Duties of the Confessor as Judge

Duties of the Confessor as Judge in Hearing the Case.—(a) Since confession should be entire, the confessor is gravely bound to question the penitent, when there is reason to think that the confession is not entire. With pious and well-instructed persons, of course, there is no need of questioning, and, since the duty of integrity rests primarily on the penitent, the confessor’s negligence may be regarded as venial when he is burdened by a great multitude of confessions.

(b) Since confession must not be made onerous or harmful to penitents, the confessor is bound to be very discreet in the questions he asks, and to follow the rule that it is far better to say too little than to say too much. He must avoid any word or remark that might teach sin to the young or scandalize the old; he must be very reserved when speaking of matters that pertain to the Sixth Commandment, and, if there is need to question about them, should begin with very general queries. Neither directly nor indirectly may he inquire the name of an accomplice of the penitent (Canon 888); but he is allowed to investigate matters which he has a right to know, even though the accomplice thereby becomes known to him. If the common good requires that a complaint be lodged against the accomplice, the confessor may oblige the penitent to make this complaint to the proper superior; but it is seldom advisable that the confessor agree to perform this duty himself, and then he should require that the penitent speak to him about the affair outside of confession, if this can be done (see 1287).

(c) Since the penitent acts as the accuser in confession, he should be believed both for and against himself. But should it happen that the confessor knows for certain that his penitent is lying, his procedure will depend on the source of his knowledge. If the knowledge is not of sacramental origin but comes from the confessor’s own reliable experience (e.g., because he saw the penitent commit a sin and is sure that the silence about the sin is not due to forgetfulness, ignorance or previous confession of it), he should try to induce the penitent to confess, and, if the latter refuses, should deny absolution. If the confessor is morally certain on account of the word of a third person that the penitent is now concealing a sin, it seems to some authorities that absolution may be either granted or refused, to others that it must be refused. Finally, if the confessor’s knowledge comes from a previous sacramental confession or other obligatory secret, he is held to respect the secret; he may not ask any questions which he would not have asked otherwise, and, if the penitent will not confess, he must either grant absolution, as some hold, or dissimulate its denial, as others think.

Duties of the Confessor-Judge in Deciding about the Case.—(a) The confessor should pass judgment on the past state of the penitent’s soul as declared to him, but defect or mistake here would not make the Sacrament null. The objective malice of the sins (i.e., their theological and moral malice) will be recognized by the priest from his knowledge of theology, and the subjective malice from the declarations or replies of the penitent. At times the confessor will have to rest satisfied with the decision that the sin or its character is uncertain.

(b) The confessor should pass judgment on the present dispositions of the penitent, or the sincerity of his sorrow and resolution; but it suffices that the judgment be probable, and there be no strong suspicion against it. The penitent’s devout confession, or his promise of amendment, the trouble he took to make his confession, etc., are indexes of good faith, just as boastful confession, disregard for former promises, and unwillingness or carelessness about coming to confession are signs of bad faith.

Duties of the Confessor-Judge in Passing Sentence.—(a) The Duty of Binding.—The confessor must impose upon the penitent such duties as are necessitated by the essence of the Sacrament (e.g., there is no true contrition without willingness to make due restitution, reparation, or satisfaction, and to avoid sinful occasions and to struggle against bad habits), or such penalties as are required for its integrity (i.e., the priest must impose a suitable penance). To safeguard morals, the law of the Church gravely obliges a confessor to require his penitent sub gravi to denounce another confessor certainly guilty of the crime of solicitation, unless there be a grave reason that excuses the penitent; and, if the penitent refuses, absolution must be denied. On the details of this law and on the penalties for solicitation, refusal to denounce, and false accusation, see Commentaries on Canons 904, 2368 and 2363 of the Code.

(b) The Duty of Loosing.—The confessor is bound sub gravi to give absolution at once to one who is properly disposed, for there is a tacit contract between the penitent and the confessor that absolution will be granted if the penitent is worthy; the penitent puts himself to considerable trouble to obtain forgiveness, and he is deprived of a great good if absolution is refused (Canon 886). If only free matter is confessed, it is a venial sin now and then to deny absolution without reason, but no sin to deny it for a good reason if the penitent consents.

(c) The Duty of Retaining.—The confessor should always refuse absolution to those who are certainly not contrite and in whom he cannot awaken true repentance, for absolution would be of no benefit to such persons and would make the confessor an encourager of sin. Likewise, absolution should be denied those who are incapable (e.g., those who have not as yet committed sin or who confess only imperfections). If there is doubt about the fitness or capacity of the penitent, absolution should generally be delayed; but it may be granted conditionally for a serious reason (e.g., if the penitent is in a state of sin and cannot return to confession for a long time), and it should be granted conditionally for a very serious reason (e.g., if the penitent will probably not return, or if he is confessing in preparation for marriage).

Penitents to Whom Absolution Should Be Denied.—There are three classes of penitents especially to whom absolution should be frequently denied on account of their lack of repentance:

(a) those who refuse to abandon a proximate and voluntary occasion of grave sin, for these are impenitent and unworthy of absolution. But absolution may be given those who promise to abandon a proximate and voluntary occasion, or to use the proper means of safety if they are in a proximate and necessary occasion of sin (see 263 sqq.);

(b) those who have contracted the habit of some grave sin, if they are unwilling to use the proper means to overcome it; but if they seriously promise to use means prescribed by the confessor, they should be considered as well disposed. A sin is habitual when it is committed often—that is, for an external sin about five times a month, and for an internal sin about five times a week-and when the sinner acts for the proper motive of the vice, e.g., in injustice for disorder, in intemperance for pleasure of the sense, in sins against charity out of hatred, etc. But consideration should be taken also of the character of the person (i.e., a weak-willed person is enslaved by habit more readily than a strong-willed person) and of the vice (i.e., an alluring sin like impurity becomes a habit more quickly than other sins);

(c) those backsliders or recidivists who have confessed the same grave sin in three or four previous confessions and have relapsed into it again without any improvement. These persons should be absolved if they are sincere now and give some special indication as proof of sincerity (e.g., some effort made to conquer their habit); otherwise (except in great necessity, when they may be given the benefit of the doubt and be granted conditional absolution) they should not be absolved but should be put off kindly for a short space, since there is no reason to believe that the present sorrow is any better than that of the past.

The Sacramental Penance.—(a) Obligation.—The confessor is bound to impose a penance in order to provide for the integrity of the Sacrament and the good of the penitent. Exceptions to this rule are the cases when the penitent cannot perform any penance, as when he is at the point of death, and when the penitent after the imposition of a penance and absolution remembers new and necessary matter. It is at least a venial sin to delay the giving of a penance till after the absolution, and it is a grave sin to give no penance at all, unless (as some hold) only a light penance was due.

(b) Quantity.—The amount of the penance should be suited as a punishment to the degree of the penitent’s guilt, that is, a heavier penance should be given for necessary matter and a lighter penance for free matter. The penance should also take into consideration the moral malice and the frequency of the sins. Works that the Church may order under pain of serious sin suffice for necessary matter (such as a Mass, a fast, five decades of the Rosary, or the Litany of the Saints). Light penances are the De Profundis, the Litany of St. Joseph, five Paters and five Aves. For a sufficient reason (e.g., the sickness of the penitent, the probability that a grave penance will keep him from future confession, the fact that his sorrow is very great or that he has gained a plenary indulgence, the performance of satisfaction for him by the confessor himself) the quantity of a penance may be lessened. A grave penance may be lightened by joining it with some duty already owed (e.g., by requiring the penitent to say the Rosary while hearing Sunday Mass, by obliging him to hear Mass on Sunday and also to say a few prayers after the Mass).

(c) Quality.—The character of the penance should make it suitable as a remedy for the spiritual disease of the penitent; that is, as far as possible he should be required to perform works that tend to correct his chief failings. Thus, for those who are uncharitable or avaricious an alms or other work of mercy is a good penance; for those who are given to pleasures of sense, a fast or other corporal austerity; for those who are lax or irreligious, a prayer, a visit to the Blessed Sacrament, a meditation, or frequentation of the Sacraments. Ordinarily it suffices to impose prayers as penances, since prayer is a universal remedy. Penances unsuitable to the penitent (e.g., fasts for one who needs nourishment on account of labors), those that are too difficult (e.g., perpetual or long-continued practices), those that are harmful (e.g., penances that will bring the penitent into suspicion or ridicule), must be avoided.

1. "Gervasius, a confessor, because of haste and some carelessness, sometimes omits one or another question to be asked about the species or number of sins.

It is asked: 1.º Whether, or in what way, there is a grave obligation of interrogating penitents? - 2.º What must be said about Gervasius?

R. To the 1st. Of itself there is a grave obligation in the confessor of interrogating penitents, because the confessor, insofar as he is judge, must take care that, as much as is sufficient, the cause of the sacramental judgment be instructed. Besides, he is constituted so that he may not only hear the penitent, but aid him in duly fulfilling his obligation. Hence:

1.º A confessor sins gravely if from the voluntary omission of some interrogation there ought to follow grave harm of the penitent or of another, and he had foreseen that harm at least confusedly. He also sins gravely if he fails in the obligation of interrogating with regard to a notable part of this obligation, considered in its whole complex; for example, if knowingly and voluntarily, without reasonable cause, he omits most questions about number and species. For then he gravely fails in his office, and inflicts grave irreverence upon confession and the sacrament.

2.º But he does not sin gravely if from slight negligence, or from inadvertence, he omits several things even necessarily to be asked. Billuart, diss. 6, a. 10, § 2, where he speaks thus: "If from slight negligence, from inadvertence, from lapse of memory, human distraction, weariness of spirit, too great attention in hearing confessions, etc., he omits to inquire something even necessary, it will be no sin or only a light sin: for no one is bound with so great difficulty and moral impossibility to supply the defects of others."

3.º There will be greater difficulty if the confessor, without grave reason and voluntarily, or from grave carelessness, omits only one or another necessary interrogation, for example, concerning number or species. On the one hand he seems to sin gravely, because he supplies the place of the penitent; but the penitent, if he adverted to the obligation and did not satisfy it, would sin gravely. Yet on the other hand it does not more probably seem that he sins gravely. The reason is that in this there appears smallness of matter with respect to the whole obligation considered in its complex. Besides, if gravity of matter were admitted, a very great burden would be imposed upon confessors, who would always fluctuate amid anxieties, fearing lest perhaps from grave negligence they had omitted an interrogation to be made, and thence would be driven into the opposite excess with great burden to penitents.

Furthermore, although the confessor supplies the place of the penitent, nevertheless he does not seem to be bound to interrogate with such rigor as the penitent is bound to accuse himself. For the confessor precisely supplies not as taking caution for the penitent, but rather as his helper. Add also that, if a rigorous comparison between the obligation of each were admitted, the burden of the confessor would exceed the debt of the penitent a thousand times; since the penitent is rarely bound to confess, but the confessor must continually and often the whole day fulfill his office.

To the 2nd. Gervasius seems to be excused from grave sin, since from carelessness he omits a few questions to be asked about the species and number of sins, because he is judged to fulfill his office as to its substance." G. 666-668, 671; I. M. 819.

As regards the number of sins, one must not be solicitous beyond measure, and when it is very difficult to know the probable number, it will be better to know the state of the penitent, especially with the unlearned and the habituated, and as regards internal acts. Lig. 466; Sporer 451; Lugo, d. 16, nn. 573, 575, 576.

It must also be noted here that if the confessor has not understood something well, he will be able at the end to interrogate about it, lest he interrupt the penitent. "But if from the conscience of the penitent known to him he can presume that what he did not perceive is something light, and he cannot interrogate without disturbance or annoyance of the penitent, he can be silent and absolve." La-Croix 1716.

2. "Guido, a priest of unhappy memory - whatever may be said of his judgment - lest he disturb penitents, is accustomed to postpone to the end of confession the questions to be asked, the remedies to be prescribed, and the burdens of restitution to be imposed, of abandoning the occasion, etc. But not rarely, when the narration of the penitent has been completed, he has become entirely forgetful of the things to be investigated or imposed, indeed even of the sins themselves. What then, the wretched man? He compels the ruder to repeat the confession in a summary way, but leaves the more cultivated in peace, lest he offend them; and, the matter being dissembled, he immediately absolves, sometimes indeed not knowing what he is absolving.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. Guido acted badly, by postponing to the end of confession all questions to be asked and burdens or remedies to be prescribed, because of the danger of forgetfulness. Any other man acting thus would be imprudent; how much more Guido, who knows well that he is of unhappy memory?" Thus Fr. Gury 679.

Guido indeed acted badly, but is he bound before he absolves to demand from his penitent a repeated confession, so that he himself can now ask the questions which he omitted, especially concerning the species and number of sins? Busembaum, apud St. Alphonsus 499, says: "If, when confession has been finished, you understand that the confessor did not perceive some things, whether because of sleep or distraction, but you do not know what those things are, you are bound to repeat the confession if it was short, because you can prudently doubt about each thing. But if it was long, you are not bound because of the contrary reason; and it is enough to confess that you doubt whether the confessor perceived any of your sins." And St. Alphonsus immediately adds: "Thus also hold the Salmanticenses, etc., who say that Christ the Lord is not presumed to have imposed the precept of integrity with so great a burden, namely of repeating all sins in such a Case, and Lugo teaches the same, d. 16, n. 607, with Sanchez, etc., commonly." Hence it is drawn that a confessor who had proposed to himself to interrogate the penitent about the species and number of some grave sin at the end of confession, and then forgets such a sin, if the confession was of only one or another grave sin, seems to be bound to demand a repeated confession; for then he can prudently doubt about each thing, nor otherwise is a grave burden imposed upon the penitent, especially if the confessor does this prudently. And this certainly without scruple is commonly done by confessors, if sometimes they do not hear and understand some sin well, nor are penitents disturbed on that account. But if the confession was long and of several grave sins, then the confessor seems able to abstain from demanding a repeated confession of all, lest he impose so great a burden upon the penitent. I. M. 717.

3. Robertinus abstains from hearing confessions, because he says that from experience itself it is established for him that he often cannot define whether there was mortal or venial sin, since penitents often explain sins in a very doubtful manner, so that they themselves do not know whether they gave consent. Besides, he adds that he is greatly wearied in his head in hearing confessions, both so that he may form a judgment about the lowest species of sins and determine against what virtue precisely they are, and so that he may judge about the number, which often is impossible for him to perceive clearly, since he cannot at once make mentally the addition of all the sins in order to know the entire number of sins.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. Robertinus is greatly deceived concerning the nature of the judgment to be formed about sins in the administration of the sacrament of penance. For first, "the confessor is not bound to form a certain judgment about individual sins, but only about the obvious and clear." Lig. 500. "It is not necessary that the confessor judge in all things which sins are grave or light; it is enough if he knows how to judge this in those which commonly occur; but the rest he may hear and absolve." Lig. 627.

Besides, as regards the judgment to be formed by the confessor concerning sins, 1.º with regard to the species of sins, a twofold knowledge of sin must be distinguished. The first knowledge is explicit, reflex, and in the signate act, concerning the nature or species of each sin, against what virtue and what precept it is; and such is the knowledge of guilt in the external judicial forum, when the judge pronouncing punishment explicitly signifies the various laws violated by the guilty person and the punishments already established by law in the diverse articles of the code. The other knowledge is implicit, direct, and in the exercised act, and is had when the confessor apprehends the sin with all its circumstances changing the species, so that if any one of them is lacking, he is prepared to interrogate. Although he himself does not actually say: such a sin is against such virtues and precepts, in such or such lowest species, nevertheless he distinguishes one sin from another very well. Now for hearing confession validly and licitly this latter knowledge of sin is sufficient; for it is sufficient for forming a true judgment about the sin. But it is enough, with regard to the species and circumstances of sins that must necessarily be explained, by reason of restitution of goods and reputation, reservation, censure, irregularity, etc., "if the confessor understands the things which more frequently happen, and knows how to doubt about the others." Lig. 627; I. M. 811. - 2.º With regard to the number of sins, it is not necessary that at the end of the whole confession the confessor make some arithmetical calculation and addition of all the sins. For, for imposing penance, even a confused knowledge of the state of the penitent is sufficient; but once the penance has been imposed, it is not necessary for imparting absolution also to remember even confusedly the sins or the imposed penance, but it is enough to remember that the penitent, rightly disposed, has rightly confessed, and that judgment has been passed upon him. Nor indeed is it necessary to make the same calculation in any part of confession, when the penitent confesses sins of each species, saying, for example, that through several years he committed such a sin about ten or twelve times; and then through several years fell into it more frequently, say about twenty times each week, etc. For that distinct knowledge of the number is sufficient which is had successively by parts: then the confessor, although successively and by parts, truly forms judgment about the number of sins, and from this can sufficiently know at the end of the whole confession at least confusedly the state of the penitent. Besides, that calculation would be an intolerable burden for the confessor. Suarez, d. 22, s. 6 at the end; Lugo, d. 16, n. 636; La-Croix, l. 6, p. 2, n. 1717; Reuter, Neoconf., p. 1, c. 7, n. 28; L. 502; G. 678; I. M. 745, 749.

4. Patutius the confessor asks: Whether he is always bound to absolve a penitent whose confession he has heard, and for this purpose to embrace the more benign probable opinion?

R. 1.º In a Case of grave necessity, for example at the article of death, he is bound. The reason is that in such a Case he cannot, charity being preserved, leave the penitent without a remedy which he can licitly apply. But, according to a morally certain opinion, he can licitly use the more benign probable opinion.

2.º Outside the case of grave necessity, if that probable opinion stands on the part of the penitent, who in his action wishes to embrace a probable opinion favorable to himself, for example, whether the penitent in such a Case is bound to restitution, then the confessor is bound to embrace the probable opinion of the penitent and absolve him. The reason is that, the confession having been heard, the penitent has a certain right to absolution if he is legitimately disposed. But although he wishes to embrace the more benign probable opinion, the penitent can be legitimately disposed; for by embracing that opinion, he can well detest all past sins and have an efficacious purpose of observing all the precepts of God. For he sufficiently observes the divine precept who, by following a probable opinion, prudently judges that he is bound by no precept to perform something, and therefore omits it. Therefore. - But if that probable opinion stands on the part of the confessor, for example, whether in such circumstances the confessor can deny absolution or give it, and each opinion is probable, the confessor can choose the stricter opinion and deny absolution. For 1.º then the confessor acts according to an opinion truly probable and consequently licitly. Therefore, just as the penitent concerning his own obligation can choose a probable opinion, so also the confessor concerning his own obligation can choose a probable opinion. 2.º Because, if there were any reason why the confessor could not do this, it would be because, the confession having been heard, the penitent has a certain right to absolution. But since only the obligation of absolving the penitent is probable, the penitent does not have a certain right to absolution. Therefore. - Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 1, d. 26; L. I, 6, n. 604; H. A., tr. 16, nn. 118, 119; I. M., vol. 1, n. 119.

We must treat: 1. of instructing the cause; 2. of rendering the sentence.

614. Principles. - I. The Confessor is bound to question penitents concerning the species, number, and circumstances changing the species; concerning the causes of sins, habit, and proximate occasions, whenever he reasonably presumes or prudently doubts that these things have not been sufficiently declared. The reason is that the Confessor, as minister of the Sacrament, must procure its integrity and, as judge, must obtain for himself the knowledge necessary for rendering an equitable judgment. This is also evident from the Fourth Lateran Council and from the Roman Ritual. - St. Ligorius, no. 617, and Practice of the Confessor, no. 19.

II. The Confessor is not bound to question the penitent except with some ordinary diligence. The reason is that the penitent himself is bound to examine himself not with the greatest but only with moderate, that is, ordinary diligence. But the obligation of the Confessor cannot be graver than that of the penitent, since the Confessor is bound to examine the penitent only secondarily, or in default of him. - St. Ligorius, Practice of the Confessor, no. 20.

III. The Confessor is not bound to question penitents who, although uneducated, seem sufficiently instructed for their condition and diligent in confessing sins with their circumstances according to their state and capacity. - A fortiori, it is not necessary to examine those who confess frequently and rarely sin gravely, such as devout persons, Religious, and Ecclesiastics, unless something necessarily to be explained appears to be omitted by them. - St. Ligorius, no. 607, II and III; Apostolic Homilies, no. 103.

615. Rules for the Practice of Questioning. - I. Rule. Questioning must be moderate, and therefore the Confessor must take care not to be too anxious in questioning. Otherwise, questioning, and consequently confession itself, will be grave and burdensome both to himself and especially to the penitent. Hence let him never ask useless things or permit them to be narrated to him. Therefore let him attend to those things which the Roman Ritual has: Let him take care not to detain anyone with curious or useless questions, especially younger persons of either sex, or others, by imprudently questioning them about that which they do not know, lest they suffer scandal and thereby learn to sin.

And St. Ligorius, no. 607: Let the Confessor not be too anxious in questioning, but let him ask only about those things which probably pertain to the penitent according to his condition. And in the Practice of the Confessor, no. 21: Let him ask only about sins into which they can easily fall, their condition and capacity being considered. Thus also Billuart (dissertation 6, article 10, section 2): In a moral examination (the Confessor ought to examine) not with the greatest and exquisite, but with human and moderate diligence, and conformably to the capacity of the penitent. For the Priest is not bound to examine the penitent more than the penitent himself is bound to examine himself, since the Confessor is bound to examine him in default of the penitent. But the penitent is not bound to examine himself with the greatest and exquisite diligence, but with human and moral diligence. Nor does it matter that, if the Confessor examined more, perhaps he would discover more; for here attention must be paid not only to the material integrity of confession, but also lest the Sacrament be rendered burdensome and odious to penitents by the greatest and excessive industry in examining. It is therefore sufficient if the Confessor prudently judges that the penitent omits nothing. Sporer, no. 792, has the same in nearly the same words. - Salmanticenses, chapter 12, no. 21. - Reuter, The New Confessor, chapter 3, at the end, etc.

616. II. Rule. - Questioning must be discreet; namely, the Confessor must question with great prudence, diligently taking care: 1. not to ask about sins which probably were not committed, considering the condition and capacity of the penitent, etc.; 2. not to ask about those things from which the penitent may learn to sin or may suffer scandal, according to what was just said from the Roman Ritual; 3. not to ask with curiosity or levity even concerning those things about which inquiry must be made, for example, immodestly concerning immodest things, etc., etc. In a word, he must strive that in every question gravity, piety, modesty, and paternal charity alone appear, as the nature and dignity of this office require. - See the Roman Ritual. Hence: 1. he must be very cautious in questioning concerning the matter of lust, especially with women, adolescents, and children, who can suffer scandal much more easily. For how many unhappy penitents have lost innocence and soul because of an incautious question or explanation of the Confessor! But with married persons let him never make mention of the conjugal debt without grave cause (Sacred Penitentiary, June 8, 1842); and it will be sufficient, when the matter requires, to ask the woman whether she has furnished due fidelity and obedience to her husband in all things.

2. The rule admitted by all must be diligently observed: In the matter of lust it is much better to fall short in many things than to exceed in one by reason of the integrity of confession. Therefore, in doubt whether in such a case you can or ought to question, the negative side must always be followed; for it is a lesser evil that the integrity of confession be lacking than to incur the danger of losing a soul.

617. III. Rule. - Questioning must be opportune, that is, it must be done at the time and in the manner which are suitable. But certain questions are ordinarily to be asked before confession, though few, lest the penitent be offended, for example: How long has it been since he confessed? Was he absolved? Did he fulfill the penance ¹?... Is he at peace concerning his past life? This last question should be asked only when the penitent has not confessed for a long time or when a general confession is undertaken from a determined time. - The other questions concerning condition, state, age, etc., will more suitably be asked, as occasion is given, during the course of confession. Thus, on the one hand, every suspicion of curiosity and levity will be avoided, and on the other the penitent will answer more easily when his confidence in the Confessor has been increased.

¹ The Author does not contend that these questions must always be asked, but only that, if at any time, after certain things have been heard, it seems that they should be asked, they are more suitably asked at the beginning.

But those Confessors err who wish always to make a certain judgment concerning the quality of the sin, whether it is grave or light, and torment penitents in order to know with what intention or what conscience they did this; for these will often answer whatever happens to come into their mouth, so that, when questioned a little afterward concerning the same matter, they will deny what they had previously affirmed. The case is different, however, if they appear sufficiently instructed, or if there is doubt about full consent given to a temptation. Generally, unless the circumstances counsel otherwise, it can be presumed that the penitent apprehended the object of the sin as it is evil in itself.

618. Questions. - QUESTION 1. What must the Confessor do in doubt concerning the sincerity of the penitent?

Reply. It is a common rule and a received axiom: The penitent is to be believed when speaking both for himself and against himself. The reason is that in the sacred tribunal the penitent is at once the accused and a witness, his own accuser and advocate, and moreover in doubt he is always to be presumed truthful. Therefore, after suitable questions, the Confessor must absolve a penitent who denies. - St. Ligorius, no. 631.

619. • QUESTION 2. What must the Confessor do if he knows with certainty that some sin is being concealed or denied by the penitent?

Reply 1. If he knows it from the confession of another, he must, lest the seal of confession be violated, question only generally, as he otherwise would have done or ought to have done. But if the penitent, when questioned, denies it, let him reply nothing; rather, if he can do so without arousing suspicion, let him merely exhort him generally to open his conscience with all confidence. Whether the Confessor ought to absolve such a penitent is disputed. - St. Ligorius, after reporting the opinions of others, concludes thus: In my judgment, Croix thinks better, that in this case he should by no means absolve, but should merely say some prayer in order to conceal the denial of absolution ². - More commonly, however, other Doctors with Suarez, On Penance, disputation 32, section 3, no. 9, teach that absolution is to be denied only when it is altogether evident that the penitent is lying against the integrity of confession. Indeed, several say that absolution is to be granted in every case to a penitent denying his sin whenever knowledge of this sin has been obtained solely from the confession of another, namely, an accomplice, because this knowledge is to be held as nothing, since it was acquired from the confession of another. This, moreover, is sufficiently probable. Reply 2. If he knows it outside confession, of itself he must absolve the penitent who denies it, because the penitent speaking for himself and against himself is to be believed; nor can the report of another of itself produce greater faith than the declaration of the penitent himself; therefore the Confessor is no more bound to believe others than the penitent. For if the penitent committed that sin, the Confessor must presume that he either forgot his sin, confessed it to another, has a just cause for concealing it, or that the reporters were instead deceived. - St. Ligorius, ibid. - Billuart, ibid.

² Illsung first introduced this opinion and practice (treatise 6, disputation 6, question 4, article 7, section 4, no. 128), relying upon a fallacious citation of Suarez, who (On Penance, disputation 32, section 3, no. 9) indeed teaches the opposite. Croix borrowed the same from Illsung (book 6, part 2, no. 1969), together with the fictitious support of Suarez, adding through inadvertence a citation of Dicastillus, whom Illsung had cited for another purpose. To these St. Alphonsus (no. 631) added Viva, who (On Penance, question 8, article 5, no. 2), although he reports the opinion of Suarez and De Lugo less exactly, nevertheless in no way adheres to that opinion. Therefore, that entire opinion is owed to an hallucination which wrongly adduced the authority of Suarez, Dicastillus, and Viva.

** The VV. oppose thirty-four columns (pp. 587-603) to the twenty-four lines of which this and the immediately following Note consist. Nevertheless, so great a bulk has more appearance than substance. As the matter demands, we shall give an account of those things which are said in the Note.

In this first little Note the question is whether a confessor can absolve a penitent concerning whom he knows from the confession of another that a sin is being concealed. But in the Note it is said that Illsung replied in the negative, relying upon a fallacious citation of Suarez, who indeed teaches the opposite. Therefore, that Illsung relies upon a citation of Suarez is beyond controversy. But the words of Suarez cited by Illsung prove that he cites Suarez fallaciously. These words of Suarez are (loc. cit. above in the Note): It is replied that as a rule one must stand by the confession and word of the penitent. Hence, however much (Illsung incorrectly has from whatever source) the confessor knows the sin of the penitent from the report of others, he is bound in this judgment to believe the penitent himself rather, for the reason given. Then, if the confessor himself saw the sin with his own eyes and can probably judge that the penitent confessed that sin to another, he can dissemble and believe that he then denies it because he is not bound to confess it again. But if it is altogether evident that he is lying against the integrity of confession, he is not bound so to stand by the words of the penitent that he cannot use his knowledge to convince and reprove the penitent himself. Moreover, Illsung argues from this text thus: According to Suarez, the confessor is not bound to stand by the words of the penitent if it is altogether evident that he is lying. But from the confession of another which has been heard, it can become altogether evident that the penitent is lying. Therefore.

But the reasoning is fallacious and contrary to the mind of Suarez if, according to Suarez, that complete evidence cannot be referred to a case of knowledge drawn from the confession of another. That, according to Suarez, that complete evidence cannot be referred to knowledge drawn from the confession of another is manifestly evident from these words of the same author: HOWEVER MUCH the confessor knows the sin of the penitent FROM THE REPORT OF OTHERS, etc. For the word however much embraces whatever certitude the Confessor can have from the confession of another. Therefore Illsung relies fallaciously upon the authority of Suarez.

The VV. here object (p. 589) that the words of Suarez, as a rule one must stand by the word of the penitent, are to be referred also to knowledge received from the report of others. - Reply. I deny the whole. For the context evidently proves that the word as a rule indeed intimates the exception which he adds, if the confessor saw it with his own eyes and cannot conjecture that the penitent confessed that sin to another; but the word however much in no way permits an exception as regards knowledge received from the report of another.

2. It is added in the Note that Croix borrowed from Illsung the false citation of Suarez and, furthermore, through inadvertence added the false citation of Dicastillus, whom Illsung had cited for another purpose. It is easily evident that these things are so. For Dicastillus, in the place which Illsung cites (On the Eucharist, disputation 9, no. 491), disputes whether the administration of the Eucharist can be simulated by giving an unconsecrated particle and, from this, generally whether it is lawful to simulate the administration of Sacraments. But Illsung cites him to prove that absolution can be simulated. Yet Dicastillus has not even one word concerning our present question. Therefore, through mere inadvertence Croix added the fallacious testimony of Dicastillus to the fallacious support of Suarez.

3. Finally, it is added in the Note that St. Alphonsus took from Croix the citations of Suarez, Illsung, and Dicastillus, and added to these Viva, who, although he reports the opinion of Suarez and De Lugo less exactly, nevertheless in no way adheres to that opinion (namely, of Illsung). - These things too are demonstrated with little business. For Viva indeed says (loc. cit. in the Note) that a penitent is not to be absolved if the confessor prudently judges that the penitent denies the sin from shame; but he nowhere says that this prudent judgment is had in the case of St. Alphonsus. Moreover, he reports the opinion of De Lugo and Suarez less exactly; for these did not say, if the confessor prudently judges, but if it is altogether evident. Therefore, in their opinion, a judgment, unless it is altogether evident, will not be prudent. But De Lugo (disputation 22, no. 22) denies that a judgment which rests upon the testimony of another penitent is evident and therefore prudent. You ask, he says, what if the confessor knows evidently from the confession of others that Peter committed such a sin, which he himself afterward denies in confession? It is replied that it is contradictory for him to know this evidently from the confession of others, since that entire knowledge is resolved into the testimony of another penitent. And these things can suffice to give an account of those things which had been written in this brief little Note.

For the opinion of St. Alphonsus the VV. add (pp. 592-594), besides Henno, who inclines to that opinion, also the authorities of Babenstuber, Reuter, and Voit. - Reply. St. Alphonsus had already observed that not all Authors thought the same in this question; this ought therefore to seem even less surprising because different authors frame different hypotheses. Moreover, Babenstuber, Reuter, and Voit, no less than St. Alphonsus, manifestly transcribed from Illsung and Croix.

Finally, the VV. conclude this part thus (p. 594): But it matters little whether more or fewer Authors approved the opinion of Father Illsung; for the holy Doctor approved it not on account of extrinsic authorities, but on account of intrinsic reasons which are certainly evident and convincing. - Reply. The holy Doctor in fact adduces no reason, but merely cites the Authors whom we indicated in the Note; the Note itself also, as is evident, merely has certain things concerning the Authors cited by the holy Doctor. Moreover, if truly evident reasons were present, as the VV. boast, we would not thus have dissenting Authors. For why, in a matter which depends especially upon prudent judgment, would we have as blind in an evident matter Suarez and Cardinal De Lugo, easily the foremost of the Theologians?

And let these things suffice for those sixteen columns which the VV. wrote against the eight lines of the preceding little Note. We shall subjoin to the Note itself the response to the other eighteen columns which the VV. added against the sixteen lines of the following Note.

I said, of itself; for if the confessor is altogether certain of the sin committed by the penitent because, for example, he himself saw him stealing, heard him blaspheming, etc., or knows it from the certain report of others ³, he cannot absolve one who denies, provided he is certain that the latter has not forgotten his sin and has no motive for concealing it; for this rule, The penitent is to be believed, etc., avails indeed in a matter less certain, but not in a matter evidently certain.

³ These words, if he knows it from the certain report of others, etc., seem to have slipped inadvertently from Benjamin Elbel (On Penance, conference 17, no. 454), from whom St. Alphonsus then took them, and our Author from him also. For Elbel adds that all think thus, although, even by the admission of St. Alphonsus, this is manifestly false, and that doctrine is the common one which Suarez expresses thus (On Penance, disputation 32, section 3, no. 9): However much the Confessor knows the sin of the penitent from the report of others, he is bound in this judgment to believe the penitent himself rather, for the reason given.

Indeed, Elbel himself teaches the opposite (On the Sacraments in General, conference 2, no. 44), where he proposes this case: "A certain bridegroom confessed that on the preceding night he had acted shamefully with his bride; and because the Confessor knew that he had already relapsed several times and was unwilling to avoid the proximate occasion, he dismisses him without absolution. Immediately after him the bride, very well known to the Confessor, approaches; nevertheless, perhaps fearing the denial of absolution, she says not a word about the sins of lust committed with the bridegroom. The Confessor doubts whether he ought to absolve." And he replies: "If the bride denies that she committed anything against chastity, he is bound to absolve her, because he is bound to place faith in the penitent as at once the accused and the accuser, speaking both for herself and against herself."

** It could seem incredible that from this brief Note the VV. could have taken matter with which to fill eighteen solid columns. For they heap together from everywhere texts of Authors by which they prove that a confessor cannot impart absolution to a penitent when he is altogether certain, when he knows evidently, that the penitent mendaciously and in bad faith denies the grave sin which he committed. But surely, with so great an apparatus of arms, are they not fighting against shadows?

For in the Note merely a certain defect of coherence in Elbel was noted: while he teaches that the confessor is bound in the proposed case to absolve the bride at least under a condition, he then says that absolution is to be denied if the confessor becomes more certain of the state of the penitent from the report of others. In what sense the words of Elbel in the Note are to be understood is evident from the fact that the opinion which St. Alphonsus attests to be commonly handed down is opposed to him. But this opinion is of this kind (book 6, no. 631): A distinction must be made: if he knows outside confession and knows by his own knowledge, for example, by seeing him steal or hearing him blaspheme, without doubt he ought not to absolve if he denies it, provided there is not a prudent doubt, etc. But if the confessor has it from suspicion or from the report of others, Suarez, Laymann, Holzmann, Sporer, and others also commonly say that after diligent questioning he ought as a rule to absolve. But if you understand the words of Elbel as referring to that certainty by which, for example, in Fagundez, cited by the VV. (p. 597), the Confessor is certain of someone's concubinage FROM PUBLIC NOTORIETY, the question is indeed reduced to such a condition that you seek adversaries to attack in vain. For this reason it was said that the VV. fashioned shadows for themselves against which they turned their arms.

620. • QUESTION 3. How in particular must the Confessor deal with the uneducated?

Reply. Ordinarily the Confessor himself must examine the more uneducated, because, if left to themselves, they will not examine themselves better; and if they are dismissed, they will never return better disposed. Indeed, deterred by the difficulty of examining their conscience, they will easily abstain from confession. - St. Ligorius, no. 607.

621. Principles. - I. Absolution must be granted from justice and under grave obligation to every penitent who has confessed properly and is disposed. The reason is that in the very act of confession a certain quasi-contract has been entered into, by force of which a penitent who has confessed properly and is disposed has a right to receive the Sacrament. Otherwise, an intolerable burden would be imposed upon the penitent without just cause, namely, that he make a confession to another, without being able moreover to trust with certainty that he will receive absolution from this new Confessor. Furthermore, this is also demanded by the end of the institution of the Sacrament and the tribunal of Penance, which was instituted by Christ for the purpose of imparting mercy. Therefore, a Priest denying absolution to a disposed penitent would act unjustly, abuse the power of the keys, and render the Sacrament odious.

II. Nevertheless, absolution can be deferred for a brief time, even for a penitent rightly disposed ⁴, and even without his consent, when, namely, the Confessor judges that this is useful for his reform. The reason is that the deferral of absolution is not its denial; and although a disposed penitent has a right to absolution, nevertheless, he does not have, at least speaking per se, a right to obtain it immediately. For the Confessor is not only a judge, but also a physician ⁵, and therefore, if If, therefore, you inquire into the origin of this practice, you will easily find that it is owed to the zeal for devising everywhere new expedients by which, in certain circumstances, the faithful might perhaps seem capable of being helped more fully; but its reason and end were situated principally in this: that a penitent who, through sluggishness in fulfilling some obligation, was accustomed to weave new delays day after day, month after month, and even year after year, might at length be stirred to put his hand to the work. You have an example in St. Antoninus (part 3, title 14, chapter 19, section 19), where, treating of those who, as he says elsewhere (part 2, title 2, chapter 8, section 35), always procrastinate and are found annually promising the confessor that they will make restitution, and afterward do not do so, he rejects the opinion of those (ibid., section 2) who thought that these persons were to be absolved under the condition of future restitution, and admits the opinion of William that they ought to be absolved simply and without condition; then he adds: After the Confessor has considered that such persons have done this several times, PERHAPS IT WOULD BE A GOOD PRECAUTION to tell such persons that they should first make restitution and afterward come to confession, or for absolution.

⁴ It is of the greatest importance to consider the origin and reason of this practice. Although scarcely any trace of it appears in the writings of the more ancient Theologians, one would nevertheless wrongly take occasion from this, with certain Jansenists, to attribute it to them as its first authors, even though those same men then most notably abused the discipline of canonical penance to deter the faithful from the Sacraments, and were sometimes able, under a feigned appearance of zeal, to impose upon certain Catholics.

But that these Doctors treat of a disposed penitent is manifestly evident from the fact that they suggest deferral of absolution not as necessary, but as merely useful, to be employed from mere counsel and only sometimes. Thus, for example, Suarez (loc. cit.), although he treats of a habit which, as he says, has in a certain way passed into nature, after saying that the penitent's purpose is to be believed notwithstanding any preceding frequency and inconstancy of his, finally adds: If he has proposed more frequently to be corrected and does not do so, suitable remedies must be employed.... Finally, if these should not suffice, IT WILL SOMETIMES BE USEFUL to defer absolution for some days, IN WHICH HE MAY BE COMPELLED TO WATCH, etc. He repeats the same (On Penance, disputation 32, section 2, no. 4) concerning a man who, being placed in a proximate necessary occasion of sinning, relapses again and again: Nor is absolution to be denied to him, even if he relapse again and again, especially if he restrains himself somewhat and gradually diminishes the number of sins, as Navarrus noted, chapter 3, no. 21. SOMETIMES, however, absolution can be deferred (note well: can, not must).

And Sanchez (On the Decalogue, book 2, chapter 32, no. 45): If the penitent does not bear it very painfully, and it is hoped that he will not thereby be drawn away from confession, but rather that it will be a medicine, it will be A COUNSEL to defer absolution, employing the greatest possible gentleness; but if the opposite is hoped, it will not be a counsel.

Filliucci (loc. cit., question 10, no. 320): The remedies are frequent confession, almsgiving.... If these should not profit, a deferral of absolution for some days would be useful.

Gregory Sayrus (loc. cit., no. 8): SOMETIMES, however, it is a most salutary COUNSEL, as Medina, Peter of Aragon, Emmanuel Rodriguez, and Ludovicus Lopez rightly note, not to absolve before, etc.

Palaus (loc. cit., no. 6): FROM COUNSEL the priest will be able to defer absolution if he judges that the deferral will be profitable.

Bonacina (loc. cit., no. 7): Absolution does not seem to be denied to a penitent who has a firm purpose of abstaining in the future from oaths of this kind.... I add... that absolution can be deferred whenever the confessor shall have judged that this is expedient for the salvation of the penitent.

Azor (loc. cit., question 4): Although absolution is not to be denied simply, it nevertheless seems that it should be deferred for a time, so that he may meanwhile devote some effort to this; unless there is otherwise a just cause by which he ought to be absolved from sins immediately.

Reginaldus (loc. cit., no. 87): It is a salutary counsel to defer absolution for such a person, so that he may thus be induced to beware of relapse by watching more attentively.

Cardinal De Lugo (On Penance, disputation 14, no. 166): Finally, IT WILL SOMETIMES BE USEFUL to defer absolution for some days, etc.

Cardinal Toletus (book 3, chapter 18, no. 3): In these cases it is A USEFUL COUNSEL that absolution be deferred, after the whole confession has been heard, until some correction appears.

And this indeed is the practice against which John Sanchez fought with so much ardor (Selected Disputations, etc., disputation 9, from no. 11), contending, not indeed that penitents are to be absolved indiscriminately even if there can be doubt about their disposition, as certain men wrongly impute to him, but that, generally speaking, the hope of greater fruit expected from the deferred absolution of one who is disposed is vain, and consequently that the counsel of deferring absolution for this penitent is not commonly salutary. Hence he further inferred that, when this cause for deferral ceases, the right of the penitent to absolution prevails, so that, since the priest, as his adversaries admit, can absolve immediately, by that very fact he is bound not to defer it. But these things do not in fact oppose the preceding principle of the Doctors; for they too freely and unanimously agree that this medicine is not to be employed when it appears likely to harm rather than to profit. Whether, however, it is at times expedient on account of the fruit hoped for from it is a question pertaining to prudence, concerning which the Author presently treats. Nevertheless, that it can sometimes profit does not seem capable of being denied against the opinion of so many Doctors.

It will be useful to note this one thing: that a few persons proceeded further and contended that the confessor not only can defer absolution, but is bound to do so. But these either labor under an equivocation when they call the penitent disposed, or certainly affirm this against the common opinion. No means can ever be called necessary unless it is the only one. Moreover, the assertion that, with a penitent already disposed for absolution, the only means by which he may be compelled to carry something out is deferral of absolution smacks of a hypothesis altogether too improbable.

⁵ Concerning the office of physician, see what we noted above from Cardinal De Lugo (in the note to no. 605).

You will see this expedient suggested more frequently among Theologians who are somewhat less ancient when they treat of the obligation of employing certain means for correcting a depraved habit, especially one which impels to evil semi-deliberately or even indeliberately, although those acts are culpable in their cause, namely, in sluggishness and neglect of correction, which in these circumstances place a man in a continual state, as they say, of mortal sin. Hence the reason why the Doctors generally touch upon this matter not where they treat of the Sacrament of Penance, but where they treat of the Second Precept of the Decalogue, and accordingly of the depraved habit of blaspheming, rashly swearing, and then committing perjury. Thus the Salmanticenses, treatise 17, On an Oath, chapter 2. - Suarez, On an Oath, book 3, chapter 8, no. 7. - Sanchez, On the Decalogue, book 2, chapter 32, where he treats of blasphemy, and book 3, chapter 5, where he treats of the habit of swearing. - Bonacina, On the Second Precept, disputation 4, question 1, part 14. - Filliucci, treatise 25, chapter 10, on blasphemy and an oath. - Sayrus, Clavis Regia, book 5, chapter 5, where he treats of an oath. - Palaus, On an Oath, disputation 1, point 9. - Viva, On the Precepts of the Decalogue, question 7, article 7, On Perjury. - Trullench, Exposition of the Decalogue, book 2, chapter 1, doubt 20. - Azor, part 1, book 11, chapter 3, On an Oath. - Reginaldus, book 18, On the Second Precept of the Decalogue. The same is to be said of Bartholomew Medina, Emmanuel Rodericus, Ludovicus Lopez, and others whom it would be lengthy to enumerate. he judges that such a remedy will be notably ⁶ profitable to the soul of the penitent, he can prudently use it. - Thus expressly St. Ligorius, no. 462, and in the Practice of the Confessor, no. 76. - Lacroix, no. 1764.

⁶ How grave the cause must be on account of which the confessor employs this remedy, otherwise not necessary but merely useful, with a disposed penitent is clearly understood from those things which were disputed above (nos. 499 and 500). For there we saw from the common opinion of the Doctors that for anyone unwillingly to be deprived of the benefit of absolution is so grave a matter that a deferral beyond one or two days, according to Suarez, Viva, Renzi, Fagundez, Herincx, and others cited by the Salmanticenses (St. Alphonsus, book 6, no. 490), furnishes a sufficient cause why the penitent may licitly set aside either the natural precept of not defaming one's neighbor in a grave matter, or the divine precept concerning the integrity of confession; because, as De Lugo says (On Penance, disputation 16, no. 416), it is a grave thing to be in the state of sin for three days; which he can deservedly fear, since it is difficult to have a true act of contrition; wherefore he will do no small thing if, on account of the reputation of his neighbor, he defers confession for two days. Indeed, St. Alphonsus judged a deferral not only of two days, but even of one day excessive. But to me, he says (loc. cit.), it seems harsh that one who is in mortal sin should remain without absolution even for a day; and Antoine does not seem to dissent from him (chapter 2, question 13, reply 3), where he says that one who is in the state of mortal guilt is not absolutely bound to wait. Therefore, if absolution, as the Author adds with the common opinion of the Doctors, is not to be deferred when the deferral falls into no slight inconvenience of the penitent, it is readily evident with how much caution and prudent sobriety the Confessor must employ this remedy.

I said, at least speaking per se; because, if absolution cannot be deferred without inconvenience to the penitent, it must be granted immediately; for the penitent is then judged to have a strict right to obtain it immediately. - St. Ligorius, ibid., and others commonly.

622. • III. Absolution is altogether to be denied in every case, even that of extreme necessity, to penitents who are certainly indisposed. But absolution is to be denied to penitents who are doubtfully disposed outside the case of grave necessity; in a necessity of this kind, however, absolution under condition can, and indeed must, be imparted. - St. Ligorius, nos. 431 and 432.

623. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Is it often expedient to defer absolution for a sufficiently disposed penitent for the sake of a remedy or experiment ⁷?

⁷ It seems to pertain to an experiment rather than to a remedy when the confessor defers absolution because of a doubt not indeed about future constancy in fulfilling some obligation, but about the present will of the penitent. To this seem in part to pertain the things which De Lugo has (On Penance, disputation 14, no. 167), where, perhaps with none of the Doctors preceding him, he institutes the question: Whether sometimes, when the confessor could believe a penitent saying that he here and now has sorrow and a purpose, he can nevertheless, FOR BETTER PROVING and confirming that purpose, defer absolution for some days. But most frequent experience advises that this way is less suitable for that end and profits altogether little. Reason confirms it. For anyone who deceives himself and the confessor by affirming that he has a will which he does not in fact have will indeed bear this patiently here and will restrain himself until he obtains absolution, just as others who deceive themselves and the confessor abstain for some time before the paschal feasts from their accustomed sins, interrupt for a little while, or rather suspend, disgraceful friendships, etc., so that they may soon obtain absolution more easily; but that deferral of absolution alone should be thought to have induced that will which perhaps was previously lacking, and consequently that the confessor should be rendered more certain of the present disposition of the penitent, there is nothing which solidly persuades this.

Reply. The solution of the question depends upon various circumstances; but attention must principally be given to the greater good of the penitent.

Hence: 1. Absolution is never to be deferred when the deferral is foreseen as more likely to harm. This is evident from what has been said. 2. Nor is it to be deferred if the penitent would incur from the deferral a mark of infamy ⁸. 3. Absolution is rarely to be deferred for a disposed penitent unless he himself accepts the deferral sufficiently easily; otherwise it would profit him with greater difficulty. For the rest, no certain rule can be established ⁹; and if at any time some deferral of absolution appears expedient, it must be made only for a brief time, for example, for three, five, or eight days, etc. Sometimes, where it can easily be done, it will be useful to defer absolution even for one day or a few hours.

⁸ Above (no. 621) the Author had already said that the same is to be done if absolution cannot be deferred without inconvenience to the penitent, as, for example, if he must lack the Sacrament for a long time, or repeat the confession before another, or undergo the burden of a long journey, or incur a mark, if not of infamy, at least of astonishment or a suspicion that absolution was denied, or lose an occasion of gaining an indulgence, etc.

2. Nevertheless, St. Alphonsus does not omit to indicate when, generally speaking, the outcome of this greater advantage can scarcely be hoped for. Thus he says (book 6, no. 463): That I may pronounce my judgment here, I say that if the penitent has relapsed on account of an intrinsic cause or frailty, as happens in sins of pollution, morose delectation, hatred, blasphemy, and the like, I think absolution should RARELY be deferred for a recidivist who is sufficiently disposed.... I said rarely; for I judge that one should not regularly depart FROM THE COMMON OPINION handed down by Sanchez, Decalogue, book 2, chapter 32, no. 45; Laymann, chapter 4, no. 10; De Lugo, disputation 14, no. 166; Filliucci, treatise 7, instruction, chapter 3; Abelly, On Penance, chapter 5, section 20, no. 3; Dicastillus, disputation 10, doubt 29; Navarrus, chapter 3, no. 21; Croix, no. 1822, with the common opinion, as he asserts; Salmanticenses, chapter 5, no. 68; Sporer, chapter 2, no. 330; Toletus, book 5, chapter 13; namely, that absolution is not to be deferred for a penitent who has relapsed from intrinsic frailty, because in such a penitent it is to be hoped more that the grace of the Sacrament will be profitable than a deferral of absolution. From this context someone could conclude that, if St. Alphonsus, while pronouncing his judgment, departs somewhat from the common opinion, he departs not so as to incline toward the more benign way, but toward the stricter one. For he signifies that he departs from the common opinion in this, that he says absolution is sometimes, although rarely, to be deferred for recidivists of this kind, while the common opinion, by his own testimony, teaches that it is not to be deferred. And to this surely someone could refer these words of the same St. Alphonsus (no. 460): I think that he by no means errs who directs himself according to opinions commonly received from Doctors of no humble reputation.

3. But that he thinks somewhat differently concerning those who are involved in some proximate occasion of sinning will recur below for fuller explanation. For now it may be noted only that when Blessed Alphonsus (no. 464) endeavors with many arguments to confirm what he had said, namely, that absolution is regularly not to be deferred for those who relapse from intrinsic frailty, because it is to be hoped that the grace of the Sacrament will profit them more than deferral of absolution, he brought forward for this purpose also these words of the Salmanticenses from the treatise On Penance, chapter 5, no. 68: Why is more to be hoped from a sinner who, through deferral, does not have grace than from one established by absolution in the friendship of God?

Moreover, the Salmanticenses in fact altogether affirm this concerning those who relapse not merely from intrinsic frailty, but also from an occasion of sinning from which they cannot separate themselves either physically or morally; and they prefer that for these also, without interposing a deferral of absolution, you rather confer the benefit of absolution and the grace of the Sacrament twice, for example, today and again after eight days. John Baptist Faure agrees with them (Theological Doubts, etc., doubt 4, section 8): Other things being equal, it is more useful for a disposed penitent to receive the Sacraments of the Church twice than once; that is, it is more useful to be absolved and also to communicate this Sunday, and again to be absolved and communicate on the following Sunday, than to do the same thing only on the following Sunday and not now. For the twofold reception of the Sacraments merits and confers greater sanctifying grace in this world, greater glory in the future world, and a richer abundance of helps for each end.

4. On this matter it will not be useless to bring forward those things which John de Dicastillo has (On Penance, disputation 10, doubt 29, nos. 573-578), and which the Salmanticenses followed: What (he says) if, various means having been tried, he still miserably relapses? Here certainly not a few are at a loss, and I confess that I have not rarely been at a loss. For what some say, that absolution is to be deferred for them several times until some correction appears, experience has proved not rarely to harm, unless it is done meanwhile as he is better instructed and the whole matter is considered according to those things which I said in disputation 6, doubt 21. Here note that which he says, as he is better instructed, and, as he has below, as he is better disposed; for this is what Father Gury had before his eyes when he presently adds that it is sometimes useful to defer absolution for one day, or for a few hours, etc., namely, when the end of the deferral is not that the penitent should at length overcome the difficulty, for example, in making restitution, in pardoning an offense, in asking pardon, in destroying an obscene book or picture, etc., but that by some pious meditation, by more fervent prayers, or by some work of piety or mercy, he may dispose himself better and receive the Sacraments with greater devotion and richer fruit.

5. Note also that Dicastillus says that experience has proved that deferral not rarely harms. Indeed, Cardenas (Theological Crisis, part 4, disputation 39, chapter 2, no. 12) thinks the contrary is to be concluded from the little story he brings forward of a certain woman who, receiving the deferral with great indignation, departed; but returned on the following day full of contrition and tears, saying: If the other confessors had acted thus with me, I would not have persisted so long in depraved morals. But you might call this argument almost childish; and St. Alphonsus will meet us, saying (no. 464): How many unhappy persons I myself have known who, on account of denied absolution, cast themselves into despair and wandered for many years alienated from the Sacraments!

6. Why, however, deferral not rarely harms, Dicastillus adds this reason also: For the rest, deferral precisely as such rarely profits and often harms..., and Confessors experience that it does not always turn out well, indeed that it often turns out badly. For thus many change their Confessor, so that now a new series of remedies may begin and they may receive the benefit of absolution for the first occasions; and if afterward it does not succeed with him, they change and proceed to another, renewing the cause and litigation from the beginning.

7. Then, returning to the method of those who think that penitents of this kind are to be absolved only several times, he says: But what is to be done if, although he does not approach another confessor nor omit confession for a year, but consults the same confessor again and more frequently and asks to be absolved, nevertheless no correction appears? Is he thus to be rejected? Or rather is he sometimes to be absolved? Surely, if he is never absolved throughout the whole year, what can that non-absolution profit, IF OTHERWISE HE IS CAPABLE HERE AND NOW when he approaches? For if he is not capable, there is no question, but it is certain that he is not to be absolved. But if HE IS CAPABLE WHEN HE APPROACHES, and it is thought that absolution is sometimes to be denied as a medicine, why so many times and not more frequently? Or why, if he is always capable, is it not always conferred upon him, especially if it is already known by experience that it is not very troublesome to him to be deprived of absolution several times? Hence I do not see what advantage that remedy can then have; indeed, it has rather the disadvantage that he is deprived of the grace of the Sacrament and of the helps which are accustomed to be given in view of its worthy reception and otherwise would not be given. On account of these and similar things, I judge (I confess) that the aforesaid remedy of denying absolution is rarely to be used; and it always seems harsh to me to deprive a penitent otherwise capable of so great a grace. Nor do I esteem the fear or trouble of denied absolution to profit so much as the helps of grace and the grace itself of imparted absolution, apart from the suitability of a time granted for better instructing and disposing him, as I have already said.

8. But that Dicastillus says these things concerning those who relapse on account of an occasion of sinning which is indeed necessary but proximate is evident from the words immediately following (loc. cit., no. 576): Therefore, in this matter, when just and reasonable causes for not removing the aforesaid occasion subsist, even if the penitent relapses more frequently, he is neither to be compelled to remove that occasion nor to be deprived of absolution, even if he is a most frequent recidivist; rather he is to be exhorted to come frequently to confession, and other means are to be employed which, with the state and opportunity of the person considered, seem expedient to a prudent Confessor, in which matter there are no, indeed scarcely can there be, any certain rules assigned.

9. He gives the reason for these things thus (ibid., no. 577): This doctrine is thus declared, insofar as it can be done by me. Either that absolution is then to be denied on account of the frequency of sinning, or on account of the occasion not avoided. Not on account of the latter, because, as we suppose, he is not bound here and now to avoid it; not on account of the former, as the argument made proves, because that denial of absolution can scarcely profit except perhaps most rarely, and the frequency of Confession and the frequent benefit of absolution will profit more. Therefore, it is to be denied on no account, IF THE PENITENT IS OTHERWISE CAPABLE.

10. Finally, he concludes the matter with these things, which the Salmanticenses also adopted (no. 578): Therefore, just as in sins in which the occasion can be removed neither morally nor physically, as happens in the sin of masturbation, the Doctors and the practice of Confessors rather have frequent confession before the same Confessor enjoined than deprive one who comes of absolution; so in these sins, in which, if not a physical, at least a moral impossibility of turning away from the occasion is found, neither the remedy of separation from the occasion nor the remedy of denying absolution seems to be exacted, since Christ instituted this Sacrament not only to blot out past sins but to guard against future ones. But when absolution is denied, or (which is the same in the present matter) deferred, the Sacrament is denied, and consequently the remedy instituted by Christ against future sins. But who ever saw that it is necessary to deprive a sick person, otherwise capable of the remedy, of the best and greatest remedy for healing a wound, in order that the wound may be healed? Therefore I conclude that it is scarcely necessary, when the penitent is capable of absolution, to use a remedy of this kind, unless perhaps when absolution is deferred for a brief time so that he may be disposed still more perfectly, if this is hoped for, to receive... absolution.... For correction can rarely be hoped for from mere deferral of absolution. And surely I do not see why more is to be hoped (these are the words first transcribed by the Salmanticenses and afterward by St. Alphonsus) from a sinner who is merely attrite and consequently does not have the grace and friendship of God before absolution is conferred, than from that same person already established in the friendship of God through absolution conferred. But if he approaches not merely attrite but contrite, it seems much more harsh and incongruous to me to deprive one who is a friend of God and loves Him above all things, not now on account of past sins but on account of fear of future ones, of the benefit of the Sacrament and absolution.

11. But what was noted concerning the words of the Salmanticenses can likewise be noted concerning the words of the Roman Ritual, which St. Alphonsus (no. 464) likewise brings forward to prove that absolution is regularly not to be deferred for those who relapse from intrinsic frailty, and which are as follows: For those who easily relapse into sins, it will be most useful to counsel them to confess frequently. For no distinction is had here whether anyone relapses from intrinsic frailty alone or also under the impulse of some proximate occasion which cannot be avoided; nor does the same Ritual reckon either of these among those to whom it afterward says absolution is to be denied or deferred.

** To this Note, which otherwise consists almost entirely in reporting the opinions of others, the VV. oppose twenty columns (pp. 768-778), and indeed columns written in a sufficiently fervent style. But in truth not much is needed to satisfy their complaints.

First, therefore, the VV. (p. 769) are vehemently indignant because in Note no. 2 it is said that someone could conclude from the context of St. Alphonsus that St. Alphonsus, if he departs somewhat from the common opinion, does not depart so as to incline toward a more benign way, but toward a stricter one. And they add: 1. that it can escape no sensible and attentive reader that in that proposition there is merely a less correct construction, and that the word regularly, which pertains to the second part of the proposition, was transferred into the first either by a slip of the pen, an error of the copyist (thus), or of the printer. - 2. They add (p. 770) that Father Ballerini knows well what St. Alphonsus says in the texts immediately preceding and how he explains his doctrine in the Apostolic Man and the Practice of the Confessor; and hence anyone can judge whether, by a manner of acting of this kind, unworthy of a Theologian, Ballerini has preserved the rights both of truth and of Blessed Alphonsus. - 3. Finally, they take an argument (p. 770) from the fact that in the Cause of the Beatification of St. Alphonsus the Promoter of the Faith objected that the doctrine of St. Alphonsus concerning recidivists was too benign, namely, that ordinarily speaking, it profits habitual sinners, recidivists, and those in occasions more that absolution be imparted to them when they approach disposed... contrary to the mind of Alexander VII and Innocent XI.

Reply. Someone may deservedly find it marvelous that the VV. could be struck with so great an indignation for this reason alone: that someone could have believed that the holy Doctor, IF AT ANY TIME HE JUDGED that one should depart somewhat from the common opinion, inclined toward the stricter rather than the more benign way. For what? Does not the holy Doctor, in this very question concerning whether absolution is to be deferred for penitents otherwise rightly disposed, depart, as we shall presently see, from opinions which he himself calls common and most probable, inclining toward the stricter opinion? Why, then, could one think only by an absurdity that even in the disputed text the holy Doctor had departed at least somewhat from the common opinion? Indeed, since the disputed text clearly bears this sense on its face (nor were the VV. able to deny it), why could it appear so absurd to attribute to the holy Doctor the opinion which the text plainly bore on its face, that whoever did not suspect a corrupted syntax must be considered senseless and drowsy? And the VV. seem certainly to have considered too little upon whom that grave designation of a senseless and drowsy reader ultimately falls. Indeed, beginning from the edition of the year 1757, which is called the first Venetian edition after two Neapolitan ones, down to the most recent editions of our age, this text of the holy Doctor is read thus in all. Therefore, shall we regard as senseless and drowsy all those who read the Moral Work of the holy Doctor for a century and more, and indeed inquired most diligently into his doctrines, because they did not notice so enormous a fault in the syntax of the text? Let the excellent Father Haringer, the associate of the VV., bear this patiently; for he also, who prepared the Regensburg edition of 1846 and illustrated it with his Notes, suspected nothing of this perversion of syntax, and consequently he too will have to hear himself called a senseless and drowsy reader. But no more concerning point 1.

To point 2. Reply. I deny that from the immediately preceding texts it is so manifestly evident that the aforesaid fault of syntax is contained in the disputed text that only the senseless and drowsy did not see it. For in book 6, no. 463, the holy Doctor, after setting forth two opinions on the proposed question, merely adds two things: first, it is better said that no certain rule can be established in this matter; second, that I may pronounce my judgment here, I say, etc. But what is elicited from these things such that this fault should strike the eyes? Indeed, since the holy Doctor seems in a certain way to oppose his own judgment to the two opinions which he had set forth, while one of those is the one which the VV. contend is to be ascribed here to the holy Doctor, the preceding texts can rather suggest the opposite. Nor should the VV. say (p. 769) that among the Authors alleged by the holy Doctor for the common opinion there is no one who teaches that absolution is never to be deferred for those sufficiently disposed who relapse from intrinsic frailty, from whom, therefore, the holy Doctor thinks one should rarely depart. - Reply 1. Among them you have Laymann, Filliucci, Navarrus, and Toletus, from whose testimonies you will extract nothing. 2. The Salmanticenses (chapter 5, no. 68) do not treat only of recidivists from intrinsic frailty; therefore they do not pertain to the matter; indeed, concerning these they have these words: The Doctors and the practice of confessors rather have frequent confession before the same confessor enjoined than deprive one who comes of absolution. But Sporer, cited with others by the holy Doctor, has these most clear words (chapter 2, no. 330): The penitent will have to be absolved as often as he seriously proposes to amend in the future and wholly to abstain, provided that the Confessor prudently believes that he truly proposes and speaks seriously. Therefore, what the VV. assert so confidently is not true.

But as to what the VV. add, that this manner of acting is unworthy of a theologian and that the rights both of truth and of the holy Doctor were unworthily violated because the doctrine of Blessed Alphonsus could have been elicited more clearly from the Apostolic Man and the Practice of the Confessor: let it be omitted for now whether, through this comparison, the sense resulting from the Moral Work is excluded; let it also be omitted whether all the writings of the holy Doctor, indeed whether all parts of the same work, always bear altogether the same opinion, which it will surely be quite difficult to assert and defend; but let it be permitted to ask: Is sufficient discretion exercised toward the readers of the Moral Work of Blessed Alphonsus if it is exacted from them that, for every single proposition or opinion, they take upon themselves the burden of inquiring into all the Works and Opuscules of the holy Doctor, otherwise to incur the designation and accusation of a manner of acting unworthy of a theologian and of a right violated against truth and the holy Doctor? Let the excellent Father Haringer whom we praised also bear this patiently from his associates; he, when preparing the edition of the Moral Work, sometimes added notes taken from other opuscules, but nevertheless subjected no Note to the disputed text.

What of the fact that not even the holy Doctor escapes those insulting accusations? For he surely knew what he had written in the Apostolic Man and the Practice of the Confessor; he himself several times diligently reviewed his Moral Work. What, therefore, is the reason that he always preserved untouched the disputed text, which, as was said, is read in the same way in all editions, even the first? Will the VV. represent the holy Doctor himself also as senseless or drowsy?

To point 3, finally. Reply. Let the antecedent pass, and I deny the consequent. I said, let the antecedent pass, because an apt argument for solving the doubt concerning the disputed text can be taken neither from the words of the Promoter of the Faith nor from those of the Defender. I said, I deny the consequent; and let the VV. find the reason for themselves in those things which it is known happened in the cause of the Doctorate of Blessed Alphonsus. Indeed, in the Additional Summary Father Ballerini is accused once and again of having represented the holy Doctor Alphonsus, in a certain little Dissertation, by a sacrilegious and blasphemous jeer as a man not of sound mind; which nevertheless the VV. themselves confessed had fallen from their pen through a mere hallucination. From this, then, let it be argued how much weight is sometimes to be attributed to the sayings of defenders. And let these things suffice concerning the objections of the VV. against no. 2; for otherwise it pertains little to the purpose of the things said there whether or not the holy Doctor departs somewhat from the common opinion.

As regards the other parts of the preceding Note, the VV. attack for seven columns (pp. 773-776) that which is said concerning the Salmanticenses (no. 10), namely, that they adopted those things which are brought forward there from Dicastillus. For after filling almost three solid columns, almost beside the matter, with texts of the Salmanticenses, they conclude (pp. 774-775) that the Salmanticenses hold a middle way between Thomas Hurtado and Dicastillus and approve neither opinion. Father Ballerini (they say, p. 775) affirms that the Salmanticenses follow the opinion of Dicastillus; but the opposite is manifestly evident from the text brought forward.

Let us therefore subjoin this text (On Penance, chapter 5, no. 68): Although absolutely speaking the remedy of deferring absolution greatly pleases Thomas Hurtado...; on the contrary, Dicastillus asserts that experience has proved this sharp remedy not rarely to harm, unless it is done meanwhile for an hour or for a time, while the penitent is better instructed or something is prescribed according to the rules of prudence; and he judges NOT WITHOUT REASON that the frequency of confession and the frequent benefit of absolution MORE FREQUENTLY profit; and just as, in sins in which the occasion cannot be wholly removed even physically, as happens in the sin of masturbation, the Doctors and the practice of Confessors rather have frequent confession before the same confessor enjoined than deprive one who comes of absolution, so in those sins in which, if not a physical, at least a moral impossibility of turning away from the occasion is found, FREQUENCY RATHER THAN DEFERRAL WILL MORE FREQUENTLY HELP THE SICK PERSON OTHERWISE CAPABLE OF THE REMEDY OF ABSOLUTION, since Christ instituted the Sacraments not only to blot out past sins but to guard against future ones. BESIDES, why is more to be hoped from a sinner who is merely attrite and consequently does not have the grace and friendship of God before absolution is conferred, than from that same person already established in the friendship of God by absolution conferred AND VERY FREQUENTLY RECEIVING THE SACRAMENTS? Thus the Salmanticenses. Now I ask: Do they not approve the doctrine of Dicastillus when they write: HE JUDGES NOT WITHOUT REASON, etc.? Do not those words marked here in capital letters, which the Salmanticenses supply to add force to the opinion of Dicastillus, indicate approval? How, therefore, do the VV. not hesitate to affirm that the opposite IS MANIFESTLY EVIDENT from the text brought forward?

The VV. (p. 775) bring forward the words of the Note (no. 3) concerning the Salmanticenses, that they prefer that for these also, without interposing a deferral of absolution, for example, for eight days, you rather confer the benefit of absolution and the grace of the Sacrament twice, namely, today and again after eight days; then they add: But the Salmanticenses have not even a word about this matter, and the distinguished Professor attributes to them what Father Faure says in his Doubts.

Reply. In the Note the opinion of the Salmanticenses is reported, but not word for word; otherwise, according to custom, it would have been marked in a different type. But you have their opinion repeated not once but several times, where they praise the frequent benefit of absolution and frequency of confession rather than deprivation of absolution; where they expressly say: Frequency rather than deferral will help the sick person; and finally where they praise one very frequently receiving the Sacraments.

The VV. add (p. 775): From this genuine doctrine of the Salmanticenses, which we have now explained, St. Alphonsus in no way differs.

Reply. I deny what is supposed, namely, that the genuine doctrine of the Salmanticenses is explained by the VV., as we have already seen. For the rest, to define by a decisive argument whether or not the opinion of St. Alphonsus differs from the doctrine of the Salmanticenses, it suffices to have noted this one thing. For the distinction is very well known which the holy Doctor establishes between absolving those who fall and relapse from intrinsic frailty (see Note no. 2) and absolving those who are situated in an occasion, even a necessary one: he establishes that absolution is rarely to be deferred for the former; but for the latter, when they approach confession for the first time, that it is always to be deferred, as the VV. themselves (p. 776) say in these words: Therefore the holy Doctor declares that, supposing absolution can conveniently be deferred, he himself would always defer it for a penitent situated in a necessary occasion and approaching confession for the first time. But the Salmanticenses, as is evident from their text brought forward, treat both penitents in the same way in that place, so that from the practice observed with those who fall from intrinsic frailty they deduce the practice to be observed with those who are situated in the aforesaid occasion. It is therefore manifestly false that the holy Doctor Alphonsus does not differ from the doctrine of the Salmanticenses.

And indeed the VV. make this falsity openly evident by their own words. For, as is evident from their words brought forward, the practice which pleases St. Alphonsus more is that, as often as it can conveniently be done, absolution should always be deferred for occasionaries of this kind. But the VV. themselves, as we saw above, contend (although falsely) that the Salmanticenses held a middle way between Hurtado and Dicastillus. Thus they say (p. 775): But (the Salmanticenses) approve neither opinion, but hold the middle way already indicated above, namely, that deferral is SOMETIMES expedient. Therefore, by the admission of the VV. themselves, that enormous difference stands between the doctrine of the Salmanticenses and that of St. Alphonsus which intervenes between SOMETIMES and always.

Finally, the VV. (p. 777) censure what is said in the Note (no. 5) concerning Cardenas: In part, say the VV., they have nothing to do with the matter, because Cardenas there speaks of habitual sinners; in part they are false, because Cardenas there thus concludes: But for this great prudence is required in the Confessor; for remedies which profit some can harm others on account of the different dispositions of the sick.

Reply. In the question now at issue, whether imparted absolution or deferral of absolution can profit a disposed penitent more, and indeed prescinding from those circumstances in which it is already evident even from the common opinion of the Doctors which counsel is to be preferred, in this question, I say, even St. Alphonsus judges that absolution is rarely to be deferred for habitual sinners who fall from intrinsic frailty. Since, therefore, Cardenas, by an argument taken from that little story, shows himself more severe even concerning these, his citation pertains to the matter a fortiori when occasionaries are treated.

As regards the other part of the censure: Reply. Those words of Cardenas conclude nothing. For each person frames the laws of prudence according to his own judgment, so that even those who are considered most severe think and profess that they are led by prudence. But toward which side Cardenas inclines there can be learned even from this: that when (no. 6) he poses the question concerning one who has a purpose of correction KNOWN EVEN TO THE CONFESSOR, afterward (no. 19), in order to contend against Sanchez that the grace of the Sacrament confers no greater strength for not sinning than deferral of absolution, he objects, contrary to the hypothesis of the question, that perhaps on account of a defect of purpose the Sacrament is not valid. Behold what the name of prudence is worth in the mouth of certain men.

⁹ 1. Thus wisely St. Alphonsus; for since the penitent in the case is supposed to be disposed for receiving grace in the Sacrament, and since this immense benefit ought not to be deferred except on account of some greater advantage of the penitent, the judgment must be taken from the proportionate outcome which can be expected from the deferral; and since this judgment depends upon the prudent consideration of all the circumstances, the saying of the ancients consequently holds here, that there is no science of particulars, and therefore no certain rule can be handed down. Whether it is expedient (say the Salmanticenses, On Penance, chapter 5, no. 68) here and now, abstracting from circumstances, we cannot certainly determine, since it depends upon many things which are easily varied according to the diversity of subjects; hence, after these have been maturely weighed, it will pertain to the judgment of the prudent to impart absolution here and now or to defer it for a time....

624. • QUESTION 2. Is certainty concerning the disposition of the penitent required in order that he may be absolved?

Reply 1. Absolute certainty is not required, nor even strict moral certainty, such as is required in the other Sacraments, for example, concerning the consecration of the Eucharist. The reason is that the Sacrament of Penance scarcely admits a more certain judgment of this kind.

Reply 2. A prudent judgment, or broad moral certainty, which, as St. Alphonsus says, is equivalent to prudent probability, is required and suffices. For penitents commonly display only a probability of disposition. - Thus St. Ligorius, no. 461 ¹⁰. - Suarez, disputation 32, section 2, no. 1, and others commonly. - The Catechism of the Council of Trent, no. 60, agrees, where it is read: If, after hearing the Confession, the Priest judges that neither diligence in enumerating the sins nor sorrow in detesting them has been altogether lacking to the penitent, he can be absolved.

¹⁰ ** The words of St. Alphonsus (book 6, no. 461) are: It suffices that the confessor have a prudent probability concerning the disposition of the penitent and that, on the other hand, no prudent suspicion of indisposition stands in the way; otherwise scarcely anyone could be absolved, since whatever signs penitents give furnish only a probability of disposition, as Suarez rightly teaches. See the opinion of Suarez in the following Note.

625. • QUESTION 3. What are the ordinary signs of sufficient disposition?

Reply. The principal signs are the following: 1. if the penitent confesses candidly and humbly; 2. if he asserts from the heart that he is sorry for his sins and has a firm purpose of not sinning hereafter; 3. if he sincerely declares all sins, even the greater and shameful ones; 4. if he has freely approached confession from some pious motive; 5. if, from a desire of conversion, he has already ceased from sin. - Lacroix, no. 1734 ¹¹.

¹¹ St. Alphonsus (no. 460) reckons nearly all these signs among the extraordinary signs of disposition.

Those words of Suarez seem more pertinent to the matter (On Penance, disputation 32, section 2, nos. 1-2): Before (the priest) *absolves, it is necessary that he prudently and probably judge the penitent to be disposed, because otherwise he would expose himself to the danger of erring and would act without sufficient knowledge. It remains to be explained what the Confessor ought to do in order to judge this prudently and satisfy his conscience. In this it must be observed that this disposition of the penitent arises from two things, namely, displeasure with the past and a purpose for the future. And indeed, as regards displeasure, the Confessor can easily satisfy himself; because, if the penitent in the very manner of his confession and accusation gives signs of sorrow, or certainly if he is a man not very uneducated and appears well-mannered, the Confessor is bound to employ no diligence in this; he will nevertheless always do well by proposing and counseling detestation of sin; and when he does not have sufficient signs of sorrow, he can and must ask the penitent whether he detests the sin from his heart, and he is bound to believe him when he affirms it. And the same is to be said concerning a purpose for the future, when from the confession no special obligation arises of making restitution or leaving some proximate occasion of sinning, but only the common and general obligation of not sinning hereafter.... Nor is it necessary that the Confessor persuade himself and judge even probably that it will so happen that

QUESTION 4. Is the Confessor bound to arouse sorrow in the penitent?

Reply 1. Yes, if the penitent does not appear sufficiently disposed; the reason is that one who absolves an indisposed person exposes the Sacrament to the danger of frustration, but if he dismisses him without absolution, he exposes him to the danger of remaining for a long time in the state of mortal sin, or even of not returning again. - St. Ligorius, no. 608.

Reply 2. No, if the penitent appears sufficiently instructed and disposed, as are well-mannered penitents and those who confess frequently. For then the Confessor is bound to nothing, neither by reason of charity, since the penitent does not need special help, nor by reason of reverence for the Sacrament, which is exposed to no danger. - St. Ligorius, no. 608. - Laymann, chapter 13, no. 10. - Sporer, no. 792.

626. • QUESTION 5. To whom principally is absolution to be denied?

Reply. According to the Roman Ritual and St. Charles Borromeo, it is to be denied: 1. to those who give no signs of sorrow or are unwilling to amend their life; 2. to those who are unwilling to restore another's property, pay debts, repair injured honor or reputation, or repair any other grave harm, when they are able; 3. to those who are unwilling to use the remedies which are necessary for correction or for preventing a fall; 4. to those who refuse to lay aside enmities and hatreds, to pardon an offense, or to be reconciled with enemies; 5. to those who are unwilling to abstain from usury, superstitions, illicit arts and trades, or any evil work; 6. finally, to those who are unwilling to leave a proximate occasion of sinning when they can, or who provide an occasion to others ¹².

¹² You will have all these things, and many others which could easily be added, in this brief rule: namely, that absolution is to be denied to ALL and only those who refuse to fulfill some grave obligation.

627. • QUESTION 6. Can a debtor be absolved before he makes restitution?

Reply. Yes, if the Confessor discovers that the debtor is prepared to make restitution as he ought. But if the penitent has either several times not kept his promises of making restitution, or it is prudently foreseen that he will not keep his purpose, it is expedient that the Confessor exact restitution before he absolves, unless some grave reason nevertheless advises otherwise ¹³.

¹³ ** In the preceding Edition this little Note had been placed here: See concerning this question the doctrine of St. Antoninus in the Note to no. 621. But in that place these things were said concerning St. Antoninus: "St. Antoninus (part 3, title 14, chapter 19, section 19), treating of those who, as he says elsewhere (part 2, title 2, chapter 8, section 3), always procrastinate and are found annually promising the confessor that they will make restitution, and afterward do not do so, rejects the opinion of those (ibid., section 1) who thought that these persons were to be absolved under the condition of future restitution, and, admitting the opinion of William that they ought to be absolved simply and without condition, then adds: After the Confessor has considered that such persons have done this several times, perhaps it would be a good precaution to tell such persons that they should first make restitution and afterward come to confession, or for absolution." This opinion of St. Antoninus indeed confirms what Father Gury has, namely, that in circumstances of this kind it is expedient for the confessor first to exact restitution, etc.

This passage of St. Antoninus stung the VV. not a little, since it seems to differ from the doctrine of Daniel Concina, into whose opinion St. Alphonsus also went (book 3, no. 682, and Apostolic Man, treatise 10, no. 105), writing in the latter place: When the penitent can make restitution immediately, regularly speaking we say WITH CONCINA that the confessor CANNOT absolve the debtor unless he first makes restitution. And in the other place: But the second opinion, which Father CONCINA holds, altogether pleases me, that regularly the debtor IS NOT TO BE ABSOLVED unless he first makes restitution, when restitution is morally possible for him. Therefore, concerning the preceding Note and the citation of St. Antoninus, the VV. write (p. 757): Father Ballerini badly confounds two disparate passages and badly interprets them, and supposes in St. Antoninus a most lax doctrine which neither here nor any other of the older theologians who treat diffusely of restitution hands down.

Reply. In the one place (part 3, title 14, chapter 19, section 19), St. Antoninus treats generally of those who do not perform that to which they are bound, but defer it, for example, to make restitution. But in the other place (part 2, title 2, chapter 8, section 3), he treats of those who, since they are bound to make restitution, certainly ought to live more sparingly so that they may gather what they are to restore, and nevertheless do not do so, but always procrastinate and are found annually promising the confessor, etc. Therefore, in the one place St. Antoninus touches upon the general question; in the other he touches upon a particular case which is contained under the general question. To what the VV. object, therefore, that in the Note two disparate passages are confounded, I reply with a distinction: disparate in location, I concede; disparate as regards the question, I deny. For the rest, it is sufficiently evident of itself that the words taken from the aforesaid place in part 2, always procrastinate, etc., are employed in the Note to indicate generally the condition of penitents of this kind, which St. Antoninus again indicates in the cited place from part 3, saying that such persons have done this several times, etc., and not insofar as those former words are said there of that special case.

Let us come to the accusation of bad interpretation, which appears incredible by the very fact that in the Note the mere words of St. Antoninus are reported without gloss.

The opinion of William which is indicated in the Note is contained in these words in St. Antoninus (loc. cit. from part 3): But if the priest believes or doubts that the one confessing will not perform the penance, or that to which he is otherwise bound, such as to make restitution or the like, William says that the Confessor ought not on this account to exact a promise, vow, or oath, but it suffices if (the one confessing) says that he has a purpose of doing it. And thus he ought to absolve simply and without condition, after nevertheless making a declaration, if he is held suspect, that if he does not do it, he will render the fruit of confession void for himself. Thus William. Moreover, since the VV. (p. 759) say that St. Antoninus supports William (which nevertheless is not altogether true, as we shall presently see), let it be permitted to argue ad hominem thus: St. Antoninus supports William teaching that the confessor OUGHT TO ABSOLVE a penitent if, without any promise or oath, he says that he has a purpose of doing, or making restitution, however suspect the penitent may be held. Therefore, the doctrine of St. Antoninus is not the doctrine of Concina adopted by St. Alphonsus; nor does any bad interpretation appear here.

But the VV. wished to infer something else from William. It is manifest, therefore, they

We must treat: 1. of those who are situated in an occasion of sin; 2. of habitual sinners and recidivists; 3. of devout and timorous penitents. say, that (William) supposes that such a penitent is not to be absolved who, after making that declaration, received absolution and returns to confession without having made restitution. - Reply. I deny this entirely: 1. because it is asserted gratuitously; for the words of William in no way indicate or suggest it; 2. because it is in no way evident that William said these things only of one who had not broken the purpose of the preceding confession; 3. because St. Antoninus stands in the way, who judged that William's opinion, as though too general, should in some way be circumscribed or moderated by those things which we subjoin here.

For St. Antoninus, after bringing forward the opinion of William, proceeds thus: But because many deceive themselves, promising in every confession to make restitution and the like, and always defer; after the confessor has considered that such persons have done this several times, PERHAPS IT WOULD BE A GOOD PRECAUTION to tell such persons that they should first make restitution and afterward come to confession or for absolution, or to assign them some suitable time within which they ought to carry it out. Hence thus: St. Antoninus, as the adversative particle But manifestly signifies, wished to except something from William's general opinion, or wished to moderate it by some qualification. Therefore, either St. Antoninus did not grasp the force of William's opinion, or in the mind of St. Antoninus some exception or moderation of this kind seemed necessary to be added to William's opinion. But any moderation of this kind would have been superfluous if William's opinion bore the meaning which the VV. fabricate, namely, if in William's mind absolution was to be deferred, at least by way of some good precaution, for a penitent who returns without yet completing restitution. Therefore, no bad interpretation of ours has crept in here, but, from the testimony of St. Antoninus, this supposition and interpretation of the VV. is plainly gratuitous and fabricated at pleasure.

Meanwhile, from this latter text of St. Antoninus, the VV. (loc. cit.) wish to deduce that in his mind it is a good precaution for the confessor to defer absolution until the penitent has in fact made restitution, or to assign a suitable time within which he ought to carry it out, and (as the VV. infer a little later) within that time they may absolve him. - Reply. The VV. pervert the opinion of St. Antoninus under more than one head. For: 1. St. Antoninus did not say that it is a good precaution generally to defer absolution until he has made restitution, but to tell them that they should make restitution first; which supposes that this can then be done promptly and within a short time. 2. What the VV. add, that a time is to be assigned within which the confessor can absolve, bears a plainly absurd sense. For either it is supposed that within that time the thing which the penitent ought to do is to be carried out, so that, the matter having been accomplished, he can be absolved, and thus this second member of the disjunction falls back into the first; or the penitent is supposed to be absolved within that time even if he has not fulfilled his duty, and then this assignment of time becomes insipid. Therefore, that assignment of time does not pertain to deferral of absolution, but merely presents the second of the three modes by which St. Antoninus (ibid.) had said beforehand that the confessor can impose something upon the penitent, namely, by way of a declaration of a common obligation. And here it must be noted that this opinion of St. Antoninus is not restricted to the obligation of restitution, but extends to anything else which someone is bound to do. Hence he begins the paragraph by saying: The confessor imposes something upon the penitent in three ways: in one way, by way of counsel and exhortation.... In another way, by way of a declaration of a common obligation.... In a third way, by way of special satisfaction for things committed....

Furthermore, the VV. (loc. cit.) think light for understanding this text of St. Antoninus is to be drawn from another place, namely, from part 2, title 2, chapter 8, section 3, where, as we said, he treats of those who, by living sparingly, ought to gather something for making restitution, but who always procrastinate concerning that which they can do, and are found annually promising the confessor to make restitution, and afterward do not do so. - Reply. Perhaps the fact that the VV. use this comparison of passages will seem marvelous to someone. For if they reproached us because, by taking certain words from this passage in part 2, we badly confounded disparate passages, how do they now not hesitate themselves to have recourse to this passage, as though for them they now cease to be disparate passages? For the rest, since in the case the circumstances are such that the confessor cannot say, as above, that they should first make restitution, St. Antoninus thus applies that general rule disjunctively to these circumstances, namely, that they do not appear to be absolved unless they first act, that is, begin to put their hand to the work, or arrange the affair efficaciously so that it may have execution, that is, efficaciously resolve to put the matter into execution and determine something concerning the manner of doing it; by which things, as is evident, he does not impose the necessity of denying absolution. Hence St. Antoninus does not depart from his general norm.

Let us conclude: the doctrine of St. Antoninus and the doctrine of Concina manifestly differ from one another. The latter establishes that regularly the confessor CANNOT absolve unless the penitent has first made restitution, and does not distinguish whether he had confessed this previously and then proposed and promised it but did not keep the promise, if not several times, at least once. St. Antoninus, on the contrary, teaches only concerning those who have several times broken their purpose or faith that PERHAPS IT IS A GOOD PRECAUTION (which words present a counsel rather than a norm always and necessarily to be observed) to use either one of two remedies: namely, either to impose that they first make restitution and then come for absolution, or to fix a time within which they ought to carry out the affair, lest, by deferring the matter in the accustomed way to an uncertain time, they finally arrive, as before, at the point that they return to confession in the following year with the matter still undone. And indeed the VV., as we saw, do not hesitate to accuse the Note as though it supposes in St. Antoninus a most lax doctrine, although the mere words of St. Antoninus are reported. But perhaps it is not marvelous that the doctrine of St. Antoninus can seem most lax in comparison with the doctrine of Concina, whom the holy Doctor Alphonsus did not hesitate to call most rigorous.

the penitent will abstain from sinning; but it is sufficient that he judge that the penitent now has such a purpose, although after a brief time he is going to change it. THUS ALL AUTHORS TEACH.*

QUESTION 7. Can, or indeed must, a penitent be absolved who wishes to follow an opinion opposed to the opinion of the Confessor?

— 1. The confessor, as minister, physician, and neighbor, must take care that the penitent make a morally complete accusation. For as minister he must procure the integrity of the sacrament; as physician, perfect healing; as neighbor, the spiritual alms of instruction.

2. Yet his obligation is less grave than that of the penitent. For to the penitent belongs of itself the diligent accusation of all grave sins; only accidentally does it belong to the confessor. Wherefore they do not judge that a confessor sins gravely who, in a series of confessions to be received, once or twice omits a necessary question.

3. But the confessor must supply the examination, not such as the confessor himself would have to procure in his own cause, but such as the penitent can make according to his quality and instruction without excessive inconvenience. Therefore inquiry will have to be made only about those species which the penitent, according to his condition, easily distinguishes. Numerical calculation will have to be obtained such as, for the elapsed time and the more or less confused state of conscience, is morally possible.

And attention must also be given to the spiritual fragility of the penitent. Therefore care must be taken lest our diligence become too burdensome to the penitent, and render confession hateful to him. For thus we would sin against the primary rule of acting of a good confessor, which is that he act in that manner which the salvation of souls seems to demand.

The confessor "should beware lest he detain anyone with curious or useless questions, especially concerning the sixth precept of the Decalogue, and especially lest he imprudently question younger persons about those things which they do not know" (c. 888, §2).

For unless our questions are few and cautious, we can give occasion to accusation or suspicion, imprudently dissipate or offend ignorance, and expose ourselves or the penitent to danger of sinning.

4. When the penitent himself has in some way prepared his confession, let the confessor allow the penitent to narrate his matters in the order and manner which the penitent himself has chosen, lest, disturbed, he already be unable to say from memory the things which he had prepared, and thus depart less integrally confessed and less content. Wherefore also let him interpose nothing except a very brief little word to which an answer is most easily given. For example, if the penitent says that he sinned with women, it will be possible to ask: even married women? Therefore the confessor himself will endeavor to note in his mind the things which then will have to be asked, certainly with some danger of forgetfulness; but this will be abundantly compensated by the hope of a better and fuller confession on the part of the penitent.

Nor from the beginning are circumstances to be sought which afterward will easily be detected, for example, that the penitent is married, or is bound by some vow.

— 5. These things especially come into use in hearing a general confession. A general confession which is made from devotion must be distinguished from one which is necessarily to be made.

When it is made from devotion, the penitent should immediately be admonished about the faculty left to him of keeping silent about what he wishes, with the counsel added that he say in few words those things which can beget greater confusion, so that a richer fruit of humility may be received.

But if it is necessary, the cause is sometimes one single sin besides which other grave sins were not committed. Then sufficient accusation is made most easily, with that sin declared and with the frequency of the sacraments added, if any were received sacrilegiously.

But if many grave sins from a long time must be accused, the more expeditious method will be that the course of life be divided into several parts, each of which is of a sufficiently homogeneous tenor. Then let the penitent say what chiefly happened in the individual spaces of time. Or let him also describe his life by the week, or the month. From this it will sufficiently become known what he did in other weeks or months, through which he led a sufficiently similar life. Then let the confessor ask the penitent whether he perhaps thinks something must be added.

If, warned by the penitent or because of another indication, the confessor knows or suspects that there is something which the penitent is especially ashamed to reveal, let him give him courage to accuse it at once, so that, relieved of the burden, he may make an exomologesis grateful and full of solace. Otherwise, it must be feared lest in the course of confession he yield to timidity and confess sacrilegiously. Not so rarely an experienced confessor can conjecture a shameful matter sufficiently certainly. It will help then that the confessor himself indicate the matter and thus spare the penitent a longer explanation. If he suspects someone studiously to be mixing old sins with recent ones, let him act, and regularly let him keep his own suspicion silent.

At the end of such a confession rightly made, let the confessor not omit, for the more perfect quiet of the penitent, to make him more certain: a) concerning the remission of all sins, even of those which have fallen from memory, so that these alone, if they are restored to mind, must be accused; b) concerning the faculty which he has of no longer repeating examinations, since it is enough that he wish to declare the things not yet accused which occur of themselves; c) concerning the legitimate presumption of a completed confession, especially since the confessor often in confused accusation has touched individual things sufficiently so that nothing now has to be repeated. But he who has made a general confession twice or three times should be forbidden now to examine his conscience about past things, but should indicate only those things, if any occur, which are certainly mortal and most certainly not accused. For too frequent general confession would remove peace of soul and impede spiritual progress, while from Christ's institution that sacrament ought to strengthen peace and help us that, with expanded heart, we may run the way of the commandments of God.

N.B. Lacroix, n. 1882, observes that there are some who would be terrified by the name of general confession, and from whom, nevertheless, almost without their knowing it, a general confession can be elicited by the help of questions.

— The Various Sentences of the Sacramental Judge. 1. He can grant, deny, or defer absolution.

Whether absolution is granted or denied, the examination of the cause is finished, and the confessor has discharged his function: of itself he is not bound to admit the penitent again. But if absolution is deferred, the judgment is suspended; the right remains to the penitent of returning to the confessor, who, from justice, must hear him and bring the cause through to the end. Thus it is seen what difference there is between denied and delayed absolution, although the penitent is held by the same material obligation of obtaining absolution from his grave sins, and enjoys the same liberty of changing confessor.

2. The granting can be conditional, or without a condition added.

A condition concerning the future, for example "if you will restore," no less than in other sacraments, and for the same reason, is excluded (cf. n. 180 and 184). Reasonable addition of a condition concerning the past or the present, when it regards either the present competence of the confessor, or the words of absolution well pronounced, or a fact extrinsic to the judgment itself and presupposed, "if the penitent lives," is subject to no difficulty. But if it regards the object itself of the judgment, that is, the disposition of the penitent, to many it has seemed inept and illicit, for example to Cajetan, Summula, word Absolution (p. 3, ed. 1571). This question was moved in the fifteenth century. And it can be objected that by a conditional sentence the matter is left in the state of doubt from which it ought to escape through the sentence. This difficulty would be serious enough, if the sentence ought merely to declare some fact. But concerning a sentence which gives a right, it must be said otherwise, provided he to whom it pertains can know whether the condition has been fulfilled or not. Thus, in Roman law, the praetor (magistrate) by his formula gave to the other party a conditional right, the condition which the judge of fact then examined. But since nothing lies hidden from God, the sacramental sentence can usefully be subordinated even to the condition of sincerity or interior sorrow.

By a certain opposite excess, Ballerini, Op. theol. V, 21, judged absolution to be intrinsically always conditional, or to be borne, "if in reality the required dispositions are present, which God alone knows with certainty, but the confessor more or less probably." Yet this agrees little with the nature of the institution. Why has the accusation of the penitent been prescribed? why has the right of questioning been given to the confessor, unless so that, judging about disposition in a human manner, he might pronounce the sentence simply, certainly subject to error like every sentence of a human judge, but not therefore conditional?

The confessor assuredly does not have the will of giving absolution through right and wrong, just as a priest consecrating has no positive will of consecrating inept or illicit matter. Yet the sentence or consecration does not become conditional on that account. But, after prudent examination has been premised, it is consecrated and pronounced absolutely. Nor is the matter practically indifferent. He who administers a sacrament conditionally posits the sacramental sign itself only conditionally; wherefore, the condition failing, nothing has been done, nor could the sacrament be valid and unformed. But he who administers a sacrament without condition wishes to posit the sacramental sign simply, and indeed efficaciously, insofar as depends on himself.

Wherefore, since we admit, on the part of the penitent, that it suffices for validity that he accuse sins with some true supernatural sorrow (provided he is in no bad faith concerning the degree of sorrow above all things), it can further be asked to what condition of disposition the validity of absolution must be subordinated, when the sacrament is administered conditionally. And to no other, unless we are mistaken, except to that which suffices for the validity itself. Therefore the condition about which we now treat will have to be explained thus: "if, the accusation and attrition having been considered, he can validly receive absolution," although, on account of the deficient quality above all things, grace is not going to follow immediately. Another manner of understanding the condition would beget many anxieties.

3. Absolution can remit sins directly, or give place to indirect remission, which they are accustomed to say more briefly: absolution can be direct or indirect.

Those are directly remitted which, after sufficient accusation, are remitted to a disposed penitent by virtue of the keys; but those are indirectly remitted which are not remitted by virtue of the keys, but only because, one mortal fault remaining, sanctifying grace could not be infused, to which infusion, however, the penitent, considering his disposition and the absolution received, has an immediate right.

Of itself the Lord could have so ordered that sacrament that mortal sins would be absolved singly by one or several confessors, so that the former absolutions would merely give a title to grace and reconciliation with God, which would be perfected by the last absolution. But now one grave sin cannot be absolved without the others, so that the cause must be submitted completely to one confessor from the beginning. Yet if any things, because of forgetfulness or just cause, have in no way been declared, these nevertheless are remitted indirectly to a disposed penitent, with the burden remaining of confessing the same things in the next following confession, unless the same obstacle impedes this. Nor is it repugnant that the same sin be remitted directly and indirectly. Suppose that a penitent remembers that a sin has not yet been accused by him, which he knows to be grave, yet in such a way that he is ignorant of its species. That sin, under the generic account of grave sin, will be directly remitted by absolution, but indirectly insofar as it is such a sin, so that the obligation remains of accusing the species. For only direct remission obtained through this sacrament removes the burden of accusation.

— Common norms concerning the ministering of absolution. Come then, these brief rules concerning the administration of absolution are commonly proposed: to the disposed penitent absolution is to be given; to the indisposed it is to be denied; for the doubtfully disposed it is to be deferred (cf. c. 886, about which we have already spoken above). Therefore:

To the disposed, absolution is to be given, and indeed of itself immediately, so that the disposed penitent who asks it has the right of obtaining it without delay, as we are taught by c. 886 itself.

Yet no one denies that there are just causes for deferring the same for the spiritual utility of the penitent. And we have indicated as a just cause the opportunity of urging, before absolution, the execution of a difficult obligation, which otherwise would scarcely be fulfilled.

— But a particular question is moved concerning those in occasions and recidivists. And concerning those in occasions, or those who are placed in an occasion of sin, the matter is dispatched in few words. What an occasion is; how it is distinguished; what and how great the obligation of deserting an occasion is, has been said in I, 452-456. Therefore either the penitent has a grave obligation of deserting the occasion, or he is held by no certain obligation. He who, bound by a grave obligation, does not wish to fulfill it, is not worthy of absolution, unless he is in good faith, and the confessor judges that admonition must prudently be omitted or deferred. But if he is held by no certain obligation, he preserves his right to receiving absolution. Nor is it in the power of the confessor to add a new obligation by some precept of his own.

Nevertheless, if a permanent occasion, or one which stands in being, can and must be deserted, and the penitent has an easy faculty of returning, regularly it will be expedient that the penitent, before he is absolved, remove the occasion. This, at least when the penitent is not unwilling, must be done gently by the confessor as physician. In some parts (but by no means everywhere), even when there is question of an occasion not to be approached, absolution can usefully be deferred, until the penitent by some reason has demonstrated his constancy in purpose.

If, on the contrary, the penitent who had to dismiss the occasion has deceived trust in this matter several times, then often he cannot prudently be judged disposed by the confessor as judge, before he has executed the obligation, so that absolution must be deferred for him, or given only under condition (when this is lawful). And unless grave necessity stands in the way, the confessor as physician will then have to recur to that remedy.

— Concerning recidivists. 1. The custom of sin itself of itself does not effect a special difficulty. Indeed, since it increases fragility, the presumption of unworthiness which relapse begets is more easily destroyed in the customary sinner than in another relapsing person.

2. A recidivist, by force of the word, is he who repeats a sin, especially after amendment proposed in confession. But in the present matter, he is treated strictly as one "who after confession, although admonished, relapses into the same sins without any or almost any amendment" [d'Ann., III, 338 (9)].

If he has so relapsed that his present disposition has become doubtful, and at the end of confession he does not seem better disposed in soul, absolution will have to be deferred for him, unless there has been place for conditional absolution. St. Alph., VI, 459, denies that a recidivist who returns with the same depraved habit can be absolved unless he brings extraordinary signs of his disposition.⁽¹⁾

If in the present he has demonstrated himself sufficiently disposed, or he has relapsed from intrinsic fragility, from the very force of custom, etc., all wish that he be treated benignly. Nor should suitable exhortation and admonition ever be omitted. And regularly he is to be absolved, unless from a penitent well known to him the confessor can have a prudent persuasion that from delayed absolution no damage is going to arise and that hope of greater horror of sin will be born. To this end, he could test what the threatened denial of absolution effects. Yet let him have greater hope in the sacraments, according to those words of St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 25, art. 1 ad 4: "It must be said that a greater remedy is furnished against sins to be avoided from grace than from the habituation of our works."

Or he has relapsed because of a voluntary occasion in which he remained. Then the things said in 542 return.

Or he has relapsed from a necessary occasion. If apt remedies have not yet been prescribed, they will have to be prescribed.

If remedies were prescribed but were not applied, their use will have to be efficaciously urged, unless the penitent in rigor can desert the occasion, and prefers to desert it. Many here teach that delay of absolution must be employed. And we shall not deny that this can sometimes profit. Yet it seems preferable, unless the penitent is opposed, that he indeed be absolved, but that there be imposed on him (under grave or light sin, according to the case), as penance, a new confession after a brief time, in which he may give an account concerning the very use of the remedies. For thus, besides the stimulus of good will, he will meanwhile enjoy sacramental grace.

But if progress made gives hope of amendment, let the confessor take care that he depart absolved and made more erect for the fight. This progress is held by St. Alph., II, 460, for an extraordinary sign of disposition. Concerning progress of this kind St. Leonard of Port Maurice writes: "If on the days assigned for return penitents fall somewhat more rarely than usual, grant them absolution... When they have furnished this little bit of better fruit, it is verified that hope of amendment is now present." (In Berardi, De recidivis, n. 136.)

But what if the use of remedies seems fruitless, and better remedies in the concrete are not at hand? The supposition admitted, which Ball.-Palm., V, 119 ff., think rather must be denied, some then deny the obligation of deserting the occasion, either by their very silence or by express words. For if, thus they say, the penitent "could be absolved the first time, he will be able also the second" (Tamb., Exped. conj., III, 3, 10, who thinks this probable), since sorrow and purpose are no more lacking in the second case than in the former, and because in a physically necessary occasion, all ought to be content with this present disposition. Thus approximately Lugo, d. 14, n. 156, who inclines to this opinion. Others, not few, oblige to deserting the occasion, because formal flight of the occasion alone then gives hope of amendment, and Christ said: "If your eye scandalizes you, pluck it out," etc. Others, as Suarez, in 3 p., d. 32, §2, St. Charles, Instr. conf., deny that a general rule can be given. Gury, n. 631, thus distinguishes: flight of the occasion must be commanded if practically it seems easier to desert the occasion than to remain in the same without sin. Berardi, in some rare case, in which the confessor, having known the moral strength of the penitent, judges the means proportioned to his powers, thinks that flight of the occasion must be imposed, notwithstanding great inconvenience.

Thus therefore we shall say: as often as the matter seems possible in some way, flight from the occasion itself, or the safer parts, should be advised to be followed by every effort. And unless a most grave inconvenience stands in the way, this flight seems of itself to have to be imposed: for, considering the gravity of spiritual ruin, the necessity of the occasion seems eliminated, so that it is morally converted into a free occasion (cf. the notions handed down, I, 452). Yet with most grave inconvenience of life, fortune, etc., the confessor does not seem able strictly to impose flight, since, because of disagreement among authors, the obligation cannot be called certain (cf. Lugo, Paen., d. 25, n. 115).

N.B. Let delay of absolution, where it seems expedient, be very brief: for hours, one or another day, eight days, at most fourteen. For of itself it is grave that someone remain in the state of mortal sin. Yet St. Alph. says that a greater delay, for the sake of experiment, is sometimes necessary. We greatly doubt that this can be valid today.

⁽¹⁾ These signs are numbered by him: greater sorrow disclosed through tears, sighs, and cordial words; a lesser number of sins, in the same difficulties; longer abstinence from sin, or resistance to temptation; zeal applied toward amendment; solicitude concerning remedies to be known and applied; spontaneous confession; an extraordinary reason by which he was brought to confessing; more accurate accusation; reparation of damage; greater horror of sin conceived and demonstrated, or fear of divine vengeance.

— Conditional absolution, that is, given under a condition not concerning the future, but concerning the present or the past: "if you are capable or disposed; if I have the faculty," can be conferred when great utility or a certain necessity will advise it. Wherefore, unless certainly efficacious absolution can be procured, he is to be absolved under condition:

a) who is placed in danger of dying without absolution: in grave illness, before a long voyage, dangerous use of the scalpel, etc. Nor in this case does it matter to distinguish whence the doubt arises: whether from uncertain life, doubtful presence, received baptism, disposition of the penitent, or from jurisdiction of the confessor or absolution perhaps already conferred;

b) who, unless he were absolved, would remain long in mortal sin, or would be deprived long of sacramental grace; or who is pressed by necessity of receiving a sacrament of the living: Confirmation, the Eucharist, Matrimony. This certainly must be done, if opportunity is lacking for the penitent to dispose himself better.

Hence children and the half-witted, in doubt about sufficient discretion, are to be absolved conditionally whenever they bring matter probably grave, and sometimes in the year, according to the prudent estimation of the confessor, indeed as often as they wish to confess, with moderate frequency. So also those from whom an accusation of certainly sufficient matter about which they are sorry is obtained with difficulty: both if they accuse a doubtfully grave sin (then from St. Alph. you must confer absolution), and several times in the year (then from St. Alph. this can be done but need not be done; and he himself permits monthly absolution). Yet for the most part certain matter is easily obtained if the confessor himself positively suggests defects to which morally all of us are liable.

Hence he who truly doubts about absolution rightly given, which the penitent probably needs, will repeat it; and we shall use doubtful jurisdiction with sufficient cause.

He will be absolved conditionally who, while he judges himself disposed, is doubtfully disposed, and unless he is absolved seems about to profane Confirmation, Matrimony; or concerning whom it is to be feared lest he desert confession and waste away in sins, which is easily to be feared in those who in Paschal time have with difficulty been brought to confession.

N.B. On account of the controversy about valid and unformed confession, the condition, as we have already warned in n. 540, should be referred to the disposition necessary for the validity of confession.

— The account of penance. From the most ancient time, this was the doctrine of the Church: that sins after baptism are no longer fully, that is, as to guilt and punishment, of themselves remitted except laboriously, that is, with suitable expiation offered for the temporal debt. For the temporal debt, I say, for the eternal is always and necessarily taken away gratuitously together with the fault. At the same time the Church recognized in herself the power of binding the guilty by penalties and fully loosing the same even from temporal debts: which power, however, since it has not been given for dissipating, is subject to prudent use.

Whether in the first age there was the formal intention of the Church that through the grave and long-lasting penances which were then imposed, with the proper force of her absolution added, insofar as there was need, she should certainly free penitents from every debt of punishment, this historically is by no means certain (cf. d'Ales, La doctrine des indulgences, Etudes, t. 145, p. 40 ff.). But for many centuries certainly she no longer intends to join the full remission of sins with far milder sacramental penances.

That discipline is most clearly demonstrated in St. Thomas, Quodlibet III, art. 28, and formally approved in Trent, Sess. XIV, c. 2, 3, 8, 9; Sess. XXV, Decree on Indulgences. But indulgences have been annexed to pious works to be performed freely, which can suffice for extinguishing temporal debts.

Therefore the constant tradition of the Church has been of absolving, from the power of jurisdiction, even from punishment, with a payment offered partly from the works of penitents, partly from the merits of Christ and of the saints. Yet formerly the principal payment was customarily sought from definite penances, while today non-commanded works seem to have obtained the principal place, and indulgences are expressly available to all as supplements. Therefore today, by a formally double use of jurisdiction, by which she imposes sacramental penances and grants indulgences, the Church works toward the perfect remission of sins more gently, more fully, and more perfectly than formerly through penitential discipline. More gently, I say, because without so much coercion, and partly through voluntary acts; more fully, for Christians formerly were as it were left to themselves for less grave sins; more perfectly, because in a greater light there shine both the various accounts by which the Church can bind and loose, and the sacraments and their power, and the merits of Christ and of the saints, and the communion of saints, and the various dignity of works and the excellence of the spirit of love and charity.

— Obligation and rights of the confessor. The principle is placed by canon 887: "For the quality and number of sins and the condition of the penitent, let the confessor enjoin salutary and suitable satisfactions."

Therefore: 1. The confessor must impose penance: a) as minister of the sacrament, that he may take care for the integrity of the sacrament, of which satisfaction is an integral part; b) as judge, constituted by God and by the Church, that he may observe the order of divine justice, to which the Church necessarily conforms itself; but divine justice does not gratuitously remit temporal punishments to be paid for sins committed after baptism; c) as physician, solicitous about the spiritual health of the penitent, who is to be freed from punishments and preserved from sins.

Nor, on the occasion of gaining a plenary indulgence, is the obligation of imposing penance removed: today this is beyond controversy, after Benedict XIV (Const. Celebrationem, January 1, 1751, §65), on the occasion of the jubilee itself, confirmed the necessity of giving penance.

2. The confessor imposes penance by using his jurisdiction, as judge, not as priest. He can create this obligation alone; other obligations he does not effect but declares. He can impose this both before absolution and immediately after, when the judgment is not yet morally finished. Yet it is better that he impose it before absolution.

3. The sacrament demands penances by which provision is made for its honor and dignity; divine and ecclesiastical justice wishes that penances correspond to the accusation, that is, to the sins accused and to the disposition of the penitent, which can be excellent, truly good, and scarcely sufficient; harmless and salutary medicine is demanded.

But by grave words by which he explains the excessive indulgence which, because of the penitent's infirmity, he uses, the confessor can provide for the honor of the sacrament; and he observes the order of divine and ecclesiastical justice, if he does not intend to remit punishments beyond the merit of the work performed, so that he can principally attend to imposing salutary penances (cf. Galtier, S.T., La penitence a imposer, Nouv. Rev. Theol., 1923, p. 1 ff.).

Hence it is understood how today the custom of imposing modest satisfactions has grown strong. For those which today are reputed grave should rather be called light in themselves. For today that penance is judged grave by which a work is imposed which, if it were a common precept of the Church, would have to be furnished under grave guilt. Thus assistance at Mass, fasting or abstinence for one day, recitation of the third part of the Rosary. (Yet the recitation of any little hour of the breviary would not be a grave penance, since the omission of a little hour is imputed under grave obligation to those who are held by the obligation of the breviary, not on account of quantity alone, but on account of peculiar considerations.)

4. Even today the confessor must regularly impose a grave penance, in the present meaning, for grave fault, and must have some account of the quality of the faults. Yet, on account of the difficulty of the matter, proportion between degrees of fault and degrees of penance is now not customarily observed so accurately.

We are taught this by the sufficiently common usage itself of approved confessors. But these at the same time know how efficaciously to procure true interior penance.

For venial faults the confessor cannot impose a penance, whether it was light or grave, under grave obligation; while he can bind under light obligation to doing a grave penance imposed for grave faults.

For grave faults to enjoin a very slight penance (without an excusing cause) would be grave. But they judge that a confessor sins venially who imposes no penance on one accusing light things.

5. A work already commanded can be enjoined, a mental work, a work to be defined by the choice of the penitent, a bestowal of money; a work cannot be imposed by which the things accused in confession are in some way revealed, as if one should command a young man that, after confession, he ask pardon from his parents for his disobediences. Counsel of doing thus could indeed be given. But a grave penance which the guilty person executes gladly can usually be found without trouble.

6. The same confessor can always, as if perfecting his judgment, commute the preceding penance; another must first sacramentally know the cause and therefore absolve. Therefore, standing by principles, a simple confessor does not seem able to commute a penance enjoined for reserved things: yet the matter is controverted (cf. Lehmkuhl, II, 475).

But the penitent himself cannot commute the work enjoined, not even into something better. But if by two confessors whom he successively approached in numerically the same cause two diverse penances have been imposed, he has the option of either one.

7. Causes of lessening penance can be taken from the fervor of the penitent, from the occasion of gaining an indulgence, from the physical infirmity of the penitent; from his moral infirmity, as if he is not going to accept a greater one; from his spiritual utility, if from this he is enticed to more frequent use of the sacraments; from the will of the confessor to satisfy for the penitent.

— Counsels concerning salutary penance. That penance may truly be salutary, care must be taken not only lest by its weight it turn the penitent away from the use of the sacraments, but also: a) lest by its lightness it deceive the penitent about the gravity of his faults and draw him to relapse more easily; b) furthermore care must be taken lest, from negligence of the confessor, excessive punishments to be paid in the future life remain to the penitent who would now have preferred to expiate his debts; c) finally, it must be procured that penance prepare a stable conversion of the penitent, and by this reason also be truly medicinal.

Now: a) a minimal penance simply imposed for grave faults would of itself lessen the consciousness of grave guilt. Wherefore of ourselves we cannot be content with imposing such a one. But what is desired in penance can be supplied through admonitions and exhortations.

b) In sacramental penance there is a satisfactory value which surpasses the value of similar works freely done by the faithful. Wherefore pious penitents themselves can usefully be advised to ask greater penances from the confessor, by which they may satisfy more abundantly and thus in some way exercise what St. John Berchmans had proposed to himself: "for small defects to do great penances."

But many today are little solicitous about this great utility. At least let us exhort them to gain indulgences which are offered abundantly, and to multiply pious works. Besides, with these freely done works the confessor can join the value of penance, by saying, for example: "Whatever good you shall have done for two days will be to you for penance."

c) Medicinal penances, or remedies against relapses, can be recalled to three heads: some lessen the force of the occasion or temptation, as consideration of eternal truths, access to the confessor before a danger which recurs after fixed intervals, flight from idleness or from a person attracting to sin; others weaken the force of passion, as interior and exterior mortifications; others increase spiritual strength, as almsgiving, prayer, more frequent invocation of the Sacred Heart, of the Blessed Virgin Mary, of the guardian Angel; purposes renewed with great soul, indeed, in certain circumstances, vows, sometimes fenced about with a penitential clause; more frequent approach to the sacraments. If this can be obtained, it will greatly help to advise a purpose in the morning, for example before the image of Christ crucified, and an examination in the evening, with thanksgiving for progress, if there was any. Penances which beget a pious custom of renewing acts of faith, hope, and charity are also very profitable.

Among these, today the following seem especially to be commended: more frequent use of the sacraments; frequent renewal of acts of faith, hope, and charity; almsgiving, whose efficacy for redeeming sins the Sacred Scriptures themselves teach. Let the designation be left to the penitent to define; let the utility of deputing a part to the celebration of Masses be suggested.

Penance is too uniformly reduced to a certain recitation of prayers: this custom seems to have to be corrected by a prudent but constant effort.

Finally let us observe these things. If in part it is understood in what way today it has come about that, in the administration of the sacrament, penance occupies a secondary place, nevertheless its true place must be preserved for it: especially where there is question of penitent priests. Certainly the stricter discipline of the Sacred Penitentiary is by no means destitute of its efficacy, when grave crimes are referred to it.

Certainly care must be taken that the penitent truly accept the penance; which, where it is doubted, can be learned by a courteous question. This good will can be helped by the addition of some intention, for example of praying for the deceased of the family. But we ought to be less moved by fear of inculpable forgetfulness. It is better that the sinner become forgetful of the penance than of the gravity of his sin.

Therefore the confessor who indiscreetly always imposes the same small penance can in no way be approved, nor does he obey the laws of the Church; but it is necessary that, taught by zeal and experience, he know at once to oppose at least certain remedies to vices.

Excessive facility of confessors diminishes the name and efficacy of Christianity.

4. In judging the dispositions of the penitent, the confessor must carefully attend lest he immediately, from the frequency of relapses, accuse the penitent of a depraved disposition of will. Let him examine attentively whether the relapses have as their cause malice, corruption, affection toward sin, lack of firm resolution, or on the contrary only the frailty of the penitent and the violence of temptation. No one fails to see that one must act with the penitent in one way or another according to the case. In the first case, after some warnings and exhortations, absolution is generally to be deferred, according to the rules which are handed down concerning the relapsed; but in the last case, the more frequent one, not only is absolution to be given, but with the greatest affection of heart and industry of soul the confessor will sustain those poor souls.

5. Absolution is never to be denied or deferred to these last penitents unless they are certainly indisposed or the confessor knows that a brief delay of absolution will turn to the good of the penitent.

6. As to sacramental satisfactions, especially in the present case let them be medicinal, for example daily morning and evening to elicit an act of contrition and firm resolution, not in any sort of way, but in a reflective and plainly deliberate mode; to approach Holy Communion frequently; attentively sometimes to recollect the Passion of Christ, the presence of God in temptation, and so forth. It is best to exhort the penitent earnestly that after a relapse he approach the sacrament of Penance without delay, and that he impose upon himself a salutary penance, such as, for example, flight from occasions, to which moreover by another law he is already bound.

The confessor sometimes must exercise his function, - and then he is bound to know the case, - and to bear sentence.

For exercising the function, it is necessary to know from what and when he is obliged to this.

To the knowledge of the case belongs: 1) as judge, of itself, to question the penitent and form for himself a judgment concerning the case; then, accidentally and occasionally, also 2) as teacher, to instruct and admonish; 3) as physician, to furnish remedies; 4) as father, to dispose and prepare.

To the pronouncing of the sentence, as minister exercising the power of the keys and sacramental judgment, he must grant, deny, or defer absolution.

Concerning these things we must speak in three articles.

I. The confessor, as judge, is sometimes bound from office to question the penitent with moral diligence, and indeed of itself under grave obligation, as often as he probably judges that the penitent, whether culpably or inculpably, perhaps omits certain things necessary to know for absolution.

It is said 1) sometimes, for if from the confession itself or from the condition of the person of the penitent he judges that he knows the sins in full and the dispositions of soul sufficiently, the confessor is not bound to question: for then questioning would become idle and odious; whence neither are the rude to be questioned if they seem to be sufficiently instructed and diligently to confess their sins with number and circumstances according to their state and capacity;

2. with moral diligence, because the confessor is only bound to question in order to supply the defect of the penitent, who himself is not bound to greater diligence; and besides, excessive diligence would render the sacrament burdensome and odious;

3. of itself, under grave obligation: for it concerns a grave matter, as pertaining to the salvation of the penitent and to the reverence of the sacrament; although nevertheless there can be negligence lightly culpable, as if in a long series of sins one or another question should be omitted. As a judge acts perfidiously if he believes that a witness is keeping back something which it is necessary to declare for judging the case, and omits to ask that, and dissimulates; so the confessor who in grave matter is lacking in this office, of itself gravely offends. This sin pertains to the genus of sacrilege.

It is proved: a) from the authority of the Church, namely from the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter Omnis utriusque sexus: "Moreover let the priest be discreet and prudent... diligently inquiring both into the circumstances of the sinner and of the sin"; and from the Roman Ritual, tit. III, c. 1, n. 16: "if the penitent has not expressed the number, species, and circumstances of sins necessary to be explained, let the priest prudently question him";

b) by reason: The confessor, as judge, cannot bear sentence unless he knows the case, namely, both the sins which the penitent has committed as to number, species, and gravity, and his dispositions, and also often the occasions and causes of sins, which he must be disposed to leave or combat. But for this it is often not sufficient that he hear the penitent, but it is required that he question him: for not rarely the penitent, because of ignorance, or forgetfulness, or confusion, or negligence in examination, or a slight disposition of sorrow or purpose, is silent about sins or at least the number or circumstances of sins; more often he says or manifests nothing concerning dispositions, and still less concerning the causes and occasions of sins. Therefore the confessor sometimes cannot know these things except by questioning, and he is bound to do this as often as he knows or reasonably doubts or presumes that the penitent does not sufficiently open them.

Therefore he is bound to question concerning three things, namely those which, and insofar as they, are necessary for procuring 1) the validity of the sacrament, 2) the integrity of confession, or 3) the correction or amendment of the penitent.¹

¹ Concerning the mode in which questioning is to be done in practice, see our little work: Concerning Various Categories of Penitents, p. 18 sq.

II. The confessor, the case having been inspected from sufficient accusation or, if necessary, from supplementary questioning, as judge is bound from office to form for himself a prudent judgment concerning it, namely concerning the sins committed and concerning the dispositions of the penitent.

It is proved: 1. The confessor is bound to form a judgment concerning sins, which is necessary for knowing what satisfactions or remedies are to be imposed, and whether the dispositions of the penitent are sufficient. Hence he must bear judgment concerning the morality of sins, that is, concerning their species and gravity both objective and subjective, insofar as possible. And indeed a) concerning objective morality it is required at least that, endowed with habitual knowledge of the principles by which the gravity and diverse species of sins can be distinguished, he hear the penitent and, in hearing, judge according to the said common principles; b) concerning subjective morality he can presume it to be the same as the objective, unless there is a special reason for doubting, in which case he must question the penitent; c) concerning all things let him judge as much as he can by ordinary diligence, for it is not always possible concerning individual delicts to say whether they are of such species or gravity, mortal or venial, which not even great theologians can do; because often the matter is difficult in itself, and besides not even the penitent himself is always able to say whether he fully consented; - but if he lacked the aforesaid knowledge or from ignorance judged falsely concerning sins, confession would not for that reason be invalid; d) but if because of distraction or noise or singing he did not hear certain sins, it is necessary to question if it is probable that in these perhaps grave matter is present; e) nevertheless he is not bound distinctly to remember all sins at the moment of absolution, but it suffices that confusedly he remember the state of the penitent.

2. The confessor is also bound to bear judgment concerning the sufficient disposition of the penitent, which is necessary for knowing what sentence he ought to pronounce, namely, whether to grant or deny absolution; - which disposition can be known by conjectural signs, concerning which a. 3, n. III.

But what must be done by a confessor who doubts concerning the sincerity of the penitent, or knows or presumes that he is keeping back a sin? Resp.: He must attend to the principle: the penitent speaking both for himself and against himself must be believed, unless it certainly appears that he is lying: for he is at once the accused and the witness, whose testimony of itself has force in this tribunal alone and is better than any other, since he himself knows better than anyone else whether he has sinned or not, whether a sin committed has already been declared or not. Hence:

a) if there is doubt concerning the sincerity of the penitent, the confessor is bound to question diligently, and can exhort him to perfect sincerity; but if the penitent perseveres in his declaration, he must be believed and absolved;

b) if the confessor certainly knows that the penitent is keeping back a grave sin committed, and indeed from his own experience, he must convince the penitent, and if he continues to deny, he must be dismissed without absolution, unless it can be thought that he is in good faith, ignorant of the gravity of the fault, or that he has already confessed it, or has a just reason for keeping silent;

c) if the confessor knows this by the testimony of others, he is bound to question the penitent specially concerning the sin, but if he continues to deny, he is to be absolved, unless nevertheless the testimony of others were of altogether greater authority so that it made true or perfect certitude;

d) if the confessor knows it from the confession of another, for example, of an accomplice, wife, betrothed woman, etc., he cannot question him except generally as he is accustomed to question, and not specially unless he also would have questioned persons of the same condition in that way; nor is it expedient to ask from the accomplice permission to use the knowledge acquired, because in the case it would render confession odious. But while the penitent perseveres in keeping silent, he can absolve him as if he had not received the confession of the other; because he is not bound to use knowledge acquired in confession, and on the other hand he cannot impede the sacrilege; - indeed he seems to be bound to absolve (at least under condition), because otherwise he would break the seal, since he would quite openly use knowledge of confession for the governance of another.

St. Alphonsus, however, asserts that absolution is to be denied, but that somewhat of prayer is to be said and that the denial of absolution is to be dissembled: on the one hand, he says, the priest does not break the seal because he manifests nothing and causes burden to neither; on the other hand he consults the reverence of the sacrament, by impeding its frustration.

I. After the confessor has questioned penitents, admonished them and exhorted them to contrition and amendment, and inspected their disposition, he will find some certainly disposed for receiving absolution, others doubtfully disposed, and finally others positively indisposed. Therefore the Ritual says, tit. 3, c. 1, n. 23: "Let him diligently see when and to whom absolution is to be conferred, or denied, or deferred, lest he absolve those who are incapable of such a benefit." Concerning this the following principles are valid.

II. Absolution regularly and of itself, and indeed from justice and under grave obligation, is to be granted to a penitent guilty of grave sin who is certainly well disposed. This general principle is enunciated in the Law, can. 886: "To a penitent certainly disposed and seeking absolution, this is neither to be denied nor deferred."

For the confessor, by receiving confession, obliges himself by a quasi-contract to bear sentence according to the institution of Christ. But according to the institution of Christ, absolution of itself must be granted to the well disposed, since this sacrament was instituted precisely for remitting sins. Therefore of itself by force of contract, and therefore from justice, he must absolve the duly disposed, who accordingly have a strict right to absolution; - and indeed under grave obligation, if the penitent is in the state of mortal sin, because it is a grave injury, since he is unjustly deprived of the greatest good of sacramental grace.

It is said 1) guilty of grave sin, because if he has only venial sins or mortal sins already remitted, to defer the penitent a few times is not a grave sin, because grave injury is not inflicted upon him; indeed, if this happens from a reasonable cause, there will be no sin;

2. who is certainly disposed, that is, morally or quasi-certainly, by practical and imperfect certitude, which excludes every prudent and grave doubt, so namely that there is a grave reason for judging this and no serious reason for doubting. For often it is impossible to have greater certitude concerning dispositions;

3. regularly and of itself: for regularly absolution granted at once profits more than if it is deferred, because it furnishes sacramental grace by which the penitent can more efficaciously resist temptation and cultivate virtue. Nevertheless sometimes accidentally absolution can be deferred even to one sufficiently disposed: a) so that before absolution restitution or reparation which can be made in the present be urged; which is an apt mode of exploring more and proving the disposition of the penitent and of obtaining the fulfillment of the duty more certainly; - b) also if the confessor as physician prudently judges that this is more useful to the penitent, who then would be unwilling irrationally; yet his consent is to be sought, because generally delay will not profit unless the penitent consent to it. Hence by the general rule it is already established in law: "to a penitent certainly disposed and seeking absolution, this is... not to be deferred";

c) only for a brief time, for example, for some hours, for a day, for eight days or a little more, because to remain long in mortal sin is a grave inconvenience.

III. Indications of positive disposition are required, so that there be a truly grave motive for bearing a truly founded or morally certain judgment concerning the sufficient disposition of the penitent.

Of this kind are: 1) the due preparation of the penitent for confession, 2) the confession itself duly performed, especially if it is done spontaneously, for example, for more easily avoiding sin and obtaining the state of grace, 3) the affirmation of the penitent if it appears true and sincere, 4) the mode of confessing, namely, a mode evidently candid and humble. These are ordinary signs, namely, which of themselves and in ordinary circumstances suffice; but when there is a special reason for doubting concerning the disposition or sincerity of the penitent, graver signs are required, drawn from the special circumstances of the penitent, or extraordinary conjectural signs, whether of more abundant grace, or of more intense sorrow, or of firmer purpose:

A. Of more abundant grace, as 1) if he confesses from a supernatural and particular motive, for example, on the occasion of preaching, or the death of a friend, or an impending evil; 2) if he had to undergo a rather great inconvenience in order to confess, such as a long journey, loss of a day's gain, a great external conflict; 3) if the confession is made altogether spontaneously from the impulse of grace alone, with no other external circumstance impelling, especially in regions where faith has grown weak and human respect does not impel to the sacraments.

B. Of more intense sorrow, for example, 1) if he employed special means (fasting, alms, prayers, Masses) so that he might institute a good confession; 2) if he says words flowing from the heart, or gives forth sighs and pours out tears, which is a sign having force in many, but not always certain or sincere; 3) if he confesses with greater sincerity, outpouring of heart, for example, sins which he had previously culpably omitted; 4) if he signifies that he apprehends better his sins and danger of damnation.

C. Of firmer purpose, as 1) if he says that after the sin he immediately repented; 2) if he especially asks for remedies and willingly promises to employ them, or willingly accepts a great penance; 3) if already for some time he has persevered or has employed diligence for this by the remedies indicated, for example, by fleeing the occasion, burning depraved books, renouncing the society of the depraved; in one word, if there is already a change of life; 4) if he has relapsed with greater difficulty, that is, after notable resistance, or more rarely in the same circumstances; 5) if he has already fulfilled a difficult obligation, for example, restitution or reparation of reputation or honor or reconciliation with enemies.

IV. Absolution is to be denied to those who are morally certainly incapable or unworthy. This is altogether certain, since in each case absolution is invalid or at least fruitless; but knowingly and willingly to administer a sacrament in a certainly invalid or fruitless mode is grave sacrilege.

Radically incapable are the perpetually insane, - those not yet baptized, - the certainly dead, - those not knowing the things necessary to be known by necessity of means, - and those who certainly are not morally present.

Those incapable because unworthy are indicated by the Roman Ritual, l. c., n. 23: "Let him not absolve those who are incapable of such a benefit, such as: those who give no signs of sorrow, - who do not wish to lay aside hatreds and enmities - or to restore the goods of another, if they can - or to abandon the proximate occasion of sinning - or in another way to leave sins behind (for example, a depraved habit or sinful art) - and to amend life for the better (for example, by employing necessary remedies), - or those who have given public scandal, unless they satisfy publicly and remove the scandal." To these can be added in a general way all those who do not wish to fulfill a grave obligation known to themselves; or who refuse to confess their sins integrally, unless they are excused from material integrity by a grave reason. For in these or similar cases there is lacking the essential condition required for the validity of absolution, namely, contrition.

Moreover let it be noted that the confessor: 1) before he denies absolution, generally must exhort sinners to contrition so that as far as he can he may dispose them, and if by a fervent exhortation he renders them contrite, he can absolve them; - 2) if he must deny absolution, let him do this only with great charity and kind words, by explaining the reason why he cannot act otherwise and by declaring that he will willingly grant absolution as soon as the penitent is disposed.

435. 1. The first duty which is incumbent upon the confessor in the act of confession is to judge rightly both concerning the sins heard and concerning the absolution to be given or refused.

For judging rightly, not only sufficient knowledge of moral theology is required, but also the integrity of the confession. Accordingly, the Roman Ritual admonishes:³⁸⁰ "If the penitent has not expressed the number and species of the sins and the circumstances necessary to be explained, let the priest question him prudently." But questioning must always be: a) Moderate, because excessive questions are accustomed to exasperate the penitent and bring upon the confessor the reproach of curiosity. b) Discreet and prudent, both concerning the matters about which he questions and in the manner of questioning. The confessor must avoid everything by which penitents could justly be scandalized.³⁸¹ c) Opportune. Generally it is not expedient to question the penitent before the accusation has been entirely completed, because otherwise sins are easily omitted through forgetfulness. If, however, the confessor perceives that the penitent accuses himself so imperfectly that as many questions must necessarily be posed as the memory is unable to retain, he can also question the penitent during the accusation.

³⁸⁰ Tit. 3, c. 1, n. 16.

³⁸¹ Cf. Code of Canon Law, c. 888, § 2.

436. 2. The second duty of the confessor is to teach and admonish the penitent.

The confessor must teach the penitent those truths which are necessary for rightly receiving the sacrament; therefore not only the truths which are necessary by a necessity of means, but also all those things which necessarily pertain to contrition, purpose, confession, satisfaction, and so forth.³⁸² It is evident of itself that unlearned penitents do not need an altogether perfect knowledge of these truths, but that it suffices if they know at least the substance according to their capacity. Sometimes the confessor is also bound to instruct penitents concerning the duties of their state, for example, concerning the obligations of spouses.

If the penitent judges from an erroneous conscience that something is a sin which in truth is not such, or a grave sin which in fact is light, he must be instructed; for such an error is very harmful to him. But if the penitent thinks that something is licit which in truth is illicit, or that something is a light sin which in truth is grave, then a distinction must be made. If such ignorance is vincible and culpable, the penitent must be instructed, because he already sins from the fact that he did not expel this ignorance. But if such ignorance is invincible, the penitent must be instructed whenever good fruit is hoped from it; for otherwise the penitent would commit a material sin, which it is not lawful to permit without a grave cause. But whenever greater inconveniences are prudently feared from the instruction, whether for the penitent himself, for a third person, or for the community, the penitent can and must be left in good faith; for otherwise formal sins would be made from material sins. This case sometimes occurs in a putative marriage. For if the putative spouses are in good faith and their union can neither be dissolved nor changed into a legitimate marriage, it is preferable that they be left in good faith.

The confessor must admonish the penitent concerning obligations which must necessarily be fulfilled, for example, concerning restitution to be made, the proximate occasion to be avoided, and so forth.

³⁸² Cf. Roman Ritual, ibid., n. 14.

437. 3. The third duty of the confessor is to dispose the penitent to true contrition and amendment.

Concerning this matter the Roman Ritual admonishes:³⁸³ "And [the confessor] shall endeavor by efficacious words to lead him to sorrow and contrition, and shall induce him to amend his life and institute it better, and shall hand down remedies for sins." If the confessor prudently judges that the penitent is well disposed, he is strictly bound to nothing else except giving absolution, but it is almost always expedient to suggest to all some motive of contrition and good purpose. If the confessor doubts concerning the sufficient contrition of the penitent, he cannot absolve him unless he first rightly disposes him. St. Alphonsus teaches that this obligation is grave,³⁸⁴ saying: "Therefore I do not know how those indolent confessors can be excused from fault who, as soon as they have learned that the penitent is not sufficiently disposed, dismiss him, with no diligence or very little diligence first employed for curing him. For I say that the confessor is bound by a rigorous obligation of charity to dispose him insofar as he is able."

Since the confessor is not only a judge and teacher but also a physician, he must investigate the cause of the spiritual illness and then prescribe suitable remedies for amendment, for example, the frequent reception of the sacraments of penance and the Eucharist, determinate prayers, flight from the occasion, certain mortifications, and so forth.

³⁸³ Tit. 3, c. 1, n. 18.

³⁸⁴ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 608.

438. 4. The fourth duty of the confessor is to give, deny, or defer absolution.

Concerning these things, the following are to be noted:

a) Absolution must be given to a penitent rightly confessed and disposed, who asks for it here and now, or who does not readily consent to a delay.³⁸⁵

For the confessor, by freely hearing the confession of the penitent, enters into a quasi-contract of giving absolution if the penitent is rightly disposed. Hence, if after hearing the confession of a rightly disposed penitent he denies absolution, he breaks the contract and sins gravely, at least if the penitent is thereby compelled to remain in the state of mortal sin and bears this with difficulty. For a just cause, for example, for the sake of medicine or trial, absolution can sometimes be deferred for a brief time even for one well disposed and consenting, as will be stated below, because this can sometimes be useful to the penitent. Thus also in the ancient Church absolution was sometimes delayed for penitents.

b) Absolution must be denied to those who are certainly unworthy or incapable.

The reason is that otherwise the sacrament would certainly be frustrated, which is not lawful even in extreme necessity. The unworthy or indisposed are those who lack true contrition and a sincere and firm purpose, for example, those who are unwilling to leave a voluntary proximate occasion of sinning; who are unwilling to put aside grave enmities or hatred of their neighbor; who are unwilling to make necessary restitution, although they can do so; who are unwilling to remove the scandal which they give to others; who refuse to leave gravely sinful arts or occupations, and so forth. Those incapable of absolution are, for example, the unbaptized, the dead, the perpetually insane, the absent, and so forth.

Note. Whenever the confessor must deny absolution, let him not employ harsh words, but in a kind and tranquil manner let him manifest to the penitent the reason why absolution cannot be granted. Moreover, let the confessor first endeavor with prudent diligence to dispose unprepared penitents, and only after useless attempts let him deny absolution.

c) Absolution must be deferred if the disposition of the penitent is plainly doubtful and there is no urgent cause for absolving him conditionally; it can be deferred for a brief time for a penitent rightly disposed if alpha) the confessor rightly judges this to be useful for his amendment, and beta) the penitent consents to the delay.

The reason for the first part is that otherwise the sacrament would be exposed to the danger of nullity, which certainly is not lawful except in grave necessity. Furthermore, penitents are judged doubtfully disposed whose contrition seems very suspect, for example, recidivists who always return with the same sins and have not employed the remedies prescribed by the confessor; penitents who narrate grave sins very cursorily and coldly, without any sense of contrition; those who approach the sacrament of penance from custom or from reverential fear of parents or masters; those who refuse to accept a moderate penance proportioned to their strength, and so forth. In practice it is sometimes most difficult to judge concerning the sufficient disposition of the penitent. When the confessor remains in doubt, he can usefully employ this rule: If he prudently judges that the delay of absolution will be useful to the penitent, since after a brief time he will return better disposed, let him defer absolution; but if he seriously fears that the penitent will become worse from the delayed absolution or that he will no longer return to confession, let him impart absolution, at least conditionally, after a diligent exhortation to contrition and firm purpose has first been given. For the rest, discussion will return to this matter below, when recidivists and habitual sinners are treated.

The reason for the other part is that a rightly disposed penitent indeed has a right to absolution, but not that absolution be granted to him immediately. Furthermore, the confessor as physician can employ delayed absolution as an efficacious remedy for curing the tepidity of the penitent. Such a practice of deferring absolution existed in the ancient Church and produced good fruits. Nevertheless, let the delay be brief (that is, ordinarily not beyond a week), especially if the penitent is in the state of mortal sin; for a long delay cannot but harm the penitent, who then lacks many graces. Then let it not be done unless the penitent consents.³⁸⁶ For the Code of Canon Law, c. 886, establishes: "If the confessor cannot doubt concerning the dispositions of the penitent and the latter seeks absolution, absolution is neither to be denied nor deferred." The reason is that a delay of absolution which a penitent certainly rightly disposed and burdened with mortal sins accepts not willingly but under compulsion will very rarely produce good fruits; on the contrary, it is sometimes very harmful.

St. Alphonsus wisely admonishes:³⁸⁷ "For the rest, each one in this matter of imparting or deferring absolution must direct himself according to the light given to him by God. This is certain: in this matter those who are more lenient than is right err just as those who are more rigid than is right in absolving. Either extreme is pernicious; for many confessors on account of excessive facility in absolving are the cause that more souls go to perdition, but others on account of excessive rigidity are of no less detriment. Hence I hardly know whether it ought to be a matter of less scruple for the confessor to absolve the indisposed than to dismiss the disposed."

³⁸⁵ Code of Canon Law, c. 886. Cf. Cappello, l.c., n. 487.

³⁸⁶ Thus also Noldin-Schmitt (De sacr.¹⁷, n. 392), nor is the contrary efficaciously proved by Ter Haar (De occasionariis et recidivis, thesis 20).

³⁸⁷ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 464.

1804. "The priest ought to search out the conscience of the sinner in confession, as a physician the wound, and a judge the cause." Thus St. Thomas.¹ - Wherefore hold the following:

Principles. I. The confessor is bound, sometimes under grave obligation, TO QUESTION the penitent. Thus all Theologians; and it is proved:

1. By the authority of the Church, especially from cap. Omnis utriusque, de Poenit., in which one reads: "But let the priest be discreet and prudent... diligently inquiring both the circumstances of the sinner and of the sin." And from the ROMAN RITUAL: "If the penitent has not expressed the number, species, and circumstances of sins necessary to be explained, let the priest prudently question him."

2. By manifold reason. - The first is that omission of opportune questions redounds TO THE DAMAGE OF SOULS: for, 1) it can furnish occasion for many sacrilegious confessions, because there are many penitents who, unless they are questioned, pass over more grave sins in silence. "Frequently," says St. Thomas,² "things which one confessing would keep silent out of confusion, when questioned he reveals." 2) Many penitents will lack opportune remedies; for the confessor, not questioning about habit, occasions, causes of sins, diligence used or not used for amendment (all of which things are usually kept silent), cannot indicate remedies by which new falls are prevented. - 3) Damage will very easily be brought also upon others; for things which turn to the detriment of others are usually passed over in accusation: such are scandals, neglect in fulfilling the very grave duties of one's own state, e.g. in the education and custody of children. Hence, unless penitents are questioned and suitably admonished, no amendment will be able to follow.

The other reason is because the omission of questions redounds TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE SACRAMENT; for, 1) it frequently prejudices its integrity: for, questions being omitted, the accusation will be made in this or a similar way: "Father, I have blasphemed, I have committed base things, I have had quarrels, etc.," with species and number not explained; - 2) it also frequently prejudices its validity: for unless the penitent is questioned, e.g. whether he has used any care not to fall again, whether he has used the prescribed remedies, etc., it will not be possible prudently to judge whether he is disposed, or whether he needs a more ardent exhortation, so that he may be rightly disposed. Hence it can most easily happen that absolutions are given which are wholly invalid.³

We said, 1. under grave obligation; for there is question of a grave matter, which regards the salvation of the penitent and the reverence of the Sacrament. - Nevertheless there can be negligence lightly culpable, as is plain.

We said, 2. he is bound sometimes; for if the penitent explains his sins and his state as much as there is need, it is clear that the confessor is held to no further questions.⁴

1805. II. The confessor is bound to question AS MUCH AS this is NECESSARY for procuring the validity of the Sacrament, the integrity of confession, and the healing of the penitent. - The reason is because these three things must be cared for by him, insofar as he is minister of the Sacrament. Hence, as often as he reasonably presumes, or prudently thinks, that something of those things which are required for the aforesaid has not been sufficiently declared, so often he is bound to inquire.⁵ (See also n. 1809.)

Therefore: 1. For procuring the VALIDITY of the Sacrament, it may be necessary, by questioning, to investigate: whether sufficient matter is present, e.g. if there is question of imperfections, or of light faults which are often committed without advertence; - whether the penitent is keeping something back out of shame, as happens especially in boys and girls; - whether sufficient disposition is present: for knowing this, it will often be necessary to question the penitent, e.g. whether and how, after confession, he abstained from faults; whether and how he fulfilled the prescribed means.

2. For the INTEGRITY OF CONFESSION it may be necessary to question the penitent - about the number of sins; - about their species; - about circumstances changing the species (whether objective or theological); - about certain sins which he is accustomed, from inconsideration, wholly to keep back, e.g. sins of thought, and sins of omission concerning the obligations of his own state (cf. n. 1810, Rule 32).

3. For the HEALING OF THE PENITENT, questions can be necessary by which it becomes known, e.g., what the causes of his sins are, namely whether they proceed from some occasion, or habit, from lack of custody of the senses, from impure thoughts, etc.

Hence, the PRACTICE of certain confessors is especially to be disapproved, who not only do not question penitents, but do not even allow them to bring their confession to an end, and who, having heard one or another sin, interrupt the accusation, saying: "Come now, that is enough, I absolve you from all your sins." Nor can such a practice be used with that penitent who declares only venial sins (unless he is scrupulous); for often penitents begin from venial sins, being about to confess mortal sins only toward the end, which therefore, on account of the fear injected by the confessor, are easily kept back. For the rest, confession made so very hastily and cursorily usually disturbs them exceedingly, far from calming their mind.⁶

1806. III. Questions, where they must be made, should be MODERATE, DISCREET, and TIMELY, namely such that no greater inconvenience stands in the way than would be the defect itself of the integrity of confession.

1. MODERATE; therefore the confessor: 1) should never inquire into matters foreign to confession, nor suffer them to be narrated to himself. - 2) let him remember that he is not held to question the penitent except with ordinary diligence. - 3) Let him remember, moreover, that less distinct knowledge is required from one who, either because of incapacity, or because of sickness, or because of the multitude of sins, or for another reason, could more difficulty render exact knowledge (cf. nn. 1703 and 1705). - Hence the penitent is not to be questioned about sins which he has probably not committed; because, in this case, there is lacking a reasonable presumption and prudent doubt that the things which must be declared are not being sufficiently declared. - But because of the contrary presumption, let him be questioned about sins which usually abound in men of such a condition.⁷

2. DISCREET, especially in those things which regard the sixth precept. For theologians, without any exception, affirm that it is rather to be permitted that material integrity be lacking to confession than that scandal be furnished to the penitent. And the Roman Ritual admonishes concerning the same thing. Wherefore: "Questions, in the matter of chastity, ought to be few and cautious, lest (the confessor) either give occasion for investigating or betraying confession, or teach the ignorant, or offend, or expose himself or the other to danger. And if he fears these things, he ought rather to suffer something to be lacking to material integrity. And indeed, if in this matter thoughts are denied, there is no need to proceed to works. Yet the more rude deny thoughts; when asked, they confess words and works, because they do not equally recognize or advert to those thoughts."⁸ (cf. n. 1694).

3. TIMELY, i.e. made at the time and in the manner in which it is fitting. - Hence: 1) Certain questions are to be made before confession, but few, lest the penitent be offended: e.g. from what time he has not confessed? whether he was absolved? whether he fulfilled the penance? - 2) But questions concerning the condition of life, state, age, etc., if these do not appear from the confession itself, will more fittingly be made when an occasion has been given in the course of confession: for thus, on the one hand, every suspicion of curiosity and levity will be avoided, and on the other, the penitent will more easily respond, since his trust in the confessor has increased more.⁹ - 3) Let the penitent first be allowed to explain himself as much as he can, as is fitting; then let him be helped from time to time by questions.¹⁰ - 4) Toward the end, unless a better occasion has previously offered itself, let it be benignly asked of an unknown penitent whether there is anything which still troubles his conscience, whether he has omitted nothing in prior confessions. "Through these questions many souls are usually freed from sacrileges."¹¹

St. Alphonsus also notes:¹² "1) It is better if the confessor examines the sins one by one, as soon as the penitent exposes them, than that he defer the examination until the end; because either the confessor easily forgets those things which he heard, or the penitent would have to be obliged, with his grave burden, to repeat what had been confessed." 2) "Regularly speaking, it is not expedient that the confessor rebuke the penitent in the course of confession, lest he, being terrified, omit some sin; nevertheless, sometimes it is expedient within confession to set before him the malice of some graver sin, provided courage is immediately furnished to him," according to what was said at n. 1793, 2.

1807. Q. What ought the confessor to do with a penitent concerning whom he KNOWS or SUSPECTS some sin which that one does not confess?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. "If he knows outside confession, and knows from his own knowledge, for example by seeing him stealing, or hearing him blaspheming, without doubt he ought not absolve, if that one denies it: provided there is not present a prudent doubt whether he has confessed to another; or he has a just cause for keeping silent. Thus commonly."¹³

2. "But if the confessor has this from suspicion or from the report of others, the Doctors also commonly say that after diligent inquiry, if the penitent still denies, he must be absolved; for then the confessor is not able to refuse faith to the penitent, nor, on account of a suspicion or another's report, can he deprive him of the right which he has acquired to absolution by confession and by signs of contrition."¹⁴

3. Finally, if the confessor knows the sin from the confession of an accomplice, he certainly will not be able, without violation of the sacramental seal, to question the penitent in a special manner about that sin, unless he has obtained express permission for this (but this permission is not ordinarily to be sought); but only in a general manner, that is, in the manner in which he is accustomed to question other similar penitents. But whether he ought to absolve one denying is disputed. But St. Alphonsus, having brought forward the opinions of others, concludes in this manner: "In my judgment, Croix, etc., thinks better, that in that case he should in no way absolve, but only pray something, to hide the denial of absolution." Nor is the conclusion of the Blessed Doctor supported by a reason of little moment: for the confessor, by using the knowledge of confession in the aforesaid manner, by no means violates the sacramental seal; wherefore he is bound to do this for denying the Sacrament to the unworthy person secretly asking it, according to those things which we said above, nn. 1426 and 1430.¹⁵

1424. - Principle I. The practice of making no questions is not a little to be disapproved, especially for these reasons:

1° It is because that practice redounds to the harm of souls; for: a) it can produce not a few sacrileges, insofar as many are those who, unless they are questioned, do not reveal graver sins. "Frequently," says St. Thomas, "those things which the penitent would be silent about from confusion, when questioned he reveals"; - b) it leaves many without opportune remedies; for the confessor not questioning concerning habit, concerning occasions, concerning causes of sins, concerning diligence employed or not employed for amendment, etc. (which things penitents for the most part pass over in silence), will not be able to assign suitable remedies for preventing relapses; - c) it harms others also than penitents, insofar as penitents, for the most part, do not accuse themselves of scandal, or of most grave omissions in the duties of their own state, e.g. in the education and custody of children; and thus, unless they are questioned and suitably warned, they do not cease from the same scandals and omissions.

2° It is because it redounds to the prejudice of the Sacrament; for: a) very often it prejudices its integrity, as if the confessor does not question a penitent accusing himself in this way: Father, I have done shameful things, the species and number not having been explained; - b) it often prejudices validity also; for if the confessor does not question penitents, e.g. whether they have employed any care for not relapsing, whether they have fulfilled the remedies assigned, etc., he will never be able prudently to judge whether they are disposed, or whether they need a more fervent exhortation in order that they may be disposed, and thus he will often give absolutions that are altogether invalid.

3° It is because it is opposed to the concordant opinion of Theologians.

4° It is because it is opposed to the authentic rules of the Church, as is clear from the Canon Omnis and from the Roman Ritual.

Principle II. Since the confessor must procure three things, i.e. the validity of the Sacrament, the integrity of Confession, and the cure of the penitent: therefore, whenever he reasonably presumes or prudently doubts that something of those things which are required for these has not been sufficiently declared, he is held to inquire concerning it. - Hence:

1° For procuring the validity of the Sacrament, it can be necessary to investigate by questioning - whether sufficient matter is present, e.g. if there is question of imperfections, or of light faults which are often committed without advertence; - whether the penitent holds back anything from shame, as especially happens in boys and girls; - whether sufficient disposition is present, for knowing which it will often be necessary to question the penitent, e.g. whether and how after Confession he has abstained from faults; whether and how he has fulfilled the prescribed means.

2° For the integrity of Confession, it can be necessary to question the penitent - concerning the number of sins, - concerning their species; - concerning circumstances changing either the objective or the theological species (n. 27); - concerning some sins which he is accustomed from thoughtlessness altogether to pass over in silence, e.g. sins of thought, and sins of omission concerning obligations of one's own state.

3° For the cure of the penitent, questions can be necessary through which it becomes known, e.g., what are the causes of his sins, whether namely they proceed from some occasion; from some habit; from a defect of custody of the senses; from impure thoughts, etc.

4° The penitent must not be questioned concerning sins of which it is not likely that he committed them; for then a reasonable presumption and prudent doubt are lacking that those things which must be declared are not sufficiently declared. - But on account of the contrary presumption "he should be questioned concerning the sins which are accustomed to abound in men of such a condition."

5° If the penitent seems sufficiently instructed, as devout persons, Religious, Ecclesiastics, and is sufficiently accurate in explaining his sins, he is to be questioned concerning nothing, unless perhaps there is fear lest he hold back something from shame, or unless it is necessary to add some question for assigning opportune remedies to him. The reason for each part of the resolution is the same as that which was just alleged under 4°.

Principle III. Questioning, where it must be made, should be moderate, prudent, opportune.

1° Moderate. Hence the confessor:

a) Should never ask useless things, nor suffer them to be narrated to him.

b) Should be mindful that he is not held to question the penitent except with ordinary diligence.

c) Should remember besides that a less distinct knowledge is required "from him who either on account of incapacity, or on account of sickness, or on account of the multitude of sins, or for another cause, could render an exact knowledge with more difficulty.... And this is the reason why from a prostitute and a concubinary and the like we ask less exactly and distinctly the number of sins than if for one month or for one week only e.g. they had been in that sin." Besides "it must be adverted," says St. Alphonsus, "concerning the number of sins of which some are held by a depraved habit, since a certain number cannot be had, let the confessor take care to know the state of the penitent, namely the manner of living, the application which he spends on other affairs, the time of habit with the accomplice, the place where he especially stayed; and then let him question concerning the number, questioning the penitent how often approximately he sinned in a day, or in a week, or month, proposing to him several numbers, e.g. three or four times, eight or ten times, so that he may see to which number he rather adheres. And if the penitent adheres to the greater number, the best thing to do will be if he is again questioned concerning a greater number. But in this the confessor should advert not to form a certain judgment concerning the number; let him note the frequency in general, and make a judgment in a confused way, apprehending the sins as many as they are before God. Some Doctors say that concerning the internal sins of the habituated, such as sins of hatred, of depraved delights and desires, it suffices for the most part to question concerning the time through which the evil habit endured; but this altogether does not satisfy me, because it can be that someone is more intent on external business, or stays where fewer occasions of depraved thoughts occur to him; another will be more allured by another passion of soul; and therefore general questions must be employed concerning one's own application, concerning place, concerning inclination of soul, etc., so that he may form a judgment of greater or lesser frequency of internal acts."

d) Those confessors err who, from boys, half-witted persons, the hard of hearing, stammerers, men of confused mind (who now affirm, now deny to the same question), would wish to know how the matter precisely stands. Moreover in this manner, the more they question, the less they understand, and the more they confound both the penitents and themselves. Hence St. Alphonsus wrote: "After two or three questions, the confessor should not be anxious if the judgment which he makes seems to him to be too confused; for from involved and confused consciences it is morally impossible to hope for greater clarity."

2° Prudent. Concerning this quality of questions it will soon be treated more broadly, where there is question of questions concerning shameful things.

3° Opportune. The question, namely, must be made at the time and in the manner in which it is suitable. Hence:

a) Certain questions must be made before Confession, but few, lest the penitent be offended: e.g. from what time has he not confessed? was he absolved? has he fulfilled the penance? is he not anxious about his past life? Yet this last question must be made only when the penitent has not confessed for a long time, or when a general Confession is being instituted from a determinate time. - But questions concerning the condition of life, state, age, etc., if these are not made manifest from the Confession itself, will be made more suitably when an occasion is given in the course of the Confession: for thus on the one hand every suspicion of curiosity and levity will be avoided; but on the other hand the penitent will more easily respond, since his confidence in the confessor will have grown more.

b) "It is better" if "the confessor examines the sins one by one as soon as the penitent sets them forth, than that he defer the examination until the end; because either the confessor easily forgets those things which he heard, or the penitent would have to be obliged with his own grave burden to repeat the things confessed." Yet this warning of St. Alphonsus, according to the mind of the holy Doctor himself, does not hold where there is question of easier or shorter Confessions, nor in the case in which the penitent accurately declares his sins. For apart from necessity the accusation of the penitent is not to be interrupted by any questions, or even warnings, lest namely fear or confusion be injected into him thence.

c) Those confessors would be vehemently disapproved who would scarcely concede to penitents time for responding to questions, and would urge them with an impatient voice, repeating: What further? Do you know other things? etc. For they would disturb and confound the penitent.

1425. - Principle IV. Questions concerning carnal sins must be: 1) necessary; 2) prudent; 3) modest; 4) such as do not bring grave harm to the confessor himself. I explain each.

1) Necessary, i.e. they must be made from a just cause; for without a just cause it is illicit to expose - oneself to temptations, - the penitent to the same temptations, and besides to the suspicion that the confessor delights in such conversations, or even that he is practically versed in things of this kind, - the Sacrament, Religion, and the priestly body to reproach, insofar as to the penitent an occasion is easily given afterward of laughing and joking concerning inept questions made to him.

But questions are necessary, or are made from a just cause, if they are required either for aiding the shame of the penitent, or for knowing what remedies are to be assigned to him, or for procuring the integrity, even material, of Confession.

1° For aiding the shame of the penitent. This can more easily be present in boys and adolescents. Therefore St. Alphonsus wisely warns: "Many times, even if boys deny" that they have committed shameful things, "it is profitable to use suggestive questions with them, e.g. and now tell me, how often have you done these things? Five times? ten times?" - Yet those confessors exceed who in every Confession make and repeat questions for aiding the shame of the penitent, even with those concerning whom it is not likely that they commit shameful things and hold them back. Indeed, although this suspicion is present, one must beware of questions too often repeated and multiplied. - But much more and in a very worse manner do those confessors exceed who, under the pretext of aiding the shame of penitents, make many particular and minute questions, even when one or another, expressed in generic words, would suffice.

2° For knowing what remedies are to be applied. For this it ordinarily suffices to inquire whether sins arise from some occasion, or from an evil habit, or from freedom of the senses, or from depraved thoughts. - I have said: ordinarily suffices; because if the penitent could employ fasts and other macerations (which indeed is a rarer case), it would be useful also to know whether his sins arise chiefly from carnal motions, and whether these arise from a more robust constitution of body. But it is not necessary to question directly concerning these motions; for if the penitent is asked whether he always rushes into sins on account of evil thoughts, from his response the confessor will be able to infer whether the cause of his sins is to be placed in thoughts of the mind rather than in motions of the body.

3° For procuring the integrity, even material, of Confession. For this not only do questions suffice which are necessary for knowing the species, and, insofar as it can be morally known, the number of mortal sins, but questions concerning other things besides species and number are altogether to be disapproved. Hence confessors exceed when they question: whether a) concerning circumstances only aggravating; - or b) concerning imperfect acts preliminary to copula or done immediately after copula, when the penitent already accuses himself of copula (n. 218. 4°; 222); - or c) concerning the manner in which the sin was committed, if that manner does not change the species; - or d) concerning the number of imperfect acts which were done in the same impulse of passion (n. 220. Note).

I said: the species and... number of mortal sins; for it is not necessary to question concerning simple temptations, concerning carnal motions, concerning involuntary pollutions, concerning light disorders in the use of Matrimony, unless from another head a good reason urges for questioning concerning some of these. Hence, if someone moved by a vain scruple comes to Confession saying that he committed shameful things in childhood without cognition of malice, and now wishes to accuse them because he never confessed them, the confessor will teach him that no obligation is present of accusing such things; yet if the penitent desires to disclose them for greater tranquillity, this can be permitted to him; but it will not be necessary to add questions.

Note. - In questioning penitents concerning the species of sins, the distinctions of Theologians are to be followed as a norm, provided the penitents are not such that concerning them (either on account of childish age, or on account of extraordinary ignorance or stupidity) it cannot be presumed that they have formally contracted those special malices. Cf. n. 199. Resolves 2°.

2) Prudent. For Theologians cry out with one voice that it should rather be permitted that material integrity be lacking to Confession than that scandal be furnished to penitents through imprudent questions. - But an imprudent question is one which contains the danger lest it produce evil rather than good; and especially lest penitents learn the malice which perhaps they are ignorant of, and thus on account of that very question begin to sin. Cf. Lit. Rom.

3) Modest. But questions will not be modest if the confessor uses words too free, shameless, and least fitting to priestly modesty.

But what expressions will the confessor be able to use in particular cases, so that with due prudence and modesty he may question penitents?

Behold some particular examples of questions for some cases often occurring in practice.

A girl says: I made indecent jokes with my sister in bed; - the Confessor should ask: were these touches very shameful?

A married woman says: I had copula in a preposterous manner. - The Confessor will ask: in this manner can you conceive offspring?

A husband says: I touch my wife with my hands; - the Confessor will ask: do you linger in these touches, without coming to the conjugal act? On account of these touches did an evil effect happen?

An adolescent says: I did shameful things with my brother in bed; - that the confessor may understand whether sodomy was present, he will ask: therefore did you touch your brother with your hands? To the one responding affirmatively he will add: did you do something worse with him?

A man says: I sinned with a woman, or I slept with a woman, or I did what I wished with a woman; - these things are to be understood of perfect copula, and therefore no question is to be made, except for knowing whether that woman was married, consanguineous, etc.

A married man says: I did shameful things with a girl; - the Confessor will question him, saying: did you make the matrimonial act with her?

A girl says: I did shameful things with a lover; - the Confessor will add: did you do these things with the hands, or also in a worse manner? - Thus he will understand whether there was, or was not, union of bodies, in which there is present the malice of fornication. Yet if the confessor sees the necessity of knowing whether this fornication was effectively completed, he will also be able to say: by that which you did, could you become pregnant? To the one responding affirmatively he can further question, saying whether she actually remained pregnant, that he may forearm her against temptations to abortion, and that he may strive to impede scandal in the best possible way.

A man says: I have a vice of touching women; - the Confessor will be able to add: are these touches very shameful?

A married woman says: I did not well perform the matrimonial act; - the Confessor will be able to say: in the manner in which you bear yourself with your husband, can you conceive offspring? If she affirms, then he will teach her that in that manner there is a light fault, or even none, if the husband wishes to do this; but if she denies, then the confessor will add: explain therefore what you did.

A girl or boy says: I touched myself. - Should it then be inquired whether pollution was present? Certainly not at all. "Let him take care," says St. Alphonsus, "not to inquire of girls or boys whether emission of semen was present," lest namely "they apprehend what they had not yet known, or be placed in curiosity of learning." The same caution is to be had generally with respect to unmarried women, even adult ones; whence P. a Bergamo wrote: "Nevertheless nothing is to be hinted concerning pollution; since this is not equally sensible to all women; indeed to many it is altogether unknown;... whence one must abstain from these words: pollution, corruption, and the like.... Worthy of being known is that the vice of pollution is not so common generally among women as among males, and very many women are in no way infected with this lust. Therefore one must speak more cautiously with women, lest they draw malice from our expressions."

Here finally it can be asked what questions are to be made to girls or young persons who accuse nothing at all concerning faults against the Sixth Precept, if the confessor fears lest they hold something back from shame? He can say: have you heard evil conversations? have you had evil thoughts? Have you done some indecent thing? Have you made evil jokes? These questions can induce no danger, because, if the penitent does not know the malice, he will not learn it; nor will he be placed in curiosity of learning what these words of the confessor signify, because he will understand that there is question of indecent things and jokes in another kind. Meanwhile, if they respond negatively, sometimes the confessor will be able to use a suggestive question, saying, as was noted above from St. Alphonsus: And now say, how often have you done these things? If they affirm that they have committed indecent things, or have made evil jokes, then the confessor will be able to say, e.g.: explain what these indecent things and these evil jokes are which you did? Did you do them secretly? Were you alone? Where were you? Would you have done thus, if your mother had been there? If your mother had seen you, would you have been suffused with shame? And on account of shame you have never accused these sins; is it not so? Ordinarily from the responses the confessor will know either certainly or almost certainly whether that boy truly did shameful things, and thence, according to the rules given above, he will be able to come to other questions, if they seem necessary. - Some confessors instead of saying: have you done some indecent thing? say: have you committed some dishonesty? or: have you committed something against the virtue of holy purity? I judge that these questions made thus abruptly are not sufficiently prudent; because, if the girl does not know the malice, she will not be able to attach any sense to these questions, and therefore she will easily be in curiosity of learning what those words mean; whence also she will easily seek an explanation from other girls, and thus she will badly learn what she was well ignorant of. - Other confessors behave much worse, and to nearly all boys, girls, and adolescents they say abruptly: have you touched yourself? But they do this because from experience they know that other questions, made in general and under a certain veil, are not effective, as this one is, for extorting the confession of sin. I indeed confess that this open question is more effective, so that, if other questions extort confession from seven or eight boys, this one will extort confession from nine or ten; but I judge altogether that it is not ordinarily to be employed; for if it were ordinarily employed, it would teach malice to very many; but is it fitting, in order to aid some, to inflict harm of this kind on very many others? - At most, therefore, such a question will be able to be made in some rare case, when namely the confessor is certain of the sin committed by the penitent, the confession of which he could not obtain unless by employing the aforesaid question.

4) That they bring no grave harm to the confessor himself. For if the confessor on account of some special questions would be cast into grave danger of sinning mortally, certainly he neither ought, nor would be able, to make them. That he ought not is clear; because, just as a penitent is not held to the material integrity of Confession with his own grave spiritual harm, much less will the confessor be held to procure the same integrity with grave harm to his own soul. Besides, all know that charity begins from oneself. But that then he cannot make those questions is clear from the general obligation itself of avoiding grave dangers of sinning mortally, when it is possible to avoid them. Besides, if there were question only of some temptation or of some carnal motion, through these things the confessor would not be obliged to abstain from necessary, prudent, and modest questions; but rather he should fortify himself with prayer, and, before he begins to hear Confessions, renew his right intention. Thus almost concerning questions Berardi.

1426. Questions. - Query 1° What must the confessor do in doubt concerning the sincerity of the penitent?

Resp. There is a common rule, and as it were a received axiom: The penitent is to be believed, both when speaking for himself and against himself. The reason is that the penitent in the Sacred Tribunal is at once defendant and witness, his own accuser and advocate, and otherwise in doubt is always to be presumed truthful. Wherefore, after opportune questions, the confessor must absolve the penitent denying.

Query 2° What must the confessor do if he knows certainly that some sin is being sacrilegiously held back or denied by the penitent?

Resp. 1° If he knows it from the Confession of another, and has not obtained from this one license to speak with the accomplice concerning the sin declared (which license is not ordinarily to be sought), he must, lest the seal of Confession be violated, only question generally, as he otherwise would have done or ought to have done; but if the penitent questioned has denied it, let him answer nothing, but, where this can be done without suspicion, let him merely exhort generally that the conscience be opened with all confidence. But whether the confessor must absolve such a penitent is controverted. - St. Alphonsus, after reporting the opinions of others, concludes thus: "Better, in my judgment, Croix thinks,... that in that case he should in no way absolve, but only pray something to conceal the denial of absolution." And rightly indeed. For whenever, as in the case, injury to the seal can be avoided, the Sacrament cannot be ministered to one unworthy who asks it occultly.

Resp. 2° If he knows it outside Confession, of itself he must absolve the penitent denying, because the penitent speaking for himself and against himself is to be believed; nor of itself can the report of another make greater faith than the declaration of the penitent himself; nor therefore is the confessor held to believe others more than the penitent himself. For if the penitent committed that sin, the confessor must presume that he either has forgotten his sin, or has confessed it to another, or has a just cause for holding it back, or that the reporters rather were deceived.

I said: of itself; for, if the confessor is altogether certain concerning the sin committed by the penitent, because e.g. he himself saw him stealing, heard him blaspheming, etc., or knows it from the certain report of others, he cannot absolve the one denying, provided he is certain that he had not forgotten his sin, nor has any motive for holding it back; for this rule: The penitent is to be believed, etc., holds indeed in a less certain matter, but not in an evidently certain matter.

In practice let confessors take care not easily to give faith especially to women, although pious, by whom they are informed concerning the sins and the manner of life of those who are going to approach them; for very often some things are exaggerated, and not rarely reports of this kind bend the judgment of the confessor concerning the disposition of those approaching him to the worse side than is fitting.

1427. Principles. - I. Absolution must be granted from justice and under grave obligation to every penitent rightly confessed and disposed. The reason is that in the very act of Confession there is entered into a certain quasi-contract, by force of which the penitent rightly confessed and disposed has the right to receive the Sacrament. But otherwise an intolerable burden would be imposed on the penitent without just cause, namely that he institute Confession before another, without besides being able certainly to trust that he is going to receive absolution from that new confessor. Moreover this is also required by the end of the institution of the Sacrament and of the tribunal of Penance, which was instituted by Christ for the sake of imparting mercy. Therefore the priest, denying absolution to a penitent disposed, would act unjustly, would abuse the power of the keys, and would render the Sacrament odious.

II. Nevertheless absolution can be delayed for a brief time, even for a penitent sufficiently disposed, and even without his consent, when namely the confessor judges that this is useful for his amendment. The reason is that the delay of absolution is not the denial of the same; and, although a disposed penitent has a right to absolution, nevertheless he does not have a right, at least speaking of itself, to obtaining it immediately. For the confessor is not only judge, but also physician; and therefore, if he judges such a remedy to be going to profit the amendment of the penitent, he will be able to use it prudently; indeed he will be held to use it, when he judges that a remedy of this kind is necessarily useful for the salvation of the penitent. - Thus expressly St. Alphonsus, from whom that Theologians, even older ones before the Sixteenth Century, do not dissent, the Vindiciae clearly prove.

I said: at least speaking of itself; because if the delay of absolution 1° is judged more likely to harm than to profit, or 2° cannot be done without a sufficiently notable inconvenience of the penitent, it must be granted immediately: for the penitent is then considered to have a strict right to obtaining it immediately.

III. Absolution is altogether to be denied in every case, even of extreme necessity, to penitents certainly indisposed. But to penitents doubtfully disposed, absolution is to be delayed, or, according to the rules handed down n. 1344. q. 8°. pag. 93. col. 2., can be imparted under condition, or even sometimes must be.

IV. In order that the delay of absolution may be the more profitable, the penitent is gently to be drawn to consent to it.

1428. Questions. - Query 1° Is it often expedient to delay absolution for a sufficiently disposed penitent, without his consent?

Resp. Outside the two cases alleged n. 1427. II., "it is better to say," says St. Alphonsus, "that a certain rule cannot be established in this; but the confessor must direct himself from the occurring circumstances, and, after he has commended himself to God, as he shall have been inspired by God, let him delay or impart absolution." Then he distinguishes a twofold kind of recidivists, and for each brings forward its proper resolution, as will be explained n. 1480.

Query 2° Is certitude concerning the disposition of the penitent required, so that he can be absolved?

Resp. 1° Absolute certitude is not required, nor even strict moral certitude, such as is required in other Sacraments, e.g. concerning wine for the consecration of the Eucharist. The reason is that the Sacrament of Penance scarcely admits a more certain judgment of this kind.

Resp. 2° Prudent probability is required and suffices, to which no prudent suspicion of indisposition is opposed. For evidence is not possible.

Query 3° What are the ordinary signs of sufficient disposition?

Resp. A rightly made Confession with a protestation of penance and purpose.

Query 4° Is the confessor held to excite sorrow in the penitent?

Resp. 1° Affirm., if the penitent does not seem sufficiently disposed; the reason is that one absolving an indisposed person exposes the Sacrament to the danger of frustration; "but if he dismisses him without absolution, he exposes him to the danger of remaining long in the state of mortal sin, or even of not returning any more." - Nor is he excused from this because he must spend much time on it, or because others are waiting, provided nevertheless that there is hope that he is to be disposed here and now.

Resp. 2° Neg., if the penitent seems sufficiently instructed and disposed, as are mature penitents, and those who confess frequently. For then the confessor is held to nothing, neither by reason of charity, since the penitent does not need special help, nor by reason of reverence of the Sacrament, which is exposed to no danger.

Query 5° Can, indeed must, a penitent be absolved who wishes to follow an opinion opposed to the sentence of the confessor?

Resp. Affirm., provided 1° the opinion of the penitent is somewhat probable, at least extrinsically; for the confessor is not a judge of opinions; 2° the penitent is not so unlearned that he is unable to form for himself a right conscience from probability, at least extrinsic, e.g. from the response of another learned and prudent man, with whom, against the opinion of the confessor, he wishes to stand: for he would act against conscience; 3° there is not question of a judgment which directly regards the administration of the Sacrament, e.g. the disposition of the penitent or the jurisdiction of the confessor, because then there is question not only of permitting the penitent his own opinion, but of following it in one's own operation: I add, from the mind of St. Alphonsus, 4° the opinion of the penitent must be not only speculatively but also practically probable, or not joined with a certainly probable danger of formal sin, as was said n. 87. Reg. 1. 2°: for then there is question of judgment concerning the disposition of the penitent.

608. Principle I. The confessor, as judge, from office is sometimes bound to question the penitent with moral diligence, and indeed of itself under grave obligation, as often as he probably judges that he, whether culpably or inculpably, perhaps omits certain things necessary to be known for knowledge of the case or for absolution.

It is said: 1) sometimes, for if from the confession itself or from the condition of the person of the penitent he judges that he knows the sins completely and the dispositions of soul sufficiently, the confessor is not bound to question, as this would be idle in the case. This also holds concerning uneducated persons who seem sufficiently instructed and diligently accuse their sins;

2. with moral diligence, because the confessor is bound to question only to supply the defect of the penitent, who himself is not bound to greater diligence; and besides, excessive diligence would render the sacrament burdensome and hateful;

3. of itself, under grave obligation: for it concerns a grave matter, since it regards the salvation of the penitent and the reverence of the sacrament; although nevertheless there can be negligence culpable only lightly, as if in a long series of sins one or another question is omitted.

It is proved: a) From the authority of the Church, namely from Lateran Council IV, in the decree concerning annual confession: "But let the priest be discreet and prudent... diligently inquiring both the circumstances of the sinner and of the sin"; and from the Roman Ritual, t. 3, c. 1, n. 16: "if the penitent has not expressed the number, species, and circumstances of sins necessary to be explained, let the priest prudently question him."

b) By reason: The confessor, as judge, cannot pronounce sentence unless he knows the case, namely both the sins which the penitent has committed, as to number, species, and circumstances, and his dispositions, and often also the occasions and causes of sins, which he must be disposed to leave or combat. But for this it is not always sufficient that he hear the penitent, but often it is required that he question him. Therefore he is bound to question as often as he knows or reasonably doubts or presumes that the penitent does not sufficiently manifest these things.

609. Concerning what things one must question. - Therefore he is bound to question concerning three things, namely those things, and insofar as they are necessary, for procuring 1) the validity of the sacrament, 2) the integrity of confession, or 3) the correction or amendment of the penitent.

1. For procuring the validity of the sacrament, e.g., for knowing whether there is sufficient matter of confession, whether the penitent is concealing something out of shame, as often happens in boys and girls, whether the penitent is sufficiently disposed.

2. For the integrity of confession, e.g., concerning the number of sins, species, circumstances changing the species; or concerning sins of which penitents are not accustomed to accuse themselves, as concerning internal sins, the omission of the duties of state, etc.

3. For the correction of the penitent, e.g., concerning the cause and occasion of sins, frequency, gravity, malice, etc.

Yet not all are to be questioned, but only those concerning whom, whether from the manner of confessing, or from the common state or condition of the person, there is for the confessor a special reason for conjecturing that one of the aforesaid defects is present.1

610. Principle II. The confessor, after the case has been inspected from sufficient accusation or, if necessary, from supplementary questioning, as judge, from office is bound to form for himself a prudent judgment about it, namely concerning the sins committed and concerning the dispositions of the penitent.

It is proved: 1) The confessor is bound to form a judgment concerning sins, which is necessary for knowing what satisfactions or remedies are to be imposed and whether the dispositions of the penitent are sufficient. Hence he must form a judgment concerning the morality of sins, i.e., concerning their species and gravity, both objective and subjective, insofar as this is possible.

And indeed: a) Concerning objective morality, it is at least required that, endowed with habitual knowledge of the principles by which the gravity and diverse species of sins can be distinguished, he hear the penitent, and in hearing judge according to the common principles stated.

b) Concerning subjective morality, he can presume it to be the same as the objective, unless there is a special reason for judging otherwise, or for doubting; in which case he must question the penitent.

c) Let him judge concerning all things as much as he can by ordinary diligence, for it is not always possible to say concerning individual delicts whether they are of such species and gravity, mortal or venial, which not even great theologians can do; because often the matter is difficult in itself, nor can the penitent himself always say whether he fully consented.

d) But if the confessor lacked the aforesaid knowledge or from ignorance judged falsely concerning sins, the confession would not on that account be invalid.

e) But if, because of distraction or noise or singing, he did not hear certain sins, he must question if it is probable that in these perhaps grave matter is present.

f) Yet he is not bound distinctly to remember all sins at the moment of absolution, but it suffices that he remember the state of the penitent confusedly.

2. The confessor is also bound to form a judgment concerning the sufficient disposition of the penitent, which is necessary for knowing what sentence he ought to pronounce, namely whether to grant or deny absolution.

The disposition of the penitent can be recognized by conjectural signs, concerning which it will be said in n. 617.

But what must be done by a confessor who doubts concerning the sincerity of the penitent or knows or presumes that he is concealing a sin? He must attend to the principle: "The penitent is to be believed when speaking both for himself and against himself," unless it certainly appears that he is lying. For the penitent is the accused and the witness, whose testimony of itself has force only in this tribunal and is better than any other, since he himself knows better than anyone else whether he has sinned or not, whether the sin committed has already been declared or not.

Hence: a) If there is doubt concerning the sincerity of the penitent, the confessor is bound to question diligently, and he can exhort him to perfect sincerity; but if the penitent perseveres in his declaration, he is to be believed and absolved.

b) If the confessor knows with certainty, and indeed from his own experience, that the penitent is concealing a grave sin committed, he must convince the penitent; and if he continues to deny, he must be dismissed without absolution, unless it can be thought that he is in good faith and is ignorant of the gravity of the fault, or that he has already confessed it, or that he has a just reason for concealing it.

c) If the confessor knows from the testimony of others, he is bound to question the penitent specially concerning the sin, but if he continues to deny, he is to be absolved; unless, however, the testimony of others were altogether of greater authority, so that it would make certitude, not merely broadly so called, but true and perfect certitude.

d) If the confessor knows from the confession of another, e.g., of an accomplice, wife, betrothed woman, etc., he cannot question the penitent except generally, as he is accustomed to question, and not specially unless he would also question persons of the same condition in that way; nor is it expedient to ask from the accomplice permission to use the knowledge acquired, because in this case it would render confession hateful. But if the penitent perseveres in silence, he can absolve him as if he had not heard the confession of the other; because he is not bound to use knowledge acquired in confession and, on the other hand, he cannot prevent the sacrilege; - indeed he seems to be bound to absolve, at least conditionally, because otherwise he would break the seal, since he would use the knowledge of confession rather openly for the governance of another. Yet St. Alphonsus asserts that absolution is to be denied, but that one must pray somewhat and that the denial of absolution is to be dissimulated: on the one hand, he says, the priest does not break the seal because he manifests nothing and causes a burden to neither; on the other hand, he consults the reverence of the sacrament, by impeding its frustration.