Article I. On the Notion, Division, and Morality of Detraction

I. Notion. Detraction is the unjust denigration of another's reputation. If it is done before the defamed person, there is added insult or injury of honor (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 966).

II. Division. Detraction is distinguished into simple detraction and calumny, according as it is committed by revealing what is true, or by imputing what is false.

III. Morality. 1. Detraction, both simple detraction and calumny, is opposed to justice and is grave from its kind. It is opposed to justice because it deprives a man of a good justly possessed. It is grave from its kind, which is clear from Sacred Scripture,¹ and likewise from reason; for "to take away someone's reputation is very grave, because among temporal things reputation seems to be more precious, through the lack of which a man is impeded from doing many good things; on account of which it is said in Ecclesiasticus 41: Have care for a good name, for this will remain to you more than a thousand great and precious treasures; and therefore detraction, speaking per se, is a mortal sin" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 2). Yet they can become venial because of slightness of matter. Finally, that the aforesaid sins are opposed to justice is sufficiently elicited from what has been said (St. Alphonsus, III, 966). Besides, note:

a) The malice of calumny is graver than the malice of simple detraction; for the former injures an absolute right to reputation, the latter a limited right. For everyone has the right that what is false never be imputed to him; but with respect to revealing what is true, he has only the right that it not be revealed without a relatively grave cause.

b) The gravity of matter, if there is question of injury of reputation, depends: 1° on the gravity of the thing revealed; 2° on the judgment which the hearers make, considering their region and condition; 3° on the greater or lesser authority of the detractor; 4° on the condition of the person against whom detraction is made (St. Alphonsus, III, 967).

Objection. A bad man does not have the right of retaining the reputation of goodness.

Response. I deny the assertion, since on the one hand no one is certainly held to deprive himself of reputation; and on the other hand, per se it belongs to no private person to deprive another of a good which the latter has and possesses without injury to another; nor can public authority do this unless public order demands it.

2. Simple detraction and calumny, insofar as they are opposed to justice, do not differ in species, because they injure the same good or right. But to calumny there is added the species of lying. Furthermore, detractions in different matters seem to be of the same species, because, insofar as they are injurious to reputation, they are not morally diverse, but differ only according to more and less (St. Alphonsus, III, 978).

Objection. Reputation consists of parts distinct in species; for one reputation is that which someone possesses concerning chastity, another concerning justice, and therefore injuries of reputation ought to differ in species according as they violate parts of a different species.

Response. The parts of which reputation consists are indeed diverse in species in themselves, but insofar as they constitute reputation, they differ only according to more and less.

Corollary I. Ordinarily it is venial to reveal: 1° natural defects of mind or body; 2° venial faults; 3° a defect which is indeed grave, but which is sufficiently common in men of such a condition (St. Alphonsus, III, 967).

Corollary II. Generally, unless the matter is known, it is mortal to say of a superior that he is a liar; of a religious or priest, that he has been drunk, or that he is a lover of girls; likewise to use words which provide occasion for suspecting something grave, as if "you should say nothing in particular, but only in general, for example, that you know something about him, which, if you should say it, would affect him with great shame" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Corollary III. He who narrates the hidden crime of someone who has already been defamed in other matters sins gravely if the new revelation notably increases the prior infamy, or brings a new grave infamy, for example if about one infamous in one species a crime of another species is narrated, not very connected with the prior one (St. Alphonsus, III, 976).

Corollary IV. He who, in reporting someone's hidden crime, at the same time reports his repentance, is guilty of grave detraction, unless the repentance is so great that it entirely destroys the infamy.

Corollary V. Several slight detractions can coalesce into grave matter, because taken together they can contain a grave injury of reputation.

Corollary VI. What has been said about injury of reputation should also be applied to defamation of the dead, although it is less grave to detract from the dead than from the living, and the detraction is the less, the longer the person has been dead. But what is lawful for historians, see n. 1070.

3. Detraction from some person also contains a graver sin if the infamy of the defamed person redounds to the community, or to the family, to which he belongs; and the sin is graver in proportion as a greater and more common good is injured. Yet note that the defamation of a member commonly redounds into the community the more, the smaller it is in number, and therefore redounds more into a family, which of itself is smaller in number (St. Alphonsus, III, 978; Homo Apostolicus, tract 11, n. 16).

¹ Prov. XXIV, 9; Rom. I, 30, 32; 1 Cor. VI, 10; Jas. III.

Question 1. How great a sin is it to reveal a grave defect to one or another person who certainly will keep the matter secret?

Response 1. If it is done on account of a just cause, for example for the sake of instruction or counsel, there is no sin. The same seems to be said if it is done only for the sake of consolation, but not from the intention of blackening the neighbor. The reason is that one affected by injury seems to have the right of lessening his grief with some damage to him who inflicted the grief. Hence servants, wives, and children who reveal injuries inflicted on them by a master, by a husband, or by a father seem to be excused (St. Alphonsus, III, 973).

Response 2. If it is done without cause, it is disputed whether it is a grave or slight sin. Now a sufficiently probable opinion recognizes only a slight fault, because, since reputation consists in the common estimation or the estimation of many, it does not appear that it is notably injured by the bad opinion of one person or another (St. Alphonsus, III, 973; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 73, a. 1, ad 2). Nor should it be said that by defamation before one person, just as by one person's rash judgment, reputation is gravely injured. For it is answered that in rash judgment there is an accusation of a false or wholly uncertain crime, but in our hypothesis the revelation of a true crime is supposed. Yet authors except the case in which someone reveals the offense to a person, for example to a superior or master, from whom the delinquent reasonably wishes it to be hidden before others (St. Alphonsus, III, 973). Moreover, the narration of a false crime is always mortal, because I have a firmer right that a false crime not be imputed to me than that a true crime not be revealed to another. Finally, even the revelation of a true crime to one trustworthy man can accidentally be grave, namely if it contains whispering or tale-bearing (n. 1079).

Question 2. Of what kind and how great a sin is it to reveal a defect which per se would constitute grave matter, but as heard from others?

Response 1. If you report it in such a way that others, by force of the narration itself, believe what is reported, there is a grave sin against justice; for example, "if you assert that you heard it from a person worthy of trust, ... because you give a sufficient cause for believing the evil" (St. Alphonsus, III, 977).

Response 2. If you report it in such a way that others are going to believe from their own levity or malice alone, you do not sin gravely against justice, because you are not the cause but only the occasion of grave damage. But you sin against charity, because everyone is held to impede grave damage to the neighbor as much as he conveniently can (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). Indeed, if there is discussion of an enormous crime, there is also grave sin against justice. The reason is that on the one hand even suspicion of such a crime gravely injures reputation; on the other hand the narration must be called at least a cause of suspicion (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Question 3. To what extent is it a sin to report the crime of a person entirely unknown, or without the person being named?

Response. Per se this contains no detraction. Yet except: 1° if there is danger that the person can afterwards become known or come under suspicion; 2° if a report of this sort redounds to the family, community, etc., of him whose crime is reported; in which case there is grave or slight sin according as that person's reputation is gravely or slightly injured. Hence, for example, he would sin gravely who said that someone from this religious community had committed such a crime (St. Alphonsus, III, 978). "Nevertheless, if the order were large, it should not be considered a grave sin ... to name the order which is not of strict observance" (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tract 11, n. 16; p. 9).

Question 4. Whether it is lawful to detract from the deceased.

Response. No, because the soul of the deceased, no less than a living man, has a right to reputation. Yet "to defame a dead person is less grave than to defame a living one," because he has less need of reputation (St. Alphonsus, III, 978).

Question 5. To what extent is it a sin to divulge further a notorious crime?

Response. A crime can be notorious: 1° by law; 2° by fact; 3° by report. It is called notorious by law when it is established by a sentence of a judge. It is notorious by fact when it has been committed before so many persons of the community that it will certainly and quickly be divulged more and more. It is notorious by report when it has been narrated to so many persons of the community that it will certainly and quickly be narrated more and more (St. Alphonsus, III, 975; VII, 141). Furthermore, some crime can be notorious either only relatively, for example with respect to a college, community, family, or neighborhood, or absolutely, with respect to all who inhabit the same region or city. Now:

1. A crime notorious by law can be divulged without injustice in whatever place and time. For the judge by law deprives the accused absolutely of reputation, just as he can deprive him of goods of fortune; indeed public trials are held for this end, that from publicity a partial penalty may be had through defamation. Nor does he who divulges a crime of this sort per se, i.e. unless he acts from evil affection, sin against charity. For the accused has also been condemned for this reason, that others may be deterred from crime; there is added that it has been expedient for the common good that each one be known as he publicly is (St. Alphonsus, III, 974).

2. A crime notorious either by fact or by report may be revealed as follows:

a) It is lawful to reveal it to members of the same convent or college.

b) With respect to revelation in another community, this must be said:

alpha) It is lawful if, considering the circumstances, knowledge of the crime is going to arrive there quickly. Wherefore note that today communications between convents are more frequent, so that revelation will with difficulty be a grave sin. The contrary must be said about a different province and about an autonomous monastery.

beta) If knowledge of the crime is not, or is not quickly, going to arrive in another community, it is illicit and unjust to reveal it there, if there is question of a restricted community, i.e. of a house, convent, or college. The same must be said theoretically if there is question of a city, town, or village, because one defamed in one place still justly possesses reputation in the place to which knowledge of the crime is not going to arrive quickly; therefore he does injury to him and sins against justice who defames him there. Nor is it valid if you say that he no longer has anywhere a right to reputation, from the fact that his crime is public somewhere. For by what reason would he have lost this right? Not through the crime itself according to itself; otherwise whoever had committed a crime, however hiddenly, would no longer have a right to reputation, and no one would sin against justice by spreading it abroad; which no one admits. Not through the crime as public in one place; for it is and will be unknown elsewhere unless you reveal it, and accordingly it is so related there, where it is unknown, as if it were absolutely hidden.¹ I have said theoretically, because practically, on account of more frequent communication between different places, a crime public in one place will quickly be divulged in another place. Finally, it is always lawful to divulge crimes which render a man pernicious, because it is expedient for the common good that pernicious men be known by all: such are, for example, murderers, thieves, scandalously lustful persons, etc. (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Question 6. Whether it is lawful again to reveal a crime which through forgetfulness has become hidden.

Response. Affirmatively, if there is question of a crime notorious by law, as was said above. Otherwise, if there is question of a crime notorious by fact or by report. To manifest this again is certainly opposed to charity; and also to justice, as it seems, because through forgetfulness the matter has been reduced to the state in which it was before publicity (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tract 11, n. 13).

¹ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iustitia, diss. 15, a. 1, § 5.