Distributive Justice

252. Justice strictly so called has three subjective parts. — For thus the diverse species of a virtue are called. But justice strictly so called is divided into two species: legal or general (algemeene of wettelijke), and particular (bijzondere), and this latter is subdivided into two others: commutative (ruilende) and distributive (verdeelende). And thus there are three species of justice, or subjective parts, and only three.

It is proved: There is a threefold species of due or of right to be rendered: for the good due is either the good of the community as such (the common good), which is to be rendered to it by private persons who are its members; — or the good of a singular person, which is to be rendered to each one, either by society itself, — or by other private persons.

Hence a threefold order is required: the order of part to whole — the order of whole to part — the order of part to part. The first regards legal justice, which orders subjects to the republic; the second, distributive justice, which orders the republic to the subjects; the third, commutative justice, which orders a private person to a private person. A fourth order is not possible, and therefore neither is a fourth species of justice.

Legal justice is that by which the members of society as such (whether the prince or the subjects) give to society whatever is owed to it as such for procuring the common good. Distributive justice is that by which the republic, or its presiding officers, distribute common goods or offices and burdens among the members of the community according to the gifts, merits, faculties, and needs of each. Commutative justice is that by which a private man, or even society acting as a particular person, renders to a private man that which is owed to him from strict right.

253. The three species of justice differ among themselves:

1° By reason of object,

both a) principal object, which is the due of private persons toward society, — or the due of the community toward private persons, — or the due of a private person toward a private person.

Moreover this threefold due, according to St. Thomas, is of a diverse account: "for the account of common good and of singular good is diverse, just as the account of whole and part is diverse" (q. 58, a. 7, ad 2), and "what is common is due to someone in one way, and what is proper in another way" (q. 61, a. 1, ad 5);

and b) secondary object, which comprises either the acts of all virtues insofar as they can be ordered to the common good; — or distributions of goods and burdens; — or commutations among private persons: for although distributions and commutations pertain to the same things, nevertheless the use is diverse.

2° By reason of subject:

a) legal justice is principally and, as it were, architectonically or directively in the prince and rulers, as in those commanding the things which pertain to the common good; in subjects it is secondarily and, as it were, administratively, as in those executing the things which have been constituted by rulers and laws;

b) distributive justice is properly and formally in the superior presiding over common goods and distributing them; in subjects it is participatively, insofar as they are content with a just distribution;

c) commutative justice is in private persons.

Hence he to whom something is owed and he who owes are physically adequately distinct in commutative justice; in legal and distributive justice they are not physically adequately distinguished, but only morally, insofar as according to the estimation of men and according to the consideration of reason, one moral or juridical person is that of society, another that of the members.

3° By reason of equality:

A. In commutative justice there is absolute equality of thing to thing (for example, of what is given to what is accepted, of wage to labor, of the thing restored to the thing taken away), and therefore the mean of the thing is taken according to arithmetic equality, for example, 100 to 100.

B. In distributive justice there is relative equality of the proportion of things to be distributed to the persons to whom they are to be distributed; so that, just as one person exceeds another in dignity or need, so also the thing which is given to one person exceeds the thing which is given to another: for that which is owed by the whole to the part is so much greater as the part has a greater principality (merit, dignity) in the whole. And therefore the mean of the thing is taken according to geometric proportion, in which the equal is attended to not according to quantity but according to proportion, for example, as six is to four, so three is to two, because in each there is the same proportion.

C. In legal justice there is relative equality of the proportion of the person to the community.

254. Conclusion to be noted. — Hence commutative justice of itself obligates to restitution, because restitution makes equality of thing to thing; as is clear from the very notion of restitution, which is to render to another his own proper thing. — But the same is not proved for distributive and legal justice, insofar as they are such, because they make equality of thing to person, or of person to community.

Common goods, namely, are not simply and immediately the goods of the members, as if they were appropriated or owed to them, as their own proper things and their own possession (for they are goods of the community), but they pertain to them only under some respect and mediately, namely by destination, insofar as in them there is dignity or need for obtaining those goods.¹ Hence neither is there a complete right to the thing: a strict right to such or such a good; for these things do not yet pertain to this or that man, but to all. There is only a certain beginning of right (a non-strict right), by which they are owed by reason of condignity and of the community of which they are parts, insofar as the things which are of the whole are in some way owed to the parts.² Likewise, conversely, the goods of the members pertain only mediately to the community. The goods, namely, of the community are for the sake of the subjects, but they are not the subjects' goods; and conversely, the goods of the subjects sometimes ought to be ordered to the community, but they are not goods of the community. — And therefore in those goods, pertaining to distributive or legal justice, restitution is not proved to be owed, because no one is deprived of his own proper thing.

¹ A right to a common thing does not become a right to a private thing.

² "Just as part and whole in some way are the same, so that which is of the whole in some way is of the part; and thus when from common goods something is distributed to individuals, each one in some way receives what is his own," q. 61, a. 1, ad 2. Similarly, "the part is that which belongs to the whole; whence also any good of the part is orderable to the good of the whole," and can be due (q. 58, a. 5).

This is more confirmed: a) the good which commutative justice regards and commands (namely, that each one not be without his own things) perseveres as possible and commanded, whether before this justice is violated by unjustly taking away the thing of another, or after it has been violated. For once the injury has been posited, the other remains, because of your deed, deprived of his own thing, and right reason demands that by your deed this disorder cease; this happens through restitution to the equality of the thing or its equivalent.

On the contrary, b) legal justice: for if an act which ought to have been ordered to the common good was not ordered to it, it now becomes impossible to refer it, or to reduce the ordering of a past act to the common good; other new acts can be ordered, not that one. But no virtue can obligate to the impossible.

Similarly, c) distributive justice: for when this has been violated, it is not possible to restore the thing to its former state; for no one had a strict and complete right to the just portion, because the things distributed were not from the goods of someone, but from the goods of the community. Hence neither was the strict complete right of him who had less violated, because he was not deprived of his own proper thing in the strict sense. But after the distribution has been made, each acquires a strict right to his portion, nor can he be despoiled even partially without violation of commutative justice; and if the distributor restores from his private goods, for that reason he does not repair the unequal distribution of common goods; but if in a second distribution of goods the unjust distributor wishes to compensate, he will violate distributive justice in this second distribution, and the first distribution will remain unjust.³

³ It could be objected: 1° By the injury of distributive justice, inequality is introduced; this ought to be repaired. Therefore. — Resp. I distinguish the major: inequality is introduced without a permanent right to the goods which ought to have been received, concedo; with such a right, nego.

Yet by accident legal and distributive justice obligate to restitution, if commutative justice is at the same time injured, as often happens; as if a distribution is made from contract, for example, a competition, or if legal justice commands an act of commutative justice.

2° It is urged: He who was unjustly passed over has, from the unjust omission itself, a title so that he may receive compensation in a new distribution. Therefore. — Resp. I distinguish: insofar as this passing over leaves aptitude or present dignity on account of which some good is formally conferred, for example, a public office, concedo; insofar as compensation for the passing over would be the formal and sufficient reason, nego. For if after a distribution of offices badly made, the candidate who was more worthy has become less suitable because of illness, old age, etc. (or if a new one arises still more worthy), nothing now remains for him to expect for himself.

255. Corollaries. — 1. In every virtue, the general just commensuration is to that to which it ought to be equated, or the measure of reason; for justice properly so called, equality is either arithmetic equality of thing to thing, which is invariable for anyone, rich or poor, prince or subject; — or geometric equality of proportion to proportion.

Distributive justice according to itself in every act directly attends to the dignity and qualities of the person; on the contrary, commutative justice does so only by accident and according as the thing is diversified thereby.

For, as St. Thomas says, q. 61, a. 2, ad 3, commutative justice also considers the person, but indirectly, "insofar as the condition of the person contributes to the quantity of the thing: for the injury is greater if a prince is struck than if a private person is struck. And therefore the condition of the person in distributive justice is attended to according to itself (insofar as it per se influences the proportion of the thing); but in commutative justice according as by this the thing is diversified," and therefore by accident. Cf. Cajetan on this place.

"Legal justice attends to a certain equality tempered from each of the aforesaid: for insofar as any part gives to the whole, for example, any citizen to the city, according to the proportion of his powers, which are not the same in all, it seems to preserve an equality of proportion. But insofar as any part in rendering to the whole ought not to attend to what another renders, and therefore ought not to preserve proportion between that which another gives and that which it itself repays, but each part, without any account taken of the others, ought to give as much as it can and as is required from it, thus there seems to be a certain equality of quantities or arithmetic equality." Thus Goudin, in Philosophia, III, q. 6, a. 2, § 1.

It must be noted, however, that the equality which it primarily regards is equality of proportion; only secondarily and consequently, equality of quantity.

In commutative justice there is given counter-suffering or reaction, that is, recompensation of suffering to the preceding action, and indeed according to equality, so that the recompensated suffering or reaction is equal to the action, and someone suffers as much as he himself has done; as if, if he struck, he is struck back; if he inflicted damage, he is also damaged in his own thing; if he bought a thing, he also gives his own thing. But this recompensation or counter-suffering is not always to be attended to according to material equality (or in the same species), but according to equality of injury; for example, if someone strikes a prince, he is not only struck back, but is punished much more gravely; and if he steals, he must not only restore, but also repair the damage inflicted on the private person and on the republic; and in commutation it would not always be equal "if someone gave his own thing, receiving the thing of another, because perhaps the thing of another is much greater than his own" (a. 4).

But in distributive justice there is no counter-suffering, because in it equality of thing to thing, or of suffering to action, is not attended to, but according to the proportionality of things to persons.

256. Observations. — 1. Some among more recent authors, after Schmalzgrueber, posit a fourth species of justice, namely, vindictive justice, by which superiors afflict guilty subjects with due punishments for the common good. Yet this is rightly reduced to one of those named above: to commutative justice, insofar as the prince or judge inflicting punishment is held from strict office or quasi-contract to just punishment; — to legal justice, insofar as he acts with regard to the common good; — to distributive justice, insofar as he proceeds by geometric proportion and decrees punishments proportionally to the gravity of delicts; indeed to commutative justice, if he punishes in order equally to repair damage inflicted on someone. But insofar as vengeance is sought before the judge by a private person injured, in that person there is a virtue which moderates the appetite for external vengeance; yet it is not justice strictly so called, but a potential part or virtue annexed to commutative justice, because a private person is not strictly held to seek punishment; — but the prince or judge is strictly held to punish.

Several more recent authors hold only commutative justice as justice strictly so called,⁴ but the others are called justice by analogy: for legal and distributive justice are not toward another perfectly distinct, because the part is that which belongs to the whole, and the whole is that which belongs to the parts. Yet better with St. Thomas it is said that in them "the proper account of justice" is found (q. 58, a. 5): for society is a moral person distinct from the private persons who are its members, and has a perfectly distinct end; and therefore there is sufficient otherness so that between them there can be an order of justice.

⁴ Thus, after Lugo, Waffelaert, Pottier, the Mechlin authors, Cathrein. On the contrary, the Thomists, and also Vermeersch.

Social justice understood in the strict sense is nothing other than legal justice, which directly orders to the common or social good and renders what is due to the community. Certain authors, however, also call distributive justice social, but not rightly, because although it is exercised by society, nevertheless it does not render what is due to society, but to private persons. In a broader and general sense every justice is social insofar as it orders us to another.

Recently it has been said that social justice is a certain justice, specifically distinct from the others, by which the diverse classes or orders of citizens will to give to one another a part of the common good, especially under the economic respect.⁵ — But individuals, just as social orders, ought to will this; moreover, that justice of a diverse genus is exercised by the orders of citizens or by individuals, concerning economic goods or concerning others of a different genus, is a merely material difference from which a diverse species does not arise; — furthermore, since they say that this is done formally with regard to the common good, for this legal or general justice itself fully suffices, and the other virtues under its direction and command; — finally, neither is a fourth species of justice possible, as we noted in n. 252.⁶

⁵ Thus Hentzen, Commentaar op Quadragesimo anno, I, 3° B.

⁶ Cf. Kors, Sociale Rechtvaardigheid.

Moreover, as Pius XI acknowledges in the encyclical Divini Redemptoris against the communists, March 19, 1937, "it belongs to social justice to demand from individuals all that is necessary for the common good." And although therefore in his encyclicals the Pontiff wished to insist much that among individual citizens, and among individual classes or social orders of citizens, there be a more equitable distribution of goods — which of itself regards distributive justice — just as also that everyone's strict rights be preserved uninjured — which according to itself belongs to commutative justice — nevertheless those things do not belong to social justice except insofar as they are necessary for the common good.

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Right and Justice, On the Vice Opposed to Distributive Justice, which is Respect of Persons · Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Right and Justice, On the Vice Opposed to Dis…, What is respect of persons? · Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Right and Justice, On the Vice Opposed to Dis…, On respect of persons in the distribution of spiritual things

In present times they speak much of international justice; but this is not a distinct species of justice, but is easily reduced to the species enumerated. For since the matter concerns due relations among various nations, which justice certainly ought to rule, nations must be considered as individual moral persons. Furthermore, the society of nations can be conceived and considered as a certain higher society and as the common good of all nations. And thus it is commutative justice itself which obligates individual nations to render to others what is owed to them; — and if certain goods accrue to them and are distributed by the society of nations, this ought to be done according to the rules of distributive justice, just as conversely, those things which individual nations are obligated to furnish and owe toward their common society and the common good of all and of the whole of humanity, pertain to legal justice.

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Fourth Part: On Distributive Justice

n. 611.

611. Distributive justice is that by which society, or its presidents, distributes advantages and burdens among members, according to the merit, suitability, or necessity of each. It differs from commutative justice:

…and 45 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Billuart, Summa Summae

Charles-René Billuart, O.P. — 44 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Right and Justice, On the Vice Opposed to Distributive Justice, which is Respect of Persons

(D. Thomas, q. 63.)

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Right and Justice, On the Vice Opposed to Dis…, What is respect of persons?

1°: Acceptance of persons is the injustice by which, in common matters to be distributed by justice, no regard is had to the proportion of merits or the suitability of those who are candidates, but to some cause irrelevant to the matter. ⁴⁶³ ⁴⁶³ Merc., Instit. moral. Alphons., n. 1027-1030.

n. 2.

I said, « in common matters », whether goods, such as public offices, benefices, honors, judgments, etc.; or evils, that is burdensome things, such as taxes, tolls, public works, contributions, penalties, etc.

n. 3.

It must be observed, however, that common goods are of two kinds. Some are ordered primarily and immediately to the public good, and through it only mediately and secondarily to the benefit of the particular persons who occupy them, such as benefices, public offices, dignities, etc. Others are ordered primarily to the benefit of particular persons, such as the public treasury, common revenues, a legacy to be distributed to the poor, a sum of money handed over by the king to be distributed, stipends for well-deserving soldiers, etc.

n. 4.

In both kinds of goods, bad distribution is an acceptance of persons opposed to distributive justice, insofar as no regard is had to the proportion of merits; but moreover in both is found a violation of commutative justice, though in different ways. In the bad distribution of goods of the first kind, commutative justice is violated toward the state or the Church; because this or that has strict right that provision be made for it from the best ministers, and this devolves upon the providers by their office. Hence, strictly speaking, restitution must be made to it, not indeed to the particular persons, for whose benefit these goods are not primarily ordered, and who therefore have not strict right to them, but only a right of aptitude. But in the bad distribution of goods of the second kind there is found a violation of commutative justice even toward private persons; because from the fact that these goods are destined primarily to them, they have strict right to them, that is, a right to the thing itself, and the bad distributor is held to restitute to them.

n. 5.

I say 2°: Acceptance of persons is, by its genus, mortal sin. ⁴⁶⁴ Because every injustice is, by its genus, mortal sin. Now acceptance of persons is an injustice opposed to distributive justice, which is a virtue more excellent than commutative justice, and from which follow damages no less than from commutative justice. Therefore. ⁴⁶⁴ Hic q. 63, a. 1, c.

Billuart, Summa Summae, Tomus III. On the Secunda …, On Right and Justice, On the Vice Opposed to Dis…, On respect of persons in the distribution of spiritual things

By spiritualities we here understand ecclesiastical power, whether of order or of jurisdiction, and its exercise, especially ecclesiastical benefices and offices.

n. 2.

I suppose as certain that the conferral of spiritualities on an unworthy person, if worthy ones are found, is mortal sin, because it is an acceptance of persons in a matter of grave moment. ⁴⁶⁵ ⁴⁶⁵ Ibid., ad 2 et 3.

n. 3.

The difficulty, therefore, is whether it is lawful to confer a benefice on a less worthy person, passing over one more worthy. Hence:

n. 4.

I say: The conferral of any benefice or ecclesiastical office made on a less worthy person, one more worthy being passed over, regularly speaking, is illicit, but valid. Say the same of presentation and election. It is the common opinion of the authors. ⁴⁶⁶ ⁴⁶⁶ Ibid., a. 2, c.

n. 5.

Furthermore, understand the conclusion thus: not that the collator or patron must inquire through the whole kingdom or province who is the most worthy; for that would be a burden too heavy, and liable to deception; but that from those who are at hand, or whose merits he knows or can come to know, using moral diligence, he choose him whom he judges the more worthy.

n. 6.

The first part of the conclusion is proved 1° from canon law, cap. unico: « Ut ecclesiastica beneficia », Decretal. lib. III, tit. XII. Innocent III says: « Not out of carnal affection, but with judgment weighed, ought you to have dispensed the ecclesiastical office and benefice to the more suitable person. » The Council of Trent, sess. XXIII, cap. 1, on the promotion of bishops, declares that those promoted and those lending their efforts sin mortally, « unless they have most diligently taken care that they judge them the worthier and more useful to the Church. » And cap. 18, on the presentation of pastors, says: « From these the bishop shall choose him whom he judges the more suitable than the others. »

n. 7.

It is proved 2° by reason. ⁴⁶⁷ As long as, in promotion to a benefice or ecclesiastical office, a less worthy person is preferred to a more worthy one, there is manifestly an acceptance of person injurious to the Church, for whose benefit ecclesiastical benefices and offices were instituted. Therefore. ⁴⁶⁷ Ibid., ad 3.

n. 8.

But note that the worthiness of someone can be regarded in two ways. ⁴⁶⁸ In one way, simply and in itself; and thus he is of greater worthiness who more abounds in the gifts of grace in spiritual things. In another way, by comparison with the common good; for it sometimes happens that he who is less holy or less learned can contribute more to the common good because of power, or industry, or something of this kind. But greater worthiness must be regarded not simply, but comparatively, with respect to the common good. ⁴⁶⁸ Ibid., a. 2, c.; Quodlib. cit.

n. 9.

The second part of the conclusion is clear from various places in the law which require only a worthy person. ⁴⁶⁹ This the interpreters understand with St. Thomas to mean that the conferral or election be valid and cannot be challenged in a judicial forum; because otherwise every election could give rise to calumny, and there would be no end of lawsuits. ⁴⁶⁹ Ibid., ad 3.

n. 10.

From what has been said it follows that he sins mortally who promotes, or takes care to have promoted, presents, or elects to a benefice or ecclesiastical office having annexed the care of souls or ecclesiastical governance a less worthy person, one more worthy being passed over — or even to simple benefices, but otherwise of grave moment, for instance one having a vote in elections to dignities or to offices having the care of souls; because it is an acceptance of persons in a matter of grave moment, with great detriment to the Church, or at least from which such detriment can follow. See proposition 47 condemned by Innocent XI.

n. 11.

[Such is this proposition: « When the Council of Trent said that those communicating in the sins of others sin mortally who promote to churches none other than those whom they judge worthier and more useful to the Church itself: first the council seems by this to have meant by worthier nothing else than the worthiness of those to be chosen, taking the comparative for the positive; or, secondly, in less proper language it understood the worthier so as to exclude the unworthy, not indeed the worthy; finally, thirdly, it follows when the concursus takes place. »]

n. 12.

But it will be venial only, more probably, if simple benefices of lesser moment are in question, such as chaplaincies, modest canonries, provided they are not conferred by concursus; because, since such benefices are ordered to humble and very limited offices, such as reciting the office, celebrating Mass, singing the Epistle or Gospel, etc., it does not seem that grave damage is inflicted on the Church if sometimes a less unworthy man is placed over a worthier one.

n. 13.

I said in the conclusion, « regularly speaking, » because there are certain cases in which it is lawful to promote worthy men to benefices even with the cure of souls, worthier men being passed over.

n. 14.

1° If from the institution of the benefice it has been settled by the Church that the one to be promoted must be from the bosom of the Church, e.g., from a certain family. 2° If the founder of the benefice himself fixed beforehand who is worthy; for this privilege is granted to him by law, cap. Monasterium, causa 16, q. 7. 3° If in the election [...] it would not benefit the more worthy one.

n. 15.

You will ask 1° whether he who promotes an unworthy or less worthy person to benefices or ecclesiastical offices, one more worthy being passed over, is held to any restitution.

n. 16.

I answer. 1° He who promotes an unworthy person — both the promoter and the one promoted are held to restitute to the Church all the damages that come to it from this: the promoter, because he sins against commutative justice toward the Church, to which he is bound by his office to set over it worthy ministers; the one promoted, because he cooperated in the unjust action of the promoter, and from him immediately flow the evils of the Church.

n. 17.

I answer. 2° He who promotes a less worthy one, the more worthy being passed over, is also held, speaking of itself, by force of such promotion, to restitute to the Church; because toward it he violates commutative justice, since he is bound by his office, as was said, to set over it the best ministers. But it seems that the Church neither demands this restitution nor binds to it, in order to avoid perplexities: and thus the common sense [of theologians] apprehends it.

n. 18.

[The other opinion, no less probable, holds that the promoter is held to no restitution in this case. The reason is that ecclesiastical offices to which benefices are annexed were instituted primarily, indeed even solely, that the Church may be served by good ministers. Now, as is supposed, if the worthier are passed over, those chosen are worthy or good. Hence, if the good of the Church is not provided for in a better way, it is at least done sufficiently, and the intended end is essentially attained. Therefore ⁴⁷⁰ Moreover this question becomes purely speculative from what was said above, namely that the Church in the aforesaid case does not demand restitution.] ⁴⁷⁰ S. Lig., lib. V, n. 107.

n. 19.

I answer. 3° He who promotes an unworthy or less worthy person, one more worthy being passed over, outside the concursus, is held to restitute nothing to the more worthy one who was passed over; because with respect to him he does not violate commutative justice, but only distributive justice. For the more worthy one has not strict right to the benefice, but only a right of aptitude and proportion.

n. 20.

I said, « outside the concursus; » because, by force of the announcement of the concursus, anyone capable acquires the right to compete, and he who is judged the worthier has, from an implicit pact, strict right to the benefice. Hence, if it is conferred on a less worthy one, injury is manifestly done to the worthier one; just as, when many fight in a public contest, injury would be done to the victor if the proposed prize were denied to him.

n. 21.

[You will ask 2° whether a worthy man, clearly knowing another to be worthier, sins by accepting the benefice, and is held to repair the loss to him.

n. 22.

I answer. The first opinion affirms it, because he himself, by accepting the benefice, cooperates in the unjust election to the damage of the other. The other opinion, which seems truer, says that he neither sins nor consequently is held to restitution.

n. 23.

The reason why he does not sin is given by D. Thomas, IIae IIae, q. 185, a. 3, c, namely that, on the part of the one choosing, « he who must choose someone as bishop... is not held to take the better one simply,... but the better one for the governance of the Church... On the part of him who is taken up, it is not required that he consider himself better than others; for that would be proud and presumptuous: but it suffices that he find nothing in himself by which it becomes illicit for him to take up the office of prelacy. » Furthermore, what is said of the episcopate must be said a fortiori of inferior benefices ⁴⁷¹] ⁴⁷¹ Id., ibid., n. 110, dub. 2.

n. 24.

You will ask 3° whether what has been said thus far in the present article is to be extended to secular offices.

n. 25.

I answer, more commonly and more probably affirmatively; because these offices are likewise ordered primarily and principally to the common good of the state. Hence he who distributes them to the unworthy, or to the less worthy, sins against commutative justice toward the state, and against distributive justice, by acceptance of persons, toward the worthier.

n. 26.

You will say: He who holds dominion over some thing, and can sell it, is not an acceptor of persons if he hands it over or sells it to whom he wills. Now the prince or the state holds dominion over secular offices, and can sell them. Therefore.

n. 27.

I answer: I distinguish the major. If that thing is so much its own property that it is not to be appropriated to the common utility of the state, I concede; if it is to be appropriated to the common utility of the state, as public offices are, I deny. — To the minor ⁴⁷² Indeed, speaking absolutely and from the nature of the thing, secular offices can be sold; because the dignity, the ample stipend, the occasion of gain, and similar things annexed to these offices are assessable in price. But they must be sold to the worthier and for a moderate price, lest poor but more suitable men be shut out from them, and lest those who buy at an immoderate price practice rapine and extortion to keep themselves whole. And because they are accustomed to be sold indiscriminately to the higher bidders and at an immoderate price, without regard to greater or lesser unworthiness or worthiness, therefore it is not expedient that they be sold. ⁴⁷² D. Thom., Opusc. XXI, 1, 5°.

n. 28.

You will ask 4° what qualities are necessary for duly obtaining benefices.

n. 29.

I answer. The first is probity of life. The second is learning, which must be such as the office annexed to the benefice requires. The third is legitimate age, namely for the episcopate, the completed thirtieth year; for benefices having the care of souls, the completed twenty-fourth year; for a canonry of a cathedral church that age is required that the one receiving the benefice may be able within a year to receive the order annexed to that benefice; for other canonries and any simple benefices, the begun fourteenth year. The fourth, legitimate title, without which, or without a dispensation, the conferral is void. The fifth, clerical tonsure. The sixth, celibacy, so that a conferral made to a married man is null. The seventh is immunity from major excommunication, suspension, interdict, and irregularity. The eighth is immunity from heresy in oneself and in one's parents up to the second generation according to the paternal line, and up to the first according to the maternal line. The ninth is a determined intention of taking up the office annexed to the benefice, or, if none be annexed, of persevering in the clerical state. Hence he sins mortally who accepts a benefice with the mind of enjoying its fruits until, for example, he has finished his studies, or found a suitable wife, intending afterwards to resign it; and if it be a parochial benefice, he is held to restitute the fruits received. The last condition is that another benefice not be conferred on one who already has one without cause. Hence

n. 30.

You will ask 5° whether it is lawful to possess several benefices at once.

n. 31.

I answer: that it is illicit by natural and positive law ⁴⁷³, except in certain cases to be assigned below. ⁴⁷³ Quodlib. IX, a. 15, c.

n. 32.

By natural law; because for one man to hold several benefices at once contains in itself several disorders. First, the Church is deprived of a number of ministers and their service, since it is not possible for one man to serve several churches, and then prebends were established as it were stipends for those ministering there. Secondly, there follows a diminution of divine worship, while one man is instituted in place of many; for he who holds several prebends does not recite the hours, sing, or celebrate Mass more often, etc. Thirdly, there follows the frustration of the will of the founders, who contributed something to this church precisely so that, according to the number of benefices, there would be a number of beneficiaries ministering to God there. Fourthly, there follows inequality, while one man abounds in several benefices, and others equally or perhaps more suitable cannot obtain even one. Add that plurality of benefices is a foment of ambition, avarice, gluttony, lust, and many other vices.

n. 33.

By positive law. Cap. Sanctorum, dist. 70; cap. Clericis and cap. Clericum, causa 21, q. 1. Which ancient law the Tridentine confirms and renews, sess. xxiv, cap. 17 de Reform., in these words: « The holy synod... commands by the present decree that hereafter only one ecclesiastical benefice be conferred on each man, which indeed should suffice for his honorable support for life; nevertheless another simple one sufficient may be conferred on the same man, provided neither requires personal residence. »

n. 34.

I said, « except in certain cases. » The first is the one assigned by the Tridentine: if one benefice does not suffice for the honorable support of the beneficiary and his dependents in need.

…and 4 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Concina, Compendium

Daniele Concina, O.P. — 15 passages

Diss. III, Chapter V — On the worthier who are to be elected to ecclesiastical benefices

n. I.

I. QUESTION I. Whether the worthier, the worthy being passed over, ought to be elected to ecclesiastical benefices? ANSWER. He is called worthier who is more useful for the ministry. This worthiness is to be gathered not from knowledge alone, nor from probity alone, but from all the endowments seriously weighed; and judgment is to be formed which of those to be elected is more useful for governing the evangelical flock. The Council of Trent, session 24, chapter 1 On Reformation, teaches that electors, communicating in others' sins, sin mortally, unless they diligently take care that those be set over churches whom they themselves have judged worthier and more useful to the Church, and not indeed by prayers, or human affection, or the suggestions of the ambitious, but by their merits requiring it.

n. II.

II. Fr. Thomas Tamburini, Book 8, chapter 4, § 4, no. 5, writes these things: “I assert secondly that all benefices — whether greater, as a cardinalate and bishopric, or lesser, as a canonry and chaplaincy; whether having the care of souls, as an abbacy and parish, or not having it, as the aforesaid canonry and chaplaincy, and the other benefices which are named simple — abstracting from those which are given in competition (of which presently at no. 14) — I assert, I say, that it is enough for avoiding mortal sin if they be conferred upon the worthy and fit, although the worthier or the most worthy be passed over.”

n. III.

III. Fr. Filliucci, tract 41, in the Appendix, chapter 4, no. 181: “I say fifthly that the opinion which reckons it enough to elect the worthy to benefices which are not given in competition is probable, from Trent, session 7, chapter 5 On Reformation, saying: Let them be conferred upon the worthy; and from the universal estimation in the creation of beneficiaries, cardinals, bishops, abbots, and so forth, who, if they be held among the worthy, the elector and the election are praised. But it would not commonly be praised, if it were evil and a mortal sin.”

n. IV.

IV. These things I have transcribed, that it may be more explored and more discovered by all whither the genius of certain casuists tends, and that they do not fear to elude the most clear words of Trent. What they are about to do when the canons and laws are not so perspicuous, let the wise judge. Fr. Tamburini in the same place, no. 8, adds these things: “Since immediately before, the Council seems to be content with the worthy, either first it seems by this to wish to signify by worthier nothing else than the worthiness of those to be elected, the comparative being taken for the positive; or secondly by a less proper locution it sets down worthier, that it may exclude the unworthy … or lastly, thirdly, it speaks when there is a competition.”

n. V.

V. The Venerable Innocent XI condemned this opinion of Tamburini, proposition 47, which is of this kind: When the Council of Trent said that those communicating in others' sins sin mortally, who promote to churches any others than those whom they have themselves judged worthier and more useful to the Church, the Council either first seems by this to wish to signify by "worthier" nothing else than the worthiness of those to be elected, the comparative being taken for the positive; or secondly, by a less proper locution it sets down "worthier," that it may exclude the unworthy; or lastly it speaks thirdly, when there is a competition.

n. VI.

VI. Fr. Tamburini is to be excused, because he wrote before the condemnation of the theses. But Fr. Viva upon this thesis, no. 1, adverts that Tamburini calls the opposite opinion more probable. What thence? This alone was lacking, that he should not recognize the doctrine evidently handed down in Trent even as more probable. But what does it matter to call the doctrine of Trent more probable, when the opposite is by Probabilism probable? Nay, it is enough that it be probable; and by these words of proscription all testimonies, even the most evident, are eluded.

n. VII.

VII. It is plain therefore that electors to benefices, whether simple or with the care of souls, ought to elect the worthier. Assuredly electors sin more gravely and more wickedly who elect the worthy, the worthier being passed over, to benefices with the care of souls, than if they elected them to simple benefices. But this does not take away that they sin gravely, if in the distribution of simple benefices they violate the order prescribed by Trent. Since in this also a grave detriment is brought upon the Church, and distributive justice is violated.

n. VIII.

VIII. Authors dispute here whether, when the excess of worthiness is slight, electors sin gravely if they prefer a worthy man to another who is slightly worthier. Some deny it, others affirm it. But speculations being dismissed, pastors in a most grave business, in which the public good of the Church is always treated, are bound to prefer him whom, all things being regarded, they acknowledge to be worthier. To an unworthy man in no case is a vote to be given; nay, that electors may avoid the election of an unworthy man, when they cannot elect a worthier, they can give their vote to a worthy one. He who resigns a benefice in favour of someone is bound to seek the worthier. Examiners ought to propose to the bishop him whom they acknowledge to be worthier. Unjust electors to benefices are bound to compensate the losses at least of the Church or community. As regards him who is unjustly passed over, read St. Thomas, II-II, q. 63, art. 2, reply 4.

n. IX.

IX. QUESTION II. Is the translation of bishops forbidden? ANSWER. Fr. Suárez, Vol. III, On Religion, Book 1, chapter 18, with others defends that it is forbidden by ecclesiastical right alone. But Soto, Carthusianus, Bannez, and the Salmanticenses maintain that this translation is forbidden by natural and divine right. And they evince it by the authority of Innocent III, chapter Inter corporalia, where he decrees these things: Since therefore a spiritual bond is stronger than a carnal, it ought not to be doubted that Almighty God has reserved to his own judgment alone the dissolving of the spiritual marriage which is between a bishop and his Church.

n. X.

X. That spiritual marriage is not founded in all things upon matrimony, since the latter is a sacrament not subject to human power. Innocent III nevertheless subjoins that by a divine rather than a human power that spiritual bond is dissolved when by the authority of the Roman Pontiff a bishop is removed from his Church and transferred to another. Hence gather that this translation can in no way be made, unless a most urgent and most evident cause occur, which yields to the convenience and utility not of the bishop but of the Church. Wherefore what is to be said of those bishops who receive one Church as a spouse with this intention, that she may be a step to another, and the other to another to be espoused, until at last they find one most beautiful — that is, which they judge richest and most opulent? Whether these are adulterers and not spouses, wolves and not pastors, let the judgment be others'. Nor should you object that things which are of natural and divine right are not obnoxious to dispensation, even pontifical: since some things are of natural and divine right absolutely; others presuppose free human acts, which being posited, a natural and divine right arises. This latter, not the former, may lie subject to a dispensation, or rather to an interpretation of the Supreme Pontiff, who, as bearing the place of God, interprets laws of this kind. See Vol. III, on the dispensation of vows.

n. XI.

XI. Confirmation is an act which affords full right to the elected or presented man to the dignity to which he has been elected. The confirmer ought to explore the endowments of those elected, and to confirm the worthier.

n. XII.

XII. The Supreme Pontiff has power of conferring all benefices of whatsoever kind in the universal Church. Archbishops and bishops in their own dioceses. Cardinals can confer the benefices of their own churches, whatsoever they be; and Cardinals in the province of their legation can confer benefices. The Chapter of a cathedral Church together with the bishop has power of dispensing canonries and prebends. In diverse Churches diverse customs obtain. The Chapter, the See being vacant, cannot confer benefices, by rule 3 of the Chancery.

n. XIII.

XIII. QUESTION III. What is the resignation of a benefice? ANSWER. A benefice can fall vacant either by the death of the beneficiary, or by renunciation, which is a voluntary dismissal of the benefice made before the lawful Ordinary. It is twofold: the one express in words; the other tacit through acts contrary to the retention of a benefice, as through matrimony, through the military art, through religious profession, and so forth. Bishops can admit simple resignations only; the Pontiff all conditioned ones. In the Bull of St. Pius V given in the year 1568 several causes of resignation are assigned: 1. If the beneficiary be an old man of seventy years; 2. If he be sickly; 3. If he be paralytic, apoplectic, lunatic, leprous, and so forth; 4. If he be lame, dumb, deaf; 5. If he be a homicide, sodomite, concubinary, blasphemer; 6. If he be bound by ecclesiastical censures; 7. If he have obtained several benefices which he cannot administer together; 8. When on account of capital enmities he cannot administer. Some of these causes induce a necessary resignation.

n. XIV.

XIV. After a triennium all benefices can be resigned. If the benefices be of a right of patronage, the patron's consent is necessary. A beneficiary in the article of death cannot renounce with hope of return, as Trent declares, session 25, chapter 7 On Reformation. Resignations in favour of another are simoniacal. The use of these crept in little by little about the end of the fifteenth century, against all the ancient canons. What absurdities follow hence cannot be expressed. The dispensations by which successions of this kind are wont to be made honourable are frequently obreptitious and subreptitious, and therefore before God null.

n. XV.

XV. Exchange is akin to a resignation in favour of another, and differs only in this, that in an exchange the resignation is mutual. If anyone having only a right to the thing should exchange with another having the same right, or a right in the thing, the exchange is simoniacal. For a lawful exchange there is always required a greater utility of the Church. A beneficiary through a contracted marriage loses his benefice, even if afterwards the marriage be detected to be null. For if he truly intended to contract, by that very deed he spurns the benefice. If he contract feignedly, he deserves to be deprived. This is to me the more probable, the argumentations of very many being dismissed.

Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V

Gaudentius Bontempi of Brescia, O.F.M. Cap. — 16 passages

Tr. I, Disputation XXIII: On Just…, Question X: Whether distributive justice differs in species from commutative