sin than simple detraction, because it moreover deprives another of the good of peace and friendship with his neighbor.
b. To commit the sin of detraction it is not necessary that the detractor have the intention of detracting from his neighbor and of harming him in reputation, but it suffices that he advert that from those things which he narrates the blackening of reputation follows.
646. Norm for judging gravity. The gravity of detraction and calumny is taken from the gravity of the damage which another suffers in reputation; but the gravity of the damage depends not only on the gravity of the crime which is manifested, but also on the circumstances both of the detractor and of the person from whom one detracts. Hence for judging the gravity of these sins one must attend:
a. To the defect which is narrated: manifestation of a grave defect ordinarily injures reputation notably, and manifestation of a light defect ordinarily injures it lightly;
b. To the condition of the detractor: a grave and prudent man harms more than a light and talkative one;
c. To the condition of the injured person, namely to the reputation which he enjoys among men and to the dignity by which he stands out among others: for he who is of intact reputation and great dignity experiences much greater detriment from detraction or calumny.
Hence it can happen that grave damage is inflicted if a light sin or even an inculpable defect is narrated about someone, as if someone says of a bishop that he is a liar or of illegitimate origin. On the contrary, to narrate a grave sin about someone can be only light detraction, as if someone says of a soldier or of a young man of lighter disposition that he is a lover of girls or has been drunk: for certain vices occur so frequently in persons of a determined condition that in them they are almost already supposed, and therefore do not gravely harm their reputation; but to narrate the same vices about a priest is mortal because of the condition of the person.
647. Applications. 1. To manifest natural defects, for example, to say that someone is ignorant, unlearned, imprudent, illegitimate, etc., ordinarily is not a grave sin, because all know that defects of this kind are not imputed and therefore do not notably diminish reputation. Moreover these things are usually publicly known. Yet if an inculpable defect is truly disgraceful, and if moreover men are gravely saddened by its revelation, and especially if they suffer damage, its revelation would be a grave sin, whether against justice or against charity.
To call someone in general proud, avaricious, angry, lazy, etc., ordinarily is not a grave sin, because defects of this kind signify rather a natural inclination than personal fault, or only venial defects, but not mortal sins; but to reveal inculpable defects or only venial ones ordinarily does not gravely harm.
To narrate a single grave sin to several will ordinarily be grave detraction, because grave damage in reputation is inflicted on one's neighbor, for example, to narrate that someone is a concubinary, unjust, or a robber.
To manifest a grave defect to one prudent man who is not going to divulge the matter certainly is not mortal if it is done from a reasonable cause, as if someone narrates an injury accepted to his friend in order to take consolation from it, although some defaming of the author follows from it. But if it is done without reasonable cause, there exists a twofold opinion: of those who judge that grave damage is inflicted even in this case, and of those who judge that damage to reputation in this case is not notable. Since the opinion which denies grave damage is truly probable, in practice it is permitted to follow it. Therefore a wife does not commit grave sin who communicates to her husband even gravely defaming things which she has discovered about her neighbor, provided the husband is prudent and silent. But if there is present a just reason for communicating these things, she is immune from sin.
Those who affirm that it is grave, such as Molina, Lessius, Lugo, the Salmanticenses, and others, commonly argue in this way: insult gravely injures honor even if it is done by only one person; moreover rash judgment in a grave matter is a grave sin; therefore, by parity, lesion of reputation before one grave man must be judged grave. But those who with St. Thomas, Navarrus, Bonacina, and Tamburini deny that it is grave bring this reason: reputation consists in the estimation of many; therefore he who has lost reputation before one or another prudent man is not considered to have undergone grave damage of reputation. But to the arguments of the former opinion these authors deny the parity. And indeed insult is made to one present; but rash judgment must be compared more to calumny than to detraction; but to impose a grave crime on someone is mortal. But all except the case in which a crime is manifested to him to whom the delinquent would especially wish to conceal it before all others.
To say nothing special, but only general things about someone, of itself is not a mortal sin; yet if general things are brought forth in that mode that hearers must suspect something grave, it can be mortal; for example, if you say that you know certain things which, if they were revealed, would affect another with great disgrace, or that you know certain things about that person which charity forbids revealing.
To narrate a grave matter about someone as heard from others:
a. is grave against justice if the narrator foresees that the hearers are going to believe because of motives brought by him, as if he says that he accepted the matter from a trustworthy person: for in this case he is the efficacious cause of the damage;
b. is grave against charity if he foresees that the hearers are going to believe not because of motives brought by him, but because of their own lightness or malice: for although the damage of the defamed person must be attributed not to the narrator but to the lightness of the hearers, nevertheless each one is bound to impede the grave damage of his neighbor which he can conveniently impede by being silent;
c. is a light or no sin if he foresees that the hearers are not going to believe, because light or no damage is inflicted on one's neighbor.
He who narrates a hidden crime committed, without naming the person, for example, "it happened in this place," does not sin if the hearers cannot come to knowledge of the person; but he sins gravely if he either describes the matter in such a way that the person can easily be known, or if grave infamy redounds upon the family or monastery or religious order of that person from the narration. This can happen if someone, while keeping silent about the person, says that a member of this family or order committed such a crime.
About one who is already defamed in some crime, to narrate a defect commonly connected with that crime, for example, to narrate perjury about a robber, or about a drunken husband that he quarreled with his wife, is not grave, because the infamy is not notably increased from it. But to narrate about him an altogether disparate defect is ordinarily grave defamation: for he who has lost reputation in one matter, for example, in chastity, has not therefore lost reputation in another quality also, for example, in learning; but he can have good reputation in one matter and bad reputation in another.
To say that in such a city all or most are unjust is considered grave defamation, because the reputation of individuals is gravely injured. But to say that in such a city many are unjust is not grave, unless it can be referred to determined persons, because no determined person is injured. Hence if someone by enormous exaggeration says that in such a city all merchants are defrauders, all virgins are corrupt, and the hearers judge that many are of this sort, and yet do not refer the vice to determined persons, he does not seem to sin gravely.
To say about some religious order or some monastery that religious in it live badly or do not observe regular discipline is grave detraction, unless the matter is plainly notorious: for both the whole religion or house and its individual members suffer grave damage by this defamation, because suspicion is induced about individuals.
It is not permitted to reveal another's hidden crime while at the same time adding the penance performed for it: for there always remains in others a certain sinister opinion, since the blackening of reputation from the manifestation of the fault is not wholly taken away by knowledge of the penance.
To refer in general the vice of a people or of a whole nation, for example, that it is proud, generally is not a sin, or is only venial, because either the matter treated is known, or concerns a natural disposition, not personal sins, or many indeterminate persons are understood.1
1 Cf. Titus 1:12.
648. Specific and numerical malice. 1. Detraction and calumny are sins specifically diverse, not insofar as they injure reputation, but insofar as calumny adds to detraction the malice of lying; yet this malice, since it is against veracity, is not mortal.
Therefore of itself it is not necessary that it be declared in confession whether the reputation of one's neighbor was injured by detraction or calumny. Yet generally it is fitting that the confessor know this, both so that the gravity of the sin and so that the mode of restitution can be determined.
- Detractions in matters diverse in species, for example, to say that someone is a robber and an adulterer, are not sins diverse in species: for reputation morally is of the same nature, whatever the prerogative may be in which it is founded; therefore also lesions of reputation are of the same species, just as all lesions in goods of fortune are of the same species.
The opposite opinion, which seems more probable to St. Alphonsus (n. 48), uses this argument: as many diverse sins are committed as there are diverse reputations and therefore diverse rights injured; but as many diverse reputations and diverse rights in reputation are injured as specifically diverse crimes of one's neighbor are revealed: for one is the reputation which someone has, for example, concerning justice, and another which he has concerning chastity, and to each there corresponds its own right. But although it must be conceded that one reputation is that which someone has concerning justice, and another that which he has concerning chastity, nevertheless each is not specifically diverse, but is of the same species. In like manner one property is that which someone has of money, and another which he has of a house and a forest; yet each is of the same species. Since St. Alphonsus also holds the former opinion as probable, the confessor would imprudently require the matter of detraction from the penitent where this is not necessary from another reason. Therefore it suffices to say: I gravely injured another's reputation.
- He who detracts from someone before several commits only one sin, because he injures only one right to reputation: for reputation by its nature consists in the estimation of several; yet the sin is extensively so much graver as there are more who hear the detraction.1
1 Lugo, De poenit., disp. 16, n. 112. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 5, n. 49.