Fourth Part: On Distributive Justice

611. Distributive justice is that by which society, or its presidents, distributes advantages and burdens among members, according to the merit, suitability, or necessity of each. It differs from commutative justice:

1. Essentially, it is in society as in its subject; on the contrary, commutative justice is in a private man;

2. It necessarily regards several, whose merits or necessities are compared, even if an office is conferred or a burden imposed on one; on the contrary, commutative justice does not compare or distribute among several, but gives to one or to several, to each a rigorous right;

3. It distributes things of the community which are not actually, but only in potency and by destination, things of the members, and therefore it does not render a strict right nor per se oblige to restitution. On the contrary, commutative justice renders a strict right which each one has to a determined thing which is already at least in some way his; whence it obliges to restitution. Therefore commutative justice per se regards equality of thing to thing; not so distributive justice: the latter per se regards geometric proportion, because it distributes goods and burdens among members proportionately to the dignity which they have toward them.

One must speak of distributive justice after the others, because it frequently happens that, together with it, commutative and legal justice must be observed or are violated.

We shall speak:

1. Of judgment in general, which is primarily an act of distributive justice, and of the opposite sin, namely, acceptance of persons; then specifically:

2. Of justice and injustice in distributing goods;

3. In distributing burdens, for example, taxes and military service;

4. In public trials, namely, a) of judges; b) of the accuser, defendant, and witnesses; c) of advocates.