Question X: Whether distributive justice differs in species from commutative

THE DIFFERENCE between Distributive and Commutative Justice is taken from the object. I distinguished and explained both p. p. Tract. 1. disp. 19. quaest. 1. Distributive justice, therefore, establishes equality among private persons, by dividing the goods of the Community among them equally, according to Geometric proportion, the dignity of persons being considered, in such a way, namely, that with the same Geometric proportion (as double, e.g., or sesquialter, etc.) by which the dignity of one is greater than the dignity of the other, he also obtains more of the common goods. But Commutative justice establishes equality among private persons, by giving or receiving an equal according to Arithmetic proportion, such as, e.g., between five and five.

THUS, then, Distributive justice has as its formal object the mean between excess and defect, according to Geometric proportion, just as, e.g., the quintuple is the mean between the sextuple and the quadruple; and therefore to him who exceeds another in dignity, e.g. by the quintuple, there ought to be distributed from the common goods quintuple more than to that other. But Commutative justice has as its formal object the mean between excess and defect, according to Arithmetic proportion; just as five is the mean between six and four; and therefore, of two men having five each, he who has taken one from the other must restore one to him, lest he himself have six and the other four, but each have five, which is the mean. Aristotle hands down this definition 5. Eth. cap. 3. et 4, received by all. Nor is it necessary to dispute this doctrine with Geometric and Arithmetic speculations, for they would obscure the moral matter more, as Gregory of Valencia warns disp. 5. quaest. 5. puncto primo.

HE NOTES, however, that by Distributive justice an equality is established according to the relation of the Community to its parts, and by that very fact an equality is established also among the parts of the Community themselves; and in this last respect, he says, the formal reason of Distributive justice consists; for among these there is a quintuple equality, e.g., to the quintuple, a quadruple to the quadruple, which is an equality simply and properly, such as ought to be in proper justice, and this Aristotle teaches 5. Eth. chapter 2. Whence it happens that this Justice is not only in the Dispenser of the community, but also in the members of the community, in those capable of receiving this equality; for they can will it.

I ASSERT that these two Justices are specifically distinct. So Aristotle in the place cited, and the common view.

IT IS PROVED. Those virtues differ in species whose acts, from the formal reason of their object, have both a different praise and a different difficulty: such are the acts of Commutative and Distributive Justice: Therefore. The minor, as to praise, is evident; as to difficulty, however, it is proved, because by Commutative justice there is given to another what is truly his; but by Distributive justice there is given what is as it were his, inasmuch as what belongs to the whole community belongs also to the parts; but it is easier to give to another what is his absolutely, than what in another way is in some manner his.

From these things the answer to Buridan's argument 5. Eth. quaest. 7 is clear, where he contends he can prove that they are not specifically distinct, because both preserve equality. For we have already seen that the equality of each is different. See the rest in Valencia loc. cit., and Mastrius disp. 7. num. 179.

FURTHERMORE, the matter of Distributive and Commutative justice are the very things that are commuted or distributed; but the proximate matter of Commutative justice are commutations, either voluntary, as Buying, Selling, Exchange, Betrothal, Usury, Deposit, Hiring, as Aristotle says 5. Eth. cap. 2; or according to D. Thom. art. 3: Buying or Selling, which is the permutation of a thing for money; Usufruct, when someone grants gratis the use of a fruit-bearing thing, with the obligation of returning the same thing; Loan for use (Accomodatum), when the use of a non-fruit-bearing thing is granted gratis, with the obligation of returning the same thing in number; Mutuum (consumable loan), when likewise the use of a non-fruit-bearing thing is granted gratis, with the obligation of returning the same in species, not in number; Leasing and Hiring, when the use of a thing is granted for a price, with the obligation of returning the same: Deposit, when a thing is granted that it be kept and afterwards returned; Pawning, when a thing is granted to secure the obligation of satisfaction, namely that if he does not satisfy, it can be retained: Suretyship (Fideiussio), when someone simply obliges himself to satisfy for another. Add Bills of Exchange, Partnership, and other things to be discussed below.

THERE ARE ALSO Involuntary Commutations, from which some are clandestine, as Theft, Adultery, Poisoning, Pimping, the seduction of servants, Homicide treacherously committed, and false testimony. Others are violent, as scourging, Chains, Death, Robbery, Mutilation, Reviling, the infliction of Contumely. See St. Thomas.

BUT THE proximate matter of Distributive justice are the distributions of all the goods of the Republic, revenues, honors, etc. Indeed also of burdens, which ought to be distributed according to the distribution of goods and honors as well. See the same D. Thomas.

FROM WHAT has been said it seems to follow that Commutative justice does not observe Geometric equity, otherwise the species would be confused, as Valquez and Turrianus say: Yet Suarez, Card. Lugo, Poncius (in Mastrius n. 181) assert this for the case when someone, because of contracts, owes many and has gone bankrupt; and therefore cannot satisfy all equally; then he must satisfy all according to proportion; as if one creditor is owed a hundred gold pieces, another two hundred, let 150 be given to the latter, but only fifty to the former. Thus he will pay by Commutative justice, and Geometric proportion will be preserved.

YET FOR all that those equities are not confused, says Mastrius, because in Commutative justice an equity of quantity, of equality, and moreover of proportion is required; in Distributive justice, however, of proportion alone.

AMICUS, however, disp. 11. sect. 14, for that reason denies that they are specifically distinguished.

COLLECT MOREOVER that Commutative justice is a genus divided into subordinate species, as I related above; for in nearly each there is a different law, as Mastrius says num. 184; for the law concerning goods of reputation, life, fortune, etc. is different, as Amicus also says.

CARDINAL LUGO ALSO COLLECTS disput. 1. num. 43, on Distributive justice, that in every act it regards several persons compared, so that proportion may be preserved.

THIS, HOWEVER, Suarez denies, disp. de Iustitia sect. 3, as do Poncius and Mastrius, because a Bishop can confer a benefice on someone without comparison with others.

BUT THIS reason is frivolous; for Distributive justice to be preserved, the more worthy must be chosen, according to the decree of the holy Council of Trent; and this supposes a comparison, at least confused, or some distinct one with several; otherwise, if he confers it thinking nothing of it, he will not act according to the norm of Distributive Justice.